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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine problems related to the liability of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) for their subsidiaries' torts. The reason for the existence of the 
problems is that the legal theories and practice fail to understand interdisciplinary 
features of MNEs. Thus, there have been no satisfactory solutions to the problem of tort 
liability of MNEs. 
In order to understand the questions of liability, there should be an examination of 
the concept of multinational enterprise using interdisciplinary methodology. Thus, the 
thesis, in the first section, examines the social, economic, managerial and legal 
characteristics of MNEs and compares the findings of this examination to the current 
understanding of MNEs in the way that tort liability is applied to them. As a result, there 
is a conflict between legal understanding of the structure of MNEs and contemporary 
realities; while legal practice considers MNEs as simple vertically structured 
organisations; an interdisciplinary examination reveals more complex horizontal 
structures with different characteristics. This conflict creates problems of liability and 
also prevents satisfactory solutions to problems of tort liability in the context of MNEs. 
In the second section, the thesis examines the existing laws related to liability of 
MNEs from different jurisdictions. The aim of this examination is to assess whether 
these laws are adequate for the challenges modern MNEs create. The thesis seeks in 
each sub-section to understand how groups of companies are conceived by these laws 
and how liability rules would be different if modern understandings of MNEs are 
applied in these cases. 
In the final section, the thesis aims to identify the basic problems of achieving 
satisfactory tort liability for MNEs and it offers solutions to the problems of liability for 
MNEs subsidiaries' tort based on the findings in the first and the second parts of the 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER I: I~TRODUCTIO:\ 
The thesis aims to examine the liability of multinational enterprises (\1:\Es) for their 
subsidiaries' torts. Although the discussion of liability has increased in recent decades. 
the laws that apply to MNEs liability cases are not de\°eloped enough to offer a 
satisfactory solution to MNEs' tort problems. The reason for the failure to find a solution 
to the tort liability problems can be found in the lack of understanding of the concept of 
MNEs in interdisciplinary studies. Accordingly, the statement of the thesis is that there 
is a conflict between the understandings of basic features of MNEs in legal studies and 
the realities of the modem concept of MNEs. Thus, the thesis aims to provide 
interdisciplinary examination of MNEs and test the existing liability rules to see whether 
they are adequate to solve the problems and as a result it aims to offer solutions to the 
liability problems in the context of MNEs. 
The recent movement in world trade is opening up domestic markets for investors 
from other countries. States are liberalising their markets by offering generous and 
specific investment incentives designed to attract investors since international economic 
theory claims that overseas investment is good for MNEs for a number of profit-creating 
benefits while it is good for host countries since the capital and technology brought by 
MNEs is crucial for the economic development of countries and regions. Accordingly. 
there has been a progression to a more international economic world order. creating the 
concept of globalisation. 
Economic globalisation- the linked process of trade and investment liberalisation, 
privatisation and deregulation- developed on the idea of open markets has brought huge 
increases in movements of capital. goods and services. Multinational enterpris~s are the 
vehicles for much of this globalised economic activity. and in tum. foreign direct 
investment by MNEs accounts for an increasing proportion of global economic actiyity. 
At a global level. the world economy was in constant growth in th~ 19th and 20th 
centuries. There were a number of factors and actors for this growth proc~ss. One of the 
mam factors for international economic growth was the efficiency of considering 
companies as centres for capital creation. This practical utilization of companies was one 
of the import~t factors for the emergence and survival of economic capitalism. 
In the early stages, the clever use of companies as a capital creating tool was very 
efficient at the domestic level. Companies at a domestic level transform themselves first 
into corporate groups with help of rules allowing a trouble-free approach to the 
emergence of corporate groups. Corporate groups accumulated huge domestic savings 
with the ability to use it wherever possible and whenever profitable. Thus, once the 
groups are big enough, they consider investing in foreign markets. While doing this they 
use every power they have accumulated in order to create more beneficial business 
environments for themselves. The key factor in determination of the relative efficiency 
of foreign incorporation derives from many internal and external factors. The most 
important reason for foreign direct investment (FDn is the ever-growing market pressure 
to increase their profits. 
Since the frrst emergence of companies with modem company laws in the middle 
of the 19th century, there has been constant transformation of MNEs' investment 
strategies and organisational structure. An interesting point in this process was that 
neither political, nor legal developments have been able to match this dynamic self-
transformation in corporate groups' structure. Accordingly, MNEs have acquired unique 
legal and political status in the world. 
Presently, despite the arguments, it is true that MNEs are one of the biggest actors 
in both developing and developed economies. In some situations, MNEs can even be in 
conflict with states, the most advanced social institution created by mankind. This 
modem image of the corporations has been developed since the time companies first 
emerged. Hobbes, who found the rise of corporations threatening to the state's authority, 
noted "the great number of corporations; which are as it were many lesser 
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commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a man".) The 
difference between that time and today is the greater intemationalisation of corporate 
activities and thus the emergence of bigger and more powerful corporate groups. 
Accordingly, MNEs are a phenomenon of contemporary societies that have a great 
magnitude and raise some specific economic, fmancial, and legal, social and human 
rights problems. Their transnational character, their economic and legal versatility, their 
enormous economic and fmancial power and their great political and social influence are 
important obstacles to any attempt to exert on them legal and social contro1.2 
The power of MNEs is not completely self-built since international policy making 
works to the benefit of MNEs in many senses; international organisations are helping 
companies to operate on a large scale; the devotion to open market econOImes m 
international economic policy-making is expanding territories with open market 
economies in the world. Thus, the current domestic and international policies of 
developed economies depend on supporting more corporate activities through any means 
at domestic or international levels. The fierce support of privatisations and market 
liberalisation by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are important 
in the expansion process of MNEs activities. Moreover, the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), with ever-growing members, is changing the dimensions of international 
dispute settlement in trade matters, which gives MNEs more power to circumvent 
national court systems. Furthermore, there has been an enormous increase in bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) in the last two decades between developed countries and 
developing countries. The BITs grant power to MNEs to challenge host states according 
to dispute settlement provisions that mostly require international arbitration. Moreover, 
MNEs have been given permission to use international dispute settlement tribunals such 
as the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSIO). 
I Hobbes T, Leviathan (1651) cited in Hill Jennifer, 'Changes in the Role of the Shareholder' in Grantham 
Ross and Rickett Charlie (eds.), Corporate Personality in the 10th Century (Hart, Oxford 1998) 
:! UN, Economic and Social Council "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (8 March, 2004) 
FlCN.4/2004INGO/122 
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Regional and international trade agreements are designed to reduce the level of 
conflict related to MNEs' activities to a minimum. In many cases, human rights, 
environment and even public health are considered as obstacles to international trade 
since any conflicts under these concerns are considered a deterrent to MNEs. Thus, this 
immense power of MNEs, the aid of some of the major world powers and the complicity 
of many governments, have made it possible for them to intertwine a basic network of 
norms that are contrary to national and international public law in force, in the shape of 
BITs for the protection of foreign investments and regional agreements such as North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A). 3 
The complex appearance of MNEs in the world economy provoked a good deal of 
criticism. MNEs are accused of causing serious harm to the people of the world and 
exploiting national economies and societies and even undermining democracy. In 
reaction to these problems, many people and countries demanded abandonment of 
MNEs' activities in their territories. However, on the other hand, most of the less 
developed countries try to attract those companies to invest in their countries because 
MNEs are considered a basic source of technology, employment, and capital and thus as 
main actors in economic development for their countries. This creates a dilemma, on the 
one hand, countries want to attract more FDIs by giving economic and legal incentives 
but on the other hand, they have to protect their citizens against any breach of law and 
torts committed by MNEs. 
It is not easy to attract MNEs to any territory; successful FDI attraction needs a 
very favourable scheme of economic and legal incentives. Sometimes, exemption from 
liability for the breach of some basic human rights could be possible. In many countries, 
governments bend or remove their own labour and environmental legislation to allow 
MNEs a freer hand, or turn a blind eye to violations. States, such as Sri Lanka, have 
created export processing zones (EPZ), within which the state allows a separate system 
of law or waivers of national law. At worst, MNEs and governments actively collude to 
3 UN Economic and Social Council. 'Adverse Effects Of The Dlicit Movement And Dumping Of Toxic 
And 'Dangerous Products And Wastes On The Enjoyment Of Human Rights' (ElCN.4/200llSS, 19 
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operate profitable national sources; MNEs ignore abuses made by states in order to 
create better operating conditions, or even worse they demand any protest or civil 
activity be stopped at any cost. In many cases, MNEs prefer less-developed countries as 
a primary place of investments to escape strict safety, labour and environmental 
regulations in developed countries. For example, San Diego based Sempra Energy 
decided to build its new natural gas-fired power plant just over the border in Mexico in 
order to avoid stringent air quality regulations in southern California and escape from 
completing detailed environmental impact statements. 4 As a result, MNEs have acquired 
strong economic power and they are one of the centres of policy making in the world. 
The effects of :MNEs are felt at every level of society from the bottom to the top, which 
makes examination of :MNEs as international economic, social and legal institution a 
necessity. 
In a legal examination one will see that, while all these developments are taking 
place in the world, the general principles of company law have not changed since its first 
emergence. Companies were considered basic institutional forms to convince people to 
invest and to create a cumulative capital to make the necessary investment required for 
large-scale economic activities. For this reason, shareholders were granted immunity of 
liability to convince them to invest their capital. This immunity later was also given to 
corporate shareholders, which altered the area of corporate law fundamentally and 
irrevocably. 
Thus, the broad ranges of economic incentives given by countries are actually just 
the surface part of a huge iceberg. The real incentives lie under the structure of law of 
developed countries, which are copied by many developing and less developed countries 
since MNEs and governments in developed countries as well as international financial 
organisations first demand a modem company law in a country eager to attract FDI. It is 
interesting for example in even such small and politically conflicted countries or 
territories, such as Kosovo, there is a push to legislate modern company laws, even 
January 2001) 
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though these communities have virtually no international trade yet. Moreover, big 
economic powers, such as China and Russia, had to change their company laws to 
western style company laws to attract more investments in their territory. There is also 
ongoing effort in Turkey to change company law, which is already western, to make it 
more modem and up-to-date. 
In contrast to slow developments In the legal area, in the area of MNE in 
economics and management, there have been huge dynamics inside MNEs to change 
their own structures. While economic activity in the 19th century was growing at 
domestic and international levels there was a need for better-organised institutions. This 
gap was filled by allowing corporations to have shares in other corporations. The result 
was emergence of corporate groups in domestic business while multinational enterprises 
took their place in the international business world. Accordingly, the organisation grew 
gradually while changing its structure over time to adopt better and more competitive 
business environments. In some organisations, it went beyond borders, creating its own 
studies in economic and managerial fields; there have been many attempts to understand 
basic operative and managerial structures of the MNEs. 
This complex structure gives grounds for more sophisticated problems in the area 
of MNEs, which is still mostly regulated by the rigid principles of company law settled 
in the 19th century. Thus, there is always a claim that MNEs are primarily governed by 
the national legislation of the countries in which they operate. However national 
legislations in developing countries are weak or they do not have the political will or 
technical lalOw-how to enforce liability. Moreover, increasingly, corporations' 
headquarters are located in one country, where they are registered, with sourcing or 
production networks linking them to subsidiaries in another country or countries, while 
they have share listing on several stock exchanges. They can move money around and 
within the enterprise, relocate their headquarters and subsidiaries in response to 
changing legal and social environments, and play one government off against another to 
4 Ross JP, 'Sempra: Exporting Pollution, U.S.-Mexico Border Region to Pay the Price for California's 
Power' http;/Iwww.corowatch.orglartic1e.php?id=2S88 accessed 20 June 2006 
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obtain more favourable tax and regulatory treatment. Under these conditions, being 
regulated by host states does not increase level of liability of MNEs but gives them 
power to manipulate the countries' fragile legal systems. 
The complicated structure of the international economy puts MNEs in positions of 
extraordinary power and equally extraordinary lack of accountability to anyone or 
anything except their shareholders. Accordingly, the directors can always legitimate 
their decisions by claiming they have a duty to produce the best for the shareholders. 
Under these conditions, the only aim would be to maximise profit whatever it costs to 
outsiders of the company. 
While 'aiming at profit maximisations, MNEs are not reluctant to use any possible 
incentives offered to them or any gap in the law. Current structures of company law 
offer many gaps in this sense; the businesses might use shell companies in order to 
escape from liability. Moreover, at the international level, the cOIporation might divide 
up its assets to many locally operating subsidiaries while escaping overall group 
liability. Not surprisingly, these problems of company laws ability to regulate MNEs are 
not unknown at governmental and international organisations levels. S 
One particular problem MNEs create is of the utmost importance and thus will be 
examined in this thesis. With developments in the global economy and MNEs 
transformation, other global common characteristics of the international economy have 
emerged, the globalisation of cOIporate victims. In recent decades the world witnessed 
the global phenomenon of cOIporate torts. MNEs have been involved in mass tort 
actions in various parts of the world and mostly escaped justice easily. With the 
campaigns of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) , the dark side of the global 
economic order has been revealed. It has become usual to witness a new example of 
cOIporate torts on a daily basis. These torts were more severe and common in less-
developed countries. But, it is not surprising to see the same level of corporate tort in 
developed countries. Some incidents have attracted worldwide publicity while many 
S UN, Economic and Social Council, (FJCN.4/2001ISS) (n 3) 
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others were simply forgotten thanks to the difficulty in bringing a tort action against 
MNEs. 
The cases for corporate torts vary from country to country according to their 
economic and social characteristics; in less developed countries there is usually 
collusion between the state and MNEs. In severe cases, MNEs are ignoring safety and 
environmental regulations causing many injuries and deaths. In developed countries, 
since the law is more developed, MNEs use the legal incentives given by company law 
statutes by dividing their entity into many sub-units to escape possible lawsuits. 
Yet, despite this surge in interest in corporate tort responsibilities, there remain 
certain important countervailing factors. The most important among these is the 
disagreement between the objects and practice of globalisation of tort victims, and that 
of economic globalisation on the other. Certainly, international trade law essentially 
grants numerous rights to MNEs and very few enforceable duties, and few of any 
apparent significance in respect to tort victims. 
What is interesting in this sense is the lack of action taken by states to create 
improvements in this situation. It is somehow understandable for less developed 
countries to ignore most of the allegations in order not to lose investments but developed 
countries also take no action. There is hardly any effort by parliaments to change the 
current situation and courts do not try hard enough to create better regulations. Instead, 
with the efforts ofNGOs, the existing laws, such as Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), are 
usually stretched in an attempt to impose tort liability on MNEs. 
Accordingly there are a number of obstacles that prevent justifiable solutions to 
MNEs' torts; attempts to find justifiable solutions to corporate tort often have resulted in 
disappointments for mUltiple reasons from current legal systems to negative campaigns 
run by MNEs. There is a political unwillingness in less developed countries not to scare 
MNEs. Moreover, there is collusion between MNEs and governments in less developed 
countries so states are not willing to enforce existing laws and often pass laws which 
actively exempt MNEs from their national legal systems, often under pressure from their 
own economic needs. In developing countries, the laws and models of the legal system, 
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originating from the developed countries, where the companies have their centres. are 
weighting the system towards the already powerful. Thus, both home and host countries 
legal systems are not efficient to solve the problems. 
Therefore, MNEs escape from possible lawsuits with reverse forum-shopping, 
where the accused corporation fights to have a case refused in a country favourable to 
the complainants (usually the home country) and to get it returned to a location 
favourable to itself (usually the host country). This is a first strategy carried out by 
MNEs when faced with tort claims under home countries' laws. They use a number of 
gaps in private international law to reverse back cases to their origin where they are 
likely to remain unsolved. The cases that have overcome forum problems will have to 
struggle with the corporate veil and disguised ambiguities in the nationality of MNEs 
and the separation of identities of the parent company and the subsidiaries, created by 
MNEs to enable them to escape legal responsibility in any country where they operate. 
The forum problems together with substantial and theoretical problems in 
company laws are basics obstacles to preventing MNEs' tort liability. There are a 
number of other factors that prevent liability; any small achievement at international 
level in creating better liability will be blocked by poor implementation mechanisms in 
most international regulatory instruments, if they are not already weakened by 
commitment to the voluntary regulations since internal codes of conduct allow 
corporations to claim to be good while not imposing any legal obligations on them, and 
so do not address the claims ofMNEs' victims. Moreover, the expenses of legal actions 
can sometimes be crippling even in the case of a victory, particularly, where a group of 
poor people, are defending themselves against a corporate counteroffensive. 
Despite all these beneficial environments for MNEs to operate with only a small 
risk of liability, there are counteroffensives by MNEs. MNEs have been involved in an 
intense lobbying battle to change the existing law of torts that allow victims to be 
compensated. Moreover, the system of out of court settlement is giving rights to 
companies to avoid having an effective ruling on certain issues; in a number of recent 
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cases even though MNEs argue that they are not liable, they settled cases so that 
substantial grounds for future claims have been prevented. 6 
These problems are not independent from each other and some of them are core 
law problems while some of them are related mostly to the political preference of 
countries. In this thesis the discussion will concentrate on the core-law issues; mainly 
jurisdictional problems and company law problems. Leaving aside more social-political 
arguments, the concentration in this thesis will be on the legal obstacles for creating 
MNEs' tort liability since the legal structure of corporate groups makes it possible for 
them to evade liability easily. Actually, this situation has been praised by many business 
and economic commentators for its success in raising capital through granting immunity 
from liability. This aspect was reflected in a newspaper report very dramatically. An 
American MNE, Halliburton, has settled asbestos claims for $5billion. The interesting 
and important remark in this report is this part; "Halliburton has won praise on Wall 
Street for the way it dealt with an issue that could have led its demise. By separating the 
oil business from the other subsidiaries, it was able to protect itself from lawsuits and 
built up cash to pay a settlement.,,7 
Accordingly, MNEs' gift of spreading power, their capacity to be present in 
several parts of the world and nowhere at the same time, allows them to avoid national 
jurisdictions. The unique characteristic of MNEs' structures together with private 
international law and company law makes access to justice in MNEs' tort situation very 
problematic. The treatment of foreign subsidiaries of MNEs as independent legal 
persons separate from a sophisticatedly structured group, results in a situation that 
victims of these subsidiaries might bring their legal actions only against torts committed 
by a subsidiary in its own jurisdiction. 
6 Report is at www.guardian.co.uk/burmi, and the Guardian, 15 December 2004. Accordingly, there was 
out of court settlement between the energy MNC Unocal and Burmese villagers. The villager claimed the 
company's Yadana pipeline has led to deaths, rapes and the disruption of their lives. The amount of 
compensation is not disclosed. The lawsuit was launched in 1996; the action was brought to California 
using the ATCA. There were US governmental fears that, if the action succeeded, it could lead to a flood 
of similar claims by indigenous people whose ands had been used for pipelines or oil drilling carried out 
by multinationals. 
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Limited liability, which first emerged as a capital-raising tool in the simple fonn of 
a company, is now used as a liability evading tool for corporate groups. Thus, in a 
simple evaluation of limited liability, it will be seen that limited liability almost grants a 
company more rights than private property grants since private property owners are 
liable for the damage that is caused by the misuse of property. For example, where a 
house or car cause damage to people, there is full liability of owners for compensation 
but if a company causes the same injury and goes bankrupt because of the consequences, 
shareholders are liable for not more than they invested in the company. 
While all these negative sides of corporate law and private international law were 
being misused by MNEs to escape from liability, responses by lawmakers to corporate 
groups challenge were at a minimum level and in very specific circumstances. Both 
actors of law making (courts and parliaments) have failed to give immediate and 
satisfactory responses to these unfair situations. Responses were mostly related to 
corporate groups' laws without a comprehensive examination of MNEs, thus they failed 
to create significant change in the current situation related to MNEs' tort liability. 
Given the characteristics of MNEs, the expectations at international and national 
level of regulations are high but there have been different approaches to the issues. They 
prefer to create code of conducts or guidelines, which do not have clear enforcement 
. mechanism. While at a regional level, the EU, even though it was expected to be 
creative, considered the issues in narrow sphere of company and group of companies' 
law. At a global level, ideally, an international legal framework or convention is needed 
to discuss the activities of MNEs and to help encourage legislation at national level, but 
none has been drafted. 
Regulatory efforts have been concentrated on the issues mostly relevant to the 
practical operational environments of MNEs, rather than liability issues. Thus, most of 
the efforts related to groups of companies were in favour of MNEs activities or related to 
public law issues, such as tax law. Even in the European Union one of the frrst attempts 
7 The Daily Telegraph, (London, OS January 200S) 
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in company law was to regulate consolidated companies accounts in the Union. When 
the issue is collecting money for governments, there are many regulations but if the issue 
comes to the compensation of poor people from the other jurisdictions. courts, 
parliaments and governments strictly refer to rules of limited liable company. It is very 
difficult to justify the fact that corporate groups are allowed to prepare consolidated 
accounts but in case of tort of one company in the group, creditors cannot claim 
compensation from the others. 
However, it would be unfair to claim there have been no regulatory efforts for 
corporate tort liability; there have been some efforts, which tried either directly to hold 
corporate groups liable for their torts by a different model of laws to create some sort of 
liability regime in the corporate groups' context. However, those efforts, either in 
statutory law or in case law, have been weak and inefficient. 
The reason for this failure could be found under the conception of MNEs in a legal 
world under which corporate groups have been traditionally considered as having one 
central decision-making body. Accordingly, in a group situation when one of the 
companies in the group has fallen under the control of the parent, the regulators incline 
to make the controller liable for the torts of the controlled one. Therefore, the courts 
were never inventive beyond the theory of veil piercing, which has very strict 
conditions. Mostly, theories related to veil piercing, developed for small companies, 
tried to be applied in the corporate group context. Eventually, it was almost impossible 
to demonstrate and prove the strict requirements of veil piercing in corporate groups. 
Thus, the efforts to extend veil piercing theory to corporate groups have failed. 
Interestingly, academic discussions in the area of corporate groups' liability were 
somehow successful in pointing out the problems of the application of limited liability in 
corporate groups' context and thus evasion of liability against involuntarily creditors. 
However, solutions suggested were mostly short and unconvincing due to miss-
interpretation of economic and managerial characteristics of MNEs. Thus, suggestions 
offered by academia have never been inventive enough to be considered as alternatives. 
The failure was due to lack of interdisciplinary examination in the area of MNEs 
activities and thus, misinterpretation of the way control by one entity over another in 
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MNEs was used. There has always been belief in the simple top to bottom control since 
they have never gone beyond the theory of fIrm to develop a theory of a multinational 
enterprise. 
The structure of MNEs makes it almost impossible to establish a tort liability 
under the control theory in a group situation because the horizontal structure 
transformed the control theory in real terms into less-hierarchical but more complex 
decision making process. However, in law-making the concept of MNEs as a simple 
vertical structure has never changed. Thus, expectation from current regulations and 
efforts based on misconception of MNEs are very low and results have been logically 
unsatisfactory . 
Accordingly, there is a requirement that MNEs must be examined from 
interdisciplinary perspectives in order to create better regimes of liability for MNEs' 
tort; there must be extensive efforts to discover what the basic theories behind MNEs 
are. This examination should cover economic, social, organizational and legal areas. 
When applying these requirements into the current thesis, the future of MNEs tort 
liability must be discussed from two perspectives, first there must be an examination of 
basic economic managerial social and legal characteristics of MNEs and secondly the 
existing regulations must be tested to see if they are efficient enough to meet the 
challenges. As a result, suggestions on MNEs liability must be built on the results of 
extensive interdisciplinary and inter-jurisdictional methods. 
Accordingly, the thesis aims to indicate the social, economic and organisational 
characteristics of MNEs. The purpose is to evaluate how different MNEs are conceived 
in other disciplines and how this perception of MNEs in legal discipline and practice has 
been absorbed. While doing this there will be indication of theories developed by legal 
practice in order to solve liability problems in groups of companies' context. The 
concentration will be on the perception of MNEs structure in legal theory and the 
liability theories developed on this perception, namely the theory of control in MNEs 
management structure. The reason for concentration on the structure and the theory of 
control is that from the early discussion of the liability of groups of companies to the 
latest liability proposals, liability of MNEs, applied or suggested, have been based on the 
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simple and inefficient understandings of structure of MNEs and thus on the inefficiently 
developed control theory. 
Therefore, liability applied or suggested was based on a simplified fonnula, which 
considered corporate groups as vertically organized institutions, thus the control theory 
was one-way control applied by parent companies over subsidiaries. Accordingly, there 
have been very long and strict requirements in order to establish liability, plaintiffs are 
required to prove the excessive control of parents over their subsidiaries. This requires 
very detailed fact specific inquiry and thus is almost impossible to prove in the modem 
structure of corporate groups. This misunderstanding has caused another negative result 
in that there have never been real discussions or applications of group liability, rather 
parent- subsidiary liability has been considered as the only possible ways of establishing 
liability in corporate groups' context. 
In order to bring modem interdisciplinary understandings of MNEs together with 
legal disciplines and try to create modem proposals for MNEs' tort liability the thesis 
will be divided into six chapters and chapters will be divided into sections. The first 
chapter is the present chapter where the introductory arguments are made. 
The second chapter of the thesis will be devoted to the examination of basic social, 
economic, managerial and legal characteristics of MNEs under the title of concept of 
MNE. The chapter will be divided into sections; the first section will be an examination 
of social and economic characteristics of MNEs; there will be a search for where MNEs 
stand in current social-economic orders and how they operate. There will be a historical 
look at the concept of MNEs starting from the first emergence. The process will be 
examined together with FDI movements and there will be a quest to discover the 
rationale behind the investment theory by simply asking why MNEs invest. This 
examination will contribute to the discussion of tort liability by pointing out the basic 
social-economic characteristics of MNEs; the aim is to indicate that different social-
economic characteristics need different laws and regulations. The second section will be 
an examination of the organisational structures of MNEs under which there will be a 
close look at MNEs from the inside. The theory of corporate structures will be examined 
in an historical context and the basic features of managerial organisational structure of 
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MNEs will be examined and later concentration will be on contemporary corporate 
structures. While doing this, some examples of structures of modem MNEs will be 
demonstrated. This managerial organisational examination has key importance for two 
reasons: fIrst, the complex structure of MNEs prevents any liability theories and laws to 
be applied in MNEs torts. Second, the future law and theories must be built by 
considering the current characteristics of the structure of MNEs. The third section of the 
chapter will be an examination of the legal theory behind MNEs' regulations and 
liabilities. The examination will be historical; fIrst the emergence of corporate groups 
and secondly an evaluation process of corporate personality and limited liability will be 
made. The difference between individual and corporate shareholders will be identified. 
The overall aim of the second chapter of the thesis is to indicate the basic feature of 
MNEs as unique institutions. Consequently, the weakness of legal theory and regulations 
applied to J\1NEs will be better understood and this interdisciplinary examination will 
indicate the basics theoretical problems in the area of MNEs tort liability. 
In the third and fourth chapters of the thesis, there will be examination of how the 
modem structure of MNEs create obstacles to solving tort liability and solutions created 
by courts or parliaments or suggestions made by academics will be examined by asking 
if they match the demands to bring interdisciplinary approaches to MNEs tort liability 
discussions or not. 
Accordingly, in the third chapter, jurisdictional problems of imposing MNEs' 
liability will be examined. The importance of jurisdictional obstacles to imposing tort 
liability will be the beginning of the discussion. The so-called forum non conveniens 
theory and further obstacles will be examined by giving examples from English and 
American jurisdictions. Then, suggested solutions to the jurisdictional problems will be 
discussed. As in other parts of the thesis, the examination of jurisdictional problems and 
solution suggestions will be comparative and interdisciplinary by questioning how 
current laws meet the challenges. 
In the fourth chapter existing laws on groups of companies and liability issues to 
MNEs will be under critical examination. The case law and statutory law will be 
examined separately. In case law, examination of piercing the corporate veil will be 
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central. Both case law and statutory laws examinations will be comparatiye: rangmg 
from the UK laws to some examples from the CS as well as approaches in the El' law 
will be discussed. Moreover, individual efforts from Germany and Turkey \\'ill be 
examined and further reference to laws from other jurisdictions will be made. The aim of 
this chapter is to discover the approaches of lawmakers to the problem of groups of 
compames and MNEs liability and compatibility of these examples with 
interdisciplinary features of MNEs. 
In the fifth chapter the thesis will examine the findings in the previous chapters 
questioning those findings from two perspectives. First, there will be a quest to find out 
what are the obstacles to imposing better developed liability rules on MNEs. The second 
quest will be how and on which criteria the future of MNEs' liability must be built. The 
suggested solutions will be based on results of examinations made in the previous 
chapters. 
The sixth chapter will be the conclusion. 
CHAPTER II: CONCEPT OF MCLTI~ATIO:\AL E:\TERPRISE 
Introduction 
A multinational enterprise can be defined as an enterprise that has affiliates in more than 
one country. On the other hand, the multinational enterprise, in a strictly legal sense, can 
be defined as a collection of corporate entities, each haying its own juridical identity and 
national origin, but each in some way connected by a system of centralised management 
and control, normally exercised from the seat of primary ownership.) This definition 
does not exist in any statute or in any official documents. 
According to some researchers, multinational enterprises have existed SInce 
ancient times.2 They come to the conclusion, after researching ancient business history 
that MNEs were actively operating in the times of Roman. Greek, Mesopotamian and 
Anatolian civilizations. The first recorded MNEs appeared in the Old Assyrian Kingdom 
shortly after 2500 BC, when Sumerian merchants found in their foreign commerce that 
they needed men stationed abroad to receive. to store and to sell their goods. The 
researchers found that the MNEs of ancient times have some similar characteristics to 
contemporary MNEs. On the other hand, some other researchers find the forerunners of 
MNEs in medieval times in chartered trading colonizing enterprises.3 For example, the 
East India Company, chartered in London in 1600, established overseas branches. In the 
mid-seventeenth century, English, French and Dutch mercantile families sent relati\'e~ to 
America and to the West Indies to represent their firms. So too, in time, American 
I Wallace CD, The Multinational Enterprises And Legal Control Host State SovereignlY 111 An Era Of 
Economic Glohalisation (Martinus Nijhoff. London 2(02) p. Q 
:! Moore Karl, Birth oJthc Multinational: 2000 rears ofAncie1lf Business HiSlOryJrom Ashllr 10 Augw;(lIs 
(Zed Books. London 1999) 
colonists found in their own foreign trade that it was desirable to have correspondents. 
agents, and, on occasion, branch houses in important trading centres to warehouse and to 
sell American exports.
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These early-chartered companies can be regarded as closer 
predecessors of the modem MNEs.5 
However, for the purpose of the present study, there is not any practical reason to 
examine ancient business history; rather concentration must be on the modem MNEs 
and their historical development. Although earlier MNEs shared certain features with the 
modem MNEs, the evolutions of the modem multinational enterprise dates back roughly 
to the last half, or better still the last quarter of the nineteenth century.6 However, it must 
be stressed that the modem multinational enterprise is not a post World War II 
phenomenon in contrast to common public belief. 
I want to give some conceptual characteristics of MNEs in order to explain why 
they need special examination, since they have been under examination of variously 
specialized scholars for decades, and I want to indicate the conceptual limits of the 
MNEs for the present research. In a short explanation, the origin of contemporary 
conceptions of the MNEs lies in the belief that this modem, large-scale capitalist 
enterprise is a unique phenomenon, different in kind from earlier business organisations 
such as the partnership and the small firm. 7 Therefore, this new phenomenon needs 
special examination in order to indicate the differences from the patterns of small finn's 
limited models. These differences occur in economic, social, organisational and legal 
characteristics of MNEs. The present study, principally, shall focus on the differences in 
3 Hertner Peter and Jones Geoffrey (eds.), Multinationals: Theory and History (Gower, Aldershot 1986) 
p.l 
4 Wilkins Mira, Emergence of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass, 1970) p.1 
S Carlos A and Nicholas SJ, 'Theory and History of the Early Trading Companies' (1996 December) 
Journal of Economic History 56 and Wallace CD, The Multinational Enterprises p.15 (n 1) 
6 Chandler Alfred 0 Jr. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard University 
Press Cambridge 1990), Wilkins Mira, The History of Multinational Entelprise in Rugman AM and Brew~r TL (eds.) Oxford Handbook of international Business (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) p. 4 
7 Fieldhouse OK., 'The Multinational: a Critique of a Concept' in Teichova Alice, Uvy-Leboyer Maurice 
and Nussbaum Helga (eels.), Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1986.) p. 13 
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some aspects of legal characteristics in relation to tort liability. However. economic, 
organisational and social differences, to the necessary extent, will be examined in order 
to create better understanding of the legal regulations and proposed solutions to the civil 
liability problems. 
An MNE has two distinctive econonuc features. First, it orgamses and co-
ordinates multiple value-adding activities across national boundaries and, second, it 
intemalises the cross-border markets for the intermediate products arising from these 
activities.8 Therefore, it is different since no other institution engages in both cross-
border production and transactions.9 These unique characteristics of MNEs led some 
scholars to call it the most significant class of global networks. to Moreover, MNEs are 
different from government and international organisations in that the management of 
MNEs is not concerned with the development targets of individual nation-states, regions 
or territories; in contrast, circumstances and country-specific economic policies of 
nations determine the outcome of relations with MNEs.ll 
MNEs also distinguish themselves from other types of business enterprises by 
their main characteristic feature that, as parent companies they exercise control over 
subsidiary firms that are scattered over several states. In other words, although there are 
legally independent organisations under the group, the parent company exercises strict 
control over the subsidiaries. However, this excessive exercise of control and unique 
organisation of MNEs have undergone changes in the last decades. The changes have 
taken places in the structure of MNEs towards less-hierarchically structured 
organisations under which the power of the parent companies has considerably reduced 
and the organisations have gone in the direction of decentralisation. However, the fact of 
8 Fieldhouse OK, The Multinational, p. 24 (n 7) 
9 Dunning JH, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (Addison-Wesley, Wokingham 1993) 
p.4 
10 Wallace CD, The Multinational. p.9 (n 1) 
II Gurak H, 'Multinational Enterprises and Foreign Direct Investments' at 
http://econwpa.wustl.edu:8089/epslgetlpapersl0404/0404004.pdfaccessed 20 February 2005 
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being a unique phenomenon under this new organisational structure still apparently 
exists, even making the phenomenon more interesting to conduct a study on. 
The idea of what an MNE consists of is also a challenge for scholars so the limits 
of the study must be illustrated from this perspective. There is an overwhelming 
agreement in academia that minority joint ventures, co-operative alliances and 
networking relationships with other organisations should be considered as part of an 
MNE's sphere of influence. 12 For example, licensing agreements, joint ventures and 
strategic alliances may give them some degree of control under an organisational 
structure or influence over the foreign companies associated with these organisations. 
However, MNEs' relations and control over a company because of contractual 
relationship will be excluded from this study. Leaving this for further research, the 
present study shall cover the liability arising from the ownership relationships under 
groups of companies. In other words, the examination will be based on the legal bodies 
under the group that are tied to each other with ownership relationships Goint-stock 
MNEs); the ownership could be fully, partly or cross-ownership. 
At this stage, I want to draw attention to the fact that in the history of ideas, 
attempts have been made to conceptualise the phenomena that multinational enterprises 
create. The phenomena were regarded as new without realising that both the phenomena 
and their images themselves undergo changes in time. This applies evidently to the 
concept of the MNEs. 13 Therefore, one should bear in mind that MNEs are neither 
homogeneous in function nor consistent in character over time. This obliges researchers 
to undertake further studies over time considering new developments and adopting them 
into arguments. Since it is the contemporary multinational enterprise organisations under 
critical examination, the present study claims to have special characteristics. 
12 Caves RE. Multinational Enterprises and Economic Analyses (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1996), Casson Mark, the Economic Analyses of Multinational Trading Companies (Reading: U. of 
Reading, Dept. Of Economics, 1997), Dunning JH, Multinational ... Global Economy p.6 (n 9) 
13 Teichova A, 'Multinationals in Perspective' in Teichova Alice, Uvy-Leboyer Maurice and Nussbaum 
Helga (cds). Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1986) p. 363 
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In order to understand the problems and basic facts of MNEs' tort liability this 
chapter frrstly examines the historical developments of FDI movements in parallel with 
MNEs' emergence and maturing process from social and economic perspectives. This 
examination will contribute to understanding the reasons for cross-border investments in 
the historic,al order. Moreover, the better understanding of FDI movement and growing 
direction of MNE developments will help to understand why there are problems in host 
countries related to the activities of subsidiaries. And more importantly, this part of the 
study will enable better examination of the efficiency arguments of limited liability 
theory since it is considered to be the primary trigger for investment for companies. 
Secondly, in order to prove the inefficiencies under the laws currently applicable 
to MNEs, the structural differences in organisation of MNEs will be under critical and 
explanatory examination. This examination will be crucial for illustrating the need to 
move from the classical understanding of MNEs' structures in applicable law and 
proposed regulations. The main reason for examining the organisational structural 
developments lies behind the fact that as a social institution the regulation of liability of 
MNEs should be structured according to their organisational structure. MNEs shall be 
considered as an institution that has certain characteristics which defme them and make 
them different from any other institution in society, such as company, trust or 
international economic organisations. In particular, this study aims to discuss the 
liability issues arising from subsidiary activities; in reality there have been many studies 
in the examination of multinational corporate groups and liability arising from 
subsidiaries' tortious actions under the group. However all these studies mostly 
concentrate on one simple type of organisational structure of multinational enterprise, 
which is vertically organised MNE. The concept of vertically structured MNE can be 
defined as a group of companies consisting of a parent company and subsidiaries under 
its apparent control with not much effect on each other's operational decisions. 
However, for the economic, social and organisational examination of MNE activities, 
there is growing academic interest in inspection of horizontally structured enterprises. 
The past studies, in legal approach, have not taken horizontally structured MNEs into 
their main discussion. Therefore, this study will take these new developments as its main 
focus of research. 
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Finally, I examine the emergence of applicable principles of law to corporate 
groups and MNEs. This examination will be purely devoted to understanding the legal 
evolution with the developments under the case and statutory law. Limited liability 
principles will be at the centre of the argument. However, the group of companies' 
concept will be examined from different aspects in an extensive way. The aim of this 
examination is to prove the inefficiency of current legal regulations, which are 
dependent on historical case and statutory law. Accordingly, the efficiency of limited 
liability will be discussed under this part in order to indicate the conceptual differences 
between limited liability company and limited liability MNE. 
As a result, the combination of economical, social, organisational and finally legal 
examination will provide broader understanding of the issues and provide a genuine and 
efficient background for regulatory efforts. With this examination, I aim to prove that 
MNEs are representatives of the global economic order; their operational and 
organisational features are almost the same allover the world because interdisciplinary 
examination supports this claim. The laws of different states or different regions differ 
since the social, cultural and traditional features of national states are different. 
However, it will be amply seen that that in terms of MNEs, the characteristically 
differences amongst national states are very insignificant and are diminishing fast. 
Social and Economic History of Multinational Enterprises 
History of FDI and Emergence of MNEs 
Firms from Europe and North America began to invest in overseas plantations, mines 
factories, banking, sales and distribution amenities in large numbers in the first half of 
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the 19
th 
century.14 This resulted in a significant growth in the size and number of firms, 
which can be considered early forerunners of modem MNEs, but these companies 
cannot be, in actual meanmg, considered as a MNE since it is widely accepted fact that 
the emergence of modem multinationals started in the second half of the 19th century. 
This was due to effect of the industrial revolution. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, 
most value added activities initiated by economic entities outside their national 
boundaries were provoked by three factors. 15 The first was the desire to promote trade 
and financial activities resulting from the needs of the state or that of individual 
producers or consumers. The second was to acquire new territories and new forms of 
wealth. The third was to discover new avenues for the use of domestic savings. 
Therefore, the fITst MNEs were mainly resource-based investments with the aim of 
supplying the home country with food and raw materials and logically; the host 
countries were mostly colonial countries. However, this pattern changed in the 
beginning of the second half of the 19th century with the growth of large MNEs both in 
the United States and in Europe. 
The effect of industrialisations and improvements in technology and remarkable 
advances in domestic and international transport, communications and storage 
techniques created new market opportunities and led firms to reassess their location 
strategies. Firms, differently from the earlier factors, started to search new territories for 
their economic wellbeing. These developments, together with the emergence of 
professionally trained managers and administrators, led both to a widening and 
deepening of value-added chains and to a expansion in the transactional division of the 
manufacturing economy. 16 As a result, combining mass production with mass 
distribution, they built up a harmonized system of goods flow from raw materials, via 
14 Dunning, Multinational ... Global Economy p.99 (n 9) 
IS Dunning, Multinational ... Global Economy, p.97 (n 9) 
16 Jones G 'The Performance of British Multinational Enterprise, 1890-1945' in Hertner Peter and Jones 
Geoffrey, Multinationals: Theory and History, (Gower, Aldershot 1986), Wilkins Mira, Emergence of 
Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass, 1970), and Dunning Multinational ... Global Economy p.l03 
(n 9) 
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production, to the retailer and fmal consumers.17 The implications of these later 
progresses were truly transnational and consequently, many firms grew into, multi-
activity, multi-regional and multi-national units. 
In the examination of American developments, one will see that, towards the end 
of the 19th century, American technology had already overtaken European technology in 
a wide range of metal using industries and in those utilising mass production practices. IS 
Consequently, from the second half of the 19th century MNEs with the power of these 
new technologies appeared in the United States with extraordinary speed and took their 
place in the economy in a radical way.19 On the other side of the ocean, in Britain, the 
evaluation of multinationals came in a slower, more evolutionary manner. 
US fIrms tried to capitalise on their advantages by stepping up their sales to the 
UK and thus, the larger ones often moved overseas. They fIrst set up branch offices and 
warehouses on foreign shores because frequently they found it difficult to export from 
their American plants; then as demand grew and local tariffs appeared or as shipping 
costs increased scheduling of flows across oceans became difficult. 20 In these conditions, 
the fIrms had two options;21 one was concluding licensing arrangements with British 
producer, the other was to set up a foreign manufacturing affiliate. Some companies 
were not yet open to setting up production affiliates abroad so they chose to contract 
with their foreign partners. However, some companies went further and set up factories 
in Britain to produce their products in the domestic territory. After some unsuccessful 
attempts, United States Singer Sewing Machine can be given as an example of 
successful foreign direct investment in England.22 By 1867 the Singer had established its 
first foreign manufacturing plant in Glasgow and was the fIrst to produce and market a 
17 Dunning JH, Cantwell JA and Corley TAB, 'The Theory of International Production: Some Historical 
Antecedents' in Hertner Peter and Jones Geoffrey, Multinationals: Theory and HIStOry, (Gower, Aldershot 
1986) p. 27 
18 Dunning, Multinational ... Global Economy p.l 02 (n 9) 
19 Nicholas SJ, 'The Growth of the Multinational Corporation' (1986 May) Corporate History Bulletin 396 
20 Nicholas, the Growth, (n 19) 
:II Dunning, Multinational ... Global Economy p.l02 (n 9) 
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product world-wide under basically the same form and trade name. This gives Singer. 
perhaps the strongest claim, to being considered the first true multinational.:!3 
On the other hand, especially British economists regarded outward investment as 
an expansion of domestic activity, where the interests of investing countries and firms 
were assumed to match. Thus, for British companies, the process of FDI was slow, and 
thus, it was only in the 1960s that they made the conversion to a more different range of 
experience across quite different countries and markets.24 The main reason for the slow 
growth in FDI in Britain in 19th century was that many firms, which became 
multinational before 1914 preferred exporting to, rather than investing in, foreign 
markets. However, this strategy was blocked by a variety of location specific factors. 
The spread of protectionism from the late 1870s was a major influence in this context. 
For that reason, American MNEs and MNEs from some other countries preferred to 
locate subsidiaries in free trade areas. Britain was the principal free trade area at that 
time in contrast to the protectionist Continent.25 That explains why Britain was the first 
country that American companies chose to invest in. 
Therefore, some economists conclude that tariffs were the single most important 
trigger leading to foreign investment by market seeking British and American MNEs 
before 1914; second was incentives offered by governments. 26 Another reason depended 
on competitive strategy to reduce freight and production costs for overseas investment. 
Moreover, firms·engaged in FDI to be near the market and to provide to the specific and 
special needs of local customers. 
From that point one can reach a hypothesis that there were two different kinds of 
multinational investment before 1914, which were market-seeking investment and 
22 Tugendhat Christopher, The Multinationals (penguin, Hannondsworth 1973) p. 33 
23 Wallace, The Multinational p.9 (n 1) 
24 Dunning, Cantwell and Corley p. 26 (n 17) 
25 Hertner and Jones, Multinationals p. 10 ( n 3) 
26 Jones G, 'The Performance of British Multinational Enterprise 1890-1945' in Hertner Peter and Jones 
Geoffrey, Multinationals: Theory and History, (Gower, Aldershot 1986). Franko L, The European 
MultinatioruUs (London 1976), Dunning Multinational ... Global Economy p. 108 (n 9) 
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resource-based investment. But it should be born in mind that the reason for investing 
overseas was prompted by the main principles of capitalism that growing in domestic 
markets led them to think about overseas options.27 After companies decided to make 
cross border investments, comes the time to think about entry strategies to other markets . 
. Consequently, by 1914, both resource-based and market-seeking investments were 
becoming strongly motivated by the desire to exploit sources of host countries as well as 
the desire to minimise the uncertainties of intermediate product markets.28 However, in 
general, there was little attempt by British- or indeed European- investors to exploit the 
benefits of using the main sources of countries, while US companies invested abroad to 
acquire intermediate products for their domestic factories, European MNEs primarily 
invested in the US to sell to the local market. 29 
In summary, the 19th and the early 20th century witnessed the fonnation of MNEs 
from United States and Great Britain, as well as from the several European countries, to 
conduct large-scale trading operations or to exploit resources and raw materials in Latin 
America, Africa, Asia and Australia, or even to run public utilities such as tramways or 
gas and electric works. Beginning in the 1860s, the forerunners of the modem MNEs 
began to exceed their national boundaries in significant numbers and to establish actual 
production facilities beyond their own frontiers, and no longer only in the developing 
world, but also in strong consumer markets. 30 
27 Chandler AD, The Growth of Transnational Industrial Finns in the UK and US: A Comparative 
Analysis. (1980) 33 Economic History Review 396 and Dunning Multinational ... Global Economy p. 109 
(n 9) 
28 Dunning, Multinational ... Global Economy, p.118 (n 9) 
29 Wilkins M, The Growth of Multinationals (Edward Elgar, Aldershot 1991) and Dunning 
MultinDtiontJi ... GlobaJ Economy p. 113 (n 9) 
30 Wallace, The Multinational p. 16 (n 1) 
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Developments between 1918-1960 
Both market-seeking and resource-based MNEs declined sharply in the immediate post-war 
period. The reason for that· was the movement of countries toward to more protectionist 
economies and associating foreign companies with their states of origins. As a result, many 
fIrms considered other strategies of international expansion, such as licensing, 
participation in cartels and joint ventures; this was especially valid for German 
companies.31 Although the number of new subsidiaries set up by MNEs continued to rise 
throughout the period; it was only in the 1930s that the value of the foreign direct capital 
stake exceeded its pre-war fIgure.32 Only a slight recovery was on the way especially for 
American companies. 
The controversial developments in that time was that although the US was more 
resource-suffIcient than the UK, she had built up a signifIcant stock ofFDI by 1914, and 
by 1939 the value of her foreign manufacturing subsidiaries' output was twice of that 
her export of manufactures.33 This could be considered the time for the start of American 
domination because the American expansion was in fact relatively slow before World 
War I, whereas some very important positions had already been secured by European 
.. Am . 34 
comparues 10 enca. 
The period between the two world wars was not economically prosperous for 
companies, nor for the countries. In that time, thus, companies established big trusts and 
monopolies. By the 1930s large-scale MNEs had become a crucially important 
institution in all industrially advanced market economies and contemporary MNEs had 
become a socio-political commonplace.35 However, it must be pointed out that there 
31 Hertner and Jones, Multinationals, p. 9 (n 3) 
32 Dunning Multinational ... Global Economy p.120 (n 9) 
33 Dunning, Cantwell and Corley p. 26 (n 17) 
34 Gurak, Multinational Entreprises (n 11) 
35 Teichova, Multinationals in Perspective p. 365 (n 13) 
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were other important developments in the growing of some technologically developed 
and high consumer demand so the companies that were concentrated on such kinds of 
business expanded their development internationally, such as IBM. Unilever. Shell and 
Esso.36 
The main idea for cross border investment was still the same; Europe and USA 
fIrms were prompted to establish branch plants mainly by their need to modify goods to 
local supply capabilities and require power in the market to save on transatlantic 
transport costs and by the incidence of non-tariff barriers.37 Therefore, what was 
overwhelmingly important to the MNEs before 1945 is the idea of moving to other 
countries for basic marketing reasons and therefore it was limited to movements from 
developed economies to developed economies and usually between neighbour countries 
or countries which have close relationships for historical reasons. Investments (if we can 
call it really investment) to less developed countries were mainly investments in 
colonies. Thus it cannot be considered the same as the modem understanding of foreign 
direct investment and operating subsidiaries cannot be considered as similar to 
subsidiaries that exist in the 21 st century rather they had branch -like characteristics. 
The real expansion in American investment abroad began in the 1950s. America's 
more pragmatic evaluation than her European counterparts' as well as her rising living 
standards, her governmental support of foreign investment and her competitive character 
were all contributory factors for this increase.38 It is for this reason that those who 
centred in on the multinational phenomenon only in the period of its late expansion, with 
its readily available statistics, tended to view the rvtNEs as an American phenomenon. 39 
36 Wallace, The Multinational, p. 22 (n 1) 
37 Nicholas SJ, 'British Multinational Investment before 1939' (1982) Journal of European Economic 
History 60S and Dunning Multinational ... Global Economy p. 123 (n 9) 
38 Muchlinslci P, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Blackwell, Oxford 1999) c. 2, Tugcndhat., n.e 
Multinationals c.2 (n 22), Hood N and Young, S, 'Ihe Economics Of MultinotionQ/ Enterprises (Longman, 
London 1984.) p. 12 and Wallace, The Multinational, p. 22 (n 1) 
39 Wallace, The Multinational, p. 22 (n 1) 
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Developments between 1960- 1990 
It must be accepted that, production in more than one country under a common 
nationality of ownership or control had little importance in the world economy before 
the 1950s.4o In explanation, MNE activities as a device for the transfer of resources 
between countries and as a means of controlling the use of these assets played a less 
important role in the world economic activities than it had since the mid 1950s and 
1960s.41 
The figure that before 1914 there were more European than American 
multinationals changed in favour of America after the First World War and especially 
after the Second World War, and consequently, there was American dominance in the 
world economy.42 By 1960, the share provided by the US had jumped to 49 per cent, 
while that of Britain was down to 16 percent. The recipient areas had also changed 
markedly, with developed· countries now accounting for two-thirds of global FDI, due 
largely to the substantial growth of US manufacturing investment in Canada and Western 
Europe in the 1950s. 
There was European concern about _ growing American dominance in world 
economic activities. In 1968 when Jacques Servan Schreiber published his book The 
American Challenge; he warned Europeans of the increasing domination by US finns in 
high technology industries in Western Europe. The concern was less with the growing 
proportion of European production accounted for by US affiliates, and more with the 
implications of this phenomenon for the long-term competitiveness of the host 
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economIes. 
40 Dunning, Cantwell and Corley, p.19 (n 17) 
41 Gurak, Multinational Entreprises (n 11) 
42 Franko L, The Europetl1l Multinationals (London 1976) p. 8 
43 Servan Schreiber J, The A.merican Challenge (Hamish Hamilton, London 1968) 
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The concern had its effect and the post-war era of American multinational 
superiority was challenged after the 1960s. The rise of US's FDI in the 1950s and 1960s 
in the 1970s has been matched by an increase in the FDI by West Germany and Japan 
and West Europeans.44 Very recently, in 1980s and 1990s MNEs have emerged from 
some of the newly industrialising countries, e.g. South Korea, Hong Kong and 
Singapore and China. Related to the trend of FDI being largely between developed 
countries, cross-investment or intra-industry FDI has emerged. These new economic 
activities were a comparatively rare phenomenon before 1945.45 As a result, there was a 
shift from an American dominated era to a much more complex system of MNEs in 
which, many nations increased their foreign investments and the United States became 
the world's foremost host economy as well as home economy to MNEs. 
In that period, the growingly accepted explanation for the foreign production of 
fIrms was based on the acceptance that it was a market replacing activity. The 
investment in production abroad would occur whenever and wherever firms supposed 
that the net benefIts of using cross-border markets to establish new production units 
abroad.46 Therefore, in the 70s and the 80s MNEs preferred largely Greenfield 
investments.47 However, affIliates were comparatively involved in little innovatory 
activities and thus they were less embedded in host countries and more importantly they 
were mainly under hierarchical structures and thus under the strict control of the parent 
. 
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44 Hertner and Jones, Multinationals p. 2 (n 3) 
45 Dunning, Cantwell and Corley, p. 36 (n 17) 
46 Dunning JH, The Key Literature on IB Activities: 1960-2000 in Rugman AM. Brewer n. (eds). Oxford 
Handbook of International Business (Oxford University Press, Oxford 200 1) p. 40 
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Contemporary Developments, Globalisation of the World Trade 
During the last half century and particularly in the last 3 decades, a new and separately 
individual vehicle of international economic activity has emerged as a result of the 
intemationalisation of productive activities of many enterprises, the multinational 
enterprise.48 Consequently, the modem theory of international production has moved 
away from a reliance on country-oriented advantages in production towards fum-
specific advantages. Thus, the emergence of the truly global enterprise and escalating of 
all forms of corporate structures is the most marked organisational development of the 
past three decades.49 
This fast and nearly completed globalisation of many enterprises is reducing the 
significance of the nationality of ownership as a feature influencing the contribution of 
such firms to national economic welfare. In some industrial sectors dominated by global 
producers, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between the nationalities 
of the ownership of value-added activities in any significant way. so This mobility, which 
is currently being dramatically enhanced by the advent of electronic commerce and 
money, is offering MNEs wider location options in respect of both the creation and use 
of these assets and products.sl This makes differentiation of the FDI movement more 
difficult in the world, particularly between developed countries since exercise of 
manufacturing in more than one country has become the standard rather than the 
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exceptIOn. 
Private direct investment by companies from industrialised countries, through 
legal corporate transactions in other industrialised and less developed countries, has 
48 Dunning JH, The Multil1tltional Enterprise (Allen and Unwind, London 1971) p. 16 
49 Dunning, Multinational... Global Economy p.130 (n 9) 
50 Dunning, Multinational ... Global Economy p.11 (n 9) 
51 Dunning, The Key Literature p. 57 (n 46) 
5:! Wallace, The Multinationalp. 30 (n 1) 
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grown by overwhelming proportions in the years between 1946 and the present day; and 
it has entered the twenty-fIrst century with all the signs of renewed strength. The 
networks of the MNEs have truly taken on global dimensions, and foreign direct 
investment has been recognised as an essential element in the economic well-being of 
both home and host country, as well as in the process of global economic integration that 
is already well underway. 53 
Widespread privatisation and the deregulation of many servIce sectors have 
opened up huge opportunities for FDI in the utility, telecommunications and banking 
and finance sectors. Regional economic integration, especially in Europe, has also 
increased the ability of MNEs to intemalise trade flows. Moreover, one of the most 
distinguishing features of the new world economy is the ease with kinds of assets and 
intermediate products that determine a nation's prosperity and growth are able to move 
across national boundaries. 54 From that aspect as well MNEs remain in a class of unique 
organisation. And thus, the MNEs, with affiliates in many countries, have rapidly 
assured its place as "the characteristic industrial organisation of the age". 55 It is already 
a common practice for a number of MNEs from developed countries to send raw 
materials or components to certain developing countries for labour-intensive assembling 
or processing. The products so manufactured are then re-imported into the industrialised 
countries or exported elsewhere for assembling, finishing or final sale. 56 Therefore, 
profit-maximising behaviour of the enterprises prerequisite the free flow of the factors of 
production, both capital or labour, in order to operate at most favourable level with 
respect of global opportunities. 57 
One such conversion since the early post war investment period is that it now 
relies less on removal, processing and transport of raw materials and looks more to 
modem technologic and scientific processes of diversifying production. The degree of 
53 Wallace, The Multinational p. 31 (n 1) 
54 Dunning, Multinational ... Globa/ Economy p.129 (n 9) 
55 Wallace, The Multinational p. 30 (n 1) 
56 Guralt, Multinational Entrepriscs (n 11) 
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openness in international trade has surpassed the pre World War One record levels in 
many countries with the consequence that growth in international trade is stronger than 
-the growth in world production. 58 In particular, the growth of foreign portfolio 
investment, mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances and a host of network 
relationships have been particularly impressive over the last two decades. 59 
Multinational expansion in the field of financing production from pre-financing to 
credit-fmancing to self-financing of subsidiaries abroad, and finally, the progression in 
the sphere of finance from the old means of private banking to the new means of 
investment banking and to multinational banking created easily available funding for the 
companies who wanted to expand their operations in cross border ventures. 
Consequently, medium sized enterprises have also internationalised and are being 
integrated into production and distribution networks in which the distribution and 
manufacturing of goods are globalised. The internalisation of medium sized enterprises 
is also challenging the borders of legal systems that regulate the area. 
All these economic developments generated new movements m the world's 
economic order in the last two decades. The communist block has collapsed and 
countries from the block opened their public companies for privatisation. Not only these 
countries but also most of the less developed countries aim to attract more FDI. They try 
to reduce legal and economical barriers for MNEs in order to encourage them to invest 
in their territory.60 They invent different kind of incentives for MNEs and there is a 
battle to make the best offers for MNEs amongst less developed countries.61 Shortly, the 
57 Gurak, Multinational Entreprises, (n 11) 
58 UNCTAD, World Investment Reports, 1993-2003 
59 UNCT AD, 1993-2003. (n 58) 
60 Charlton A, 'Incentive Bidding for Mobile Investment: Economic Consequences and Potential Responses, 
(OECD Development Centre, Working Paper no 203, Paris 2003) 
61 Charlton, Incentive Bidding, (n 60) 
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last two decades as well witnessed the gradual reduction of trade barriers, which are 
welcomed by the MNEs. 62 
According to World Investment Report (WIR) 2006 ofUNCTAD, the global stock 
of FDI in 2005, owned by some 77.000 transnational corporations and their 770.000 of 
their foreign affiliates is $9 trillion.63 FDI continues to be more important than trade in 
delivering goods and services abroad: global sales by MNEs reached $19 trillion in 
2004, as compared with world exports of $8 trillion in 2002.64 Companies are still 
continuing to invest abroad and FDI outflows increased in 2005 by 27% to $916 billion 
and these :MNEs are almost all from developed countries.65 Firms from developing 
countries accounted only for $117 billion.66 MNEs employed more than 62 million 
people abroad.67 All these figures led to another defmition for multinationals that of 
''foreign direct investment entity". 68 
Also, interestingly, MNEs from the EU have become by far the largest owners of 
outward FDI stock, some $3.4 trillion in 2002, more than twice that of the United States 
($ 1.5 trillion).69 In developing countries, the inward FDI stock came to nearly one-third 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2001.70 The single market is expected significantly 
62 UNCTAD, Companies Without Borders: Transnational Corporations in the 1990s (International 
Thomson Business Press, London, 1996) 
63 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006 p.5 
64 UNCTAD, 2005, p.4 (n 63) 
65 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006 p.l 
66 UNCT AD, 2006, p.2 (n 65) 
67 UNCTAD, 2006, p.5 (n 65) 
68 Lipsey Robert E, 'Foreign Direct Investment and the Operati?ns of Multinational Firms: Concepts, 
History and Data' (National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambndge 2001) 
69 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002 
70 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, p. 14 
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to affect investment flow into and within the EU.71 These figures are expected to grow in 
number at the beginning of the 21 st century.72 
The globalisation of FDI movement has not changed the fact that the most 
powerful MNEs are from developed countries since among the top 100 companies only 
5 are from developing countries. 73 Another interesting statistics as well relates to 
fmancial MNEs; financial MNEs from France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the United States accounted for 74% of the total assets of the top 50 fmancial MNEs 
in 2003.74 Accordingly, less developed countries continue to adopt new laws and 
regulations in order to attract more investment into their countries. There were 235 
changes in laws alone in 2004 to open up borders to MNEs and introduced new 
promotional measures for MNEs.75 In addition 20 countries lowered their corporate 
income tax.76 
These figures indicate that the key to MNEs movement and behavioural policies is 
found in developed countries since developed countries host the biggest MNEs and as 
well have significant financial resources. Thus, the less developed countries have to be 
involved in a bidding war to attract MNEs by introducing foreign investment laws as 
well as reducing their regulatory schemes.77 In those conditions, it is not realistic to 
expect countries to increase regulations on MNEs; indeed it is often very difficult to 
keep existing regulations. Accordingly, in these loose regulatory environments, 
companies are almost free to move from one jurisdiction to another one with little 
problem or little loss of profit. 
71 Muchlinski, Multinational p. 31 (n 38) 
72 The figures from WIRs are given as examples to indicate the scale of global economic activit~es of 
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The increasing effect of the global regulatory actors on international trade is 
another development in the world economy. The escalating instability of financial and 
exchange markets, and the changing architecture of supranational institutions such as the 
WTO, World Bank and IMF, affect MNEs' ability to organise and move their products 
and capital across the globe. The aim of these institutions is always to open boundaries 
and reduce limitations so it is a common conditionality for countries who ask for credit 
or be accepted into memberships to open their boundaries to MNEs. 
In the inner organisational structure of MNEs, the challenges of an innovation-
driven economy and the emergence of new forms of international business activities, 
together with the increasing instability of many cross-border transactions led to new 
understanding of organisational structures for MNEs. It is forcing entities to rethink the 
roles played, and the relationships between the numerous decision-taking entities 
comprising these enterprises. As a result, there are systematic approaches to organisation 
of MNE activities, alternative modalities often harmonising with each other and more 
institutional pluralism. Considerable foreign based innovatory activity with or without 
strategic alliances with foreign frrms have been achieved.78 As a result in MNE 
organisation, there are flattened pyramids; more heterarchical structures; more 
delegation of responsibilities to line subsidiary managers.79 These new organisational 
models make MNEs movements and organisations more challenging and more efficient 
allowing them to control world economic activities better and on a more global scale. 
Theories of Multinational Investment 
At this stage, a close look at the earlier determinants of MNE activities is necessary 
because the time of emergence of early MNEs and the acceptance of the long time 
77 Charlton, Incentive Bidding, (n 60) 
78 Bartlett CA and Ghoshal S, Managing Across Borders- the Transnational Solution (Harvard Business 
School Press, Boston 1989) 
79 Dunning, The Key literature, p. 48 (n 46) 
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debated limited liability theory came at the same time. Thus, the more we understand the 
drive behind investment decisions, the better proposals for regulations we can produce. 
The basic economic explanation for FDI lies in the natural evaluations of firms , 
which requires them to search for alternatives.8o The frrms run through opportunities in 
domestic markets before going for new adventures abroad in order to search for 
international opportunities for their value added activities.81 Shortly, once firms develop 
ownership advantages, international investment theory tells us that a particular 
combination of location, marketing and knowledge-transfer factors makes foreign 
production almost inevitable.82 
Therefore, after looking at the traditional explanations for the emergence of 
:MNEs, one sees that investment theory connects the theory of the firm and location 
theory. 83 The enterprise, possessing certain firm-specific assets, finds some costs 
advantages in internalising the use of these assets within the organisation on a cross-
border basis. Consequently, the location incentives to establish operations abroad may 
derive from tariff qr non-tariff barriers which act as deterrents to trade, lower unit labour 
costs, or host government policies such as offers of investments incentives or 
nationalistic procurement policies which favour enterprises located within the market. 84 
The location differences can simply be explained by the fact that the supply of 
some goods is found in one location and demand for them in another. However, 
geographic expansion of markets also allows more benefits for the frrms; more 
productive division of labour, gains from specialisation, exploitation of differences in 
resource contribution, and adaptation of skills can be mentioned as some examples for 
80 Lall Sanjaya, the New Multinationals: The Spread o/Third World Enterprises (Wiley, Chichester 1983) 
p.68. 
81 Caves, Multinational .•. Economic Analyses p.S9 (n 12) 
8:! LaB, New Multinationals p.69 (n 80) 
83 Caves, Multinational ... Economic Analyses (n 12) 
84 Brewer T and Young S, The Multilateral Investment System and Multinational Enterprises (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1998) p.12 
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the locational benefits of investment. 85 Another locational influence on why companies 
see foreign countries as having better and more benefit creating opportunities lies in the 
technological developments in home countries. Their power and technological 
superiority enables MNEs to suppress the domestic market easily, rather than competing 
at home with other powerful companies and being exposed to severe price cuts and so 
on.
86 Furthermore, the technological developments show their effect on management of 
companies since the growth due to the application of new technology and of 
management skills extends effective control and supervision of foreign subsidiaries to 
marketing, distribution, purchasing, facilities, personnel, production units and research 
and developments encouraging companies to go for FDI with fewer risks.87 
At the frrm level, size of frrms has been found to have a strong and independent 
positive effect on internalisation. Clearly while size reflects the influence of factors 
which create entry barriers at the industry level, it also acts as a powerful source of 
monopolistic advantage on its own providing privileged access to capital markets, to 
information, to production factors, and government favours. 88 When natural power has 
emerged in the firm, how a fmn reacts to the random opportunity for direct investment 
depends on a scale of economics and market knowledge. It also depends on how the 
opportunity is perceived in the hierarchy of the firm and the response by management. 89 
This makes frrm basis advantages less predictable and dependent on other conditions. 
The inefficiency of exporting was also a reason to search for cross-border 
investment because one of the earlier actual physical expansions abroad, beyond mere 
export or licensing, was the realisation that foreign markets' needs could perhaps be 
more effectively assessed and met by an on-the-spot manager, who could better 
85 Kobrin SI, 'The Architecture of Globalisation: State Sovereignty in a Networked Global Economy' in 
Dunning JH, Governments, Globalisation, and International Business (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1997) p. 149 
86 Fieldhouse, Multinational ... a Critique p. 14 (n 7) 
87 Teichova, Multinationals in Perspective p. 366 (n 13) 
88 Teicbova, Multinationals in Perspective p. 366 (n 13) 
89 Nicholas S, 'The Theory of Multinational Enterprise as a Transactional Mode' in Hertner Peter and Jones 
Geoffrey, Multi1ll1tiol'ltlls: Theory and History, (Gower, Aldershot 1986) p.76 
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understand the local consumer, than by a long-distance counterpart.90 The financial 
advantages of manufacturing in a foreign market closer to the target consumer were also 
discovered. 91 
Of course, during the history of foreign direct investment, the motivations for 
cross border investments have shown various different characteristics. For example, one 
of the earliest motivations was the desire to control sources of raw materials, which 
explains why historically multinational operations developed in the extractive colonised 
areas before becoming involved in manufacturing. Therefore, Professor Dunning claims 
that it is not possible to produce everlasting certain theories for multinational 
investment. 92 He puts firm specific and location specific advantages together and 
explains investment theory under the name of eclectic theory that is a combination of 
three inter-related factors: 93 first, the competitive (firm specific) advantages of existing 
or potential MNEs, second, the location advantages of particular countries in offering 
complementary assets, for these advantages to the exploited or amplified, and the 
tendency of the firms possessing the ownership specific advantages to combine these 
with those of foreign based assets, by FDI, rather than by the market mechanism, or 
some kind of non-equity cooperative project.94 
The country specific conditions as well had an important role for searching out 
overseas investment. At a time when Americans moved to intemationalisation, this 
movement was greatly stimulated by the Sherman Act of 1890. Although at home they 
were restricted by antitrust regulations, American companies were entitled to use 
whatever methods were necessary to conduct foreign trade.95 Consequently, the current 
90 Wallace, The Multinational, p. 18 (n 1) 
91 Wallace, The Multinational, p. 18 (n 1) 
92 Dunning, The Key literature p. 43 (n 46) 
93 Dunning, The Key literature p. 43 (n 46) 
94 See Buckley PI and Casson M, the Economic Theory of Multinational Enterprise (Macmillan, London 
1985), Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises. p. 39 (n 38) 
95 Wallace, The Multinational, p. 20 (n 1) 
56 
analysis of MNEs argues that direct foreign investment IS based upon certain 
monopolistic advantages possessed by fInns.96 
Indeed the early process of expansion of frrms to national-market figures in the 
nineteenth century in the US economy was quite similar to their transformation to 
multinational status more recently.97 We have evidence on the behaviour of early MNEs 
such as Singer Sewing Machine Company, which became foreign investors through a 
process of incremental problem solving, such as dealing with the unsatisfactory 
performances of foreign licensees or sales agents. The historical case studies also 
illustrate that the evolution of the decentralised multi-plant and multinational firm 
depended on the need for economic effIciency for the firms. 98 
Evaluation of Social and Economic Characteristics of MNEs 
Since their emergence, MNEs have been one of the few principal institutions affecting 
the formation and outcome of all kinds of economic relations; the other important 
institution has been the states. The powerful role of the MNE in the contemporary global 
economy reflects their capabilities and willingness to organise, for good or bad, cross-
border production and transactions more effectively than any alternative institutional 
mechanism.99 In the last two decades, MNEs' activities have played an important role in 
the globalisation processes of the world's economic activities. 
As a resul,t, the 21 st century can be described as the era of the emergence of truly 
globalised MNEs and the real and more effective freedom of movement of capital 
between countries, if it is not completely free. Moreover, in economic characteristics, 
96 Lall, New Multinationals p.l (n 80) 
97 Nicholas, Theory of Multinational, p. 64 (n 89) 
98 Caves, Multinational ... Economic Analyses, p.6l (n 12) 
99 Dunning, Multinational ... Global Economy,. p.133 (n 9) 
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from a relatively simple vertical set of control procedures designed to support market 
transactions and resource seeking foreign investors, the MNE has evolved into a complex 
hierarchy of a network of vertical and horizontal intra and inter-firm connection aimed to 
carry on its global and regional objectives. loo Thus, these new type of MNEs, while 
investing, think about cost-effective structure of profit maximisation- rather than market 
entry models of 19th and early 20th century multinationals. 
This movement from market orienting types MNEs to cost effective MNEs created 
more problems in the less developed countries because of the inadequate laws of these 
countries and, in contrast, their need for FDI in order to develop. The MNEs have 
abused these weaknesses to secure many unjustifiable incentives from the governments. 
Also, the competition for attracting more FDI in less developed countries weakened the 
legal protection of their citizens in relation to MNEs. This makes already weak legal 
systems non-working since capital and economic organisations are easily movable from 
one country to another, less developed countries are afraid of deterring MNEs' 
investments in their countries. This situation creates severe competition amongst 
countries to attract more FDI and thus makes the country regulations very lenient, even 
worse, forces them give judicial incentives to MNEs for their activities. tOt This forces to 
give incentives and exemption for multinationals in host countries, sometimes 
suggestive of the old colonial era. 
On an economic basis, the very idea of a national market as an economic construct 
appears to have lost meaning in the post-modem world economy.102 Given the 
emergence of globalisation in every area of business, neither territoriality nor mutually 
100 Dunning, Multinational ... Global Economy p.232 (n 9) 
101 Under the project of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, some restriction have been introduced for the 
governments not to change the law or make not applicabl~ further c~anges of the la~ for the BTC 
consortium under which BP is the largest stakeholder and leadmg the design and construction process. For 
more details see Amnesty International "Human Rights on the Une" 
httj;J:llwww.amnestwsa.orglbusinesslhumanrightsontheline.pdfaccessed 22 June 2006. See also, Lawson-
Remer TE, • A Role for the International Finance Corporation in Integrating Environmental and Human 
Rights Standards into Core Project Covenants: Case Study of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyh~ <?il Pipeline 
Project' in Schutter OD (ed.), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Hart Pubhshing, Oxford 
2006) 
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exclusive geographic organisation retains significance. The result has effects that raise 
questions about the meaning of sovereignty of national states in a global system that 
gives the MNEs the power to operate all over the world. 
Currently, with the progressive reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers through 
the GAIT /WTO. mechanism, one of the dominant factors influencing investments 
abroad has simply come to be the need to gain and safeguard access to local and regional 
markets.
103 
These new organisational and structural changes in world trade ease cross 
border investment by creating more benefits, but making the competition for attracting 
FDI more severe for the host countries. Free trade zones like European Union and 
NAFTA are also determinant bodies for the 21 st century's international trade. 104 
Consequently, nation states have contradictory interests and objectives in their 
relations with MNEs. Some states are powerful enough not to compromise the civil and 
social rights of their citizens, while other might be desperate for FDI and thus more open 
to compromise about the civil and social rights of their citizens so national boundaries, 
in this sense, still create significant differentials on the global economic surface. lOS The 
critical point, however, is that globalisation implies that the national economy is no 
longer the unit of economic accounting or the frame of reference for economic 
strategies. The new structures and strategies in MNEs governance operate in accordance 
with the rules of globalisation. This leaves least developed countries dealing with issues 
that they have no power to change. 
The frrm specific organisation has changed the MNEs' social position. They are 
not simply groups of companies anymore; they are one of the most important economic 
and financial determinants of the world economy. They are known separately from their 
102 Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalisation, p. 159 (n 85) 
103 See WTO Secretariat, From GAIT to WID: The Multilateral Trading System in the New Millennium (Kluw~r Law International, London 2000), RuttJey P, Mac Vay I and Carol G, The WTO and International 
Trade Regulation (Cameron May, London 1998), Thomas JS and Meyer MA, The New Rules of Global 
Trade (Carswell. Ontario 1997) and Wallace, The Multinational, p. 28 (n 1) 
104 Weiler .JHH, The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA; Towards a Common Law of International Trade 
Replation (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000) 
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country of origin; they might be bargaining with the national states independently from 
their national states. Actually, it is almost impossible identifying them with a nationality 
since their assets and origins might be scattered all-over the world. This indicates 
another misconception of the problems from social theory that MNEs are controlled and 
they operate under very control of the states. 106 Indeed, states are becoming dependent 
on MNEs' control. 
Accordingly, the law making bodies have failed to react to challenges in the 
modem theory of international investment from a reliance on country-oriented 
advantages towards frrm-specific advantages. International private law still basically 
depends on the law of individual equal states, even though some bilateral harmonisation 
has been achieved, especially under European Union Law. These country specific 
regulations show very limited characteristics under company and tort laws. On the other 
hand, international regulatory activities have concentrated on creating a more 
comfortable atmosphere for the ~s, such as in tax and corporate governance. The 
improvements in the last two decades in international trade are impressive. The new and 
powerful transformation of GAIT to WTO is progressing very fast. The free trade-
agreements are emerging everyday between developed countries and developing 
countries. The governments and international fmancial institutions seem to heavily 
devote themselves to easing the trade barriers across borders. All these mean more 
powerful, bigger and wider spread MNEs influence. In contrast, the liability for 
company groups is still regulated by 20th century's narrow understanding of company 
law based on a limited liability company as a principal. This lack of sound regulations is 
common between common law and continental law .107 
At fIrSt sight, the main obstacle to the regulations seems to be limited liability 
rules. However, the examination of multinational investment theory and an historical 
approach has proved that the relation between limited liability and a company's 
lOS Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalisation, p. 154 (n 85) 
106 Birkinshaw Julian and Hood Neil (eds.), Multinatiol'ltll Corporate Evolution tmd Subsidituy 
Development (palgrave Macmillan, London 1998) p. 782 
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investment decision is not certain. The examination of economic triggers for foreign 
investments as well shows no coincidence with the prosperity that limited liability is 
claimed to create. In fact it is difficult to fmd any attempt to examine thoroughly the 
reasons why MNEs decided on different strategies once the decision to undertake FD I 
had been made. The reasons why some fInns made Greenfield investments and others 
p~rchased existing frrms, and why some fInDs established wholly-owned subsidiaries 
d h " . 108 an ot ers JOInt ventures, remam vague. Actually small and medium sized enterprises 
choose joint ven~res while big multinational have chosen direct investment and 
therefore establishing subsidiaries, mostly wholly owned. 109 This proves that 
establishing a subsidiary under entity law for MNEs is due to the effects of economic 
and fInancial evaluation rather than incentives provided by the limited liability company. 
In any explanation of the economic theories of multinational enterprise, the 
advantages of limited liability company are mentioned. The studies that have examined 
some particular countries have proved that there is no certain relation between the 
decision of investment of the fIrms and the limited liability of corporate shareholders. 110 
Even the modem investment theory provides little guidance on the factors influencing 
the allocation of resources when neither law nor custom prevails. Successful cross-
border activity requires a combination of skills; the ability to identify profits 
opportunities, the judgment to evaluate them, and the tactical awareness to exploit them 
properly. 111 In other words, it depends on the practical reality of international 
107 Detailed discussion is made at Chapter 3. 
108 Hertner and Jones, Multinationals p. 10 (n 3) 
109 Agarwal S and Ramaswami SN, 'Choice of Foreign M~ket Entr:Y Mode, .Impact of Ownership, 
Location and Intemalisation Factors' (1992) 23 Journal InternatIOnal Busmess Studies 1 
110 Jones G, 'The Performance of British Multinational Enterprise, 1890-1945' in Hertner Peter and Jones 
Geoffrey, Multinationals: Theory and History, (Gower, Aldershot 1986), Herther P, "German 
Multinational Enterprise before 1914: Some Case Studies' in Hertner Peter and Jones ~~, 
Multinationals: Theory and History, (Gower, Aldershot 1986), Fridenson P, 'The Growth of Mulunabonal 
Activities in the French Motor Industry, 1890-1979' in Hertner Peter and Jones Geoffrey, Multinationals: 
Theory and HIStOry, (Gower, Aldershot 1986) 
111 Casson M, 'General Theories of Multinational Enterprise: Their Relevance to Business History' in 
Hertner Peter and Jones Geoffrey, Multinationals: Theory and HIStOry, (Gower, Aldershot 1986) p. SS 
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b' 112 Thi 
usmess.· s proves that the understanding of the legal factors to the growth of 
MNEs is much less advanced than economic theory. 1 13 
The Changes to Organisation and Management Structures of 
Multinational Enterprises 
Need for Examination 
There is a growing expectation in business and MNEs studies to examine the structural 
changes in MNEs because examination of the issues only on the basis of the simplified 
structure of MNEs is far from creating sound solutions to the problems. Therefore, this 
study includes examination of horizontally structured MNEs, and then, will clarify the 
situation and will create more efficient ways of thinking. The need to examine the 
organisational structure of business organisations lies in the fact that if we wish to 
develop an adequate economic as well as legal theory of the modem business enterprise 
and the contemporary economic activities of them, we must begin to build an sufficient 
sociological and economical understanding of business organisations and build new laws 
on these facts. 114 In other words, at this stage if one wonders why the structure of 
organisations has become the centre for discussions of legal theory, the answer lies in 
the realities of globalisation that turned FDI and consequently international business 
activities towards a firm-based model rather than country based model. liS 
112 For example, it is still possible to establish unlimited liability company in England. Moreover, German 
and Turkish laws have company forms with unlimited liability. 
113 Muchlinski, Multinational p. 37 (n 38) 
114 Scott John, 'Corporate Groups and Network Structure' in McCahery J, Picciotto S and Scott S, 
Corporate Control and Accountability (OUP, Oxford 1993) 
115 Randoy Turquand Rule, 'Towards a Firm-based Model of Foreign Direct Investment' in Bjorkman I 
and Forsgren M (eds.), The Nature Of the Transnational Firm (Mumkgaard. Copenhagen, 1997) p. 257 
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Although the changes during the history of MNEs and its reflections have been. to 
some extent, observed and indicated in major economic, managerial and business 
studies, the history of the multinational enterprise studies from a legal perspective is 
based on the common misconception of economic analysis and its effect on law making. 
It has stayed on the same assumption that economic analysis traditionally treated the 
MNE as a single decision-making centre, as if one mind were absorbing all relevant data 
and making all decisions on the basis of well-considered purposes. In fact decision-
making is decentralised within fInns, and decisions can be highlighted by the structure 
of the internal organisation chosen by the fInn and the incentives and the resources that 
it provides to its various groups of practical specialties. I 16 
This need leads us to the aim of the thesis that is to examine the framework of 
progressed and differentiated organisation forms and to link this framework to an 
elaborated theoretical analysis of the other historical fIelds of organisation theory. This 
, assessment will indicate how and to what extent business organisations have changed 
during the past century. I 17 
The reason behind the new organisational structure is the same as the reason for 
emergence of MNEs; economic motivation and the economic background for the world 
business activities have changed. I IS The inspiration of groups of companies expanding 
overseas has increasingly shifted from one focused mainly on securing new markets or 
low-cost productive contribution, to a universal search for essential intelligence or 
limited competencies not readily available or very costly in the home market. I 19 Barlett 
and Ghoshal accurately point out that the need to secure key supplies of raw materials, 
116 Caves, Multinational ... Economic Analyses p.S7 (n 12) 
117 Dunning, Multinational ... Global Economy p.21S (n 9) Professor Dunning here explains on whi,ch 
conditions an MNE will structure itself. And, in general, the more numerous and complcx the technologIes 
required producing a particular product and the more products supplied by firm, the more complcx its 
organizational structure is likely to be. 
118 Tavares AT, 'Strategic Management of Multinational Networks: A Subsidiary Evaluation Pcrspcctivc' 
(University of Porto) at http://www.ifm.eng.cam.ac.uk!cimlimnetlsymposium200llpapersltavarcs.pdf 
accessed 2S June 2006 
119 Bartlett CA and Ghoshal S, 'The Evaluation of Transnational' in Islam I and Shepherd W (cds.), 
Current Iss,ues in International Business (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 1997) p. 110 
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to acquire new markets, to achieve further sales and to access low-cost factors of 
production such as cheap labour or low-cost capital comprised the earlier foreign 
• " . 120 Investment msprratlOn. At an early stage MNEs and foreign operations were regarded 
as organisational additions or as distant settlements to the domestic business and treated 
in an opportunistic rather than a strategic approach.121 
A common subj ect in all the discussions of organisational theory has been the 
remarkable changes in the competitive environment that have reduced the effectiveness 
of traditional MNEs' approaches, highlighting the need to move towards less-
hierarchical structures because of their experience in the international operating 
environment. MNEs that do so develop the best chance of existing. l22 Thus, they search 
for the most efficient operating environments, which basically depend on profit 
maximisation. As a result from an evolutionary perspective, there has been a shift in 
focus from measurement within traditional vertical models to movement toward the 
horizontally structured MNE models under which they can have the best chance to 
maximise the profit. 123 
On this point Barlett and Ghoshall conducted the most important studies resulting 
in fmdings that large global corporations are creating a new organisational model in the 
1990s that is significantly different from the multi divisional fonn (M-form) and its 
previous shapes of organisation that had dominated corporate structures over the last 
five decades and that had provided the background for much of present organisation 
theory.124 This movement in structure is not surprising because there had always been 
120 Bartlett and Ghoshal, The Evaluation of Transnational, p. 110 (n 119) 
121 Gooderham Paul N and Ulset Svein, 'Beyond the M-form: Towards a Critical Test of the New Form' 
(2002) 9lntemational Journal of the Economics of Business 117 
122 Bartlett and Ghoshal. The Evaluation of Transnational, p. 108 (n 119) 
123 Malnight TW, 'The Transition From Decentralised To Network Based MNC Structures: An 
Evolutionary Perspective' (1996) Journal Of International Business Studies, first quarter p. 43 
124 Ghoshal S and Bartlett CA, The IndividUIJlized Corporation (Harper Collins Publishers, New York 
1997) 
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differences within the broader M-form model as well. l2S There had been constant 
changes in structures of companies and groups of companies and MNEs since their first 
emergence. All these evolutionary developments have led to the claim that the modem 
theoretical perception on MNEs as differentiated networks of subsidiaries is the proper 
academic background to understand the global organisations of MNEs. 126 
However, one should bear in mind that each enterprise is, to some extent, unique 
and usually holds a combination of different organisational structures. Moreover, the 
most favourable, or supposed most profitable organisational structure of any particular 
MNE may change over time. 127 We will see these changes apparent in the assessment of 
structural changes of MNEs. Actually, the argument pursued in this thesis depends on 
the fact that evolution of the organisational structure of MNEs has been changed over 
the last century from vertically structured organisation towards horizontally structured 
organisations. Therefore, this study in its overall perspective will not exclude the 
examination of vertically structured MNEs; it will, to some extent, compare the different 
structural models and their reflections in law. 
The Historical Developments of MNEs' Organisational Structures 
In an historical perspective, one of the most significant factors in the rise of MNEs has 
been the development of concentration on organisational structure. The constant impact 
on the structure and organisation of business became obvious from the last quarter of the 
19th century and this led the growth of large companies, which gradually increased their 
market shares at home and abroad, and lately stood at the centre of considerable merger, 
12S Bartlett CA and Ghoshal S, 'Beyond the M-fonn: toward a Managerial Theory of the Firm' (1993) 14 
Strategic Management Journal 23 and Williamson OE, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications (Free Press, New York 1975) 
126 Tavares, Strategic Management, (n 118) 
127 Dunning, Multi1llltional ... Globai Economy, p.21S (n 9) 
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acquisition and other strategically motivated movements. 128 In early stages of emergence 
of enterprise, 'Yhen an enterprise becomes an authority and director and controller of the 
actions of participating organisations, a plain hierarchy develops. The central position of 
the enterprise and the personal relations make the authority the most important co-
ordination mechanism used in this form and creates a distinctive atmosphere that is 
simple and possible for a single centred enterprise to operate. 
As the enterprise grows in an environment that is steady and thus projected, new 
forms may develop. This happened when MNEs were too big to be controlled by simple 
hierarchic structure and the unitary form (U-fonn) has been developed. The V-form 
modifies the co-ordination by authority by introducing several levels of management and 
separates practical responsibilities among managers at the same level. The V-fonn is 
also characterised by the introduction of a new important co-ordination mechanism, 
which can be defmed as advanced rules for the organisation. This new form is 
coordinated by formalised procedures, by precise, written instructions for work 
performance and systems for planning and control. The V-form was a modernisation that 
developed earlier forms, suitable for small and medium sized companies and it reduced 
operation costs for co-ordination in large dimension, mass-production units by function, 
using a multilevel hierarchy with professional managers and relying on broad 
.c. li' .c. 129 lorma sabon lor management. 
After passing through stages of quantity expansion, geographic dispersal and 
vertical integration, companies finally grew by product diversification, experienced 
administrative problems within the functional structure of V- form and converted to the 
M-form, the multidivisional structure, to resume profitability. 130 The natural weakness in 
the unitary formed companies became significant only when the administrative load on 
the senior executives increased to such an extent that they were incapable to handle their 
128 Teichova, Multinationals in Perspective, p. 365 (n 13) 
129 Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, (n 125) and Chandler AD, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of 
Industrial Capitalism. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1990) 
130 Alarik B, 'From M-form to N-form The Structure of Multinational Enterprises' (FE-rapport 2000-378) 
http://swoba.bhs.se/gunwbalpaperslgunwba2000 378.pdf accessed 22 June 2006 
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entrepreneurial responsibility efficiently. 131 This situation arose when the operations of 
the enterprise became too complex and the problems of coordination, assessment, and 
pol.icy formulation too compound for a small number of top officers to handle long-term, 
entrepreneurial, and short-run operational administrative activities. In order to overcome 
these challenges, the innovators built the multi-divisional structure with a general office 
whose management would focus on entrepreneurial activities and with autonomous, 
fairly self-contained operating divisions whose managers would handle operational 
ones. 132 
The M-form can be explained as a development from the V-form, as the V-form 
grew into differentiated businesses, new products and markets. 133 The M-form is 
characterised by a separation into semi-autonomous units with responsibilities for 
results, creating medium-sized corporations within the large enterprise. 134 Whereas the 
principal operating units in the V-form enterprise are the functional divisions, in the M-
form enterprise, these are half-autonomous operating divisions.135 Another characteristic 
is that the responsibilities are divided vertically in the hierarchy. The M-form separates 
top level from middle levels and gives the top-level strategic responsibilities. The middle 
level is divided into divisions and each division is given responsibilities for certain front 
line units. Divisions are given decentralised responsibilities for their own operations 
while for the overall strategic decisions are made at top-Ievel. 136 
131 Chandler AD, Strategy and Structure, (MIT Press, Cambridge 1998) p. 299 
132 Gooderham and Ulset, Beyond the M-fonn, (n 121) 
133 The M-form was characterised as multi-divisional, multi-product, multi-factory, multi-level, multi-
hierarchical and multi-national. 
134 Gooderham Paul N and Ulset Svein, 'Is the Governance of T~snational Really "Beyond the M-
Form"? A critical Review of Barlett and Ghoshal's New Organisational Model' in Taggart H, Berry M 
and McDermott M (eds.), Multinationals in a New Era (palgave, London 2001) They e~plai~ t~ ~s ~f 
M-form optimum divisionalisation involves 1- the identification of separable econonuc acbVl~es .Wlthin 
the firm 2- according quasi-autonomous standing (usually A profit centre na~re) to each 3- mODlt~g.the 
efficiency performance of each division and awarding incentives 4- allocal1ng cash flows to high-YIeld 
uses 5- performing strategic planning in other respects. 
135 Gooderham and Ulset, Beyond the M-form, (n 121) 
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Figure 1: M-fonn (Vertical Structure) 
Parent Company 
6 6 6 Operating units 
6 6 Sub-operating units 
6 6 6 
The multi-divisional structure solved the overload and governance problems of the 
U-fonn by decomposing the larger enterprise into a number of half-independent 
divisions; profit centres, product, brand and geographical lines, and by separating 
strategic decision making at the corporate level from operating decision-making at the 
divisional level that have responsibility for different markets or products, rather than 
functions. MNEs were transferred to M-fonn because, as Chandler's central discussion 
claims MNEs being driven by market growth and technological change to develop 
greater diversity in their products and markets, were able to manage their new strategies 
efficiently only if they were adopted a multidivisional organisational structure. 13? As 
noted by Williamson the M-fonn not only replaced the less efficient U-form structure 
but also was consequently extended to manage diversified assets -the conglomerate- and 
foreign direct investments -the multinational enterprises, together that made the M-form 
considered the genuine and standard models for MNEs. 138 
I.'~ Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, (n 125) and Chandler, Scale and Scope, (n 129) 
I~" Chandler. Strategy and St11lclllrc. (n D 1) 
138 Gooderham and Ulset. Beyond the M-fonn, (n 121) and Williamson. Markets and Hierarchies, (n 125) 
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The more complex matrix structure of M-form was developed in order to meet 
expectation in business in the second half of 1970s. In the Matrix structure two, or more, 
divisional structures are combined~ for example divisions by products and division by 
geographical markets. This dual structure embraces the whole company and is stable 
t · 139 In dd·· h . over Ime. a l110n to t e matnx, an alternative way of achieving the dual 
advantages of global standardisation and national openness is the regional approach. By 
designing and implementing competitive strategies within a region, the MNE may 
overcome some of the very real staffing, communicational and motivational problems 
associated with the global approach. 140 The regional approaches to organisation occurred 
in a way that MNEs set up regional centres that undertake some of the tasks of the centre 
so that there is a better communication amongst the units of the organisation and more 
diverse and efficient allocation of staffmg and financial sources. 141 These organisational 
structures were developed because of the inadequacy of the alternatives to solve the 
problems that more glob ali sed business environments raise. Moreover, the matrix and 
regionally structured organisations have initiated examples of the first transformation to 
the horizontal structure. 
In summary, before the fmal stage of developments in the last century, we can 
divide the organisation of multinational enterprises into some stages. 142 First, most 
MNEs go through an initial period with relatively autonomous foreign subsidiaries that 
are tied to the parent company by financial and managerial links in a way like in a 
holding company. Second, this unstructured system of subsidiaries was successful for 
some time, but if the subsidiaries grew rapidly and accumulated resources, pressures to 
increase control emerge at the headquarters as the international division increases in 
dimension. Top managers recognised a need for a worldwide perspective and thus, a 
need for a global structure. This resulted in the way of developing the V-form and later 
139 Bartlett and Ghoshal, Beyond the M-fonn, (n 125) 
140 Marschan Rebecca, New Structural Forms and Inter-Unit Communication in Multinationals (HSEBA 
Publications, Helsinki 1996) p.6 
141 The later form of regional organisation, regionally organised horizontal MNEs is examined below. (p 
81) 
14:! Alarik, From M-fonn, (n 130) 
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evolved to the M-form. When both foreign sales and foreign product diyersity arc high. 
some companies adopt a new structure~ the global matrix structure. 
Figure 2: The Process towards Less-Hierarchical Structure l43 
Complexity of organisational structure 
Mother-Daughter 
International 
division 
Global division 
Number and dispersal of foreign subsidiaries 
Matrix 
Honzontal 
The structure indicated above was the general environment before the business 
was more complicated and more globalised. New information and communication 
technologies, the liberalisation and globalisation of markets, the integration of different 
products increased uncertainty in many industries and increased volatility in the last two 
centuries brought new way of designing organisational structure. The new structure was 
innovative and changed many basics characteristics of organisations of MNEs. 
Horizontally-Less Hierarchically- Structured Multinational Enterprises 
A new generation of scholars, the process school: Barlett. Ghoshall, Doz, Prahalad, 
Hendlund and the others dominated the international business organisation arena since 
the middle of the 1980s. They claimed that the structure of MNEs was changing. They 
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do not only conserve to have discovered the emergence of an organisational model but 
also claim to having contributed to a new concept and a new organisational theory of the 
MNE.l44 
A contributing factor to the increasing use of new structural mechanisms in MNEs 
is that classic mechanisms -M-form and Matrix- alone are considered incapable of 
capturing the turbulence of today's competitive environment. 145 Accordingly, 
horizontally structured organisation system is a creature of the information age: post-
modem organisations held together by information technology.146 This is a complete 
new era for humanity and human relations and, as happened in the past, new types of 
organisational structures have been developed to meet these new challenges. 
The studies were from many different institutions in a short time. This proves that 
the changes were realised by many scholars. Different names are used to describe the 
new organisation type, geocentric147, dynamic network148 heterarchy149 transnational 150 
integrated network151 horizontal 152 multi-centre153 integrated players154 wired 155 
143 Adapted from Marschan, New Structural Forms, (n 140) 
144 Alarik, From M-form, (n 130) 
145 Marschan, New Structural Forms, p.31 (n 140) 
146 Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalisation, p. 153 (n 85) 
147 Perlmutter HV, 'The Tortuous Evolution Of The Multinational Corporation' (1969 Jan-Feb) Columbia 
Journal of World Business 9 
148 Miles RE and Snow CC, 'Designing Strategic Human Resources Systems' (1984) 13 Organizational 
Dynamics 36 
149 Hedlund G, 'The Hypermodern MNC - A Heterarchy?' (1986) 25 International Studies of 
Management 9 
ISO Bartlett CA, 'Building And Managing Transnational: The New Organisational Challenge In 
Competition' in Porter ME, Global Industries (Harvard Business School Press 1986) 
lSI Bartlett and Ghoshal, Beyond the M-form, (n 125) 
IS2 White R and Poynter TA, 'Organising for World-Wide Advantages' in Bartlett C, Doz Y and Hedlund 
G (eds.) Managing the Global Firm (Routledge, London 1996) 
153 Forsgren M, Holm U and Thilenius P, 'Network Infusion in the M.ultinational Corporation' in 
Bjorkman I, Forsgren M, The Nature Of the Transnational Firm (HandelshonJskolens Forlag, Copenhagen 
1997) 
154 Gupta AK and Govindarajan V, 'Knowledge Flows And The. Structure Of Control Within 
Multinational Corporations' (1991) 161be Academy of Management ReVIew 768 
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tr t· tal 156 1 ·d· . al l57 158 5 anscon men mu tl Imenslon N-fonn integrated global, network-based I 9 
t . 1160 d·f~· 161· .. . 2 me anatlOna 1 lerentlated network mdlvlduabsed enterprise. 16 These names are 
differentiated on just very small differences in perceptions of the facts. I want to name 
the new organisational type as horizontally structured multinationals or less-hierarchical 
multinationals. 
For the purpose of the present study, there is no need for detailed discussion of the 
defmition under each study; rather, leaving this ongoing study to the scholars in the 
management field, the thesis focus on the common characteristics of horizontal 
structures and their reflections in practice. The above mentioned researchers share a 
general view about the organisational evolution in MNEs; their structures are becoming 
less- hierarchical. The fact that top management of several MNEs have had to reconsider 
the long-standing principle that "the parent always knows the best" has required an 
essential change in the way the entire group is managed, turning it from a hierarchical 
pyramid into an integrated network of horizontally structured enterprises. 163 
The spreading of the sources, managerial capabilities, and strategic and operational 
decision making throughout the organisation in the new structure expanded the 
155 Hagstrom P, 'The "Wired" Multinational Corporation: The Role of Information Systems for StructuraI 
Change in Complex Organizations' (Ph.D., Stockholm School of Economics, 1991) 
156 Humes S, Managing the Multinational Confronting The Global-Local Dilemma (prentice Hall, New 
York 1993) 
157 Johanson J and Mattson LG, 'lnternationalisation in Industrial Systems: A Network Approach 
Compared with a Transaction Cost Approach' (1987) 17 International Studies of Management and 
Organisation 34 
158 Hedlund G and Ridderstrahle J, 'Towards a Theory of the Self-Renewing MNC' in Toyre B Night D 
(eds.) International Business: An Emerging Vision (South Coralline Press Columbia SC University, 1997) 
p.329 
159 Malnight, The Transition, (n 123) 
160 Doz Y, Santos J and Williamson P, 'the Metanational: the Next Step in the Evolution of 
Multinationals' in Birkinshaw J (ed.), The Future o/Multinational Company (Wiley, London 2004) 
161 Nohria N, The Differentiated Network: Organising Multinational Corporations for Value Creation 
(Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco 1997) 
162 Ghoshal S and Barlett CA, The Individualized Corporation (Harper Collins Publishers, New York 
1997) 
163 Marschan, New Structural Forms, p.S (n 140) 
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possibilities for foreign subsidiaries to both exploit and create firm-specific advantages, 
and thus play a greater and more active role in the success of MNEs. It also creates a 
more effective organisation of knowledge, innovation and technological growth in 
international MNE organisation. l64 
By decentralising assets and resources into these small, specialised operating units, 
these companies are trying to create an environment in which this scarce knowledge can 
be developed and applied most appropriately. However this creates a greater need for a 
powerful horizontal integration processes to ensure that the entire organisation benefits 
from the specialised resources and expertise developed in its entrepreneurial unitS.165 
The transition between decentralised and network-based approaches must be considered 
as well. This involves the gradual linking and integrating of previously autonomous 
affiliates through a series of particular phases, each representing practical tactical 
responses to then existing external and internal challenges and opportunities. 166 
The main characteristics of horizontally structured MNEs are these167; first, the 
enterprise consists of many centres as a result of shifting geographically the focus of 
control from headquarters to subsidiary level. Second, subsidiaries are granted global or 
regional responsibilities for a particular function, or product line, or even whole business 
divisions. Such multi-centeredness as opposed to the view of having one centre and the 
boundary is a major element in the new model. Third, the importance of culture control 
is stressed and, fourth, the continuous flow of information across organisational and 
national boundaries is emphasised. 
Accordingly, a less-hierarchical structure comprises the following five dimensions 
1- allocation of decision making authority to appropriate levels (mostly to subsidiaries) 
2- de-layering of organisational levels 3- geographical dispersion of key functions across 
164 Tolentino PE, 'Hierarchical Pyramids and Heterarchical Networks: Organi~onal Structures of 
Multinational Corporations and Its Impact on World Development' (2002) 21 Contrtb Pol Economy 69 
16S Bartlett and Ghoshal, Beyond the M-form, (n 125) 
166 Malnight, The Transition, (n 123) 
167 Marschan, New Structural Forms, p.S (n 140) 
73 
units m different countries: 4- de-bureaucratisation of formal procedures and 5-
differentiations of work responsibility and authority among subsidiary units. 168 
In this modem form different dimensions are focused upon in a more flexible way. 
different for different parts of the company and different over time. The organisation 
encourages managers to think in many dimensions, rather than imposing formalised 
matrix structures. 169 This is the dominant characteristic of these MNE forms referred to , 
as less-hierarchical structures in the present study; they operate as integrated networks: 
ratl~er than behaving as hierarchical control mechanism. l7O Accordingly, this new 
innovative structuring has led to more globalised MNEs placing less reliance on 
traditional hierarchical governance structures and dictating relationships, and moving 
towards a system of cross networks based on mUltiple centres of heterarchical decision 
taking. 171 Accordingly, the roles of subsidiaries are getting more important, subsidiaries 
are given roles as "global innovators" and incorporated players. 172 
This new form decentralises responsibilities for short-term profit and long-term 
developments to front-level units who combine with flexibility over the boundaries of 
divisions to satisfy demands, business relations and customers. Management at top-and 
middle levels supports co-operation, distribute specialised roles and involve in 
centralisation. The new model is grounded in a managerial perspective that is very 
different from that of existing economic and behavioural theories of the flfUl. Thus, the 
new organisation in MNEs also challenges management roles, implying that, rather than 
traditional top-down decision-making; decisions should be made through 
168 Marschan Rebecca, 'Dimensions of Less-Hierarchical Structures in Multinationals' in Bjorkman I and 
Forsgren M (cds.), The Nature Of the Transnational Firm (Mumkgaard, Copenhagen 1997) p. 441 
169 Ghoshal and Barlett, The Individualized Corporation, (n 162) 
170 Forsgren, Holm and Thilenius, Network Infusion, (n 153) and Hedlund and Ridderstrahle, Towards a 
Theory, (n 158) 
171 Dunning, Multintltional ... Global Economy p.216 (n 9) 
mAnderson Je, Hakansson H and Johanson J, 'Dyadic Business Relationships Within a Business 
Network' (1994) 4 Journal of Marketing 1 
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communication and collaboration between managers at different levels \\·ithin different 
roles. 173 
Figure 3: the Horizontal Organisation174 
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and capabilities. 
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and cooperation in an environment 
of sharing decision-making. 
Flow of components, products, people 
and information among independent 
units. 
There should be no confusion: horizontal exchanges of infonnation and other 
elements do not exclude headquarters, but it does not necessarily pennit headquarters to 
have a dominant position in decision-making. 175 In practice, the process of moving 
toward a less-hierarchical structure is most commonly imposed from the top of the 
corporation through an essentially centralised effort. 176 Thus, the fact of the removal of 
hierarchy does not refer to complete removal of hierarchy. In contrast to the traditional 
tTl Ghoshal S and Barlett CA, 'The Multinational Corporations as an Inter Organizational Network' 1990. 
15 Academy of Management Review 603 
1"4 Adopted from Bartlett CA and Ghoshal S. 'Managing in an Transnational' in McKern B (ed.). 
Managing Global Ncrwork Corporation (Routladge, London 2003) 
P5 White and Poynter. Organising for World-Wide. (n 152) and Marschan. Yew StrllclIIral Forms. p. 3 In 
140) 
t7b Marschan. Nell' Structural Forms. p. 1 (n l·ll!) 
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hierarchical perspective, in which the centre controls all of the MNE' s activities and 
makes all strategic decisions, the horizontal perspective assumes multiple centres of 
expertise around the world, greater strategic rules for subsidiaries, and flexible 
governance structures. I 77 
The first important case study was conducted by Bartlett and Ghoshal on ABB.178 
On ABB the middle managers' crucial horizontal linkage role is supported by a top 
management that creates a value based perspective to support and reward collaborative 
behaviour, and by a front line management that exploits the personal networks such 
horizontal relationships facilitate. It is very different process than the vertical planning 
and resource allocation process at the core classical model, but a vital one for a company 
competing in an increasingly knowledge-based economy. 179 
Citibank'sl80 European corporate banking structure in 1994 closely resembled 
network-based MNE models described in the literature. 181 The bank's structure 
incorporated centralised products. and functional support centres- centres of excellence. 
Widespread- direct horizontal flows between these units and local marketing units were 
similar to projections by scholars. However, moving beyond this structure, research at 
Citibank could be used to develop a framework for the transition process in moving 
fr()m decentralised toward network-based MNE organisational models. 182 For the better 
understanding of the structure we should examine the structure of Philips183 as another 
example. 
177 Birkinshaw I, 'How Multinational Subsidiary Mandates Are Gained And Lost' (1996) 27 Journal Of 
International Business Studies 467 
178 ABB is a Switzerland based engineering company that operates around 100 countries and employs 
108.000 people. Its total asset in 2006 is over $25bn. More information is at http://www.abb.com 
179 Bartlett and Ghoshal, Beyond the M-form, (n 125) 
180 Citibank is a US based financial group and it is the leader in the world in banking sector. More 
information is at www.citibank.com 
181 Malnight, The Transition, (n 123) 
Is:! Malnight, The Transition, (n 123) 
183 Royal Philips Electronics of the Netherlands is one of the biggest MNEs in electronics industry. Philips 
employs 121.700 people in more than 60 countries. More information is at www.philips.com 
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Figure 4: Organizational structure of~.V. Philips I 84 
o Independent Companies Managerial Relationships 
1114 Adopted from Ghoshal S and Barlett CA. 'The Multinational Corporatjon~ as an Inter Organizational 
Network' (1990) 15 Academ y of Management Review 603 
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In the chart, it is seen that Philips has subsidiaries in multiple countries and each 
has managerial ties with the centre in Holland. Moreover. there are regional centrc~ and 
these centres as well have ties with subsidiaries in the region. More interesting findings 
in the chart are that regional centres have managerial ties with each other. This proves 
decentralized nature of the management structure of the group. Moreover. regional 
centres can make independent decisions from the centre in Holland. 
The structure of Shell can be given as another example the simple chart in their 
website indicates that there is an advice and service relationship between ser .. ice 
companies and operation companies. The operation companies have restricted 
relationship with parent companies since they get these services from the service 
companies although there is no ownership relationship between those companies. The 
chart is also indication of power share between parent and subsidiaries. 
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Figure 5: the Structure of SheU 185 
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There is an interesting similarity between the structure of Shell and the structure of 
Bayer. Similar to Shell, Bayer divides its main organisational structure into three 
business operations companies and three central service companies. The main function 
of service companies is to develop better services for the groups' business operating 
companies. Bayer has also a corporate centre whose function is not clearly stated in their 
website but from the structure of group. it can be claimed that it does not ha\'e a function 
185 Shell is a global group of energy and petrochemical companies. operating in more than 1-1ll countries 
and territories. employing approximately 109.000 people. More information is at \\'\\'w.shell.com. 
like a parent companies function in vertical organization. Rather its function is to create 
group principles that are applicable in operation of entities under the group. 
Figure 6: the structure of BayerI86 
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The conceptual difference between traditional and less hierarchical organisations 
is that traditional organisations are characterised by strong reliance on hierarchy and 
formal structure. In contrast, less-hierarchical organisations are seen as not being 
constrained by formal organisational charts. Rather, these forms of organisation rely 
increasingly on informal control and co-ordination mechanisms such as personal 
relationships and organisational culture to manage the dispersed subsidiary network. I8? 
The reduced degree of hierarchy reflects the increased influence of subsidiary units in 
relation to headquarters. I88 Horizontally structured MNE models have been associated 
with escalating horizontal linkages between scattered operating units through a 
186 Bayer is a Germany based pharmeticual company. It operates worldwide through 350 subsidiaries and 
employs 110.200 people. More information is at www.baver.com. 
IS" Ghoshal and Barlett. The Multinational Corporations. (n 184) 
IRR Forsgren. Holm and Thilenius. Network Infusion, (n 153) 
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collection of organisational mechanisms, whereas. the earlier enterprises tented to 
emphasise a formal organisational structures and their hierarchi..:al operating 
h · 189 M hi' mec amsm. oreover, t e evo utlOnary structure developed in this study presents the 
direction of change being driven by steady adjustments in several aspects of operations 
of MNEs. Rather than intentionally moving toward horizontal structure. each stage 
represented a practical strategic response to then-existing challenges and 
.. 190 Th £ . Opportunitles. ere ore, some enterpnses have completed their organisational 
evolutions while some others have just started their process. We should also bear in 
mind that there is a dynamic changing process in any particular business enterprise. 
Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the fact that MNEs are dynamic organisation 
with constant changing process, rather than static organisational structure. 
Regionally Organised Multinational Enterprises 
Another way of operating MNEs is to divide an enterprise into area divisions, each 
responsible for all operations in some overseas region. This solution is popular where 
the foreign subsidiaries supply one another with components or intermediate products. 
However, this requires close coordination. 191 Subsidiary units are granted highly 
specialised roles in terms of functional and geographical responsibilities. In order to 
support the new structure several companies have also created finance centres and 
regional research and development units to support activities of other subsidiaries. Such 
a development trend shows the importance of global functional management and the 
need for the new structure. 192 
I~~ Malnight. The Transition, (n 123) 
I'lO Malnight. The Transition. (n 123) 
I'll Caves. Multinational... Economic Analyses p.65 (n 12) 
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Figure 7: The Regionally Divided Horizontal Organisation 
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What has happened, particularly within the EU, is that an MNE has transferred an 
organisational system to each group of its affiliates located in a particular region. The 
possible gains from internalised transactions between parents and subsidiaries were not 
sufficient to crate the most efficient organisations, thus MNEs prefer regional horizontal 
structure in order to benefit from common governance of the value-added activities of 
affiliates. 193 Thus, we cannot exclude relationships between sister units in regional 
organisation from the horizontally structured MNEs. Although there may be differences 
in what actors and relational magnitude influence the internal and the external parts of 
the organisation, the subsidiary relations in an organisational context should be regarded 
as another system independent of the legal borders of the MNEs.194 
Managing On Global Concern; Common Group Policy 
The horizontal structure mostly happens in internal relationship of companies and is 
very hard to display from outside. MNEs are reluctant to disclose their detailed data of 
organizational structure. Rather, they prefer giving general information about the group 
as whole without any particular reference to their structure. However, examining their 
annual fmancial and CSR report reveal some indications that they are operating in 
complex structure and the corporate centre is more policy determinant than direct 
controller of the subsidiaries. 
For example, HSBC195 emphasizes the global characteristic of the organisation in 
their introduction to the group in their website. 
"References to HSBC on this website refer to the HSBC Group of discrete legal 
entities, each of which is wholly or partly owned by HSBC Holdings pic. The entities, 
193 Dunning, Multinational ... Global Economy p.130 (n 5) 
194 Forsgren, Holm and Thilenius, Network Infusion, p. 477 (n 153) 
195 HSBC Holdings is a public limited company incorporated in England and Wales. The HSBC group 
operates in five regions. HSBC's ~tern~onal ~etwork comp~ses around .10,000 offices in 8~ countries 
and territories in Europe, the Asia-Pacific regIon, the Amencas, the Middle East and Africa. HSBC 
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which form the HSBC GROUP, provide a comprehensive range of financial sen'ices to 
personal, commercial, corporate, institutional and investment, and private banking 
clients. To more easily promote the Group as a whole, HSBC was established as a 
uniform, international brand name in 1999. In 2002, HSBC launched a campaign to 
differentiate its brand from those of its competitors by describing the unique 
characteristics which distinguish HSBC, summarized by the words 'The world's local 
bank"'. 196 
The important proposal can be derived from this introduction will be their natural 
acceptance of operating as a group and promoting this fact by creating an image at 
global level even though HSBC is consisted of tens of legally independent companies 
incorporated in different parts of the world. Similar introduction and emphasis can be 
found in Shell's website. In their annual review they give brief explanation about what 
the group is consisted of and how they publicise their group. 
HIn this Review "Group" is defined as Royal Dutch Shell together with all of its 
consolidated subsidiaries. The expressions "Shell", "Group", "Shell Group" and 
"Royal Dutch Shell" are sometimes used for convenience where references are made to 
the Group or Group companies in general. Likewise, the words "we", "us" and "our" 
are also used to refer to Group companies in general or to those who work for them. 
These expressions are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the 
particular company or companies. The expression "Group companies" as used in this 
Review refers to companies in which Royal Dutch Shell either directly or indirectly has 
control, by having either a majority of the voting rights or the right to exercise a 
controlling influence. The companies in which the Group has significant influence but 
not control are referred to as "associated companies" or "associates" and companies 
in which the Group has joint control are referred to as "jointly controlled entities". In 
this Review, associates and jointly controlled entities are also referred to as "equity 
accounted investments". The term "Group interest" is used for convenience to indicate 
Holdings pic is held by nearly 200,000 shareholders in some 1 00 countries and territories. More 
infonnation is available at www.hsbc.com. 
196 Available at www.hsbc.com 
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the direct and/or indirect equity interest held by the Group in a venture. partnership or 
company (i.e., after exclusion of all third-party interests)". 197 
. The selection of an MNE and examining its Corporate Social Responsibility 
Reports (CSRs) indicate similar facts about the argument about the integrated 
managerial structure. As common theme in their CSR report MNEs are happy to create a 
report covering all entities in the group. Therefore, it can be considered that having 
unified CSR is a reflection of modem structure. For example the CSR report of GM198 
takes a global approach. 
"GM Corporate Responsibility reporting continues to evolve in order to present a 
global picture of its business. All specific regional and countryllocal activity can be 
found in the web report according to business unit structure: GMNA (US, Canada, 
Mexico), GME (Europe, UK, Sweden, etc.) GMAP (Asia Pacific Rim, including China, 
India and Australia) GMLAAM (Latin America, Africa and the Middle East) ... The 
report is global in scope and highlights our key peiformance indicators for reporting 
year 2004/5".199 
Accordingly, in business theory MNEs operate in accordance with common group 
policy together with global management structure. They create an image as a group and 
try to promote this image. Therefore, they are eager to use the terms of either brand 
name like Shell or HSBC or plural forms of expressing the corporate groups such as 
"we, our group, us". Moreover, the groups include not only wholly owned subsidiaries 
but also controlled entities as well as associated entities. In short, MNEs operate as 
integrated groups and create a public image by promoting their enterprise as an 
integrated group with a group management board and global management structure and 
common group policy. 
197 Available at www.shell.com 
198 General Motors Corp. is the world's largest automaker. OM employs 280.000 people and manufactures 
its cars and trucks in 33 countries. More information is at www.gm.com. 
199 Available at bttp://www.gm.comlcompany/gmabilityl 
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Relationships between the Firms under Different Ownership (Networked 
Enterprises) 
In some cases of multinational business transactions, decisions are not taken by only the 
finn but originate from the different finns that are connected to each other by contract 
rather than ownership. This leads to claims that MNEs definitions can be extended to 
include not only subsidiaries under common ownership and control but also networked 
companies that are connected to each other in some kinds of contractual and strategic 
relationship. The basic structure of networked enterprises is examined here because they 
have shown that many relationship between finns and the network are both heterarchical 
and multi-dimensional and are similar to horizontally structure MNEs.200 
Especially in the last two decades, .inter finn agreements have become an 
increasingly important fonn of cross border economic involvement. The increasing 
speed of technological complexity and the need for finns to respond ever more quickly 
to the actions of competitors have forced them to collaborate to maintain or advance 
their competitive position?Ol Moreover, even the global integration of markets by a 
single enterprise, particularly in some industries, may no longer be sufficient to balance 
the huge costs and risks of technological development in a number of strategic 
industries. Thus, there is a big increase in the number of technology-driven collaborative 
agreements or strategic alliances among leading MNEs from the major industrial 
countries; even the largest MNEs must cooperate to deal with the cost, risk, and 
complexity of technology.202 Alliances represent a transformation of the mode of 
organisation of international economic transactions from hierarchically structured MNEs 
ked . 203 to networ compames. 
200 Dunning, Multinational ... Global Economy p.258 (n 5) 
201 Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalisation, p. 151 (n 85) 
202 Kobrin, The Architecture of Globali sati on, p. 151 (n 85) 
203 Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalisation. p. 151 (n 85) 
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Whereas most of the analysis of cooperative alliances has centred on the 
relationship between different groups but in international relationships, it is clear that _ 
modem MNEs are adopting a more pluralistic approach to their overseas activities. 
Consequently, the form and structure of these networked groups will influence the 
model of the relationships between the fmns under collaboration.204 A network 
relationship implies that there are some linked transactions of firms within the network. 
There is a well-structured division of work amongst firms in the network. In short, the 
activities are coordinated neither by the market nor by a central hierarchical plan but by 
the establishment of a set of relationships between the members of the network. 205 As a 
result, these newly established relations create the network. 
It is a fact that cooperative alliances, reshaping of the boundaries of firms, brought 
about by the growth of inter-firm collaborative agreements opens up new challenges to 
the researchers.206 However, these strategic alliances represent a networked model of 
organisation of international economic transactions, which can be distinguished from 
MNEs, which have different aims in their structure strategies. The aim of networked 
organisations is to reach a completion of a particular business project determined by a 
contract by participating organisations and usually limited by time. The relationship 
amongst the units in the network is limited by this aim and thus is not very widespread 
or complicated as in horizontal structure. Therefore, it is very unlikely to see similar 
control mechanism and intense exchange of staff and components and less fmancial 
assistants amongst the units in networked organizations. Accordingly, one central 
question is relevant here whether networked company organisation is separate 
organisational types employing distinctive control mechanisms or plural forms on the 
governance of multinational commercial transactions.207 We can conclude that although 
networks are a distinctive form of economic organisation, they do not represent the same 
characteristics as horizontally structured MNEs since there is no ownership relation 
204 Dunning, Multinational ... Global Economy p.92 (n 5) 
20S Dunning, Multinationtll ... Global Economy p.92 (n 5) 
206 Dunning, Multilllltiontll ... Global Economy p.92 (0 5) 
l07 Kobrin, The Architecture of GJobalisatioo, p. 151 (0 85) 
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amongst the firms. Therefore, networks represent a type of arrangement with its own 
specific distinctive features, which hereafter must be considered separately.208 As a 
result, as Professor Dunning points out, since they address somewhat different issues, it 
is unlikely that the network model of intemalisation will replace that of the structure 
under :MNEs model. 209 
At this stage, it is necessary to mention other inter-fIrms agreements. The most 
popular inter-fIrm agreement is joint ventures, which can be defmed as a legal entity 
formed between two or more parties to undertake economic activity together. However, 
joint ventures represent one type of inter-ftrm agreement and this currently extends to 
networked or other more complex relationships. Some of the joint venture contracts are 
vertical contracts: technology-transfer agreements, franchise contracts and input-supply 
agreements. Some other relations are more heterarchical in these types of organisations. 
For the same reasons articulated under the networked companies, the main 
characteristics of the joint ventures are the same as networked company structures; joint 
ventures do not fall under the examination of this study in order to allow comparison of 
the networks of subsidiaries under a :MNE group.210 
Evaluation of Organisational and Managerial Structure of MNEs 
All these evaluations of the :MNE structures of organisation show that the relationship 
between parent companies and national subsidiaries in an MNE are not identical to those 
among an interacting group of universities, or social service organisations or state 
regulatory bodies or international political and economic institutions.211 MNEs 
distinguish themselves in their goals, which are maximising the profits for their 
shareholders. Thus, MNEs have undergone changes in order to adapt themselves to 
208 Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalisation. p. 152 (n 85) 
209 Dunning. MultinatioruJ/ ... Global Economy p.208 (n 5) 
210 Marschan. New Structural Forms. p. 4 (n 140) 
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dynamics of the new world affected by globalisation.212 MNEs responded to the 
challenges (If we cannot say they created the challenges) first between the social and 
business organisation and adopted new organisational and management structures. In 
particular, the new structures of MNE images are used to describe the emerging world 
economy: a shift from standardised mass production to flexible production, from 
vertically integrated, large scale organisations to unification of the value chain and 
horizontally networked economic units?13 
In the business world, the structure of this organisation is invisible from the 
position of any particular organisation, and it has no legal status. It is, nevertheless, a 
significantly important non-contractual aspect in setting the outline of limitation under 
which the structures of enterprises must operate?14 Since it is a fact, the law must 
recognise these facts and should create essential regulatory frame for operation of these 
institutions. 
The system showed its effect on the governance of the organisation splitting the 
responsibilities between the managers on different levels. The new management 
structures are fundamentally different than the ones that were dominantly used in the 
past by multinationals. The new structure shows its effect not only in management 
systems but also in the structure of subsidiary ownership since it has to create a suitable 
legal background for the new managerial system to operate. The reason for creating 
legally independent companies was to meet the needs that the M-form created because 
the M-form created semi-autonomous units in the enterprise. This autonomist 
management structure could be achieved best by crating legally independent units. 
Moreover, the hierarchical characteristic of the M-form led to a simple legal structure; 
mostly fully owned subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries with little cross-ownership. 
211 GhoshaJ and Barlett, The Multinational Corporations, (n 184) 
:m Dunning, Multinatio1llll ... Global Economy p.218 (n 5) 
213 Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalisation, p. 154 (n 85) 
214 Scott John, 'Corporate Groups and Network Structure' in McCahery J, Picciotto S and Scott S, 
Corporate Control and Accountability (OUP, Oxford 1993) 
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The horizontal organisation requires, on the other hand, more complex ownership 
structures for MNEs. This leads MNEs to consider ownership structures under the group 
since the risk and management is divided. Therefore in horizontal structures it is very 
likely that we will see very complicated structures of cross-ownership between the 
companies under the group. HSBC can be given as a very simple example for this. On 
their website they have published a very simplified scheme of their group ownership 
structure. According to the HSBC Group Structure of Principal Operating Companies at 
January 2004, HSBC Holding Place is the main company, in the lower levels; the more 
we go to a lower level the more cross-ownership we see. The subsidiary companies have 
shares for other subsidiaries ranking from 3% to 100% percent. And this chart is only 
simplified ownership structure; many of the lower units have been excluded.2IS 
lISbttp:/la248.e.akamai.netl7/248/3622114S3d3fea3a9f2/www.ime.&hg.hsbc.com/j?ubliclm>YPsitelassetsia 
bout/hsbc mup structure chart.pdf accessed 2S June 2006 
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Figure 8: The HSBC Group Structure of Principal Operating Companies at January 2004 
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J 
Consequently, cross-ownership is a fact rather than an exception m MNEs 
structures. The reason for cross-ownership is the need to create appropriate legal 
flexibility for horizontal managerial structures. Thus, the new regulations should 
consider the cross-ownership together with horizontal managerial structure to regulate 
MNEs. Thus, the legal flexibility that limited liability of companies creates has been 
used to organise this flexible structure. 
In conclusion, the new organisational structure emphasises two important 
characteristics of MNEs, which are very important for conducting the discussions made 
in this thesis. The fIrst one is the emphasis on horizontal structure with complex 
. ownership structure and geographical dispersal of subsidiaries at global level. Second 
important characteristic is the replacement of hierarchical control with more flat cultural 
control. 
The Legal Environment for Multinational Enterprises 
Historically, both in civil and common law systems, company laws are based on the 
concept of separate legal personality. It is assumed that a company is a distinct economic 
unit, which enjoys economic and managerial independence, and therefore, must be 
considered as a legal person separate from its members. Legal personality gives great 
flexibility to an organisation in structuring its affairs and facilitates creative exploitation 
of property rights. It also gives representative rights; they can sue and be sued, represent 
themselves in a court and can undertake obligations independent from its shareholders. 
Consequently, the English American and even new emerging European Community 
Company Law are still based on the independence of companies. The independence 
theory covers all companies, including single man companies and wholly owned 
subsidiaries of MNEs. 
92 
On the other hand, companies are creatures of national legal systems since they are 
incorporated in certain states. They are tied to certain nationalities from different 
perspectives as well.216 However, in transnational economic activities, a single and 
independent national company exists only in theory. Since the emergence of modem 
-company laws in the second half of 19th century, there have been speeches, teachings, 
litigation and legislation about company law but the primary reality today is not only the 
company, it is also company groups that have dominated the business world.217 Even 
small-scale economic activities might be structured to operate their business under a 
corporate group structure. The domination of corporate groups can apparently be seen in 
case of cross-border business operations since the largest commercial and industrial 
enterprises of the world are typically organised as groups of companies. They have tens 
of subsidiaries scattered around the world and some of the MNEs are bigger than 
national state economies. However, the legal status is still in a state of uncertainty since 
it depends on theories that are mainly based on a single private company. Thus, 
although, the group structured MNEs have symbolised the efficient modem business 
actor ever since its emergence this new affiliated enterprise system has been viewed as a 
special problem for the balance between the majority and minority shareholders in the 
corporation, and as a potential danger for the creditors of a subsidiary.218 
Groups of companies may, economically, be defmed as a union of companies, 
which operate under an aim to ensure the profitability of the association as a whole.219 
Some common characteristics of the group enterprises are these; first, a typical group of 
companies constitutes an economic unit, which is divided into a great number of legal 
units, for purposes of exploiting any possible convenience and benefit. Second, a 
different and simpler functional group structure is applied in the complex legal structure 
216 Domiciles and jurisdiction over companies are discussed at chapter 2 in detail. 
217 Nolan A, 'The Position Of Unsecured Creditors Of Corporate Groups; Towards A Group 
Responsibility Solution Which Gives Fairness And Equity A Role' (1993) 11 CSU 461 
218 Lutter M, 'Enterprise Law Corp. vs. Entity Law Inc. - Philip Blumberg's Book from the Point of View 
of an European Lawyer.' (1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative Law 949 
219 Avgitidis Dimitris K., Group of ComfJ"llies; The Liability of Parent Company for the Depths of Its 
Subsidiary (Sakkoulas, Athens-Komotini 1996) p. 71 
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of the group. For more formal and general purposes, the OEeD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises provides the widest and the most accepted defInition of MNEs 
in the international area; "multinational enterprises usually comprise companies or other 
entities established in more than one country and so linked that they may coordinate 
their operations in various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to 
exercise a significant influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy 
within the enterprise may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another, 
ownership may be private, state or mixed". 220 
Accordingly, the characteristics of MNEs are these; firstly, they must be organised 
as more than one company, in a way so that each and every company has its own legal 
personality, assuring that a subsidiary can have legal relations of its own, both within the 
organisation and with outsiders.221 Secondly, these companies must be related to each 
other through ownership and/or control and must operate as a commercial enterprise. 
Thirdly, the subsidiaries must perform in other countries rather than home counties. 
According to these criteria, an MNE can be, in a practical approach, defined as group of 
companies that through foreign direct investment organise subsidiaries under common 
ownership and management policy in a number of countries outside its home base. 
The most outstanding feature of multinational company groups is their incredible 
complexity.222 An MNE can have hundreds of subsidiaries all around the world and each 
subsidiary operate under its host country's regulatory arrangement, but practically they 
operate in accordance with the main economic and managerial policies of the group. 
Therefore, there is a compound multinational enterprise structure· under which, 
according to law, companies are independent from each other, but, on the other hand, 
according to economic realties, they are completely interrelated. Thus, even in a group 
of companies it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the legal personality of one 
220 DECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 27 June 2000 p.1S 
221 Giriffiths Andrew, Corporate Gove17Ul1lCe And The Uses Of Company (University of Manchester, 
1993) 
222 Hadden T, 'Inside Corporate Groups' (1984) 12 Int'l J. Soc L. 271 
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, 
member corporation and its wholly owned and controlled subsidiaries.223 This 
complicated corporate structure is the main characteristic of both in Civil law and the 
Common law systems, which may be the most important common statement for the area 
of corporate affiliated enterprise system. 224 
The attraction of a subsidiary is that the combination of legal personality and 
limited liability enables its controller to separate an area of activity, or particular assets, 
and to control the subsidiary's legal relationship with the wider organisation because the 
law has given little recognition to the essential differences between subsidiaries and 
freestanding companies. There is an effective shifting of risk from the controllers and 
owners to the creditors of a subsidiary resulting from its limited liability.225 Therefore, 
the tendency in the UK as in the United States is for holding companies, other than pure 
investment companies to hold 100 percent of the shares in all their subsidiaries.226 
This control of shares by another company is not only control but also brings 
subsidiaries under common group management systems. Here the problems arise, as 
unlike the individual majority shareholders; the common management system may have 
a reason to direct the subsidiary to act contrary to its own interest and may even put its 
existence in danger. Therefore, being controlled and managed by a company shareholder 
and especially being open to be interfered with by other companies under a group 
structure could put corporate creditors at risk. 
As a result, modem enterprises largely comprise groups of corporations under 
common ownership and managerial structure. They present the possibility of dividing an 
, 
enterprise into smaller incorporated units to perform particular functions. The reasons 
for separate incorporations may range across a broad variety such as sheltering other 
units of the enterprise from subsidiary liability in specialised financial transactions and 
ll3 Nolan, The Position, (n 217) 
ll4 Lutter, Enterprise Law Corp, (n 218) 
llS Giriffiths, Corporate Governance, (n 221) 
ll6 Hadden Tom, 'Regulating Corporate Groups: International Perspective' in McCahery J, Picciotto Sand 
Scott S (eels.), Corporate Control and Accountability (OUP, Oxford 1993) p. 347 
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evading possible tort liability. Thus, there can be use of corporateness to clearly further 
legitimate goals or possible abuse of corporate structure to avoid social conflict and 
t 1· b·l· 227 Th . corpora e la 1 Ity. e mam causes of the current problems in MNE concepts fmd 
their roots in two historical developments in the times of the emergence of capitalism 
and then big companies in the second half 19th century. The fIrst one is limited liability 
and the other one is allowing companies to have shares of another company. I want to 
examine the second development fIrst in order to reach a better understanding of the 
problems that limited liability of companies brought. 
Emergence of Multinational Enterprises 
In the early days, in America, the major restriction on corporate power- the lack of 
authority to acquire stock - was frrmly established. Even some states, i.e. New York and 
Illinois, went further and enacted statutes, expressly prohibiting corporations from 
acquiring and holding stock in another corporation.228 As a result, authorization for the 
ownership of shares of other corporations was very reluctantly granted and only to 
companies of a public character, such as railroad companies. In the absence of an 
express provision in the statute or the charter, it was held ultra vires or unlawful for a 
corporation to acquire shares in another corporation.229 However, this rule was changed 
dramatically after the acceptance of removing all restrictions and expressly authorising 
businesses incorporated in New Jersey to acquire the stock of "any other company that 
the directors might deem necessary".230 After New Jersey, other states followed and 
227 Cashel Thomas W, 'Multinational Challenge To Corporation Law: The Search For A New Corporate 
Personality (publication Review)' (1994) 9 JIBL 249 
228 Blumberg PI, '/he Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law (OUP, Oxford 1993) p. 54 
229 Avgitidis, Group o/Companies p. 69 (n 219) and Blumberg PI The Law OfCorportlle Groups: Tort, 
Contract. A.nd Other Common Law Problems In The Substantive Law Of Parent And Subsidiary Corporations 
(Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1987) p. 56-60 
230 Blumberg, '/he Multiltlltio1llll Challenge p. 56 (n 228) 
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eventually, the authority of corporations to own the shares of another corporation 
became universally recognised?31 
The fIrst signs appeared in the railroads, whose exclusive operations led to the 
development of systems of bordering roads connecting important centres. Such 
provisions also appeared in charters of other railroads, bridge, steamship, and canal 
companies, but rarely appeared in the case of manufacturing companies.232 Railroads 
thus comprised the fIrst corporate groups in the country. Subsequently, the group 
structure has emerged as a usual business organisational structure and manufacturing 
companies followed the public sector companies and turned to be structured as a trust, 
similar to public trusts, like oil and sugar. 
In 1890, the New York courts held the Sugar Trust to be unlawful, and 1892, the 
Ohio courts outlawed the Oil Trust.233 The Sherman Antitrust Act was adopted in 1890. 
It became plain that trust could no longer serve a mechanism for industry. Following the 
new legal situation, anxious corporate counsel recognised that the power to acquire 
shares of competitive corporations, if available, would serve as an alternative route to 
gain centralised control of competing fIrms and achieve market concentration, perhaps 
even avoiding the Sherman Act.234 New Jersey - enthusiastic about enriching its treasury 
with license fees from corporate promoters- enacted its pioneering statutes in 1888, 
1889, and 1893. These new statutes provided an alternative route to industrial grouping, 
replacing the trust device that was then being outlawed.235 The new law was the turning 
point for American business because a corporation no longer represented the whole 
enterprise; the enterprise became increasingly segregated between parent and subsidiary 
corporations. In contrast to the simple corporation with its clear line of distinction 
between the enterprise conducted by the corporation and the investors represented by the 
:!31 Blumberg. The Law ... Tort. Contract p. 59 (n 229) 
232 Blumberg, TheLaw ... Tort. Contractp. 57 (n 229) 
233 People V. North River Sugar Refining Co .• 121 N.Y. 582, (1890), State ex rei. l'. Standard Oil Co., 49 
Ohio St. 137 (1892) 
:!~ Blumberg, The Multinotional Challenge p. 56 (n 228) 
235 Blumberg, The Multinotional Challenge p. 56 (n 228) 
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shareholders, the corporate group was rather different; the parent and shareholders 
combined made up the enterprise. 
In Britain, a company was able to purchase shares in another company only by 
virtue of a provision to this effect in the memorandum of association of the purchasing 
company. The 1862 English Companies Act provided for incorporation via the 
registration of companies: under this system, the company powers were specified not 
only in the statute, but also in the company's memorandum of association. In England 
therefore, corporate power to acquire and own the shares of another corporation could 
arise from provisions inserted in the memorandum by the promoters and their counsel, 
notwithstanding the omission of such power in the incorporation statute. 236 Where the 
memorandum of association was silent, the English court held that it was ultra vires for 
a company to purchase shares of another company. In re Bamed's Banking Co. and in re 
Asiatic Banking Corp237 it was held the power existed and neither the common-law nor 
the 1862 Act invalidated the provision in the memorandum of association. With this case 
pointing the way, the power to acquire and own shares of another corporation was 
thereafter simply achieved by drafting the memorandum of association accordingly.238 
In summary, groups of corporations first developed more than 100 years ago, and 
met weak resistance from courts and in scholarly literature because they were not on the 
intemationallevel but rather mainly in the USA, and performing predominately in big 
business industries.239 However, with the use of this right as main strategy to perform 
business, the group of companies became the basic company type in the developed 
industries. At this point it must be stressed that at the time when limited liability was 
. f" all unkn 240 estabhshed, groups 0 compames were VIrtu y own. 
236 Blumberg, The Law ... Tort. Contract p. 61 (n 229) 
237 Re Barned's Banldng Co. ex Parte Contract Corporation (1867) LR 3 Ch App 105, Re Asiatic Banking 
Corp (1869) 4 LR-Ch 252 and Great Eastern Railway v. Turner (1872) LR 8 Ch App 149 
238 Blumberg, 17Je Law ... Tort. Contract p. 61 (n 229) 
239 Lutter, Enterprise Law Corp (n 218) 
240 Avgitidis, Group o/Companies p. 69 (n 219) 
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Limited Liability; Definition of the Concept and Historical Development 
The economic and legal history of company law depends on the nameless inventors of 
the principle of limited liability, as applied to trading corporations that were pioneers of 
the Industrial Revolution. The cleverness of these men produced the principle by which 
the productivity and power of modem companies reached its top. In 1911 the president 
of Columbia University moved to claim that: "I weigh my words when I say that in my 
judgment the limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modern 
times.... even steam and electricity are far less important than the limited liability 
corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative importance without it.,,241 
Limited liability, under the Companies Act, means that shareholders have no 
obligations to the company or its creditors beyond their obligations on the par value of 
their shares, or under their guarantee in the case of a company limited by guarantee.242 
Limited liability restricts shareholders' liability to the company to the amount of money 
they invest, which means that in case of insolvency and under payment to creditors, 
shareholders cannot be made to pay more than they invest. Under this traditional 
corporate rule, a subsidiary corporation's liability is also limited to the amount of its 
shareholders' investment, and the parent or any other company under the group cannot 
241 Cited at Lowry John, 'In Defence of Salomon: Promoting The Corporate Veil' in Barry AI(, Rider and 
Andenas Mads (eds) Developments in European Company Law, Vol 211997: The Quest/or an Ideal Legal 
Form/or Small Businesses (Kluwer Law International, London 1999) 
242 Farrar John H, Company Law (Butterworths, London 1998) p. 82, He defines limited liability as "it 
(limited liability) is a fundamental principle of corporate law that shareholders in a corporation are not 
liable for the obligations of the enterprise beyond the capital that they contribute in exchange for their 
shares". Thompson Robert B, 'Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate 
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise' (1994) 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1 defines ''Limited liability is a 
presumptive of law that facilitates the development of public markets for securities, permits the allocation 
of risk or benefits between parties and supports the certainty of planning by those who have organised the 
corporation." Farmer Richard S, 'Parent Corporation Responsibility For The Environmental Liabilities Of 
The Subsidiary: A Search For The Appropriate Standard' (1994) 19 Journal Of Corporation Law 770 
gives another definition as that "Limited liability means that the investing shareholder is liable for the 
debts of the corporation only to the extent of its original investment in the entity, the stock purchase 
money". 
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be held liable for the subsidiary's non-performed obligations.243 However. concepts 
should not be confused; it is not the company that enjoys limited liability, it is the 
shareholders of the company whose liability is limited.244 The company, as a legal 
person, is liable for its torts and obligations arising from any source but the limited 
liability theory is applied in case company's assets are not enough to meet the 
obligations. 
Limited liability was an entirely innovative doctrine, which was devised as a result 
of the pressures put on growing corporations during the first half of the 19th century to 
raise the capital required to take advantage of the emerging technology of the times.245 
Accordingly, in the UK, the Limited Liability Act 1855 was quickly replaced by the 
Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 which was this Act that introduced the rule into 
English law that such companies would have to add, 'Limited' or 'Ltd' to their name. 
In the beginning, companies aimed to collect money from individuals since in the 
early corporate history acquiring shares of another corporation was not approved by the 
COurtS.
246 However, this rule changed dramatically after the acceptance of dropping all 
restrictions on acquiring shares in another company. This means that limited liability had 
become the established rule long before corporate subsidiaries, basically group of 
companies, were common or even, in general, legal. The new stage then, with the 
emergence of corporate groups, is the discussion of the question of whether limited 
liability protects the component companies of the new corporate groups in addition to 
the investors in the enterprise. To be able to answer this question the separate personality 
of companies from its shareholder must be clarified under the examination of two 
243 Bakst David S, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil for Environmental Torts in the United States and the 
European Union: The Case for the Proposed Civil Liability Directive' (1996) 19 B. C. Int' & Compo L. 
Rev. 323 
244 Magaisa Alex, 'Corporate Groups and Victims of Corporate Torts - Towards a new Architecture of 
Corporate Law in a Dynamic Marketplace Law, 2002 (1) Social Justice &Global Development Journal 1 
245 Hansmann Henry and Kraakman Reiner, 'Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts' 
(1990-1991) 100 Yale L.J. 1879 
246 Blumberg. 17te Multinatio1llll Challenge p. 54 (n 228) 
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famous cases, which are Salomon v Salomon & co ltd 247 and Lee l' Lee's Air Farming 
Ltd. 248 
The facts of the Salomon case were as follows; Mr. Salomon created a company 
whose shareholders were himself, his wife, his daughter and four of his sons. Mr. 
Salomon then sold his business to the company and received a further 20,000 shares and 
a £10,000 debenture from the company as the purchase price. Mr. Salomon then 
continued to run the business as managing director and, as he also had 20,001 of the 
20,007 shares, was very much in control. The company soon encountered financial 
difficulties, with Mr. Salomon selling his debenture to raise further money for the 
business, but despite this it was eventually wound up. The assets of the company were 
sufficient to pay the debenture holder but not the company's unsecured creditors. The 
liquidator claimed that the company was a scheme designed to defraud creditors and 
thus that the debenture should be saved, or alternatively that it was merely the alias or 
agent of Mr. Salomon. These arguments were accepted by the Court of Appeal. 
Consequently, in 1897 this issue of limited liability and separate corporate 
personality were fmally settled by the highest judicial body in the United Kingdom; the 
House of Lords ruled that individuals could organise their affairs, as they wanted and 
that if they choose to do so via incorporation they were entitled to the protection of 
limited liability as long as the incorporation was in accordance with the formal rules of 
the relevant legislation.249 Thus Salomon brought about the situation that incorporators 
of a company could structure its capital so as to minimise the risk to them of the 
company's failure by taking some form of secured debenture; there is no requirement 
that the investment of the incorporators in a company must necessarily to a significant 
extent be in the form of equity.2so Hence, separate legal personality meant just that, and 
247 [1897] AC 22 m.. 
248 [1961] AC 12 PC 
249 Bowmer Simon, 'Company law To Pierce Or Not To Pierce The Corporate Veil - Why Substantive 
Consolidation Is Not An Issue Under English Law' (2000) 15(8) JIBL 193 
lSO Prentice DO, 'Group Indebtedness' in Wooldridge F and Schmitthoff CM (eds.), Groups of Companies 
(Sweet &. Maxwell, London1991) p. 57 
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it follows from this that a corporation is separate from its members and as such the later 
not liable for its debts.251 
These decisions on these two cases showed their effect for all corporations 
including corporate groups. Accordingly, under traditional corporate law each 
component corporation of the group, whether parent, subsidiary or affiliate, for legal 
purposes were still separate and distinct from every other corporation in the group, and 
its rights and responsibilities were divorced from those of the other constituent 
companies of the groUp.252 For that reason, although the companies in the group, unlike 
its public shareholder-investors, were parts of the enterprise and engaged in the daily run 
of business, limited liability also insulated them from liability for the activities of its 
subsidiary companies because it was not discussed deeply and the simple logic 
determined the situation that limited liability protects shareholders, a corporation is a 
shareholder of the subsidiary, and therefore, limited liability protects the shareholder 
corporation.253 This situation can shortly be defmed as follows; under limited liability 
the group collects the full reward if the subsidiary is successful, but does not bear the 
full loss in case of disaster.254 Therefore, limited liability rules are usually acknowledged 
to create incentives for excessive risk-taking by permitting corporations to avoid the full 
costs of their activities.255 In statutory developments, there have been several Companies 
Acts since 1897 and changes to the incorporation formalities have been made; yet no 
attempt has ever been made to legislate against the rule in Salomon. Some attempts have 
251 In Lee v. Lee's Air Farming, The Privacy Council held that Lee, as a separate and distinct entity from 
the company which he controlled, could be an employee of that company so that Lee's wife could claim 
workers' compensation following her husband's death. Separateness of personality enabled him to be an 
employee as the pilot and thus his widow was entitled to compensation under the scheme. 
252 Collins Hugh, 'Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Complex Patterns of Economic 
Integration' (1990) 53 Modem Law Review 731 
253 Collins, Ascription of Legal, (n 252) 
254 See Dine Janet, The Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000) and 
Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge (n 228) 
255 Note, 'Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages' (1985-1986) 99 
Harv. L. Rev. 986 
102 
been made to avoid or exempt certain areas from the general rule but though with the 
exception of specific statutory acts, little has been achieved.256 
In conclusion, under the economic circumstances of the time when the limited 
liability doctrine was accepted, economic analysis assumed that a society with greater 
wealth, measured in terms of profit maximisation, was necessarily better off than a 
society with less?57 Therefore, limited liability permitted parties to allocate the risk of an 
enterprise to a more efficient risk-bearer in particular circumstances, namely the 
voluntary or involuntary creditors of corporations.258 Nevertheless, the full effects of 
application of limited liability were not clear at the time of its emergence, or even in 
recent times because the emergence of limited liability was not an essential 
characteristic of corporate law. In reality because of the escalation of industrialisation, 
limited liability finally emerged as a political pressure, not as a usual consequence of the 
concept of a corporate body. Thus, in England and America, the adoption of limited 
liability was problematic and followed political debate state by state. It must be stressed 
that it was only during the first quarter of the twentieth century, a half century after the 
acceptance of limited liability, that this power was universally recognised.259 For 
example California insisted on unlimited liability companies till almost middle of last 
century. 260 
2S6 Griffin Stephen, '(Case Comment) Holding Companies and Subsidiaries - The Corporate Veil' (1991) 
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Reasons for Limited Liability 
The ongms behind limited liability is to encourage people to invest money in 
corporations and therefore it has been viewed as an essential element in free market 
economies; allowing investors to contribute capital to an enterprise without risking their 
personal wealth.261 Thus, the argument of mainstream law and economics analysis in 
favour of limited liability is based on the use of incorporation to raise capital from 
outsiders.262 Thus, the limited liability was an invention central to the creation of a 
modem capitalist economy?63 The limitation of risk functions as an incentive to 
investment and, therefore, it is a factor contributing to economic development. There are 
three main economic functions of limited liability; stimulating investments, minimising 
cost and shifting risk. 264 
Stimulating investments is considered as the primary economic function of limited 
liability. Since shareholders are not liable for more than they invest, it is believed that 
companies will attract more money for their shares. Accordingly, the most important 
economic need for the limited liability company is that it encourages investment by 
absent investors, because investments under a limited liability regime have greater 
expected value and are less risky to investors than investments under unlimited 
liability.265 It is a fact that limited liability plays an effective role for enterprises even 
today on the consideration of stimulating investments. 
The cost minimising function of limited liability manifests itself in four different 
ways; first, limited liability reduces the costs involved in the separation between 
261 Farmer Richard S, 'Parent Corporation Responsibility For The Environmental Liabilities Of The 
Subsidiary: A Search For The Appropriate Standard' (1994) 19 Journal Of Corporation Law 770 
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263 Easterbrook Frank H and Fischel DR, 'Limited Liability and the Corporation' (1985) 52 U. Chi. L. 
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265 Leebron, Limited Liability, (n 260) 
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management and ownership. Second, limited liability reduces the information costs that 
a shareholder has incurred in order to be constantly aware of the real value of his 
investments.266 This creates an advantage in that it decreases the investors' need to 
monitor the management of the company because they are responsible for just the 
amount they invest.267 Third, limited liability reduces the costs involved in the operation 
of securities markets. Limited liability relieves a company's shareholders of the usual 
risks and responsibilities of ownership and therefore reduces their need to be involved in 
management or to be more than mere investors.268 Finally, limited liability reduces the 
company's cost of raising capital; it enables a company to be fmanced on the most 
favourable terms. From the market economy perspective, since limited liability allows 
for the free transfer of shares, it promotes market economies and creates a competitive 
atmosphere for companies while facilitating diversification of portfolios, which is 
considered very important for development of economies.269 
Easterbrook and Fischel stress the importance of limited liability to the corporate 
structure; only in such an environment can the critical features of centralised 
management and investor willingness to bear the risk exist. 270 Limited liability makes 
investors willing to give management functions to a centralised corporate group and to 
undertake risky projects. Not only shareholders but also voluntary creditors benefit from 
these rules. As to involuntary creditors, their loss from limitations on liability is 
moderated by incentives to provide insurance, which adequately substitutes for the 
personal liability of shareholders.271 
Therefore, the discussion and problems are collected on the fact that limited 
liability removes the risk of the company's failure from shareholders and shifts it to 
266 Presser Stephen B, 'Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and 
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creditors. On this characteristic of limited liability, there is a conflict between economic 
principles that are based on the aim of reaching profit maximisation and legal principles 
that are based on reaching basic justice. The economic theory accepts the injustice for 
creditors but it claims limited liability creates incentives for society as whole and thus, it 
is justifiable and must be sustainable. Moreover, the economic theory assumes that 
creditors can alter the terms by negotiating to the company. However, shifting the risk 
causes great-unsolved problems in case of mass torts since tort victims involuntarily 
involve in corporations.272 As a result, shifting the risk gives very important incentives 
for company groups to structure themselves as a group of limited liability entities. Thus, 
the efficiency of economic analysis for limited liability must be discussed. 
Economic Analysis of Limited Liability 
All supporters of the limited liability company theory have structured their arguments on 
the hypothesis of the absence of limited liability and they mainly claim that in case of 
unlimited liability the efficiency of capital markets will be seriously damaged.273 
Therefore, the standard arguments for limited liability are based on the empirical claim 
that on balance, corporations create more wealth than they destroy and whereas it is 
regrettable that third party creditors must sometimes suffer, the benefits outweigh these 
unfortunately distributed costS.274 The argument of creating more wealth for society has 
turned out to be main problem of the glob~llised economic world. The calculation of 
benefits is based on the simple methodology that if economic activities of companies 
with limited liability create in total more wealth than it loses; following the theory that is 
good for society. However, this calculation of benefits of limited liability ignores the 
distribution of the loss, which is mainly loaded onto involuntarily creditors. Therefore, 
:m The difference between voluntarily and involuntarily creditors is discussed below. (p 115) 
273 Alexander Janet Cooper, 'Unlimited Shareholder Liability through a Procedural Lens' (1992-1993) 106 
Harv. L. Rev. 387 
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the theory must be reconsidered since it is unjustifiable to impose the burden of risk on 
the weakest. 
Supporters of limited liability company theory introduce their arguments against 
the assumption of unlimited liability for companies under three titles. Firstly, unlimited 
liability is dangerous for shareholder and capital economies. Secondly, making 
shareholders unlimitedly liable puts them in danger of being suddenly and unexpectedly 
thrown into personal bankruptcy and shareholders would have the difficulty of assessing 
and monitoring companies' management because many shareholders do not have 
enough knowledge to monitor and evaluate the companies' operations. Consequently it 
might make shareholder diversification costly or impossible. Another important problem 
that could arise in the case of unlimited liability is conflicts of law and enforcement 
problems.275 
The most important question in assessing the justification of limited liability is 
whether limited liability ,allocates risk to those most capable of bearing it. At the time 
the limited liability company first appeared the main concern was not fair allocation of 
risk but the distribution of resources between people according to political and economic 
criteria.276 However, this seems to be still common defence for limited liability even 
though business, law and companies themselves have undergone fundamental 
changes.277 
According to the risk shifting argument, in order to determine the most efficient 
allocation of risk between corporate groups and involuntary creditors, two criteria 
should be examined; the ability of the parties to avoid risk and their ability to bear the 
risk. It is obvious that groups of corporations can apparently bear and avoid risks better 
274 Dent George W, 'Limited Liability In Environmental Law' (1991) 26 Wake Forest Law Review 151 
275 Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder, (n 273) 
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than involuntarily creditors?78 Therefore, limited liability does not provide a fair risk 
allocation between corporate shareholders and creditors, especially in case of immunity 
of shareholders from liability to involuntary creditors?79 This injustice will be severe 
when we consider of MNEs because of their immense economic power and complex 
structure. This proves that the economic explanations of limited liability are usually 
based on the consideration of individual shareholders rather than shareholder companies. 
Thus, limited liability reflects a desire to help out smaller investors, those more typical 
of the people, thus reflecting democracy as much as economics. Then, limited liability 
should be most welcomed for smaller frrms who are dependent on individual 
contributions and not those possessing great economic wealth?80 Accordingly, the 
realities related to economic and business structures of MNEs have proved that it is 
unfair to sustain the current legal structure. In other words, the conceptual structure of 
company law has become ever more divorced from the economic and social realities to 
which it applies and has taken on a life of its own?81 
The argument of promoting capital market efficiency via limited liability is not 
exactly convincing either, because before the adoption of limited liability there was a 
developed capital market industry in England and in other western countries; for 
example, California kept its unlimited pro rata liability system until the middle of the 
20th century.282 There was no evidence that limited liability for corporate groups was 
making much difference in economic development since MNEs already have the 
resources to invest in third countries.283 Moreover, the MNEs are always given immense 
incentives by countries to invest in their territory so they are already in good bargaining 
position. Giving them extra protections, especially through limited liability, is making 
them untouchable by the law. 
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The relative monitoring cost for alternative risk bearers' argument cannot be 
justified if the alternative bearer is a MNE that can have assets bigger than many less 
developed countries' economic power. Experience has already proved that monitoring of 
another company under a group is part of conducting business, thus it cannot be claimed 
that if company shareholders are unlimitedly liable, the group will apply detailed and 
costly monitoring process. Moreover, the disclosure requirements for groups of 
companies are increasing; MNEs are required to disclose most of their economic and 
fmancial relations as a group, which makes the monitoring argument less valid. 
The supporters of limited liability explain the fairness of limited liability on the 
basis that it is swallowing liability rather than shifting it and under unlimited liability 
regimes creditors may be left uncompensated after the resources of shareholders have 
been finished. 284 Subsequently, involuntary creditors can mostly find enough 
compensation in case of tort, if they cannot; it is the unfairness of social life. However, 
the incidents, like Bhopal285, Shell in Nigeria286, use of asbestos by Cape Industries, 
have demonstrated that the damage is not swallowed; it is fiercely felt by the people who 
are exposed to disaster. 
All the ideas in support of limited liability meet at the middle point that despite its 
difficulties and unfairness, limited liability may be a necessary evi1.287 Consequently, 
there is an agreement on the need for criticism of limited liability, but also on the fact 
that unlimited liability is neither a practical nor a theoretically superior alternative to 
limited liability companies. It can be concluded that limited liability may well be a 
necessary consequence of trading in modem capital markets rather than an optional rule 
that can be abandoned by the legal system if some other doctrine seems preferable. 
283 The investment theories for MNEs are discussed above. (p 53) 
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Moreover, the difficulty to fmd an alternative and the relative importance of 
limited liability for settled market economies led to the claims that even if limited 
liability were not introduced by lawmakers or in case of abandonment of it. the business 
practice could have invented limited liability in the liberal markets through the 
principles of freedom of contract. This argument has valid points from the perspectiYe of 
voluntarily creditors since the relationship between voluntarily creditors and companies 
are established on the basis of mutual consent with the full knowledge of dangers and 
benefits of limited liability. Thus, in contractual liability, even if unlimited liability is 
introduced, it is very likely that companies will have clauses that prevent shareholders 
from unlimitedly liable. However, since the complex and unexpected characteristics of 
corporate torts, it is not possible to agree with this argument in respect of involuntarily 
creditors. Thus, companies cannot introduce limited liability for shareholders in tort 
claims. The argument carried out in the thesis is to establish liability for corporate torts, 
particularly MNEs liability for subsidiaries' tort. The nature of corporate tort makes 
impossible to do some prearrangements with victims to accept limited liability for 
shareholders. There is a legal impossibility since the parties are not identifiable in 
advance. As a result, the arguments that limited liability would have been introduced in 
any situation are not valid in the context ofMNEs' tort. 
Finally, the justice argument must be considered. Modem law systems are 
constantly trying to improve economic, social and legal systems in order to create better 
life conditions for human beings. Thus, legal principles and regulations for the future 
must be built on the aim of achieving justice. Consequently, the regulations must be 
justifiable covering every part of society. It is a fact that the economic development is 
definitely good for humanity but richness achieved at the cost of others' disaster cannot 
be defended and thus cannot be claimed justifiable. 
The problems of the limited liability doctrine show that the limited liability 
company for corporate shareholders is no longer justifiable. especially not in case of 
MNEs, which are professionally. legally and economically organised to be able to plan 
and insure possible liabilities so it is inconsistent to prm"ide them the same protection as 
individual shareholders. 
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Evaluation of Risks and Problems in Limited Liability Corporate Groups 
For many years corporations have benefited from the same protection via limited 
liability as have individuals even in the situation of holding the entire equity interest.288 
Thus, economic units of MNEs enjoy great freedom to define their identities by dividing 
their activities between several distinct legal persons so that they ensure liabilities 
attaching to anyone person will not also attach to the others in the groUp.289 
Consequently, the key question in the case of tort, which person committed the wrong, is 
likely to receive an artificial answer when the wrongdoer has made use of the doctrine of 
separate corporate personality to redefme itself. Obviously, it is also unsatisfactory for 
plaintiffs if the artificial person said to have committed the wrong has inadequate funds 
to meet compensation.29o 
On the other hand, the problems of limited liability are not restricted the problem 
of involuntarily creditors. In many areas of practice problems might arise; shareholders 
might manipulate their control holdings, the accounts of the group or an affiliate in the 
group may be misled, they might dominate the minority interest very easily and fmally 
they can avoid taxation, anti-trust, monopoly and other regulations.291 However, the 
present study focuses on the liability arising from tort committed by subsidiaries. 
The problem of liability occurs in practice in a way that according to existing 
Common Law practice a parent corporation could always choose to split itself up into 
separate corporations, making sure that those subsidiaries dealing with risky activities 
held the minimum assets possible because MNEs always try to ensure effective way of 
profit transfer when they are negotiating FDI agreements. A plaintiff would then only be 
able to obtain a successful recovery of damages if it could establish a chain of primary 
288 Leebron, Limited Liability, (n 260) 
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duties leading back from an exporting company to those in the group of companies with 
sufficient assets to satisfy any jUdgement. After the Adams v Cape Industries292 and 
Multinational Gas293 cases such an approach is, for the moment, extremely unlikely 
because it was held that the courts are not free to disregard the principles of Salomon 
merely because they consider that justice requires it.294 More importantly, it was not 
fraudulent for a group of companies to use the doctrine of separate corporate personality 
in such a way as to minimise its group exposure to future liabilities.295 
No courts, since Salomon, in any case involving the legal responsibility of a parent 
corporation for the acts of its subsidiary, has examined as a matter of frrst consideration 
whether the doctrine of limited liability shielded the other companies in the group from 
liability for the debts of a subsidiary in the typical multi-tiered MNEs in the modem 
economy, and this has resulted in three, four, or even more separate layers of limited 
liability. Acceptance of this wide interpretation of limited liability allows for an 
illegitimate shifting of risk from a subsidiary to the involuntary creditors of the 
MNEs.296 Therefore, in mass tort cases, the assets and personality of the entire group 
may be needed to ensure a sufficient capital fund from which to satisfy claims. This is 
very justifiable where it is a fact that the group acts as an integrated economic entity, 
which together creates the prosperity of the enterprise?97 
Where injuries are severe and tort victims not fully insured, social justice requires 
that shareholders would be better risk bearers than tort victims particularly in respect of 
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MNES.298 Especially after mass tort actions of small and undercapitalised entities, the 
bl 'd d .. 1299 Th Ii . pro em was CODSl ere cntlca. ere ore, ill order to evaluate group liability for 
subsidiaries' tort actions, one needs an appropriate model; traditional legal thinking is 
not sufficient. Blumberg reflects that the concept perhaps accurately reflected the era in 
which it was developed -when individual shareholders were investors and were not 
active in the operation of the corporation- and he questions whether it does so today.300 
Blumberg answers to the question; this development occurred without much critical 
analysis of the issue of limited liability of corporate groups and thus he argues that 
limited liability of corporate groups, one of the most important legal rules in modem 
economic systems, appears to have emerged as a 'historical accident' .301 
In another approach the problem of liability in MNE tort creates a conflict between 
economic realities and legal principles. In particular, legal regulations have failed to 
reflect the economic challenges in practice where the limited liability of companies 
under a group for the debts of its subsidiary does not provide social benefits. 
Contemporarily, the nature of the challenge is that legal systems of the world are 
confronted by revolutionary changes in corporate structure and operation caused by the 
emergence of corporate groups, particularly MNEs. The legal system that could largely 
resolve the legal problems presented by the early period of the Industrial Revolution is 
incompetent in its established form of dealing effectively with the problems of the multi-
tiered MNEs functioning with a parent corporation, sub-holding companies and 
hundreds of subsidiary corporations organised under the laws of countries around the 
world.302 Particularly, the social cost-benefit evaluation is questionable where companies 
298 Leebron, Limited Liability, (n 260) 
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own all the stock or have complete control of their subsidiary corporations or operate as 
a complex group under which the separation is barely noticeable.303 
It would be unfair to claim there is no discussion of the liability problems in legal 
regulatory environments since the problems have triggered some discussions in different 
branch of legal professionals as well as in parliaments. However, fmding its legitimacy 
in economic theory, limited liability, in legal theory, has only been criticized and all the 
attempts have been concentrated on reducing its negative affects instead of elimination. 
Therefore, the issue of limited liability within corporate groups has not received a 
sufficient degree of legislative attention. Accordingly, the case law has touched the 
problem very delicately under the principle of veil piercing.304 In legislative attempts, 
the last Company Law Review in the UK failed to break out of that cast, concluding in 
their report that there is no problem relating to liability of corporate groups. Thus new 
Companies Act 2006 has no regulation on this matter. 305 This disappointing 
development has turned all eyes on the regulations at European Community level that 
group specific laws, which are needed to protect creditors, will receive detailed debate in 
the light of developments.306 However, the EU Plan307 does not offer any solutions for 
groups of companies relating to liability issues, even worse, they do not see any problem 
relating to liability issues under groups of companies. 308 Moreover, it must be stressed 
that the problem is not that there is a lack of laws and regulations relating to corporate 
groups but, although there are a great quantity of laws in the area, these laws often do 
not address the issue of groups such, but rather deals with what are some of the relevant 
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regulatory problems of company law and in the process also covering the issue of 
groups. 
Evaluation of Creditors' Classification 
In accordance with liability clauses, it is highly possible that firms with limited liability 
will undertake projects with too much risk. Firms will capture the benefits from such 
activities while bearing only some of the costs; while shifting other costs to creditors; 
this is a real cost of limited liability.309 The main argument put in terms of economic 
analysis is that it extemalises the loss through uncompensated transfers of risk to 
creditors; the objection was met by pointing out that the risk transfer was in fact fully 
compensated by other economic benefits to the society or creditors such as higher 
interest rates. With a tort creditor, the economic analysis produces a problem since it is 
clear that the loss ineffectively extemalised; the tort victim is not in a position to bargain 
for a compensating benefit or to avoid or monitor the risk to which the company is 
exposing them.310 Therefore, legal systems must distinguish contractual creditors who 
choose to maintain a relationship with the company and non-contractual creditors that 
are in the position of acquiring creditor status without any intentional relationship with 
the corporation.311 Thus, voluntarily and involuntarily creditors must be treated 
separately. 
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Evaluation of Legal Principles of MNEs 
Professor Schmitthoff s claims that the question of limited liability of the parent 
company for the torts of a subsidiary under certain well-defmed conditions is one of the 
great-unsolved problems of modem company law.312 The historical overview amply 
demonstrates that limited liability did not emerge as necessary attribute of corporate 
personality but as a legal means of achieving a major economic and social purpose, 
which was encouraging more people to participate, as members of companies in 
economic activity. This means the legal rule of limited liability emerged in order to 
serve economic social necessities of the times. The applicability of limited liability has 
not changed since its emergence but its area of application has extended to company 
shareholders and thus to group of companies. 
However, the limited liability company theory ignores contemporary economic 
realities because parent companies and their subsidiaries are collectively conducting a 
common enterprise so the limited liability doctrine, which is designed to protect 
shareholders not enterprises themselves, has lost the support of economic efficiency 
argument in the case of corporate groupS.313 Therefore, application of economic theory 
for limited liability to the groups of companies has no impact on the investment decision 
of shareholders of the group.314 Also in economic arguments for companies, any 
economic goal that can be achieved by the creation of a wholly owned subsidiary could 
equally be achieved by the formation of a division within a single corporate entity. 315 
It is obvious that when the responsible party is a subsidiary of a larger corporation, 
the plaintiffs may forcefully argue in the courts that the corporations under common and 
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cross-ownership sho~ld be held legally responsible for the tortious acts of its 
subsidiary.316 For this purpose, plaintiffs will be able to base their argument on theories 
for the liability of parent corporations and search for existing liability under tort law, 
corporate law and the existing case law, which is mainly based on the piercing the 
corporate veil doctrine. 
In tort law the English cases Cape Industries317 and Thor Chemicals318• for 
example, have effectively been based on an argument that the parent company's 
involvement in the day-to-day management of the relevant overseas facility was such 
that it should be directly responsible for injuries sustained as a consequence of 
operations technically carried out by another company in the groUp.319 However, the 
problem of proving the existence of a duty of care, and of its breach, must be kept 
separate from the wider issue relating to the extent to which groups of companies could 
benefit from the principle of limited liability as a means of protecting itself against tort 
claims arising out of the actions of its subsidiaries.32o Therefore, it is important to 
examine whether excessive control per se will result in certain legal consequences, in 
particular, the collapse of the limitation of liability between the parent corporation and 
its subsidiary, or whether additional elements are needed.321 
As a result of current case law in order to get compensation from the English and 
American parent company in the American and English courts, the plaintiffs would have 
to overcome the reluctance of the common law of tort to make one person responsible 
for the acts of another outside the agency sphere of vicarious liability. To do this, they 
would have to show one of two things; either that the parent company had broken a 
primary duty of care; or that the doctrine of separate corporate personality should be 
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disregarded so as to make the parent vicariously liable for the acts and defaults of its 
b ·d· 322 U d th . SU Sl lary. n er e case law, many credItors felt that these companies were little 
more than scams designed to prevent the individual from being liable for his business 
debts and on a number of occasions the courts agreed and made the key individual liable 
by claiming either that there was an agency relationship or that the incorporation should 
be set aside as a f89ade.323 However, English law offers the foreign plaintiff virtually no 
prospect of success against English defendants on the basis of vicarious liability in the 
light of the Court of Appeal's approach to corporate personality in the Adams v Cape 
Industries case. Which means English courts takes the problem under tort law and 
search for the breach of primary duties. Therefore, the foreign plaintiff, in theory, has a 
better prospect of success in arguing that the English defendant has breached some 
primary duty owed directly by it.324 Unfortunately, so far, none of the major foreign 
liability cases has resulted in a clear win for the plaintiffs on the substantive issues, 
though some cases have resulted in out of court settlement. Thus, taking the argument in 
the direction of tort rules create~ no solution except for discovery that hopes for effective 
solutions end at deadlock. 
In short, the application of limited liability was not an obligatory characteristic of 
company law, but rather a political decision of states and countries to make investments 
for companies more attractive for individuals. Thus, supporters of limited liability do not 
base their arguments on the idea of necessity of limited liability for corporate law, but 
rather support economic and practical efficiency and the unavoidability of limited 
liability for capital markets and companies. Thus, it can easily be claimed that using 
economically efficient systems for limited liability is a somewhat overworked term.325 
This means a limited liability company does not represent anything ~ore than the 
economic and political preferences of states. And the increasing use of the corporate 
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form for businesses, together with the recent arrival of potentially massive tort liability, 
suggests that the issue should be reconsidered.326 
Since the origins of states several thousand years ago, the governors have regularly 
created rules for economic activity, responding to citizen demands and seeking to create 
a wealthier society. The modem nation state followed in this long tradition; they have 
created rules to increase the wealth in a society. On the other hand, citizens increasingly 
demanded new and stronger rules to protect them in the era of nationally based 
capitalism. Rules that would restrict investors and companies in order to prohibit child 
labour, assure healthy foods and drugs, guarantee the safety of transportation, and 
support the stability financial markets can be given as examples.327 Now the demand to 
protect society against limited liability corporate groups is increasing. The national 
democratic state, which represents the most effective system, cannot ignore this demand 
anymore. 
Evaluation of the Chapter 
The basic legal systems m the world consider compames as economically and 
managerially independent units so the laws recognise this independence and grant 
companies legal personality. In this situation, if one questions the separate personality 
theory of companies and its sources, independence theory must be the centre of the 
examination. Economic scholars have already started to question separate corporate 
personality in the case of corporate groups since economic and managerial structures of 
subsidiaries are dependent on the wills of another company, in some cases with no 
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http://www.globalpolicy.org!socecQnlffdl2000papr.htm accessed 2S June 2006. 
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common ownership except for being under the same MNEs. However, in law, the theory 
and practice have been built on the separate legal personality and instead of changing it; 
developments in the case and statutory laws have just strengthened its applicability since 
its emergence in the 19th century. The economic activities of companies have been 
globalised; the :MNEs have gained social characteristics, and turned to be one of the 
phenomena for the new world order. The international economic institutions and in some 
cases, states recognise :MNEs as international economic actors. Thus, the recognition of 
MNEs has been settled socially and economically. What the law should reflect is the 
social and economic developments in society. However, corporate law has failed to 
reflect the developments; instead it still follows principles of a case, which was decided 
more than 100 years ago. 
The law has failed to absorb the new circumstances that permitting companies to 
hold shares of another company created. It showed almost. no reaction to regulate the 
new situation. This failure can be mentioned as the source of many of the problems we 
are discussing in this thesis. The law has failed to recognise the fact that enterprises 
organised themselves as a group when they are operating cross-border as well as in a 
domestic market. Although, this fact is very obvious, the law still insists on the theory of 
separate corporate personality. Therefore, the law has failed to response to the 
challenges that :MNEs, one of the modem time greatest phenomenon, created. The law 
has even failed to reach a legal defmition of MNEs. Even though the investment theory 
of MNEs suggests different realities than efficiency arguments of limited liability rules 
suggest, there has been no action to change the law that grants limited liability protection 
to the groups of companies similar to individual shareholders. Thus, the examination of 
MNEs economic history and current economical social characteristics indicate that 
limited liability is not a necessary element of the existence and operation of MNEs. 
Thus, the law failed to understand these realities, which cause problems in practice when 
there are claims for tort liability of MNEs. 
The law has failed to react to the developments of new structural organisations of 
MNEs. The practice and the theory still consider MNEs as vertically integrated 
companies that have one top and many sub-equal divisions. However, the structure, 
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fIrstly, changed to be multidivisional; the law hardly responded to these changes. And 
then matrix and regional integration came; the law demonstrated no alterations in its 
approach. With the emergence of horizontally structured MNEs, the law seems to have 
lost control over regulation for MNEs. Thus, the new structural organizational realities 
must be considered when dealing with any rules of liability in the MNEs context. 
Accordingly the complex social, economic, managerial and legal structures not 
only make reaching liability difficult but also cause MNEs to commit torts. The pressure 
applied by the group's central managements over subsidiaries to be cost efficient and 
profitable is excessive. Accordingly, managers of subsidiaries work under the pressure 
of high expectations set by groups as whole. Thus, their efforts have always 
concentrated on maximising profit and success in business. Therefore, it is not abnormal 
for subsidiaries to use the social and economic power of the group and exploit any legal 
ambiguity. The wider examination and better legal regulation of MNEs will have 
positive effects on preventing the corporate tort. 
Under these conditions the question must be to what extent we can claim separate 
corporate personality? What is the end for separate company theory under a group 
structure? How could the new and complicated horizontal structures and cross-
ownerships affect the current principles? Can modem legal systems still pretend that 
existing law is fair and needs no revision? Or is it time to go for real and effective 
solutions? The author thinks the time has already come for reconsideration of legal 
principles that determines the area of company law and tort liability. Lawmakers in 
national and international level should take immediate steps to create solutions based on 
these new findings of interdisciplinary characteristics of MNEs. 
Furthermore, the examination should focus on the definition of MNEs; of course 
firstly a comprehensive definition of the concept of MNEs must be produced in law. The 
MNEs proudly call themselves a group and even give facts about their group activities. 
We can give Bayer as an example. The following fact directly taken from its website: 
"Bayer is represented by some 350 companies (as of December 31, 2003). The 
cornerstones o/its business activities are in Europe, North America and the Far East. In 
2003, Bayer employed some 115,400 people and had sales of EUR 28.6 billion. The 
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capital expenditure budget/or the current year is EUR 1.8 billion, the R&D budget EUR 
2.3 billion".328 
It is interesting that even though MNEs name themselves as a group and regulate 
all their activities accordirigly but the law still insists regulating them as separate and 
independent companies. This increases the need to make comprehensive examination of 
MNEs; the present chapter is devoted to producing a definition and basic characteristics 
of MNEs. After indicating the interdisciplinary basics of MNEs, the next step must be 
building comprehensive legal responsibilities for MNEs. The companies are given legal 
personality because they are considered economically and managerially independent 
units. Now, not only companies but also MNEs are economically and managerially 
independent units. The MNEs have a management board for the group; they provide 
financial reports for the group. They have disclosure requirements for the group. They 
are also keen to develop CSR for the group. These new aspects of MNEs have different 
characteristics from a company's basic characteristics. For this reason, the new 
regulations must be built on the facts of new social, economical and organisational 
structure. As already mentioned, the new structure, developed from vertical structure to 
the horizontal structure, can provide adequate regulatory framework for all differently 
structured MNEs. With this new conception of MNEs, there must be reconsideration of 
legal principles that prevents the achievement of MNEs liability for their subsidiaries' 
torts. 
In conclusion, the present chapter has aimed to indicate the interdisciplinary 
characteristics of MNEs from social, economic, managerial and legal studies. The 
fmdings indicate that the developments in social and economic and managerial studies 
have not been met by developments in legal studies. Therefore, this situation creates 
problems since the basic legal principles are outdated and the same principles, when 
applied in practice, cause problems in the area of tort liability of MNEs. This requires us 
to check applicable laws and practice and proposals by questioning how they are suited 
328 http://www.bayer.com!accessed 25 November 2005 
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to the contemporary understandings of groups of companies and MNEs. In other words. 
there should be reconsideration of law and principles applied in rvf?,\cs torts. 
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CHAPTER III: JURISDICTIOl'AL PROBLEMS 
Introduction 
Reaching the justified liability of MNEs' tort is blocked not only by problems of 
substantive company law but also many procedural and jurisdictional problems. In other 
words, the complex design of international private law presents significant obstacles to 
suing MNEs in the venues in which they can be held liable. Therefore. in transnational 
litigation, past experiences have illustrated the complex interplay between principles of 
substantive corporate law and procedural rules of international civil litigation. I Even 
though litigation is supposed to be the last resort as a means of ensuring that MNE 
groups comply with standards and duties of care in relation to their hazardous 
operations, it plays a very important role because the choice of law issues and 
... 
interpretations of law are determined usually according to the law of the forum states.-
Moreover, the power of MNEs and the inefficient legal structure of host countries 
prevent plaintiffs reaching satisfactory compensation. 
Commonly. people who have been injured as a consequence of the tortious 
activities of MNEs subsidiaries sue the companies in the forum of the parent company's 
state to benefit from its legal systems' advantageous structure. However. many of the 
cases brought in the forum of the UK and the USA have been dismissed on the ground 
of the principles of forum non conveniens under which the American and English courts 
considered the host states' forums distinctly and clearly more appropriate to hear the 
cases. 
I Magaisa AT, 'Suing Multinational Corporate Groups for Torts in Wake of the Lubbe Case' (2001) 2 
Lall', Social Justice and Global Dcn~/opment 1 
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When there is a tort committed by a subsidiary of MNE, plaintiffs have a number 
of options for starting legal actions; fIrst to sue the subsidiary in the host country. 
However, as discussed earlier there is very little possibility of success due to inadequate 
and unfair justice system or insufficient capital sources of subsidiaries or the basic 
problem of limited liability companies. The second possible action is to sue the parent 
corporation in their country of domicile. This seems the only logical option for plaintiffs 
to be awarded satisfactory compensation. However, the problem of independency theory 
and limited liability theory force the plaintiffs, lawyer and judges to think about the 
possible establishment of tort liability for accused companies. The other possible way is 
to sue other companies under the group, which may be domiciled in the same 
jurisdiction or a different jurisdiction. This option has not been tried yet because it is a 
breakthrough departure from existing rules, even though it could bring a different 
perspective to the examination of liability of MNE groups. However, the possible 
acceptance of jurisdiction over other subsidiaries for each other's tort requires 
establishment of group liability based on the modem structure of MNEs. 
Even when jurisdiction has been achieved over the corporations in home states, 
courts have the discretionary authority to decline to hear the case under the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens. Under the principle, American courts behave very strictly on the 
application of principle while in the UK courts are comparatively more flexible, 
especially after the recent Lubbe v. Cape Industries cases.3 On the other hand, civil law 
countries have solved the problems by not employing the forum non conveniens 
doctrine. The question of jurisdiction of civil law courts is unproblematic when the 
defendant is based in the countries where they have been sued. Both under Civil law and 
under the Brussels Convention, the rule of the so-called forum rei applies; jurisdiction of 
the court of the defendant's domicile. This is the main rule on jurisdiction in article 2 of 
the Brussels Convention. Thus, in normal civil proceedings before Civil Law courts any 
l Muchlinski P, 'Holding Multinationals to Account: Recent Developments in English Litigation and the 
Company Law Review' (2002) 23 Company Lawyer 168 
3 Blumberg Phillip I, • Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers Presented by Concepts 
of the Corporate Juridical Entity" (2000-2001) 24 Hastings Int1 & Comp. L. Rev. 297 
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consideration of forum non conveniens does not apply.4 The principles of Brussels 
Convention and decisions of European Court of Justice have brought application of 
forum non conveniens doctrine in the UK closer to application in the EU countries. 5 
Consequently, the jurisdiction problems are the first problems that a plaintiff will 
face on the way to suing an MNE and thus they have an important effect on the 
provisions of MNEs' liability. Accordingly, under this chapter, general jurisdiction rules 
on companies and the common law approach to the problem of jurisdiction in case of 
MNEs litigation will be explained. The forum non conveniens doctrine will be the centre 
of argument and the applicability of current principles will be discussed in accordance 
with the general characteristics of MNEs that are discussed in the previous chapter. 
There is a test of existing jurisdiction whether they have capacity to solve the problems 
that modem structure of MNEs creates. Later the possible ways to elimination of 
jurisdictional obstacles will be discussed. Particular attention is given to the Alien Tort 
Claims Act under which there is an examination of whether it is an efficient model to 
solve the problems. 
Jurisdictional Rules for Companies and MNEs 
According to The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, the jurisdiction rules for 
companies can be summarized as follows; a corporation may be sued in the courts of the 
state where: 1- it has its statutory seat or is incorporated, or under whose law is formed; 
2- it has its central administration; or 3- its business, or other professional activity is 
4 Betlem Genit, 'Transnational Litigation against Multinational Corporations Before Dutch Ci~1 Courts' 
in Kamminga Menno T and Saman Zia-Zarifi (cds.), Liability of Multinational Corporations under 
Intemalional Law, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000) 
5 The topic is discussed in detail below. (p 138) 
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principally carried out. 6 Accordingly, the seat of a company shall be treated as its 
domicile and in order to detennine that seat; the court is to apply its rule ofintemallaw.7 
In the United Kingdom the statutory seats means the registered office, or if there is no 
such office, the place of incorporation or, if there is no such place, the place under the 
law of which the formation took place.8 
On the other hand, there are specific jurisdiction rules; 1- a corporation may also 
be sued in the courts of a state where it has a branch, agency or other establishment, in 
respect of a dispute arising out of its operations in that state; 9 2- where a corporation 
operates in a state through a subsidiary or other related corporation in circumstances 
where that second corporation has no independent existence in fact, since the first 
corporation takes all material decisions as to the conduct of the business of the second 
corporation, the second corporation shall be treated as a branch of the fIrst corporation 
for the purposes of the preceding rule; 10 3- a corporation may also be sued in the courts 
of a state in respect of a claim arising directly out of an activity carried out by that 
corporation in that state. 11 
In common law countries the establishment of a local branch or the provision of a 
local address for service has traditionally led to general jurisdiction. 12 Thus, the key 
question may arise in what circumstances a local subsidiary may be treated as a branch 
of the parent company. This issue is of particular importance in cases where a group of 
corporations operates as a unified economic network especially under horizontal 
organisation. 13 However, as regard the meaning of the word of branch, it has been 
6 Brussels Convention art.60 (1) See Collins L, Dicey and Morris on the Conflicts of Laws (Sweet and 
Maxwell, London 2000) p. 284 
7 The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 art. 53(1) see Collins, Dicey and Morris p. 287 (n 6) 
8 The Brussels Conventions art. 60(2), Clarkson CMV and Hill J, Jaffey on the Conflicts of Laws 
(Butterworths,London,2002) 
9 The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 art. 5(4) 
10 Collins, Dicey and Morris p. 299 (n 6) 
II The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 art. 5(3) see Collins, Dicey and Morris p. 328 (n 6) 
12 The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 art. 5(4) 
13 Detailed discussion is at chapter 2. 
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agreed that a subsidiary is not a branch. Therefore, any other corporations cannot be 
sued for the activities of subsidiaries if plaintiffs do not claim any particular tort against 
them, or there exists another exemption by the statutory or case law:4 The matter has 
been considered in the EC Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters15 (the Brussels Convention). The Brussels Convention 
Art 5(5) creates special jurisdiction over companies "as regards a dispute arising out of 
the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment," Thus companies can be sued 
"the courts for the place in which the branch, agency or other establishment is situated". 
If the branch is not an independent legal person it could not be sued at all and the result 
of this provision is that the legal entity constituting the corporation may be sued not only 
at its own seat but at the place of the branch as well.16 As it is clear from the phrasing of 
the Convention, subsidiaries are not considered as branch or agency. The practice in 
international civil litigation and domestic litigation has apparently shown that 
subsidiaries cannot be classified under the 'other establishments' either since 
subsidiaries are considered independent legal personalities. 
Domicile 
The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982, which incorporates the Brussels 
Convention into United Kingdom law, enacted distinct rules governing jurisdiction in 
cases concerning such matters where the defendant is domiciled in a member state of the 
EU, as well as rules governing jurisdiction over defendants domiciled in other parts of 
the United Kingdom. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1991 enacted into 
United Kingdom law the parallel Convention of 1989 with countries, which are 
14 North P and Fawcett 11, Cheshire and North's Private International Law (Butterworths, London, 1999) 
p.29S 
IS Council Regulation (Be) No 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Official Journal L 12 of 16.01.2001) 
16 Betlem, Transnational Litigation, (n 4) 
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members of the European Free Trade Area (the Lugano Convention). There are thus four 
sets of rules respecting domiciles of companies; (i) EU domiciliary, (ii) EFT A 
domiciliary (iii) domiciliary of the United Kingdom, and (iv) the rest of the world 
population. 17 
Determining domicile for defendants is a jurisdiction issue so it is not related to 
parent companies' liability for subsidiaries' tort. Actually, there is not much legal 
problem in determining the domicile of English parent corporations. The 1982 Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act18 provide that "a company has its seat and, therefore, its 
domicile in the UK if it was incorporated or formed under a law a part of the UK and 
has its registered office or some other official addresses in the UlC'. This Act was made 
law in accordance with Brussels Convention article 53. 19 The article provides that "in 
order to determine that seat the court shall apply its rules of private international 
law".20 Additionally, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided in a case that Brussels 
Convention is applicable where the defendant has its domicile or seat in a contracting 
state, even if the plaintiff is domiciled in non-contracting country?1 
The seat of a company constitutes its domicile and must be determined by the 
court's private international law in which in the UK refers to the doctrine of 
incorporation. Actually, the concept of seat of corporation has no precise equivalent in 
the law of United Kingdom and it was necessary to provide expressly in the 1982 Act 
for the determination of corporations. Therefore, s. 42 of 1982 Act provides that a 
corporation has its seat in the United Kingdom if and only if (a) it was incorporated or 
fonned under the law of a part of the United Kingdom and has its registered office or 
17 Collier JG, Conflicts of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) p. 72 
18 1982 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act s. 42 
19 Darcy LC and Murray B, Cleave Schminhoff's Export Trade (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) p. 442 
20 1982 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act art. 52(1) 
21 Sociate Group Josi Reinsurance Company v Campagnie d's Assurances Universa/ Genera/Insurance 
Company Case 412198 (EO 13 Jul2000) 
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some 'other official addresses in the United Kingdom or (b) its central management and 
control is exercised in the United Kingdom.22 
There is difference between the common law understanding and the Convention 
that there is no question of the need for permanent home under the 1982 Act, thus under 
the 1982 Act, it will be possible for a person to have more than one domicile, whereas in 
common law only one domicile is possible?3 Therefore in determining the seat of 
Panamanian company with its central management and control in Germany, it will have 
its seat for the purpose of the 1982 Act both in Panama and in Germany.24 
The important problem with domicile is the presence of the defendant company. 
The company has to be present in the jurisdiction at the time the proceedings are started. 
In Adams v Cape Industries Plc25 , the Court of Appeal confirmed that such 'presence' 
would not be established merely through the presence in the foreign jurisdiction of either 
a subsidiary company or a company?6 In order to establish jurisdiction in case of 
subsidiary involvement there is a necessity for an investigation of all aspects of the 
relationship between the subsidiary and the parent because the current law in the UK 
still relies on traditional notions of agency.27 Under the agency rules, the relationship 
between the parent and subsidiary must be similar to the one in agent and principal.28 In 
the United States courts look at the economic realities of the situation; if the parent and 
subsidiary form an economic unit it should be possible to establish jurisdiction on the 
basis of presence of its subsidiary or indeed against a foreign subsidiary on the basis of 
the presence of the parent in England.29 This is a more logical approach and would be 
very helpful to create better jurisdiction coverage for MNEs. However, the establishment 
22 Collins, Dicey and Morris p. 288 (n 6) 
23 Collins, Dicey and Morris p. 287 (n 6) 
24 The Diechland (1990) 1 Q.B 361, See Collins, Dicey and Morris p. 288 (n 6) 
2S [1990] 2 WLR 786 
26 Baughen S, 'Multinationals and the Export of Hazard' (1995) 58 MLR 54 
27 Collins, Dicey and Morris p. 299 (n 6) and North and Fawcett, Cheshire and North's p. 295 (n 14) 
28 Detailed discussion is made at chapter 3. 
29 North and Fawcett, Cheshire and North's p. 295 (0 14) 
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of economic unity in the MNEs context is not totally different from establishment of 
agency relationships. 
Accordingly, determining domiciles of companies under MNEs is very complex 
since there is no legal institution called an MNE. Thus, each company is considered as 
independent legal units and in each case the domiciles of companies is examined 
independently. Mere existence of ownership relationships between the subsidiary and 
the parent does not necessarily create jurisdiction over a parent by the forum of the 
subsidiary nor does it create jurisdiction over the subsidiary by the forum of the parent 
company. As a result, similar to establishing liability over MNEs, establishing domicile 
and thus jurisdiction over all components of MNEs is not possible. Even establishing 
domicile and jurisdiction over parent or subsidiary outside of their incorporation state 
needs to be decided after a detailed examination of general and specific jurisdiction rules 
created by the complex rules of private intemationallaw. 
Accordingly, under this adopted Common Law rule, English courts have 
jurisdiction for each company that is domiciled in the UK. This means that the plaintiff 
is entitled to choose the jurisdiction of the court, but on this point the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens provides an interpretation gap for the case not to be heard in the UK and 
the USA legal system has similar characteristics. 30 
Therefore, the question of jurisdiction rules for MNEs is apparently too compound 
because it depends largely on the laws of a mixture of states. In many circumstances, the 
issue is left with an apparent difficulty in the international system which emerges in a 
number of situations; any state where a section of an MNE is based lacks the territorial 
jurisdiction to regulate the activities of subsidiaries located abroad, while the host states 
in which the subsidiaries are located lack jurisdiction over any other components with 
whom they constitute integrated economic network.31 In these circumstances, MNEs 
30 Anderson Michael, 'Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law the Answer' 
(2002) Wasburn Law Journal 399 
31 Lutter M, 'Enterprise Law Corp. vs. Entity Law Inc. - Philip Blumberg's Book from the Point of View 
of an European Lawyer' (1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative Law 949 
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exploit a degree of independence from national jurisdiction that is unique in the global 
legal order. 32 
As a result, there is, in theory, no court in the world that exercises jurisdiction over 
all the components of an MNE.33 For this reason, the plaintiffs have to sue corporations 
according to tort law principles in the home countries or host countries. They cannot sue 
corporations in the host states where they are not domiciled unless there are exemptions. 
Consequently, they have to choose home countries' forums to sue the other companies 
under the group. Here appears another obstacle, common law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. 
Forum Non Conveniens 
Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine that allows a court to dismiss a case, 
although personal jurisdiction and venue are proper, on the reason that there is another 
forum, which is more appropriate.34 It is a creature of equity and only defendants can 
claim/Drum non conveniens because plaintiffs are entitled to original choice of forum.35 
Forum non conveniens was originally invoked to protect the defendant from being 
harassed by a plaintiff choosing a genuinely inconvenient or inappropriate forum. 
Despite this intent, it has in many instances become a device for MNEs to escape 
liability for tortious acts committed abroad by its subsidiaries.36 
32 Anderson, Transnational Corporations, (n 30) and Ward Halina, 'Corporate Accountability In Search Of 
a Treaty? Some Insight From Foreign Direct Liability' (Briefing Paper Of The Royal Institute Of 
International Affairs no 4 May 2002) 
33 Anderson, Transnational Corporations (n 30) 
34 Duval-Major J, 'One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine Of Forum Non Conveniens And The 
International Plaintiff' (1991-1992) 77 Cornell Law Review 650 
35 Folsom MW, Gordon J and Spanogle A, International Business Transaction (West Group, St. Paul. 
Minn. 2001) p. 347 
36 Anderson, Transnational Corporations (n 30) 
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In the cases that forum non conveniens are applied by English and American 
courts it is frequently MNEs that are defendants in actions brought by foreign plaintiffs 
for injuries that have occurred in a foreign country. The implications of forum non 
conveniens doctrine are quite different in the voluntarily creditors context as opposed to 
the involuntarily creditors context. In the fonner cases, the commercial parties are 
usually contesting a forum because they wish to secure the best deal for themselves. 
Moreover, dismissing the case or transferring it to another country has little effect on the 
fmal solution because of the certain commercial characteristics of disputes.37 Under the 
latter cases foreign plaintiffs are in a weaker position since they have been exposed to 
tort involuntarily. They have no chance to negotiate for the choice of forum. In 
contractual disputes, plaintiffs might have a clause to determine the forum where 
disputes will be settled. However, in the disputes where there are no prearranged forum 
clauses, there is still space for the application offorum non conveniens. That is why, in 
many contractual disputes forum non conveniens has been applied and it is not unusual 
to see application offorum non conveniens in contractual disputes quite often. However, 
the emphasis will be on application of forum non conveniens in the context of tort 
victims. 
Tort victims choose the UK and the USA courts because they fmd the courts 
attractive for obtaining better punitive awards. On the other hand, defendants consider 
forum non conveniens as a part of litigation strategy since cases are usually moved to 
distinct forums where they end with a little punitive award or sometimes with no award. 
For example in the Bhopaz38 case, the conflict was settled for far less than what would 
have been a jury's award in the USA.39 
The forum non conveniens doctrine gives too much discretion and there is too little 
clarity in' its application. There are two kinds of applicable version of forum non 
37 Duval-Major, One-Way Ticket Home, (n 34) 
38 Bhopal case, Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December 1984 F. Supp. 8 42 
39 Birnbaum SL and Dunham DW, 'Foreign Plaintiff And Forum Non Conveniens' (1990) 16 Brook. J. 
Int'l, L. 241 
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conveniens: the abuse of process version and the most suitable forum version.4o The 
forum non conveniens doctrine was substantially based on abuse of process by the 
plaintiff till the middle 1970s and the courts generally applied the abuse of process 
version, thus if they think there is another appropriate forum they dismiss the case on the 
ground of forum shopping rules. Defendants' first objection to plaintiffs' writs is usually 
that plaintiffs abuse the process since they have made the claim in the UK or the USA 
although there is a more appropriate forum. Dismissal for abuse of process was practiced 
by the courts before the 1980s in America and it was also in commonly used in 
England.41 Later, the USA courts have changed their approach because it was obvious 
that everybody has a right to sue companies in their home states under the rules of 
general jurisdiction. In the UK, in the Lubbe v Cape Pic, at all stages, the judges refused 
the claim for abuse of process. They agreed on the basis that battling to establish a forum 
in more appropriate forum must be considered as basic rights of plaintiffs. With the 
evaluation of the decision under the Lubbe case, it can be concluded that every plaintiff 
can try to establish a forum in a more appropriate venue. It should not be interpreted as 
an abuse of process, but instead, be considered the basic rights of plaintiffs. The access 
to justice and justice system is considered one of the basic human rights, thus in the 
cases that plaintiff think the English court should have jurisdiction over dispute arising 
activities of MNEs must be considered as legitimate rights of individuals on their 
attempt to access to the justice systems. 
In the UK, forum non conveniens principles were clarified and made common 
principle under the Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Consulex Lttl2 case.43 The 
principles can shortly be explained in that a stay will be granted if the defendant shows 
that there is another available forum, which is clearly and distinctly more appropriate 
40 Robertson OW, 'Forum Non Conveniens In America And England: A Rather Fantastic Fiction' (1987) 
103 Law Quarterly Review 398 
41 Meeran R, 'The Unveiling of Transnational Corporations: A Direct Approach' in Addo MK (eel.), 
Huma" Rights Standards and the Responsibility of TransTltltio"a/ Corporations (Kluwer Law International 
The Hague 1999) 
42 [1987] A.C. 460 
43 Collier, Conflict of Law p. 88 (n 17) 
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than the UK forum. The plaintiff can only prevent the dismissal of the case if he can 
prove that justice cannot be obtained in the new forum. The approach of American and 
English courts towards forum non conveniens became very similar with the 
establishment of most suitable forum criteria by American courts.44 
Accordingly, there is a two-limbed test. In the first limb, the burden rests on the 
defendant to show not only that England is not the natural or appropriate forum for the 
trial, but also that there is another available forum, which is clearly, or distinctly more 
appropriate than the English forum. However, it is not enough for the defendant to 
establish a mere balance of convenience in favour of the foreign forum. The defendant 
has to show that there is a 'clearly or distinctly' more appropriate forum elsewhere, the 
court will grant the stay 'unless there are circumstances by reason of which justice 
requires that a stay nevertheless not be granted'. In the second limb, the burden of proof 
shifts to the plaintiff to show that substantive justice cannot be achieved in the 
alternative forum.45 
Although the Spiliada rules are still ,central in cases related to forum non 
conveniens, it can be claimed that English courts' approach towards to the doctrine has 
changed due to two recent decisions; those of Connelly v RTZ 46 and Lubbe v Cape Plc47• 
The Cape Cases concerned the claims made by employees of South African subsidiaries 
and other claimants who lived near the mining area. The plaintiffs claimed that they 
were exposed to asbestos during the period of time that the subsidiaries were active in 
the mining area. In 1997 two writs were issued by the plaintiffs' solicitors. The frrst 
44 Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 40) 
45 Magaisa, Suing Multinational, (n 1) 
46 [1998] AC 854, In Connelly the plaintiff had been employed in Namibia for a subsidiary of English 
parent company. He was a Scotsman who worked in Namibia for some time and came back to England. 
After returning he was diagnosed with cancer of throat. He sued the parent company in the UK because he 
thought that the justice was not achieved in Namibia for practical reasons. The legal aid was not available 
there and also medical witnesses were usually in England. 
47 [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1545 
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· bh Q actIOn was on e alf of Rachel Lubbe and four others. The judge ordered a stay of the 
Lubbe action. Lubbe appealed the decision and the Court of Appeal lifted the stay. The 
defendant's petition was refused by the House of Lords. After the House of Lords' 
decision the same law fIrm issued a writ on behalf of Hedrick Afrika and 1538 others. 
The defendant applied and reapplied to stay the Afrika and Lubbe actions on the ground 
of forum non conveniens and/or abuse of process. The defendant submitted that the 
English court must not carry on with the case because under the Spiliada principles the 
South African forum is distinctly and clearly more appropriate for the trial of action.49 
Although the Court of Appeal granted a stay, the House of Lords removed the stay. 
The reasons for the removal of the stay by the House of Lords in the Cape Cases 
were similar to those of Connelly. so There was no legal aid and contingency fee 
available to lawyers in South Africa and additionally, South African courts were not 
experienced enough to handle a group action. These two recent decisions point out that 
after evaluating private interest factors, if there is a possibility that justice may not to be 
achieved, courts should decide that the cases can be tried in England. Additionally, the 
Thor chemicals1 litigations opened the ways for English parent corporations to be sued 
48 Second action was on behalf of Vicenzina Gisondi and three others. These plaintiffs were Italian 
citizens so they had the right to bring a case against an English domicile company in the UK in accordance 
with the article 2 of Brussels Convention. 
49 The Court of Appeal granted a stay on the ground that the altemati ve forum was available after the 
defendants' submission. In addition, it was obvious that the action must proceed as a group action and in 
group concept, the South African forum was distinctly and clearly more appropriate. The private interest 
factors point the South African forum because essential documents are in South Africa, nearly all 
witnesses are there and medical evidence is also reachable there. For legal aid problem, the decision was 
that it might not be possible to get legal aid in South Africa but it does not make it necessary to set up 
forum in the UK. In addition, the judge though that if the case is kept in the UK., there may be some 
procedural problems related to examining evidences in South Africa. 
50 Collier, Conflict 0/ Law, p. 93 (n 17) 
51 Sithole and Others v Thor Chemicals (LTL 2/3/1999) In the case, plaintiffs claimed damages for 
personal injury or loss of support arising from the death of breadwinners also looked to a paren! company, 
this time of a mercury processing plant. It was alleged that the parent company had been adVIsed by the 
health and safety authorities in the UK that the process adopted in the UK Company was potentially 
injurious to employees' health. Notwithstanding that, the parent company exported the process, in a 
substantially unchanged form, to an operation in Cato Ridge, KwaZulu-Natal. In that matter, the defence 
of/orum non conveniens was also raised but dismissed by tbe House of Lords. 
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in the UK. However, it remains to be seen whether the Cape and Thor litigation open the 
way to further cases against UK-based MNEs. 52 
On this level the influence of the ECJ on UK law must be discussed. The UK 
enacted the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982, which is based on Brussels 
Convention. The Act was regulated under characteristics of the Civil Law, and took 
place in 1987. Consequently there has been no dispute in the UK about the appropriate 
forum in relation to plaintiffs who are from other member countries. In the Cape case. 
for the Italian plaintiffs the defendant did not appeal against the case since they are from 
a member state of Italy. However, English courts were reluctant to abandon the forum 
non conveniens doctrine, but this approach has been reinforced by Group Josi 
Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General Insurance Company judgment of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in July 2000.53 The ECJ has extended the general 
principle established by the Brussels Convention that defendants can be sued in the 
courts of the EU member state in which they are domiciled. The English courts refused 
to accept the principle in cases where the alternative court was located in a non-EU 
country. 54 
The Brussels Convention has been superseded by Council Regulation on the 
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters55 so far as Article 2 is conce~ed the Regulations are materially the same as the 
Brussels Convention. The English Court is required to apply the rules set out in the 
Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
S2 Ward, Corporate Accountability, (n 32) 
S3 Sociate Group Josi Reinsurance Company v Campagnie d's Assurances Universal General Insurance 
Company Case 412198 (ECJ 13 JuI2000) 
S4 Re Han-ods (Buenos Aires) ltd [1991] 4 All E.R. 334. The Court decided that the domicile principle in 
the Brussels Convention has no application to cases where there is a choice of jurisdiction between the 
English forum and the courts of a non-Convention country. In such a case the forum non-conveniens 
doctrine will apply by virtue of Article 49 of the Brussels Convention. 
ss Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction And The Recognition And 
Enforcement Of Judgments In Civil And Commercial Matters (Official Journal L 12 of 16.01.2001) 
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Civil and Commercial Matters. Therefore, the recent Owusu v Jackson56 decision has 
continued that trend by curtailing the ability of the English court to invoke the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens. 
Mr. Owusu, the claimant, a British national domiciled in the United Kingdom, 
suffered serious injuries in Mambee Bay, Jamaica, when he struck his head when 
swimming against a submerged sandbank. Mr. Jackson, the first defendant, also 
domiciled in the UK., had let the holiday villa to Mr. Owusu. Mr. Owusu sued Mr. 
Jackson in the English courts for breach of an implied term that the private beach where 
the accident occurred would be reasonably safe or free from hidden dangers. Mr. Owusu 
also sued several Jamaican companies in the same action. 
Mr. Owusu commenced his claim in the English High Court in October 2000. Mr. 
Jackson and Jamaican defendants challenged the jurisdiction on the English court on the 
grounds of pnvate interest factors of forum non conveniens. The judge refused to stay 
the proceedings. The judge referred to the decision of the ECJ in Group Josi 
Reinsurance, which held that whether the jurisdictional rules in the Brussels Regulation 
applied depended upon whether the defendant had its domicile in a contracting state, and 
the rules applied to a dispute between a defendant domiciled in a contracting state and a 
claimant domiciled in a non-contracting state. He concluded that on the basis of the EeJ 
ruling in Group Josi, the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Re Ha"ods was bad 
law. 
The ECJ went on to hold that the forum non conveniens doctrine was incompatible 
with the Brussels Regulations. The regulations and the ECJ's interpretation of it has 
impacted significantly on the common law rules in relation to jurisdiction by favouring 
certainty over the flexibility which was built into the common law rules. However, the 
EC] declined to answer a second question referred to it, namely whether the application 
of forum non conveniens is ruled out in all circumstances. This leaves open the 
possibility of the doctrine of forum non conveniens still having application in certain 
S6 Case-128/01 (EC] 1 March 2005) [2005] 2 WLR 942 
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circumstances. Cases to which the Brussels Convention or Council Regulation do not 
apply will be unaffected by the decisions in this case. 
In comparing the UK approach to the American one, The UK approach to forum 
non conveniens has never precisely mirrored the US approach, because US courts has 
granted/orum non conveniens dismissals whenever, on balance, forum connections were 
more strongly in favour of a foreign forum, while recent English cases have emphasised 
the importance of substantive justice for the plaintiff, taking into account the importance 
of legal aid as well as the general need to ensure that forum non conveniens does not 
result in a denial of access to justice. 57 
In the USA forum non conveniens principles were established under the case of 
Gulf Oil Corporation v Gilbert. 58 In the case the Supreme Court established a two-step 
procedure for deciding whether to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds. 59 
First, a federal court must determine whether an adequate alternative forum exists. If it 
does, the court must then decide in which forum the litigation would best serve the 
private interests of the litigations and the public interest of the forum. In international 
issues, relying on Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno, 60 the court noted that, in answering aforum 
non conveniens questions, a district court must fIrst determine whether or not the 
proposed alternative forum is adequate. The court stated that it must then consider the 
relevant private interests of the parties and public interests factors relating to the current 
and alternative forum. 61 
The position of the US courts did not change in the Bhopal litigations and the case 
was dismissed on the ground of/orum non conveniens. The judge decided that the Indian 
court was more suitable because private interest factors supported the efficiency of 
57 Anderson, Transnational Corporations, (n 30) 
58 330 US 501 [1947] 
59 Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 40) and Duval-Major, One-Way Ticket Home. (n 34) 
60 454 US 235 [1981] 
61 Chinen MA, 'Jurisdiction: Foreign Plaintiffs, Forum Non Conveniens And Litigation Against 
Multinational Corporations' (1987) 28 Harvard International Law Journal 209 
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Indian court. The Indian government and public were very interested in the problem so 
public interest factors were pointing to Indian venue. Additionally, the judge was 
convinced the Indian court could handle the case. Thus, the Bhopal decision, like Piper 
before it, proves that American courts are very reluctant to entertain claims brought by 
foreign plaintiffs against an American firm. 62 Indeed, the US approach openly 
discriminates in favour of local litigants, placing unfair obstacles in the way of foreign 
plaintiffs wishing to sue US companies in the United States.63 Actually, discussing the 
public interest64 in the case, international comity has been used ironically to promote 
prejudiced outcomes because the USA approach basically depends on the idea that the 
injuries done by American business to foreign people abroad are not America's problem. 
The legal policy problem under forum non conveniens principle which is valid for both 
English and American courts is that US and UK courts are in fear of that there might be 
a flood of cases to their courts and it would make them more congested. By allowing 
transnational business to choose legal systems imposing a lower regulatory burden than 
the United States, US courts have effectively lowered regulatory standards. By refusing 
to exercise jurisdiction in a case like Bhopal, a court effectively allows a US enterprise 
to avoid US tort liability and encourages other manufacturers to locate plants abroad. 65 
Assessment Criteria of Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
The criteria are classified in two segments; private interest factors and public interest 
factors, which are American, based criteria and rejected by the House of Lords in 
England. 
62 Muchlinski PT, 'the Bhopal Case Controlling Ultra-hazardous Industrial Activities Undertaken By 
Foreign Investors' (1987) 50 Modern Law Review 545 
63 Prince Peter, 'Bhopal, Bougainville and OK Tedi: Why Australia's Approach to Forum Non Conveniens 
is Better' (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 573 
64 The public interest factors are discussed below. (p 146) 
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Private Interest Factors 
Private interest factors can be classified as factors related to procedural problems in 
\ 
litigations and issues directly related to the case. In the evaluation of private interest 
issues, the courts have often concentrated on the location of evidence and witnesses , 
enforceability of witness summons, and where the respective parties reside. USA courts 
also consider the possibility of enforcing a judgment. 66 Moreover, English courts have 
given weight to practical considerations that are important for proper judgments such as 
the availability of a legal aid, contingency fee agreements and language barrier 
problems, which question the adequacy of the foreign forum. 67 Shortly, they ask if 
substantive justice could be achieved in an alternative forum by questioning the 
adequacy of the foreign forum and diversity of proceedings. 
Evidences and Witnesses 
In the tort cases against MNEs, evidence and witnesses are usually in the host countries 
where the subsidiaries perform their activities so overseas witnesses are likely to be 
more common in these cases and this will weigh against the home country forum. If 
documents in the possession of the overseas subsidiary are likely to be relevant, the 
parent company will usually have power to require their production. This argument can 
however be advanced in a defendant's favour where documents are in the possession of 
some other party overseas (e.g. a Government body) which is unlikely to volunteer the 
documents. In those circumstances a court order will be necessary, but an order from an 
English court would probably be unenforceable; this is therefore a factor in favour of the 
65 Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 40) and Dunham DF and Gladbach EF 'Forum Non Conveniens 
and the Foreign Plaintiffs in the 1990s' (1998-1999) 24 Brook. J. Int'l. L. 665 and Prince, Bhopal, (n 63) 
66 Dunham and Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 65) 
67 Dunham and Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 65) 
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court declining jurisdiction. 68 However, many issues are likely to be resolved by means 
of expert evidence, and this will reduce the need to call witnesses of fact and lift the 
balance back in favour of the English forum. Under the problem of the enforceability of 
witness summons it is important to consider whether or not the foreign country is a party 
to the 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial 
Matters.69 If so, subpoenas issued out of the English High Court will be enforceable in 
that jurisdiction and this will minimise the impact of any evidence advanced by the 
defendants as to the existence of relevant witnesses in the foreign jurisdiction. Even if 
the Hague Convention cannot be relied upon, there is also the possibility of obtaining 
depositions from foreign witnesses by means of letters of request. 70 
It should not be ignored that the actions are against groups of companies for tort of 
subsidiaries so courts have to check all possible decision-taking procedures or 
transactions in the group and listen to managers and other administrative workers of the 
companies. Under new developments in technological and communication of the 
operating companies, the documents or all the information that are needed can be easily 
produced because there is already very well developed flows of information amongst 
companies in the group. 7 I Thus, the horizontal structure makes it impossible to point 
another jurisdiction as more appropriate in terms of evidence and witnesses. Therefore, 
it is really difficult to decide that host countries are more suitable due to availability of 
evidence, and even if they are, this suitability cannot be distinct and clear any more. 
Additionally, the consideration of likelihood of rmding expert witnesses makes the 
forum of developed countries more appropriate. 
68 Meeran Richard, 'Process Liability Of Multinationals: Overcoming The Forum Hurdle' (1995) Nov. 
J.P .I.L. 170 
69 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (The Hague, 18.3.1970 
Treaty Series 020/1977 Cmnd 6727) 
70 Meeran, Process Liability, (n 68) 
71 Detailed discussion is made at chapter 2. 
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Enforcement 
Courts have no inherent power to enforce judgments made by foreign courts against 
defendants, but courts might consider the enforcement rules as a significant factor. 72 If 
there is no possibility of enforcing a judgment against the defendant company, a stay 
should not be given. In Adams v Cape industries the English court of Appeal held that 
the Texas judgment was not enforceable against Cape because it had not been present in 
Texas at the relevant time and the presence of its subsidiary could not constitute the 
necessary presence by Cape itself. Therefore, because of the risk of non-enforcement the 
defendant should be forced to guarantee to obey the foreign forum courts' decision and 
pay the awards, as applied in the Bhopal case. This solution may not be as effective as 
hearing the case in the parent companies states forum but at least it can prevent the 
plaintiffs giving up the case because of enforcement problems. 
In case forum non conveniens is applied in cases brought in home countries, there 
will be problems of reverse enforcement. According to general principles only 
subsidiaries are domiciled in host countries so if there is a finding against parent 
companies, the enforcement problem will occur because of the non-domicile status of 
parent companies in host states. This will create the problem that when the proceeding is 
fmalised in host states' the plaintiffs will have to look for possible enforcement issues in 
home countries. If there is any enforcement agreement between the involved states the 
enforcement must not be considered as criteria for assessing the forum non conveniens 
argument since both rulings will be treated in the same way. If there is no enforcement 
agreement, the enforcement problem will be two sided whichever court decides there 
will be problem of enforcement. Moreover, under a horizontal organizational structure 
involvements of more than one entity in the groups in tort will be more likely and these 
entities might be in different jurisdictions. In this case in whichever jurisdiction the case 
is pursued, there will be a question of enforcement for the other entities since they are 
72 Dunham and Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 65) 
143 
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Thus, the application of forum non conveniens will be 
more problematic. 
Efficiency of the Alternative forum 
American and English courts additionally evaluate the efficiency of alternative courts. If 
they come to the conclusion that the alternative courts are efficient enough to hear the 
case they grant a stay. They have no certain criteria for the evaluation since the 
assessment criteria used in past cases are vague. Some issues concerning the adequacy 
of the Indian forum was raised by the plaintiffs in Bhopal case; first, the plaintiffs 
argued that the Indian forum was inadequate because it lacked the innovation necessary 
to deal with litigation as complex as the Bhopal case. In dismissing this argument, the 
court relied on the testimony of the defendant's expert to show that the Indian judiciary 
had responded in the past by creating complex legal problems. Second, the plaintiffs 
argued that the Indian forum was subject to widespread delays. The court responded it 
could happen in the USA as well. Third, the court found unpersuasive the plaintiffs' 
further argument that substantive Indian law is incapable of handling the complexity of 
the Bhopal litigation. The plaintiffs' fourth argument focused on whether Indian 
procedural law would prevent the litigants from receiving an adequate trial. The court 
responded with concerns that India's discovery procedures would not be as expansive as 
those of the United States but US court though it was efficient enough to handle the 
case. 
In the UK, in the Cape case the House of Lords did not find South African courts 
experienced enough to handle a group action case. These discretionary evaluation 
criteria make the future of cases dependent on the alternative forum's country; if a 
country has a developed law system they grant the stay, if not they do not. One of the 
specific findings of Sir John Wood in the Connelly case was that "whilst the plaintiff had 
obtained legal aid to sue R1Z in England, the chances of him securingfimding to litigate 
in Namibia were remote". Additionally, the legal aid problem was one of the main 
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arguments in the Lubbe v Cape case and it was discussed very broadly by the parties. It 
is accepted that there is no legal aid available in South Africa for personal injuries. The 
Court of Appeal decided that unavailability of legal aid is not enough to remove the stay. 
Nevertheless, the House of Lords revised the decision as they considered that legal aid 
was very important for the future of the case and therefore, with the absence of any 
contingency fee agreement, it might prevent justice being achieved. This makes MNEs' 
tort liability cases dependant on where the tort action occurs and thus it is impossible to 
predict the result of future cases. 
Under the harsh conditions offorum non conveniens, in the UK, the plaintiffs' last 
argument in the case is human rights issues under which they claim they cannot get 
substantive justice in the alternative forum so the dismissal of a case under forum non 
conveniens violates article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
regulates entitlement to a fair hearing. These claims have not been taken to the European 
Court Human Rights. In a possible situation if the issue is brought to the European Court 
of Human Rights, I do not think the court will decide in favour of plaintiffs since in 
forum non conveniens cases the courts claim that they are not rejecting the cases and the 
alternative forum is available to reach a substantive judgement. Moreover, recent Owusu 
v Jackson decision of ECJ will reduce possible success in this matter. 
Under the private interest factors each practical argument might be raised in any 
case. The claims that American and English courts base their arguments on can be 
converted to prove that English and American forums are appropriate as well home 
countries because MNEs perform their business under very complicated business 
structures.73 Thus, all private interest factors may point to a home countries forum as 
well. Under the complicated economic and managerial structure of business it is 
impossible to prove other countries' forums are distinctly and clearly more appropriate. 
Most of the documents can easily be reachable any country in which any component of 
the MNEs is domiciled. The system of information exchange is also applicable for 
courts; in case of requirements any witness or any documents can be contacted in any 
73 Detailed discussion is made at chapter 2. 
145 
state as happens in case of business relations. More importantly, in tort claims. the 
evaluation of decision taking and the components of tort action multi-jurisdictional 
examination is a requirement. The modem structure considers MNEs not as single 
decision making centres; rather each entity can make independent decisions under 
common group policies. Thus, any tort committed by one subsidiary under a group will 
have complex roots in the process that led to this incident. Wherever the case is heard 
the same examination procedure will be gone through. Thus, dismissing the case on the 
ground of forum non conveniens does not change this fact. If the aim is to achieve 
substantive judgement,forum non conveniens is definitely not a tool to do so. 
Public Interest Factors 
Public interest factors are applied by American courts to prevent flows of cases to the 
US. American courts examine the public interest factor in three parts; the public policy 
aspect of the dispute, the choice of law issue and the administrative burden issues. The 
main justification for the application of public interest factors is that they should not 
require American citizens to bear the cost of jury service and court expenses when they 
had little connection to the subject matter of the case.74 In the Bhopal case American 
courts decided that Indian courts are more interested in the problem and thus are more 
appropriate. Moreover, the nature of law also pointed at the Indian law. During the case, 
for example, the district court focused on the Indian government's extensive regulation 
of its country's chemical industry as evidence indicating that the Indian government had 
a strong interest in the dispute, and therefore supporting a forum non conveniens 
dismissal. Most important public interest factors in the courts' decisions were the local 
interest factors in the action and application of foreign law7s but strangely enough the 
Indian government itself initially sued in the United States District Court for the 
74 Birnbaum and Dunham, Foreign Plaintiff, (n 39) 
75 Dunham and Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 65) 
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Southern District of New York on behalf of all individual victims, suggesting that the 
government was not opposed to the US judicial system crafting a solution to a problem 
that arose in India.76 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India said: "in my 
opinion that these cases must be pursued in the United States... it is the on(v hope these 
unfortunate people have.,,77 
Therefore, assessing public policy issues is very complex. It may be true that the 
Indian government and public were interested in the problem but on the other hand, the 
American public was also interested in the problem because a chemical industry plant is 
an important public issue in the USA. In addition, the company had the same kinds of 
plant and chemical foundations in the USA that needed to be regulated strictly. This 
means that the interest of public is always two sided, citizens' interest and public 
administrative bodies' interest. 
In the light of global developments and activities of any MNE, any activities and 
tort actions of MNEs are discussed at a worldwide level. For example, recent asbestos 
related liability claims and pharmaceutical liability cases attract attention from allover 
the world at an administrative level or at a public level. In the Bhopal case as well, the 
worldwide public attention has been significant. Persons from the UK were never part of 
the Bhopal disaster but the involvement ofNGOs, media and even at an administrative 
level were very high.78 Moreover, the globalisation of MNEs as well as economic 
institutions in the world brings more globalised media coverage. People allover the 
world have a chance to follow news worldwide. Even small accidents can be viewed by 
millions of people. The easy use of the Internet makes information exchanges very fast 
and wide. People are organized according to their concerns and campaigners create 
public policy not only at the domestic but also at a global level. The issue of the liability 
76 Muchlinski, the Bhopal Case (n 62) and Miller Laurel E, 'Forum Non Conveniens and State Control of 
Foreign Plaintiff Access to U.S. Courts in International Tort Actions' (1991) 58 u. Chi. L. Rev. 1369 
77 Cited at Robertson D, 'the Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens' (1994) 29 Texas D..J 353 
78 For example BBC has a whole section on Bhopal tragedy available at 
http://news.bbc.co.ukllihilprogrammeslbhopal/default.stm. Moreover, UK governments' Health and 
Safety Commission prepares its control major accident hazards by giving examples form Bhopal Tragedy, 
available at http://www.bse.gov.uklcomahlsragtecblcaseuncarbide84.htm. 
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of MNEs is defmitely one of the most discussed global problems. Consequently, all 
people either from a developed country or a developing country have an interest in the 
issues. Thus, there are many NGOs contributing to the formation of public policies at a 
local and global level. Moreover, the governments neither in developed countries nor in 
developing countries have the luxury to ignore these discussions. Thus, the issue is 
always a matter of public policy in any country but from different perspectives. 
Therefore, one intetpretation of American courts' decisions shows that the basic 
reason for dismissing cases on the ground of forum non conveniens is to keep disputes 
against American MNEs out of American courts. Thus, in the Lubbe v Cape79 the House 
of Lords did not find it suitable to apply public interest factors. It is a truthful 
intetpretation of the public policy issues because public policy is not a legal issue, so 
determining the future of cases on the ground of public interest factors could make the 
courts involved in policy that would have a very negative effect on credibility of the 
courts. 
Criticism of Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
In the cases that we have mentioned, on one side, there is a big MNE and on the other 
side there are people from less developed countries, who cannot even pay the court 
expenses without legal aid. These poor people choose the forum of the parent company's 
country because in their own country the punitive awards are very small, the quality of 
judgment is poor and they cannot even find lawyers to represent them. On the other side, 
there are powerful MNEs some of which have bigger assets than most of the less 
developed countries have. This power may give them a chance to interfere in the courts 
in the plaintiffs' countries. Therefore, these legal barriers may prevent plaintiffs from 
79 Lubb~ v CDpe Pic [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1 S4S 
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recovery in their home country.80 Thus, after the dismissal of cases, many plaintiffs lose 
their wish to follow the cases since they have lost their lawyers, money and courage. 
Therefore, most of the cases are abandoned, and those that are not are mostly settled for 
less than their estimated value.81 Thus, MNEs try hard to shift cases to the plaintiffs' 
forum in order to stay away from high punitive awards.82 Furthermore, even if the 
plaintiffs win the cases they will become engaged with enforcement problems; the 
plaintiffs' countries' decisions may not be enforced, which may make all their efforts 
useless. 
This criticism sometimes fmds supporter from the judiciary; Justice Doggett in the 
case of Dow Chemical Company v Castro Alfar083 "The doctrine of forum non 
conveniens is obsolete in a world in which markets are global and in which ecologists 
have documented the delicate balance of all life on this planet.... (It) enables 
corporations to evade legal control merely because they are transnational.... In the 
absence of meaningful tort liability in the United States for their actions, some 
multinational corporations will continue to operate without adequate regard for the 
human and environmental costs of their actions. This result cannot be allowed to repeat 
itself for decades to come. As a matter of law and of public policy, the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens should be abolished". 
Accordingly, theforum non conveniens is a complete waste of time and plaintiffs' 
resources and both the Bhopal and the Cape Industries cases amply demonstrate how the 
forum non conveniens can hold back speedy resolutions of disputes, keeping claimants 
locked into a process that focuses on determining the proper forum for the action. 84 
Plaintiffs and defendants just apply to court to, in the words of Prof. Robertson "litigate 
in order to determine where they shall litigate" . 
80 Duval-Major, One-Way Ticket Home, (n 34) 
81 Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 40) 
82 Ward, Corporate Accountability, (n 32) 
83 Dow Chemical Company v Castro Alfaro 786 S.W.2d 674 (Supreme Court of Texas 1990) 
M Ward, Corporate Accountability, (n 32) 
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In both the English and American law systems the principles of forum non 
conveniens is very broad and vaguely interpreted and gives judges nearly unlimited 
discretion rights. Although there have been attempts to establish basic principles, they 
cannot embrace all possible situations. Consequently this vague situation just helps 
MNEs escape from liability. The adoption of the most suitable forum version of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine has made it impossible to predict the outcome of a 
jurisdictional issue that would have been easy to forecast without the principle.85 
The multinational business, as it is obvious by its name, considers every each 
business relations at the same level. 86 For them the classification of people on the basis 
of citizenship is over. They make profit from their activities from allover the world and 
distribute these profits to their company's shareholders mostly resident in home 
countries. However, the judges know that courts are supported by taxpayers so English 
and American courts think that since their citizens pay tax for a better quality 
jurisdiction, courts must not be busy with claims on non-citizens. It is true that citizens 
pay taxes but the real money comes from the overseas activities of MNEs. The Shell 
Company declared a profit more than £12.5 billion in 200687 and it is not difficult to 
guess where this money came from; from Nigeria, Indonesia, Middle East and Africa, 
basically all over the world. This profit is distributed to shareholders mostly resident in 
the UK and these shareholders pay taxes. 
Courts also claim that they do not dismiss the cases but just transfer them to 
another forum. However, in practice there is almost no difference between dismissing 
cases and transferring them to other forums, because obtaining your right after the stay is 
almost impossible. More importantly, as Professor Robertson explains, a court in New 
York cannot transfer a case to India, it can only dismiss; "These astonishing references 
to transfer in the international forum non conveniens context are part of a disguised 
vocabulary whereby the true effects of forum non conveniens dismissal are masked ... in 
8S Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 40) 
86 Detailed discussion is made at Chapter 2. 
87 See www.shell.com. 
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the real world, everyone knows that international plaintiffs who suffer forum non 
conveniens dismissals in the United states are typically unable to go forward in the 
hypothesized foreign forum". 88 
Moreover, the modem context of convenience cannot be interpreted in the same 
way as that of decades ago since many advances in technology and transportation have 
taken place.89 The modem concept of organisational structure can never point out any 
particular jurisdiction clearly.90 It is a fact that a jurisdiction can be convenient in some 
aspects but none of the alternative jurisdictions for MNEs' tort litigation will be clearly 
and distinctly more appropriate. Characteristics of the modem managerial and 
organisational structure of MNEs suggest that the distinction between member 
organisations is not as clear as it used to be. This fact plays an important role when 
deciding the convenient forum in MNEs' torts since under complex horizontal 
organisation it is almost impossible to point out one single forum under which decisions 
were taken or a tort has been committed. The decision making process is now 
complicated since it includes parent, subsidiary, other operational subsidiaries and 
basically it is based on group policy. 
For example, in a hypothetical tort committed by a petroleum company in a less 
developed country, more particularly where there was a problem in their exploring plant 
and as consequence the petroleum polluted rivers and caused huge environmental 
damage and impact on the life of local people. In this case the tort is committed in the 
subsidiary's forum. However, the process of building and operating the plant involves 
the parent as a policy determinant as well as a negotiation body before establishing the 
local subsidiary. Moreover, it involves research and technology companies in the groups 
as basic determinants of operational technology. It may also involve construction 
department and thus another subsidiary since they were the one responsible for building 
in the plant side. Moreover, another important aspect of such projects, financing, is 
88 Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 40) 
89 Dunham and Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 65) 
90 Detailed discussion is at chapter 2. 
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usually dealt with by fmancing department. In short, the process of building a plant and 
operating involves many different divisions and companies in a MNE with each one 
having different responsibility in different time period. 
If defendants argue that there the forum of subsidiary is more convenient, the 
private interest factors will point out many different forums. Evidence can be found in 
different jurisdictions, for example the original decisions of investments were made in 
headquarters, and the corporations responsible for the technology might be in other 
jurisdictions. Witnesses and responsible people on the process will be scattered around 
different forums as well. Expert witnesses will be available mostly in the forum of the 
parent. In short, the concept of convenience does not suit into the modem structure of 
MNEs under which it is almost impossible to spot a more suitable forum. Thus, the 
forum non conveniens doctrine has no practical applicability. And more importantly, the 
issue of searching for convenience must not prevent the search for justice as happened in 
Cape cases and Connolly cases. 
All these explanations prove that as an empirical matter, forum non conveniens 
decisions invariably determine the outcomes of international tort cases and thus have an 
effect on substantive law.91 Consequently, the doctrine prevents the common law from 
reaching a conclusion in determining tort liability of MNEs. Considering these realities 
together with the non suitability of forum non conveniens principle to modern MNE 
concept, we should discuss the alternatives and suggestions. 
Alternatives and Suggestions to Forum Non Conveniens 
If torts committed by MNEs discriminate against people living in the jurisdictions of 
subsidiary companies, a quest to search for an appropriate solution must start. One 
straightforward answer is to amend the rules of private international law that 
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discriminate against foreign litigants. The movement towards a global judgment 
convention in The Hague conference on Private International Law may provide part of 
the answer here, but even if that effort results in a viable treaty that is widely ratified by 
states, it may still contain room for the application of the forum non conveniens 
doctrine.92 Under these conditions, other solutions could be achieved in common law, 
because as the forum non conveniens doctrine is a creature of equity, and might be 
abolished. 
Conditional Forum Non Conveniens 
In the Bhopal case, judge Keenan decided that India had an adequate forum and the 
capability to deal with the case, but imposed some conditions for the defendant. The 
subsequent conditions were laid down; 1- Union Carbide must consent to submit the 
jurisdiction of the courts of India and shall continue to waive defences based upon the 
statute of limitations 2- Union Carbide must agree to satisfy judgment rendered by an 
Indian court, and if applicable, upheld by an appellate court in that country, where such 
judgment and affinnance confonn with minimal requirements of due process 3-Union 
Carbide must be subject to discovery under the model of the US Federal Rules of Civil 
procedure after an appropriate demand by plaintiffs.93 The American court tried to seem 
fair when imposing conditions for the defendant. However, imposing conditions for the 
defendants cannot provide consistent solutions for the problems because each case has 
its own specific conditions. As it has been apparently proved in the Bhopal case, the 
dispute has not been solved yet in satisfactory way for victims.94 More importantly, 
these conditions cannot bring the expected level of protection for the plaintiffs and thus 
91 Miller, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 76) 
92 Anderson, Transnational Corporations, (n 30) 
93 Abraham CM and Abraham S, 'The Bhopal Case And The Development Of Environmental Law In India' 
(1991) 40 ICLQ 334 
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cannot help to establish MNEs' tort liability. The conditions were imposed because the 
court wanted to relieve public concern and protest in the US. However, the facts seem to 
contradict the American courts' professed belief that conditional dismissal for forum non 
conveniens is not a decision going to the character and result of the controversy; as 
Professor Robertson indicated pretending that such dismissals are not outcome-
determinative is a rather fantastic fiction. 95 
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act in the USA (28 U.S.C. § 1404(A» 
When there is problem of imposing conditions in forum non conveniens dismissal and 
also impossibility of transferring a case from one forum to another forum, in American 
federal law can be considered as an alternative example to forum non conveniens 
dismissal. After enactment of the new procedural law of 28 USC 1404 (A) enacted in 
1948, forum non conveniens problems amongst American district courts lost their 
applicability. The law provides that ''for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the 
interests of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 
division where it might have been brought'. 96 Courts have been given more discretion to 
transfer under the Act than they had to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. 
Moreover, the change of venue does not influence the law applied to the case and is 
therefore only a procedural plan that will not alter outcome of disputes. 97 It is a good 
solution for domestic forum problems in the US but application of the same rules could 
be too utopian on an international level. Judge Marshall's opinion for the majority in 
Piper noted that the development of the section 1404(a) transfer rules were drafted 'in 
accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens,' but that the district· court's 
discretion to dismiss is in fact more substantial under the transfer statute than under the 
94 For more information, see www.bhopal.net 
95 Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 40) 
96 Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 40) 
97 Miller, Forum Non Conveniens (n 76) 
154 
common law doctrine.98 Thus, the relocation of a case within the federal system is more 
flexible than its dismissal for pwposes of litigation outside the United States. 
At least in theory, transferring a case from one federal court to another does not 
need to seriously disrupt its progress because the case does not have to be refiled; there 
will be no problem with the relevant statute of limitations having expired while the case 
was pending in the first court.99 However, in transnational civil litigation, it is not 
possible to transfer cases to another state. The courts can only dismiss the cases on the 
basis offorum non conveniens, which will encounter the same problems. Moreover, the 
aim of plaintiffs by starting their legal actions in America is to escape the inefficiency of 
legal procedural systems in the forum state of subsidiary. Thus, even the successful 
transfer of the case to alternative forum does not provide justifiable solutions. 
Australian Approach to Forum Non Conveniens 
In the UK and the US the courts apply the most suitable forum approach in forum non 
conveniens discussions. Accordingly, in the UK the courts dismiss the case whenever 
there is an alternative forum clearly and distinctly more appropriate and similarly in the 
US whenever the balance of convenience points out to the alternative forum. However, 
Australian case law takes a different approach, which is clearly in favour of tort victims 
in comparison to English and American approaches. The key element in Australia's 
approach is its maintenance of the notion that a forum non conveniens stay should not be 
granted unless the choice of forum is clearly oppressive or difficult for the defendant. In 
Voth v. Manildra Flour Mills lOo, the High Court affirmed a test, declaring that an 
Australian court would need to be 'clearly inappropriate' before a stay on forum non 
98 Dunham and Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens, (0 65) 
99 Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens, (n 40) 
100 (1990) 171 CLR 538 
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conveniens grounds could be granted. 101 This sets a specific standard against which 
requests for such stays can be measured; one, moreover, which is rightly difficult for a 
local defendant to meet. 102 The Australian doctrine has retained the aim of protecting the 
defendant from harassment caused by a clearly inappropriate choice of forum by the 
plaintiff. Instead it uses the very reason foreign plaintiffs would have for taking a matter 
to court which is their great interest in the case as the main ground for rejecting a 
hearing. 103 The great benefit of such an approach is its avoidance of balancing of the 
US's balance of foreign forum and UK most suitable forum doctrine, under which a 
foreign plaintiff is at an immediate disadvantage. On the basis of the Bhopal case, 
adoption of the Australian forum non conveniens approach by US courts would have 
been more in keeping with the United States' global responsibilities, both in terms of 
foreign citizens being able to recover proper compensation from MNEs, and in terms of 
the legal standards that US corporations should be required to observe in their overseas 
operations. 104 Therefore, the Australian approach represents a more acceptable solution 
to the forum non conveniens doctrine but the risk of dismissal is always present under 
this approach as well. It should not be forgotten that, even in the Australian approach the 
battle to establish forum would be causing long time losses. 
Brussels and Lugano Conventions 
In the EU, a coordinated system for deciding issues of jurisdiction already existed under 
the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
101 Prince, Bhopal, (n 63) 
102 Joseph Sarah, Corporations and TransntJtiona/ Human Rights Litigation (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2004) p. 122 
103 Prince, Bhopal, (n 63) 
104 Prince, Bhopal, (n 63) 
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Commercial Matters. IOS It establishes (article 2) a general principle that defendants can 
be sued in the courts of the EU member state where they are domiciled. The result of an 
interpretation of the article will be that between member states, plaintiffs can sue 
defendants in the defendants' domiciles ignoring other probable domiciles. 
Consequently, courts cannot apply the forum non conveniens doctrine for plaintiffs from 
member states because under the Brussels Convention there is no place for broad 
jurisdiction-declining discretion and it seems to operate quite well without it. The 
Lugano Convention 106 is not different from the Brussels Convention in the principles 
applied; it just made the applicability of Brussels Convention principles broader by 
including EFTA countIjes. 107 Therefore, the more countries sign these Conventions, the 
narrower the applicability offorum non conveniens will be. 
In brief, the Brussels and Lugano Conventions provide the most developed 
jurisdiction regulation. Both Conventions prohibit the dismissal of the cases on the 
ground of the forum non conveniens doctrine, so they have created safe and predictable 
solutions for plaintiffs exposed to tort actions of subsidiaries of MNEs. However, the 
countries in which the conventions are applied are limited and basically developed 
countries. Thus, there are still problems in application of the doctrine and even though 
its application is fundamentally reduced in the UK by EC] decisions, American courts 
still widely apply the doctrine offorum non conveniens. 
lOS Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Official Journal L 12 of 16.01.2001). 
106 Lugano Convention of 16 September 1988 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters 
107 O'Brien 1, Conflict of Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001) 
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The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)lo8 
The Alien Tort Claims Act allows foreigners to bring a civil suit in a US District level 
courts for a crime committed anywhere in the world by an individual. government, or 
corporation that violates the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. This Act 
grants the district courts competence to hear tort claims from non-Americans who have 
been a victim of a violation of a norm of 'the law of nations' or a treaty to which the 
United States is party, no matter where the violation has occurred. I09 Therefore, the 
A TCA litigation has drawn considerable attention from academics, and is seen as an 
attractive option to solve jurisdictional problems in MNE torts because it provides 
access to US courts. 
The A TCA was originally created for use against pirates, but it was left inactive 
and forgotten until 1980 when it was rediscovered and put to use by lawyers in the 
landmark case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. llo Using the ATCA, two Paraguayan family 
members brought suit against a former Paraguayan state official who had committed acts 
of torture against a member of their family. They won a guilty verdict and were 
rewarded a significant monetary amount. Moreover, the act gained a new importance 
when the Second Circuit held in Kadic v. Karadzic lll that the ATCA could be used 
against private individuals. Il2 Karadzic's clear expansion of the capacity of human 
rights claims under the ATCA to cover private non-state actors facilitated applying the 
same reasoning to private non-state actors in corporate form. In the cases that so far 
apply the Karadzic rationale directly against corporate defendants, the results indicate 
108 28 U.S.C. & 1350 
109 Wouters Jan, de Smet Leen and Ryngaert Cedric 'Tort Claims Against Multinational Companies For 
Foreign Human Rights Violations Committed Abroad Lessons From The Alien Torts Claim Act' (Institute 
for International Law, Working Paper 46, - November, 2(03) at 
http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.beliir/nl/wpIWP1WP46e.pdf 
110 630 F .2d 876 ( 2d Cir. 1980) 
111 70 F. 3d 232 ( 2d Cir. 1995) 
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that American courts are willing to consider claims based on violations of international 
human rights laws against MNES. I13 This standing was recently confmned by Doe I \'. 
Unocal COrp1l4 which clarified that the ATCA cannot only be invoked against state 
actors, state officials and private actors for acts but also against private actors for purely 
private acts. llS 
Accordingly, corporations can be held liable for violations committed 'in concert 
with' government officials. This principle of private corporate liability under the ATCA 
has been upheld in a handful of preliminary decisions, although some have been 
dismissed on other grounds and none has yet resulted in a final judgment. In Doe I v. 
Unocol Corp for example, the district court found that a corporation can be held liable 
for private acts of slavery and forced labour because the international law prohibitions 
apply to all actors. Furthermore, for MNEs tracking the development of the Unocal case, 
the use of an 'aiding and abetting' test in comparison with one of 'state action' to defme 
private liability under the ATCA, is important because it potentially lowers the bar 
significantly for aliens to sue MNEs in US COurtS. 116 Similarly, in Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoRan, 117 the district court found that a private corporation could be held liable for 
genocide, which by definition is barred whether committed by 'public officials or private 
individuals' . 118 
According to the case law, which has some settled criteria; a successful claim 
under ATCA must present three elements: 1- an alien sues 2- for a tort 3- committed in 
violation of the law of nations. The third presents the most analytical difficulties because 
112 Zia-Zarifi Saman, 'Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating International Law' 
(1999-2000) 4 UCLA J. Intll L. & Foreign Aff. 81 
113 Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational, (n 112) 
114 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Ca. 2000) 
lIS Wouters, Smet and Ryngaert, Tort Claims Against, (n 109) 
116 Khalil SA, 'The Alien Tort Claims Act And Section 1983: The Improper Use Of Domestic Laws To 
"Create" And "Define" International Liability For Multinational Corporations' (2002) 31 Hofstra Law 
Review 207 
117 969 F.Supp. 362 (EDLa. 1997) 
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it forces American courts to identify customary international law and treaties. 119 Thus, 
only a limited number of recognised, serious human rights crimes such as torture or 
genocide can, in practice, serve as the basis of an A TCA suit rather than catching all 
civil liability claims of aliens. 
Thus, the provision is unusual in that it requires plaintiffs to find their cause of 
action in intemationallaw rather than the national law of either the US or the state where 
the injury occurred. In practice, this means that the grounds for bringing a tort claim 
under A TCA are very narrow, and have been restricted mainly to serious violations of 
human rightS. 120 The latter form of individual liability that exists in the lack of state 
action is strictly limited to 'offences recognised by the community of nations as of 
universal concern' .121 Moreover, the international law rules must be specific, universal 
and obligatory.122 Consequently, there is a huge limitation burden on plaintiffs to 
establish jurisdiction over companies. This heavy burden is results of the more complex 
early legal analysis required in establishing subject matter jurisdiction in ATCA cases, 
since plaintiffs relying on the A TCA must identify enforceable and universal 
international norms and properly claim their violation by the defendant. 123 
Moreover, there are significant procedural hurdles to be overcome in bringing 
ATCA cases- including not only forum non conveniens, but also arguments regarding 
the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity. Similar problems may arise in other 
jurisdictions, such as the UK, which do not have an equivalent of the ATCA, but may 
118 Stephens Beth, 'Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights through Domestic Litigation' (2000-
2001) 24 Hastings Int') & Compo L. Rev. 401 
119 Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational, (n 112) 
120 Stephens Beth, 'Corporate Accountability: International Human Rights Litigation against Corporations 
in US Courts' in Kamminga Menno T. Saman Zia-Zarifi (EDS.) Liability of Multinational Corporations 
under International Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000) 
121 Khalil, The Alien Tort Claims Act (n 116) 
In Wouters, Smet and Ryngaert, Tort Claims Against (n 109) 
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apply the Act of State doctrine and sovereign immUnity.124 In summary, the possible 
obstacles in A TCA litigation can be examined under following titles. 
I-As discussed earlier, the category of torts that can be brought under the A TCA is 
limited within the scope of international law. An examination of MNEs' torts will show 
that most of the torts that are committed by MNEs never meet the criteria of being 
against international law. Thus, they will never be able to taken to court under A TCA 
claims. For example, the tort committed in the Bhopal case, or asbestos related claims 
may never fall in scope of A TCA litigation. Even the cases that have international 
aspects have been dismissed; in litigation against Freeport, plaintiffs claimed that 
defendant violated at least three international environmental law principles 1- polluter 
pays 2- the precautionary principle 3- the proximity principle. 125 However, the court 
held that even if it is true, it did not amount to violation of the law of nations because the 
three norms were not universally binding and not sufficiently defmable. 126 These cases 
show that American courts do not believe international environmental law has achieved 
the level of universality and specificity necessary for supporting ATCA jurisdiction.127 
Therefore, these interpretations of international law only protect negative human rights, 
which do not cover most part of the tort claims since the torts are determined according 
to national laws. Thus, most tort actions will never be able to brought under ATCA. 
Moreover, successful A TCA litigation requires state action in the tort process. In many 
ways international law analysis affirmed in Kadic matches the parent-subsidiary joint 
action analysis in that it involves assigning unlawful actions to an entity (the state) that 
only indirectly caused the harm. The joint action test requires either a conspiracy or 
124 Anderson, Transnational Corporations, (n 30) 
125 In the same way, the court in Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp 343 F. 3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003) held that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Peruvians' environmental claims styled as claims for life and 
health. Again a recent case, Sosa v . .Alvarez Machain (124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.20 (2004» the court 
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wilful participation with the state actor, or a substantial degree of cooperative action 
between the state and private actors. 128 
2- A TCA requires that, as a company to be tried, the corporations must have 
'sufficient contact' in the US for an American court to have jurisdiction to judge them. 
The defendant must have minimum contact and the contact must be systematic and 
continuous.129 This might prevent most of the MNEs from other jurisdictions being 
brought into the US courts. It is argued that where a parent company is not US-based, 
US courts had no jurisdiction, for instance over Total, a French company which is a 
partner in the same joint venture as Unocal in Bunna. This argument was raised in the 
case of the murder of Nigerian activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and others brought in New York 
by their families, where Shell's argument is that it bears no responsibility on the grounds 
that it does not exist in the USA. The court response to this argument was interesting; 
foreign corporations are subject to suit when doing business in the United States, even if 
such contacts are a small part of their worldwide operations. As a result, US courts 
upheld personal jurisdiction over Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport 
and Trading Companyl30, two foreign corporations, based on the operations of their 
investor relation's offices in New York. 131 Indeed, corporate liability greatly expands the 
practical sweep of A TCA litigation, as it is less likely to be limited by practical 
questions of personal jurisdiction: MNEs are more likely to be present in the United 
States for personal jurisdiction purposes than are individual performers. 132 This is very 
important since it establishes jurisdiction over companies even they are not domiciled in 
the US. More importantly, this decision can easily be interpreted in a way that the 
128 Londis L, 'The Corporate Face of the Alien Tort Claims Act How an Old Statute Mandates a New 
Understanding of Global Interdependence' (2005) 57 Me. L. Rev. 141 
129 Mattei Ugo and Jeffrey L, 'U.S. Jurisdiction over Conflicts Arising Outside of the United States: Some 
Hegemonic Implications' (2000-2001) 24 Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 381 
130 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrolium Co. 226 F 3d 88 2d Cir 2000 
131 Stephens, Corporate Liability, (n 118) 
132 Ramsey Michael D. 'Multinational Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act: Some 
Structural Concerns' (2000-2001) 24 Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 361 
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existence of subsidiary in the jurisdiction must be sufficient to establish jurisdiction over 
all components of MNEs. 
3- The issue whether ATCA abolishes the obstacles that current law creates must 
be examined as well. The structure of company law and the organisation of MNEs still 
prevent most of the cases being tried in home countries. In A TCA cases, in accordance 
with practice, plaintiffs aim at parent corporations. 133 Thus, in order to assert jurisdiction 
over a foreign parent corporation, plaintiffs must show that the parent either directly 
conducted business within the jurisdiction, or that the parent conducted business 
indirectly through subsidiaries that acted as the parent's alter ago or agent, and that 
these business contacts were continuous and systematic enough to make the court's 
assertion of jurisdiction reasonable under constitutional and international standards.134 
This means the parent must be directly connected to a tort claim in order to be held 
liable, which leads us to situations very similar condition to veil piercing. 135 For 
example, in a recent A TCA case the court denied plaintiff's claims that the subsidiary 
was alter ago of the parent. 136 
4- Another requirement for a successful A TCA claim is that plaintiffs must be 
aliens in order to bring suit under the ATCA, and will usually be a foreigner thus, being 
subject to forum non conveniens application is always possible since ATCA does not 
abolish the applicability of the principle. In Wiwa v Shell, American court dismissed the 
case on the ground of available English jurisdiction although plaintiffs claim they cannot 
bring the case under English law. 137 The doctrine of forum non conveniens and 
~ . Am . 138 In 
applicable A TCA guarantee that only a very lew cases appear m encan courts. 
the first cases though the forum non conveniens was consistently rejected in most ATCA 
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cases but it was applied in the case of Texaco v Aguinda. 139 This was ultimately 
dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. This case was involved environmental 
claims against Texaco for its operations in Ecuador. 140 Thus, the risk of being dismissed 
in ATCA cases still exists so the encouraging effect of A TCA cases has been turned into 
useless litigation that cannot bring another option for the most common situations. 141 
Accordingly, forum non conveniens has become more effective as a defence given that 
human. rights liability in the wake of Flartiga has expanded beyond violations of 
fundamental human rights by government officials, to violations by corporate entities 
and private individuals who conspire with or act as agents of oppressive governments. 142 
Some example cases which were rejected on forum non conveniens are; Bowoto v 
Chevron Texaco, Saro-Wiwa v Sheil, Torres v. S. Peru Copper COrp143 Aguinda v. 
Texaco. 144 
5- In case of a fmal judgment, the question arises why a foreign court should 
enforce the decisions of American courts to punish their corporations and citizens. They 
will not be very eager to enforce the decisions especially if these decisions are involving 
discussion of foreign state sovereignty. 
In conclusion, l\1NEs, unlike the other defendants in ATCA lawsuits, have the 
motivation, money and experience to litigate fully all jurisdictional limits and 
advantages of corporate structure available to them to avoid litigation on the merits. 145 
139 Aguinda v Texaco No. 93 Civ. 7527, 200 U.S. Dist. See Shaw Courtney, Uncertain Justice: Liability 
of Multinationals under the Alien Tort Claims Act' (2001-2002) 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1359 and Zia-Zarifi, 
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The pressure has resulted in the situation that of many Alien Tort cases that have been 
brought against corporations; only few have survived, with many more facing a motion 
to dismiss because the courts thought the claims failed to adequately assert a violation of 
international law or because the courts believe that an adequate forum existed in the 
nation in which the abuses occurred. The Unocal case was the most advanced, despite a 
brief from the US Justice Department arguing against the plaintiffs' use of the statute. 146 
Choice of Law Problems in MNEs' Tort Litigation 
Even if the hurdles of jurisdiction are surmounted, the potential plaintiff who is up 
against a parent company in its home state is faced with the task of establishing the 
applicable law. The question is this; which national law should govern the activities of 
an enterprise doing business in many different nation-states since a formalistic response, 
which holds that each of the individual corporations that make up the MNE group is 
subject to the law of its own domicile, does not respond to the real issues. 147 Where the 
tortious act is deemed to have taken place in the same jurisdiction as the injury, a single 
locus delicti can be identified. For this reason, foreign plaintiffs are almost certain to 
fmd themselves subject to the laws of the state in which the injury occurred, even if that 
law is applied by a court of the parent state. With transnational corporate fault, however, 
it may be impossible to recognise a single place of the wrong because multinational 
group liability cases can involve many events, persons, and impacts in several 
countries. 148 On this subject, where a tort is committed partly at home and partly in a 
Globalisation Justice, (n 144). And see Commentary by the ICC Chairmanship, Extra-territorial 
Application of National Laws (Department of Policy and Business Practices, December, 2002) at 
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foreign jurisdiction, the law to be applied will be that of the country with which the acts 
constituting the tort have the most real and substantial connection. In case of the fault of 
a multinational subsidiary, a probability that foreign law will be applied to an action 
tends to weigh against the English jurisdiction. In order to determine the law likely to be 
applied, the court will consider where each element of the tort (duty, breach of duty and 
damage) arose.I49 As a result, since there is no apparent consent, it seems that the 
applicable law must be determined case by case by the competent forum COurtS. I50 
It is of course possible that the parties may decide an applicable law in tort 
conflicts, on the basis of mutual agreement, but this is unlikely due to opposing interests. 
In most cases involving MNEs, the MNE will persistently seek to apply the law of the 
more favourable state, which is most likely host countries' law. I51 As result, the choice 
would appear to lie between the laws of the forum, the law governing the parent 
corporation, the law governing the subsidiary corporation, the law governing tortious 
liability.I52 In the cases of doubt and conflicting situations, courts should prefer the 
forum that is most favourable to the plaintiffs. 153 
Evaluation of the Chapter 
Procedural obstacles create many problems on the way to achieving justifiable solutions 
against MNEs for their torts, and thus, are preventing plaintiffs finding justice in MNEs 
torts. The cases that have been dismissed under forum non conveniens are often the end 
of the matter in the sense that when a case is dismissed on that ground the plaintiffs may 
149 Meeran, Process Liability, (n 68) and Chinen, Jurisdiction, (n 61) 
ISO Nygb Peter, 'The Liability Of Multi-National Corporations For Their Subsidiaries' (2002) EBOLR 27 
lSI Anderson, Transnational Corporations, (n 30) 
IS:! Nygb, The Liability Of Multi-National, (n ISO) 
1S3 Lowenfeld A, 'National Jurisdiction And The Multinational Enterprise' in Lowenfeld A (ed.), 
IntemationtU Litigation And The Quest For ReQSoMhleness (Clarendon, Oxford 1996) 
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not pursue the claims no matter how legitimate their claims are. Similarly it is possible 
that when the defence of forum non conveniens fails the defendant may admit to the 
substantive claim and settle. 154 
The ECl's decisions playa very important role in the reduction of jurisdiction 
problems in search for MNEs liability. There has been very strict application of article 2 
of Brussels Regulations, which briefly regulates that companies can be sued where they 
are domiciled and courts cannot decide the opposite. Accordingly. the recent OWllSll 
case of ECl will significantly reduce application of forum non conveniens doctrine in 
English courts. In consideration of other alternatives to jurisdictional problems, each one 
still has a particular disadvantage. Thus, neither of the alternatives discussed above seem 
to remove application of forum non conveniens and other jurisdictional problems. 
Moreover, American courts still widely apply forum non com'eniens. 
Even overcoming jurisdictional barriers does not change the negative results of the 
application of traditional corporate law principles like corporate personality and limited 
liability in corporate groups without necessarily abolishing them. 155 Therefore, the 
discussion must focus on that in case of abolishing substantive obstacles to the MNEs 
liability, whether the procedural problems will need special regulation or they will 
disappear without any action. For example, in this discussion some courts have reasoned 
that in providing specific statutory protections in areas such as antitrust, securities 
regulation, environmental, or employment laws, the legislature must have indented to 
'd h I fi . d . 156 overn e t e common aw orum non convenzens octnne. 
Moreover, it seems that even in the case of abolishing problems of separate 
personality, international civil litigation for MNEs will be problematic. The horizontal 
organization of MNEs makes the determination of the venue nearly impossible from the 
154 Magaisa. Suing MultinationaL (n 1) 
155 Magaisa. Suing Multinational. (n 1) 
156 Boyd. Inconvenience of Victims. (n 142) 
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perspective of where tort action is committed. 157 Decisions and acts, which caused the 
tort, may be spread over many jurisdictions not necessarily making any of them clearly 
~ - -
more convenient. 
In the near future of the discussions of jurisdictional matters in MNEs groups 
context, it seems quite likely that, the jurisdiction discussion will be more in connection 
to the discussion of substantial liability in the corporate groups context. Reductions of 
the jurisdictional barriers in English courts in MNEs tort cases in recent years with the 
decisions of Lubbe and Connelly and more with the ECl's effort, will not completely 
remove discussions of jurisdictions in MNEs tort. The future of jurisdictional 
discussions will be determined by which law regulates the substantial liability provisions 
over MNEs tort. 
Thus, the best" solution for the problem could be developed from the American 
courts' interpretation in ATCA litigation. The courts of any country where MNEs have 
subsidiaries can be entitled to hear the case with requirement of minimum contact to 
the forum of state where subsidiary is domiciled. Is8 Thus, the minimum contacts 
theory introduced by American courts should include subsidiaries since the presence of a 
subsidiary is an important element on the activities of MNEs. Thus, there could be 
broader jurisdiction over MNEs through their subsidiaries and it would reduce the 
claims that there is no court in the world has jurisdiction over all components of MNEs. 
Moreover establishing jurisdiction over MNEs through their subsidiaries might open a 
path to establishing MNEs group liability. The minimum contact theory is suitable for 
modem structure of MNEs as well. The modem horizontal structure supports the idea 
that the presence of any subsidiary can be considered as the presence of the group. Thus, 
a jurisdiction over all components of MNEs can be established by the forum where a 
subsidiary is domiciled and opening a way to further establishment of group liability 
over MNEs. This approach will abolish the application of forum non conveniens in 
15: Detailed discussion is made at chapter 2. 
158 Stephens. Corporate Liability. (n 118) 
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MNEs tort context and will gIVe great flexibility to plaintiffs to choose where to 
progress in their civil liability actions. As a result, in a horizontal structure. any 
jurisdiction that is resident to any components of a MNE that is involved committing the 
tort might be the venue for cases. 
169 
CHAPTER IV: EXISTI~G LIABILITY RLLES FOR 'l~Es 
Introduction 
For decades a call for home countries to accept increased responsibility for regulating 
the unjust impacts of MNEs· has been expressed through transnational and local 
litigation demanding fundamental action by courts. These claims aim at holding MNEs 
legally accountable for the negative environmental, health and safety, labour or human 
rights problems generated by their operations.] In contrast to demands for more 
developed tort liability, almost every legal system only provides the direct liability for 
groups of companies for the acts of their subsidiarires under special circumstances.:! 
Similarly, in case law, the situations in which the courts will ignore separate corporate 
personality and trace responsibility back to the underlying economic reality of groups of 
companies and MNEs is very rare and unsatisfactory.3 
On the international level, the more difficult question remams; how MNEs 
operations can be put under harmonised regulations; whether MNEs might be subject to 
one uniform regulatory structure or different regulations covering their various activities 
in different countries. It may be argued, in the light of previous chapters, that since a 
MNE has a private managerial structure capable of integrated global management over 
all its components, it should be subject to a single regulatory scheme. On the other hand, 
1 Ward Halina, 'Governing Multinationals: The Role Of Foreign Direct Liability' (Briefing Paper Of The 
Royal Institute Of International Affairs. Energy And Environment Programme, no 18, February 2001) 
~ Muchlinski p, Multinational Enterprises and the Law. (Blackwell. Oxford 1999) p. 328 
J Gallagher Lynn and Peter Ziegler 'Lifting the Corporate Veil in The Pursuit Of Justice' (1990) July 
J.B.L. 292 
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thi~ type of uniform regulation, even if it could be achieved, would be problematic with 
regard to the sovereignty of independent states. 4 
The problem for regulations is that only a few legal systems propose a unified 
approach towards groups of companies5 and none of them regulate liability issues in tort, 
and therefore, national courts, with the lack of statutory provisions to trust in, use 
general civil and commercial legal principles to obtain justice in a particular case. More 
importantly, in contrast to expectations, there are new laws to extend limited liability to 
other business forms. 6 For example, the UK recently enacted Limited Liability 
Partnership Act 2000, which has extended the imperfections of limited liability to 
partnerships. 
However, the fact that corporate groups have not been regulated in a way that is 
equivalent to that of other organisational forms (e.g. joint stock companies)' should not 
prevent us from emphasising their importance as institutions and the connected need to 
provide legal answers to the questions they present.7 Actually, it will be unfair to claim 
that the phenomenon of liability in the MNE context has not received any attention from 
regulators. Conducting a more careful examination, it will appear that legal references to 
corporate groups are quite frequent in most legal systems, commonly made outside the 
field of limited liability and tort liability issues. Thus, it is not extraordinary to find rules 
related to groups of companies being found in tax law, labour law, competition law and 
commercial law . Consequently, liability of groups of companies as a proposal appears in 
the context of many legislative references to. corporate groups in company law and/or 
other abundant legislative divisions of law. Thus, it does not appear to be rational to 
consider corporate groups as an illegitimate institution when they are in reality 
considered in many different contexts.8 This regulatory approach has already been quite 
4 Anderson Michael, 'Transnational Corporations And Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law The Answer' 
(2002) 41 Washburn Law Joumal399 
S Gennany, Portugal and Brazil are examples. 
6 Griffin S, 'Limited Liability: A Necessary Revolution' (2004) 25(4) Compo Law. 99 
7 Irujo Jose Miguel Embid, 'Trends and Realities in the Law of Corporate Groups' (2005) 6 EBOLR 65 
8 Irujo, Trends and Realities, (n 7) 
171 
a widespread reality for years but the need for comprehensive regulation including 
liability issues has only recently been widely discussed and understood.9 
This brings us to the purpose of this chapter, which is to provide and elaborate on 
the discussion of different approaches to the problems of liability of groups of 
companies. The discussion will have natural limitations in that only those developments. 
which will have relevance to group liability. will be covered here. First. courts' 
approaches to the problems will be examined; basically the English case law approach 
will be examined together with an examination of American and other jurisdictions for 
comparative purposes. Afterwards, legislative examples will be given from a number of 
jurisdictions. It should be kept in mind that the thesis does not aim to cover every 
jurisdiction, nor all the regulations in the examined jurisdictions. Rather. there will be an 
examination of specific legislative efforts that are important for the purpose of the thesis. 
The case law and legislations will be tested to discover whether they have created 
efficient theories and principles to solve the MNEs tort liability. There will be a search 
to discover whether case and statutory laws have been developed enough to meet the 
changes and challenges that MNEs' business. managerial, social and economical 
features create in law. 
Case Law Approaches to Multinational Enterprises' Tort Liability 
Introduction to Case Law 
It is apparent that the unfair effects of limited liability in a corporate group context have 
forced courts to search for alternative ways to reduce these unjust affects. While doing 
this, they have adopted principles that have been used in similar legal situations. Thus. 
case law created for liability for corporate groups could fmd its rationale in the 
Q lrujo. Trends and RealitIes. (n 7) 
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characteristics of different principles of law such as fraud, agency, enterprise liability or 
simply a requirement of justice. Alternatively liability could be imposed on a parent by 
reason of its failure to exercise proper control and management over its subsidiary. 
The case law examination will bring us firstly the theory of veil piercing. It can 
simply be claimed that piercing the corporate veil is the most litigated but slightest 
appreciated subject in corporate law. The real function of the doctrine is to fill the gap in 
common law doctrines that statutory rules cannot resolve effectively.1O Piercing the 
corporate veil is not, however, the only response to possible misuse of the entity form. 
There are also various legal theories imposing direct liability based on tort, agency, or 
statutory standards introduced under certain purpose built laws. I I Consequently, the veil 
piercing doctrine here is used in a broad meaning that covers most situations under 
which courts interfere with separate legal personality in corporate law. The court 
intervention with the corporate law principles will be discussed broadly here; not only 
groups of corporations but also general situations where the veil piercing doctrine has 
been applied will be discussed, such as single person companies. However, the basic 
emphasis will be on the practice of courts in case of group of companies, particularly 
MNEs. 
The application of the veil piercing principles by the courts showed different 
features during the past century and it differs from one jurisdiction to another. 
Sometimes courts forced the boundaries of established rigid principles of company law; 
but mostly the result of the cases in which disregarding of the corporate veil was 
demanded was simply a repetition of Salomon principles. The courts have never taken 
an evolutionary step in creating alternatives as they did when establishing the principle 
of separate corporate personality in Salomon. This deep commitment to the Salomon 
principles has prevented the courts from creating sound reasoning for interventions 
10 Cohen David L, 'Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts 
and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation 
for the Limited Liability Company' (1998) SI Okla. L. Rev. 427 and Thompson RB, 'Piercing the Veil 
within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors' (1999) 13 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 379 
II Thompson, Piercing the Veil, (n 10) 
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where the corporate structure was ignored. Thus, when the courts are asked to justify the 
principles behind the intervention, the general response seems to be 'the situation 
demands' or 'justice requires'. This state of affairs creates many difficulties in such a 
developed legal system. First of all it creates arbitrary justice, rather than the sound 
application of logical legal rules to difficult factual circumstances. Thus the present 
complicated approach cannot satisfy those who believe that a legal system should be 
built, as far as possible, on a foundation of principles and certainty because the 
applicable principle of court interference is not clear and most importantly it has never 
been an alternative to limited liability company theory. 12 
In particular, the most advanced case of group liability for an MNE was 
established in Amoco Cadiz l3 in the United States in a tort claim which is found in the 
decision of the US district court for the Northern District of Illinois in re Oil Spill by the 
Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 197814, where the parent company 
was held liable for the defaults of its subsidiary on the grounds of its close control over 
the operating subsidiary. In this case, the parent was also held liable as a joint tortfeasor 
for its own active involvement in the alleged negligence. In Amoco Cadiz, the court 
found that the vessel owning the subsidiary, its parent company and the ultimate parent 
of the corporate group were all individually liable. Despite some conclusions that argue 
that this is a case of enterprise liability, it is submitted that the decision is a piercing 
approach to the extent that it deals with intra-group liability. IS The court described the 
parent company as an integrated multinational enterprise, which is engaged through a 
system of subsidiaries in the exploration, production, refining, transportation and sale of 
petroleum products through the world. The parent itself was initially involved with and 
12 Neyers Jason W, 'Canadian Corporate Law, Veil-Piercing, and the Private Law Model Corporation' 
(2000) 50 U. Toronto L.J. 173 
13 (1994) 2 Lloyd's Reports 304 
14 AMC 2123 (USOC-ND Dlinois), Amoco Cadiz, 954 F. 2d 1279 
15 Casbel TW 'Groups of Companies- some US Aspects' in Wooldridge F and Scbmitthoff CM (cds.), 
Groups ofcompanit!S (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1991) p. 43 
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controlled the design, construction, operation, and management of the Amoco Cadiz. 16 
Therefore, parent and subsidiaries were liable on the grounds that: 1- this was an 
integrated multinational corporation. 2- the parent exercised such control over its 
subsidiaries that they could be considered mere instrumentalities of the parent. 3- the 
parent was liable on the grounds of its own active involvement in the conduct said to be 
negligence and through its close control over the operating subsidiaries. 
Another example of advanced liability for corporate groups could be found in 
India. The Indian Supreme Court decision in Mehta v Union of India AIR 17 was binding 
authority for a principle of complete liability for enterprises engaged in a hazardous or 
naturally dangerous industry. It was therefore acceptable to lift the corporate veil 
between Union Carbide and its Indian subsidiary in order to hold the former liable for 
the tort. Thus, in Bhopal where the Indian authorities and the plaintiffs tried to base 
liability on the unity of enterprises, the idea has been repeated. IS 
In the UK, as early as 1969 Lord Denning had promoted veil lifting in corporate 
groups' context. Consequently, there were some important decisions such as DHN Food 
Industries 19 under which House of Lords argued that a group of companies was in reality 
a single economic entity and should be treated as one. However, the improved standard 
of liability was always rejected mostly immediately after the positive decisions. The last 
return to the original occurred in Adams v. Cape Industries Plc20 case. It apparently 
indicated that there are no fundamental principles of group or single economic liability 
for group of companies under English Law. The facts of the case were quite complex but 
we can summarise that what the court had ultimately to detennine was whether 
16 Rosenthal Linda and Raper Carol, 'Amoco Cadiz and Limitation of Liability for Oil Spill Pollution: 
Domestic and International Solutions' (1985-1986) 5 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 259, Kipp Matthew 
'Piercing the Veil of the Amoco Cadiz Decision: Judge Posner's Jurisdictional Analysis Runs Aground' 
(1988-1989) 38 DePaul Law. Rev. 703, Eskenazi Nancy J, 'Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law in 
Re: The Amoco Cadiz Oil Spill' (1993) 24 J. Mar. L. & Com. 371 
17 1987 SC 965 1086 
18 Muchlinski, Multinational, p.329 (n 2) 
19 DHN Food Distribution Ltd. v. London Borough o/Tower Hamlets [1976] 1 WLR 852 
20 Adams v Cape Industries [1990] 2 W L.R. 786 
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judgements obtained in the United States against Cape Industries, an English registered 
company whose business was mining asbestos in South Africa and marketing it globally. 
would be recognised and enforced by the English courts. In the absence of agreement to 
the foreign jurisdiction, this depended on whether Cape could be considered to have 
been present in the United States. On a detailed examination of the facts, the answer 
depended on whether Cape could be presumed to be present in the United States through 
its wholly owned subsidiaries or through a company with which it had close business 
links. The court rejected all the arguments by which it was sought to make Cape liable. 
The Adams v Cape Industries case is interesting for this study since it combines 
arguments of veil piercing accumulated during previous cases. Originally, plaintiffs 
structured their arguments on different principles to establish the liability on Cape 
Industries; these arguments were built on the past experiments during which the courts 
have pierced the corporate veil. These principles are vague so that they can be claimed 
in any situation that groups of companies are involved thus it happened so in the Adams 
case; the principles were; 
The most used and least controversial argument for piercing the corporate veil is, 
at least in logic, fraud, facade or sham arguments. This exemption today is basically 
expressed as pennitting disregard of the company veil when the corporate structure is a 
mere facade hiding the true facts. The theory has been exercised in the previous 
judgement in a variety of names.21 The fraud argument of plaintiffs in Adams was 
rejected stating that dividing the company and establishing new independent subsidiaries 
is not a sham. Secondly, the single economic unit principle suggests that groups of 
companies are operating as a part of the same mind and logic so they must be considered 
as single economic unit. However, the Adams judgement suggested that there is no 
general principle that all companies in a group of companies are to be regarded as one. 
On the contrary, the fundamental principle is unquestionably that "each company in a 
group of companies... is a separate legal entity possessed of separate rights and 
liabilities". Thirdly, the plaintiffs argued that a company having the power to act as an 
21 Muchlinski, Multinational, p.18S (n 2) 
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agent might do so as an agent for its parent company or indeed for all or any of its 
individual members if it or they authorise it to do so. However, being a subsidiary of a 
parent company does not necessarily mean that subsidiary companies are agents of the 
parent. Finally, when there is difficulty in proving the above arguments, plaintiffs argue 
that the interests of justice require corporate veils to be pierced. There is no apparent 
judgement, which has been concluded on the dependence of the interest of justice 
arguments. So the interest of justice has represented more than simply a way of referring 
to the grounds mentioned above in which the veil of incorporation has been pierced. 
Consequently, the interpretation of the judgements in Adams leaves us only with 
three conditions in which the veil of incorporation can be lifted. First, if the court is 
interpreting a statute that allows the court to look beyond the corporate veil. Second, 
where special circumstances exist indicating that the corporate veil is a mere facade 
concealing the true facts, the court may lift the veil of incorporation. The third exception 
is the establishment of an agency relationship. 
The court in Adams directly rej ected the concept of a group as constituting a single 
economic entity and also declined to pierce the corporate veil where the subsidiary was 
in many aspects wholly dependent for its survival on its parent, that had been set up to 
shield the parent from potential liability in connection with its activities.z2 In short, the 
courts have been reluctant to developing a concept of enterprise law. They seem to a 
greater extent to refuse to tolerate the single economic unit theory and confine the 
examples in which they are likely to interfere with the Salomon principle to subjective 
fraud by the controllers.23 Therefore, Adams presents a mainly harsh example of the 
application of the Salomon principle of strict separate corporate personality into 
corporate groups. 
Next, the thesis will provide brief discussion of the current situation in tenns of 
vicarious liability of MNEs. Later, there is a deeper examination of the situations where 
2l Prentice Daniel D, 'Some Aspects of the Law Relating to Corporate Groups in the United Kingdom t 
(1998-1999) 13 Conn. J.lnt'l L. 305 
23 Dine Janet, 'IJae Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2(00) p. 45 
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courts possibly pierce the corporate veil in order to evaluate compatibility of these 
principles to the current realities of contemporary operations and structures of ~1:\Es. To 
be able to evaluate the basic principles of case law and future developments in this area. 
one has to look to the basics facts of each situation. Additionally. a cross-border 
comparative examination is helpful. Accordingly, there will be discussion of the basic 
principles of ignoring corporate veiL namely: veil piercing, agency and single economic 
unit and the interest of justice. 
Vicarious Liability in Groups of Companies 
Vicarious liability becomes justifiable in those cases where the liability arising from 
company law principles is doubtful in the light of established legal rules. but where it is 
necessary for parent companies to meet the losses of corporate creditors. 24 However, the 
extent of a parent corporation' s liability for the acts of its subsidiaries will depend on the 
applicable principles of law concerning corporate group liability.25 Under English law 
plaintiffs would have some likelihood of succeeding in a claim against the parent 
corporation based on its breach of a principal duty owed to them. However, any claim 
based on vicarious liability would have virtually no chance of success because the 
English law of tort is reluctant to make one person responsible for the acts of another 
outside the master-servant, the principal-agent or the employer and independent 
contractor sphere of vicarious liability.26 Therefore, the idea of vicarious liability based 
on the natural structure of the group has not been accepted by the courts yet. 
In order to establish vicarious liability one has to prove a strict relationship 
between parties. However. under the existing corporate law. (statutory and case law) 
24 Muchlinski. Multinational. p. 323 (n 2) 
25 Muchlinski P. 'Holding Multinationals to Account: Recent Developments in English Litigation and the 
Company Law Review' (2002) 23 Company Lawyer 168 
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with the limited liability principles and separate corporate personality, the possibilities 
of establishing vicarious liability for corporate groups are very low. That is why courts 
search for alternatives to impose liability on parent companies, namely veil piercing 
principles and its derivatives. 
In reality, the courts must engage in a fact-specific inquiry into the relationship 
between the parent corporation and its subsidiary.27 To be able to impose liability on 
parent corporations, it must have broken some of its general duties. For example, in 
Amoco Cadiz, the parent company was held liable because all the important decisions, 
including those relating to the design, construction, operation and management of 
Amoco Cadiz, were taken by the parent company or with its authorization. However, 
even the parent liability in Amoco Cadiz was not direct. Liability was established 
because of the close control of the parent over the subsidiary. 
On the other hand, the recent developments in English litigation have created some 
expectations. The Cape Industries v Lubbe and Connolly cases 28 might be interpreted in 
a way that holds that English courts are willing to establish duties on parent companies 
on the basis of vicarious tort liability. However, the outcomes of cases on the legal 
principles are not clear since they have been settled out of court. More importantly, the 
main reason for granting jurisdiction against those companies was not the substantial 
issue of law but the non-availability of efficient judicial systems, particularly a shortage 
of legal aid, in the host countries where the original case should haven been brought. As 
a result, these cases were just concerned with jurisdiction issues and in the final 
outcome, the courts allowed hearing the cases in the UK; there was no decision on group 
liability of MNEs. For that reason, interpreting these cases as an improvement in MNEs 
liability is not credible and is misleading. 
26 Baughen Simon, Corporate Accountability and the Law of Tort: The Inclusive Verdict Of Bhopal' 
(University of Manchester, 1993) 
27 Meeran Richard, 'Process Liability of Multinationals: Overcoming the Forum Hurdle' (1995) Nov. 
J.P.I.L 170 
28 Detailed discussion of the cases is made at chapter 3. 
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Even if there is a wish to establish vicarious liability, it is very difficult to 
detennine the duties of parent companies even though some basic duties of parent 
corporations can be summarised under the following categories.29 On the lack of a 
clearly established principle under company law, one has to look to similar 
characteristics of other legal relationships, the agency-principal and the master-servant 
principles to determine the duties of parent corporations.3o The basic duty then will be 
acting dutifully and in good faith. There are other duties, which are mostly derivatives of 
the general duties. We can frrstly mention choosing of skilled directors; if this choice is 
negligently made, the carelessness will be identifiably linked with any damage that 
subsequently results from the negligence of the directors.3l Thus, the corporation might 
be held liable for not performing its primary duties. The second duty is duty to warn; the 
work may be hazardous to third parties unless specific information held by the employer 
is revealed to the subsidiary. Finally, there is a duty to supervise within the specific 
sphere of the contracts of employment, but there is no general duty to supervise the 
activities of a subsidiary as an independent company. 32 
The discussion of determining the basic duties of MNEs has been going for 
decades. There are several attempts at different levels to determine these duties. One of 
the recent and most important attempts has been under the UN Economic and Social 
Council. 33 UN norms determine basic duties for multinational enterprises under different 
titles. Accordingly, they have duties for human rights, labour, consumer, and 
environmental issues. However, similar to other code of conducts and international 
instrument on this matter, these norms do not have strong enforcement mechanisms 
since they are non-binding instruments and are unlikely to become the subject of a 
29 Baughen S, 'Multinationals and the Export of Hazard' (1995) 58 MLR 54 
30 Baughen, Corporate .Accountability. (n 26) 
31 Baughcn, Corporate .Accountability. (n 26) 
32 Baughen, Corporate .Accountability. (n 26) 
33 UN. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Sub-Comm 'n on Promotion & Prot. Of Human Rights, Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights. U.N. Doc FJCN.4/Sub.212oo3/12/Rcv.2 (Aug.26, 2003) 
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binding treaty in the near future. 34 Therefore, it is not possible to claim that parent 
companies have the same duties under vicarious liability rules since there is no court 
mechanism or national law to enforce these duties on MNEs. Thus, it is difficult to claim 
that these norms are part of the legal systems and should be considered as binding legal 
rules. Similar to UN Norms, other international instruments cannot be considered as 
binding in determination of the duties of MNEs. However, these initiatives must be 
considered as examples in the determination of the basic duties of parent companies and 
groups of companies in cases where vicarious liability is applied. Alternatively, it can be 
assumed that these norms are the basic responsibility of MNEs and therefore, legal 
systems should introduce vicarious liability of MNEs in breaches of these norms. 
These facts lead us to the question of whether vicarious liability serves as an 
effective means of enforcing group liability standards in a cross-border context of MNE 
activities. One is forced to admit that it plays no role, at least for the moment. The 
closest example of established liability, the case of Amoco Cadiz does not meet the 
criteria of vicarious liability. Even courts establish legal rulings based on the ideas 
mentioned in the previous paragraphs. These rules create very partial and rare liability 
since there has to be a connection between parent companies fraudulent acts and the 
damage, which makes establishment of liability very difficult. 35 A parent company 
might always avoid liability by proving it has performed its duties at a required level. In 
cases where the parent has failed in its duties, the connection must be proven between its 
act and the damage. Even if all the conditions have been established, it is very difficult 
to establish that this is a group liability because rather than ignoring separate legal 
personality, this situation might be defmed as another person being found liable for its 
participation in a tortious act. 
34 See Wallace RMM and Ortega Olga Martin, 'the UN Nonns: A First Step to Universal Regulation of 
Transnational Corporations' Responsibilities for Human Rights?' (2004) 26 Dublin U. L. J. 304, 
Weisbrodt D, Kruger M 'Current Developments: Noms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights' (2003) 97 American Journal 
of International Law 901. Sorell T 'The UN Noms' in Dine J, Fagan A (eels.) Human Rights and 
Capitalism (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2006). Gelfand Jacop, 'the Lack of Enforcement in the United 
Nations Draft Norms: benefit or Disadvantage?' in Schutter OD (ed.), Trans1Ultional Corporations and 
Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006). 
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This brings us to the discussion of modem structures of MNEs. The vicarious 
liability discussed above could be applied to parent companies for their misscontrol or in 
not taking necessary control to prevent a tort. Accordingly, there has to be a strict 
relationship between the parent and the subsidiary. However, the control relationship in 
a modem structure has been differentiated and there is a more horizontal (cultural 
. control) rather than strict control and day-to-day involvement of the parent suggested by 
vertical structure. Any claim of vicarious liability against a parent in a horizontal 
structure therefore has little chance of success since it aims to make one person liable for 
tort of the other in certain conditions. Thus, the theory of vicarious liability based on 
entity liability has a better chance of success in application to smaller and vertically 
structured groups of companies rather than to bigger and more advanced structured 
MNEs. 
Piercing the Corporate Veil 
The corporate veil is based on the distinction between the personalities of the every each 
company within groups of companies. It follows that a person who decides on the 
actions of another may take advantage himself of a series of juridical devices in order 
not to be responsible for the consequences.36 Accordingly, the basic principle behind the ' 
veil piercing is that where a company is used for an illegal or improper purpose or where 
there is a 'necessity to achieve justice', the corporate veil must be pierced.37 Hence, in 
relation to the liability of groups of companies, the common law doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil might offer a means of justifying liability in circumstances where the 
35 Anderson, Transnational Corporations, (n 4) 
36 Scovazzi T, 'Industrial Accidents And The Veil Of Transnational Corporations' in Francioni F and 
Scovazzi T (eds)lnternational Responsibility/or Environmental Harm (Graham & Trotman, London 1991) 
37 Bowmer Simon, 'Company law To Pierce Or Not To Pierce The Corporate Veil - Why Substantive 
Consolidation Is Not An Issue Under English Law' (2000) 15(8) Jl.BL. 193 
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subsidiary has insufficient assets to meet the claims against it, but where, the case for 
compensation of the claimants is hard to oppose on justifiable grounds. 38 
The general rule, under both English and US law, is that if the parent had a certain 
level of control over the subsidiary, the court may lift the corporate veil and hold the 
parent liable if additional conditions are met. 39 Therefore, the parent corporation may be 
held liable for the torts of its subsidiary where the nature of their corporate relationship 
suggests that the subsidiary has become a mere instrumentality or alter ego of the parent 
corporation.4o However, these piercing the veil situations, outside the areas justified by 
statutory interpretation, have occurred only in very specific circumstances throughout 
the twentieth century. For example, in the United States the courts have never lifted the 
veil so as to remove limited liability in the case of a public company and will not do so 
as a matter of routine in private companies.41 
In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the piercing the veil doctrine can be applied to 
both contract and tort liability. The simple logical thinking asserts that courts should 
pierce the corporate veil more often in tort cases than in contract cases because tort 
victims do not choose their association with a corporate entity, while plaintiffs with 
contractual relationships have the opportunity to evaluate the risks of doing business 
with the corporation and voluntarily disregard these riskS.42 However, Professor 
Thompson's empirical study of corporate veil piercing cases in the US pointed out that 
courts pierced more often in the contract context than in the tort context and that this 
38 Muchlinski, Multinational, p. 325 (n 2) 
39 Lutter M, 'Enterprise Law Corp. vs. Entity Law Inc. Philip Blumberg's Book from the Point of View of 
an European Lawyer' (1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative Law 949 
40 Berkamp L and Pak Wan-Q, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil: Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts' 
(2001) 8 Maastricht J. Of Europea" and Comparative Law 167. A recent survey of the veil piercing in 
Belgium, England, Gennany, and the Netherlands found that the doctrine is applied only in clear-cut cases 
of "abuse of limited liability". 
41 Davies Paul L, Gower a"d Davies' Pri"ciples of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London 
2003) p.l90 
42 Fanner Richard S, 'Parent Corporation Responsibility for the Environmental Liabilities of the 
Subsidiary: A Search for the Appropriate Standard' (1994) 19 Journal Of Corporation Law 770 
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difference is statistically significant.43 Moreover, there is lower percentage of piercing 
within corporate groups than to individual shareholders.44 There is no trend over time 
that courts appear to be moving toward permitting piercing in more and more 
situations.45 The Thomson studies for American veil piercing jurisprudence demonstrate 
general confusion of this area of law in the finding that factors listed were less objective 
and contained a total of eighty-five factual reasons for piercing the veil collected from 
previous research in the area and a sampling of the cases in the data set for deciding 
whether to pierce. Further, it was necessary to group the factors into twelve different 
areas to attempt to document the standards of the court. 46 
An empirical study in England indicates that the courts in particular have been 
likelier to lift the veil between a closely-controlled company and its subsidiary. They 
have been likelier. both to lift the veil and to keep the veil in place when asked to do so 
by a governmental body than when asked to do so by a company or its shareholders. 
More importantly they have shown themselves consistently unwilling to lift the veil to 
enable the victims of a company's tort to recover from its shareholders.47 
Moreover, in another study that examines the 55 Australian cases involving 
insolvency and demanding piercing the veil, the researcher came to a conclusion that the 
percentage of piercing the veil is 24% and in recent years there is an increasing demand 
for piercing the veil and most of the demands are dependent on contract or statutory 
basis. Piercing the veil demand for tort actions were just 5 and in 2 of them the court 
43 Thompson, Piercing the Veil, (n 10) 
44 Thompson, Piercing the Veil, (n 10) 
45 Thompson, Piercing the Veil, (n 10) 
46 Thompson Robert B, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study' (1990-1991) 76 Cornell L. Rev. 
1036 These areas are; undercapitalisation; failing to follow corporate formalities; overlap of corporate 
records; functions of personnel; misrepresentation; shareholder domination; intertwining and lack of 
substantive separation; use of the conclusory terms "alter ago" and "instrumentality"; general ground of 
fairness; assumption of risk; refusal to let a corporation pierce itself; and statutory policy. 
47 Mitchell Charles, 'Lifting the Corporate Veil in the English Courts: An Empirical Study' (1999) 
Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Review IS 
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decided to pierce the corporate veil.48 The study also reveals the basis for justifying 
piercing the veil; plaintiffs have argued mostly on the basis of agency, 34 cases and later 
they argued on the basis of group enterprises, fraud and unfairness. The study indicates 
that the percentage of piercing the veil on the group enterprise basis is the lowest.49 As a 
result, the Australian approach almost mirrors the American and English approaches. 
Australian courts have pierced the veil in the same reasons, as do American and English 
courts; agency, fraud, sham or fa<;ade, group enterprises, unfairness and injustice.50 The 
courts pierce the corporate veil less frequently when the controller is a parent company 
than when the controller is a one or more individual shareholders. And the group 
enterprises argument is the least likely basis to pierce the veil.5l Courts pierce more 
frequently in a contract context than in a tort context. 52 
There is another confusing characteristic of the veil piercing doctrine that the 
practical application of veil piercing doctrine might reveal situations under which court 
based their explanation for piercing the veil. The most common reasons for piercing the 
corporate veil are: 53 fITst is the discovery that the corporation is merely an alter ago of 
the shareholders; a subsidiary corporation is owned and controlled by the parent and the 
subsidiary has been relegated to the status of an alter ago of the parent and the 
recognition of them as separate entities would lead to an inadequate or fraudulent result. 
The second one is fraud and misrepresentation; when a corporation misrepresents the 
nature of its activities, its ability to perform, its fmancial condition, or its financial 
structure. The third one is under-capitalization. The list grows by moving towards a 
48 Ramsay 1M, 'Models Of Corporate Regulation: The MandatorylEnabling Debate' in Grantham Ross 
and Rickett Charlie (eds) Corporate personality in the 20th century (Hart, Oxfordl998) 
49 Ramsay, Models Of Corporate, (n48) 
50 Ramsay 1M, and Noakes DB, 'Piercing The Corporate Veil In Australia' (2001) 19 Company And 
Securities Law Journal 250 . 
51 Ramsay and Noakes, Piercing The Corporate Veil, (n SO) 
S2 Ramsay and Noakes, Piercing The Corporate Veil, (n SO) 
S3 Bakst David S, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil for Environmental Torts in the United States and the 
European Union: The Case for the Proposed Civil Liability Directive' (1996) 19 B. C. Int'l & Compo L. 
Rev. 323 
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detailed examination but it is unnecessary to discuss every mentioned veil lifting reason 
since it depends on the interpretation of cases by the courts at the time. 54 
Moreover, the degree of piercing and reasons for piercing are very different in 
many cases. Establishing group based liability is not the only reason in veil piercing in 
corporate group concept; rather the veil piercing doctrine pursues many other legal 
objectives.55 Thus, the application of lifting the veil is not always disadvantageous to 
corporate groups. In some situations veil piercing doctrine is applied in favour of 
corporate groups. In this sense, Ottolenghi divides the reasons behind the veil piercing at 
least into four categories. The first one is peeping behind the veil; the veil is lifted only 
to get information involving the person who controlled the company. 56 The second one 
is penetrating the veil; the aim is to impose upon the shareholders responsibility for the 
company's act or to establish their direct interest in the company's assets.57 The third 
one is extending the veil; the veil of each one of the components is lifted only to draw it 
again over a large number of components. 58 The last one is ignoring the veil; this is the 
most extreme one and applied just if the court thinks the company is established not in 
the commercial ground. 59 The examples are provided in order to illustrate the point that 
the application of the doctrine, with its complexity, can produce results that contradict 
the equitable policy considerations that lies behind the doctrine. 60 
Based on these practical facts mentioned earlier, the courts concentrate on three 
main doctrines to explain the reasons for piercing. It will be useful to examine the 
S4 Dobson JM, 'Lifting the Veil in Four Countries: The Law of Argentina, England, France and the US· 
(1986) 35 ICLQ 839 
S5 Ottolenghi S, 'From Peeping Behind The Corporate Veil To Ignoring It Completely' (1990) 53 MLR 
338 
56 Daimler v Continental Tyre Co (1916) 2 AC 217 is an example. 
57 Section 24 of Companies Act 1985 is an example. 
58 Piercing the veil on the basis of single enterprise argument falls under this section. The issue will be 
discussed in a detailed way below. (p 194) 
59 Fraudulent trading clauses in Insolvency Act fall in this category. The issue will be discussed in a 
detailed way below. (p 203) 
60 Thompson, Piercing ... Empirical Study, (n 46) 
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principles behind the veil piercing in order to test their efficiency in tenns of M?\Es tort 
liability. 
Fraud Doctrine 
Fraud consideration for veil piercing can lead disregarding the legal entity doctrine in 
the Anglo-Saxon law and the concept of fraud is contained in most of the English 
decisions. Fraud in English and American law can be found a remedy at common law 
and remedies in equity.61 The fraud approach to veil piercing is a sanction to which the 
courts tum when they think that the company was not founded for commercial or other 
sound grounds, but only as a means to defraud or defeat creditors or to circumvent 
laws.62 
In fraud cases the court will look directly at the realities of the situation and 
reference must be made to further matters, which the courts consider. Some examples of 
references are; 63 the type of company- a closely held company, subsidiary or holding 
company; the motives for the formation of the company - commercial ones as opposed 
to fraudulent purposes, defeating creditors, evading laws etc. the type of legal action - a 
claim in tort, contract, bankruptcy etc. The identity of the person seeking the lifting of 
the veil - a distressed third party or the controlling shareholder himself is also important. 
In Gilford Motor Company Ltd v Horne,64 Mr. Home was an ex-employee of the 
Gilford motor company and his employment contract provided that he could not solicit 
the customers of the company. In order to defeat this, he incorporated a limited company 
in his wife's name and solicited the customers of the company. The company brought an 
61 Dobson. Lifting the Veil. (n 54) 
6~ Ottolenghi. From Peeping, (n 55) 
6.~ Ottolenghi. From Peeping, (n 55) 
64 [19-'3] Ch.935 
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action against him.65 The Court of Appeal was clear that the company was formed as a 
device, in order to mask the effective carrying on business of Mr. Home. In view of this 
sham, the Court of Appeal declined to recognise the separate legal personality of the 
limited company.66 Jones v Lipman 67 has strengthened the decision in Gilford. Trustor 
AB v Smallbone68, a recent case, has also repeated the power of courts to pierce the veil 
in case of fraud. 
In R 69· . e a company, Cumnnng-Bruce LJ stated that the court would use its powers 
to pierce the corporate veil if it is necessary to achieve justice irrespective of the legal 
efficiency of the corporate structure.70 In another decision, Creasy v. Breachwood 
Motors limited 71 where the company had been used for an illegal or improper purpose, 
the court pierced the corporate veil where the business of a defendant company in 
litigation was transferred to an associated company so as to leave the defendant 
company without asset. 
In fraud cases, not only dishonesty is examined but also fraudulent purpose is 
required in order to pierce the veil and establish liability. This means that it is not 
sufficient just to prove that the company was established dishonestly but also it must be 
proven that the transaction, :which caused to the damage, has been conducted for 
fraudulent purposes. Accordingly, under the fraud doctrine, three elements must 
generally be shown by a plaintiff before the two entities will be treated as one for legal 
65 Payne J, 'Lifting the Corporate Veil: A reassessment of the Fraud Exception' (1997) 56 Cll 284 
66 Payne, Lifting the Corporate Veil, (n 65) 
67 [1962] 1 WLR 832 Jones v. Lipman. Under the case a man contracted to sell his land and thereafter 
changed his mind in order to avoid an order of specific performance he transferred his property to a 
company. Russell judge specifically referred to the judgments in Gilford v. Home and held that the 
company here was 'a mask which (Mr. Lipman) holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition 
by the eye of equity' he awarded specific performance both against Mr. Lipman and the company. 
68 [2001] 3 All ER 987 
69 Re a Company Ltd [1985] BCLC 333 
70 Lowry John, 'In Defence of Salomon: Promoting The Corporate Veil' in Barry AK., Rider and Mads 
Andenas (eds) Developments in European Company Law, Vol 211997: The quest/or an Ideal Legal Form 
for Small Businesses (Kluwer Law International, London 1999) 
71 Creasy v. Breachwood Motors limited [1992] 2 Bee 638 
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purposes.72 1- The parent company must control over the subsidiary. not just through 
stock ownership but through a complete domination of the policy. 2- The control must 
be used to commit a fraud or wrong by the parent through the subsidiary, to avoid legal 
obligations or statutory duties or to unjustly limit the plaintiff's rights. 3- The above-
mentioned control and breach of duty must cause the injury or loss complained of. 73 
The first requirement is that the subsidiary' lack of separate independent identity 
of its own. Such lack of separate identity may arise in two ways: excessive control by 
the parent and the lack of real separate existence.74 In the classic doctrinal formulation, 
control must extend to the extreme where the subsidiary has no mind, willpower, or 
existence of its own.75 In other words, there must be excessive domination. In order to 
answer the domination question it should be first mentioned that the issue is not simply 
the power to control but it is the exercise of control; total control or equally the absence 
of any independent judgment. Shortly the subsidiary should exist only in name.76 In the 
case of Lowendahl v. Baltimore & ORR the required level of control has been described: 
"Control, not merely majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not 
only of finances, but of policy and business practices in respect to the transactions 
attacked so that the corporate entity had at the time no separate mind, will or existence 
of its own".77 How these factors are balanced in practice, and when alter ego liability 
will be found once control is established, is subject to a fact-specific inquiry in each 
case.
78 
72 Lowendahl v. Baltimore & ORR 247 App. Div. 144, 154 (1 st Dept. 1936). These requirements are 
established in this American case but also accepted in some form in the UK. 
73 Payne, Lifting the Corporate Veil, (n 65) and Cashel, Groups of Companies, (n 15) p. 28 
74 Blumberg Phillip I, 'Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers Presented by Concepts 
of the Corporate Juridical Entity' (2000-2001) 24 Hastings Int'} & Compo L. Rev. 297 
75 Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational, (n 74) 
76 Whincup Michael, 'Inequitable Incorporation- the Abuse ofa Privilege' (1981) 2 Company Lawyer 158 
77 Hofstetter Karl, 'The Ecological Liability Of Corporate Groups: Comparing US And European Trends' 
in Teubner G, Farmer L and Murphy D, Environmental Law Anti Ecological Responsibility: The Concept 
And Practice Of Ecological Self-Organisation (Wiley, Chichester 1994) 
78 Farmer, Parent Corporation, (n 42) 
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Second prerequisite to apply the piercing the veil under fraud doctrine is that the 
control must be used to commit a fraud or wrong by the parent through the subsidiary. It 
must be showed that the subsidiary has been used as a shield to complete some 
fraudulent or unjust or inequitable conduct for the benefit of the parent or controlling 
shareholder. The conduct must be morally chargeable or primarily unfair.79 
A final requisite is that the defendant's conduct has to have caused injury to the 
plaintiff. It is obvious that if there is no harm to the creditors, there is no need to pierce 
the corporate veil. 
It is very difficult to congregate these three conditions in a single case. Therefore, 
the fraud based piercing the veil cases discloses no very obvious pattern, and it remains 
hard to predict when the courts will lift the veil in practice.8o Moreover, under Adams v 
Cape Industries, it was decided that there was no fraud for a group of companies for 
choosing to use the doctrine of separate corporate personality in such a way as to 
minimise its group exposure to future liabilities. The logic behind this is that under the 
English perspective, parent corporations are no more than a shareholder.81 A company 
exists for the benefit of shareholders so they can manage their affairs as they wish, 
provided they acted in good faith and the desire to limit liability is not a fraud.82 
In America in the case Pepper v Litton 83 the judgement explicitly recognises that 
the law's primary duty is to protect the citizen against sharp practice and, particularly, 
which is brought about by abuse of the legal principles in question.84 Accordingly, fraud 
doctrine has been applied in broader approach in the USA. Professor Blumberg sets out 
79 Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational, (n 74) 
80 Mitchell, Lifting the Corporate Veil, (n 47) 
81 Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd [1983] 
Ch 258, [1983] 2 All ER 563, [1983] BCLC 461, CA 
Bl Adams v Cape Industries [1990] 2 W.L.R. 786 
83 308 US 295,310,313, (1939) 
84 Whincup, Inequitable Incorporation, (n 76) 
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three requirements for the piercing the corporate veil. 85 The first one is a demonstration 
that the subsidiary lacks separate independent identity of its own. Such lack of separate 
identity may arise in two ways; excessive control by the parent and lack of the forms of 
separate existence. Control is the most ambiguous element of the rule because at least 
eleven individual factors may be considered by a court in determining the degree of 
control exercised by the parent. The lack of independent action by the subsidiary's 
officers and directors, if directly proven, is conclusive. 86 The second traditional 
requirement for piercing is a showing that the subsidiary has been used as a shelter to 
accomplish some fraudulent or unjust or inequitable behaviour for the benefit of the 
parent or controlling shareholder. The conduct must be ethically guilty or basically 
unfair. The final requisite, one frequently ignored in practice by the courts, is that the 
defendant's conduct has to have caused an injury to the plaintiff. As a result, the 
conditions in America are not fundamentally different than those in England. 
Common-Law Agency Doctrine 
Agency is a legal relationship between a principal and natural and legal persons with 
permanent authority to prospect for and visit customers with a view to negotiating and 
w hen appropriate concluding agreement in the name and for account of the principals.87 
Agency law is a varied and extended institution, based both on the law of torts and 
contract law. It centres on the notions of control and authority which are exerted by 
one person over another. Liability being imposed on the controller -principal- for the 
acts performed by the person subject to control -agent- within his authority.88 
Accordingly, the separate corporate personalities of two different companies will also be 
85 Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational. (n 74) 
86 Graham Boyce L. 'Navigating the Mists of Metaphor: An Examination of the Doctrine of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil' (1990·1991) 56 J. Air L. & Com. 1135 
87 ICC. Commercial Agency: Guide for the Drawing up of Contracts (International Chamber of 
Commerce. Paris 1983) p. 5 
88 Dobson. Lifting the Veil. (n 54) 
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ignored if one of them is held to have been acting as the agent for the other.89 For an 
agency relationship, the common law requires not merely control but also a consensual 
transaction. The parties must agree on that the subsidiary is acting for the parent - the 
principal with subsidiaries typically utilised to protect the parent corporation from 
liability.90 In some cases, courts accept iniplied agency relationship and impose the same 
liabilities on parties for this relationship. However, it requires establishment of many 
factual relationships between the parent and the subsidiary, which is very difficult to 
indicate under the current structure of MNEs and groups of companies.91 Therefore, it 
should not be surprising that very few parent-subsidiary relationships satisfy the 
common law requirements for an agency relationship.92 
The agency rules are illustrated in a number of English decisions.93 In Smith, Stone 
and Knight Ltd. v. Birmingham Corporation94, a Birmingham Corporation, a local 
government authority, compulsorily acquired premises occupied by The Birmingham 
Waste Co. Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Smith, Stone and Knight. In order to 
succeed in an action for compensation for loss of business, the parent company had to 
establish that the subsidiary was its agent in conducting business on the premises. 95 
Atkinson J found that in conducting business on the premises the subsidiary had acted as 
the parent's agent. In Smith, Stone, the subsidiary was described as the agent or 
employee or tool or simulacrum of the parent company because it was carrying on 
business on behalf of the parent. Therefore, this particular feature of agency in English 
and US law has created an idea that is especially well adapted to cases of abuse of 
corporate personality. 96 
89 Gallagher and Ziegler, Lifting The Corporate Veil (n 3) 
90 Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational, (n 74) and Dobson, Lifting the Veil, (n 54) 
91 Detailed discussion is made at chapter 2. 
92 Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational, (n 74) 
93 Ebbw Vale UDC v South Wales Traffic Licensing Authority [1951] 2 KB 266 
94 [1939] 4 All ER 116 
95 Gallagher and Ziegler, Lifting The Corporate Veil, (n 3) 
96 Avgitidis Dimitris K, Group of Companies; The Liability of Parent Company for the Depths of Its 
Subsidiary (Sakkoulas. Athens-Komotini 1996) p. 164 
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However, the current thinking on agency as a means of veil-piercing is inadequate 
for the following 4 reasons. The first, there is a disagreement over whether or not 
agency, as currently applied, actually represents veil-piercing. The second, there is a 
logical inconsistency of asserting that the corporation is puppet, under the complete 
control of another, while simultaneously it is an independent legal actor who can enter 
into binding agency agreements. The third, the majority of cases traditionally dealt with 
under agency are most likely mere instances of statutory interpretation.97 The fourth, it is 
very difficult to prove an agency relationship under the complex structure of groups of 
companies since veil piercing based on agency argument requires clear indication of 
connection between the parent and the subsidiary. However, the examination of structure 
of modem MNEs suggests the opposite. 
In majority of the cases, the subsidiary was described, either expressly or 
impliedly, as the agent of its parent. However, the description of the subsidiary as an 
agent of the parent was not based on the typical elements of an agency relationship but 
on a number of facts suggesting that the subsidiary was closely controlled by its parent. 
The term agent was merely used as a description, interchangeably with other labels, such 
as tool, simulacrum, facade, alter ago and creature, in order to emphasise the substantial 
degree of the parent's domination over the affairs of the subsidiary. 98 
In the case where the court attempted to examine whether the relationship between 
the parent and the subsidiary was that of a principal and an agent in the strict legal sense, 
it was pointed out that it is necessary to bear in, mind the fundamental principle that the 
relationship of principal and agent can only be established by the consent (actual or 
implied) of the principal and the agent.99 And in the absence of such consent, the 
supposition of an agency relationship was rejected by English courts. tOO Therefore, 'it is 
not surprising that in Adams v Cape Industries on the agency issue for the acts of the 
97 Ncyers, Canadian Corporate Law, (n 12) 
98 Avgitidis, Group o/Companies. p. 170 (n 96) 
99 Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 917 
100 Avgitidis, Group o/Companies. p. 170 (n 96) 
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subsidiary on the part of the parent corporation, the court did not give any credits to the 
I · 101 Th I' . I agency calms. e exp anatlOn was SImp e as that there is no real or expressed 
agency agreement. 
Examining the characteristics of the agency relationship, one sees no inaccuracy in 
coming to the conclusion that the agency argument is a variation of fraud doctrine. It is 
just better suited to the complexity of corporate groups since two separate personalities 
are involved in the case. Where the fraud doctrine was not enough to establish liability, 
the agency was created on the same basic necessity of that the parent has excessive 
control over the subsidiary. Thus, similar to the fraud doctrine. agency theory sees the 
liability as liability of controller for its unlawful control over its subsidiary. Thus. it can 
be claimed that agency argument is not functional enough to be applied to tort 
committed by subsidiaries of MNEs that operate under complex structure. 
Single Economic Unit Doctrine 
In DHN Food Distribution Ltd. 1'. London Borough of Tower Hamlets 102, Lord Denning 
M.R. decided on the treatment of a holding company-subsidiary relationship as a single 
economic unit commenting that there is evidence of a general tendency to ignore the 
separate legal entities of various companies within a group and to look instead at the 
economic entity of the entire group.103 And it was decided when a parent compan~' 
owns all the shares of the subsidiaries "These subsidiaries are bound hand and foot to 
the parent company and must do just what the parent company says.... the three 
companies should, for present purposes, to treated as one". 104 DHN is probably the 
strongest case, in England, in the tort victims' favour because it was strongly arguable 
that the court there did not base itself on the particular statutory provisions but on a more 
101 8aughen. COIporatc Accountability, (n ~6) 
10~ [1976] 1 WLR 852 
103 Gallagher and Ziegler. Lifting The Corporate Veil, (n 3) 
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general approach founded on the idea of single econOInlC entity. 105 Thus, the 
development somehow was very fundamental for corporate law. After the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in DHN, it has been said that the courts may disregard Salomon' s 
case for corporate groups wherever it is just and equitable to do SO.106 However, the 
rejection of these claims came immediately by the House of Lords in Woolfson v. 
Strathclyde Regional Council. 107 The court indicated some doubt whether the court of 
Appeal in the DHN case had properly applied the principle that it is appropriate to pierce 
the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist indicating that it is a mere 
facade concealing the true facts.108 Moreover, the subsequent views expressed by the 
Court of Appeal in Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas and 
Petrochemical Services Ltd. and Ors I09 indicate that the DHN decision was an 
abnonnality. It is suggested that the decision in Multinational Gas can be considered in 
the same light as that of Salomon, in that no injustice would have been caused to any 
party by upholding the separate entity principle. 110 
Consequently, the sense of the judgments in Woolfson, Multinational Gas and 
Industrial Equity Ltd v. Blackbum lll indicate unmistakably that the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in DHN was abnonnal and that the principle that each company in a 
group of companies is a separate legal entity possessed of separate legal rights and 
liabilities is now unchallengeable by judicial decision. Il2 More recently, in Polly Peck 
International Pic (in administration)1l3 Robert Walker J emphasised that "it was not 
open to the court to disregard the principle of separate corporate personality and treat a 
104 Ottolenghi, From Peeping, (n 55) 
lOS Davies, Gower and Davies p.185 (n 41) 
106 Rixon FG, 'Lifting The Veil Between Holding And Subsidiary Companies' (1986) 102 L.Q.R. 415 
107 [1978] SLT 159 
108 Avgitidis, Group o/Companies, p. 174 (n 96) 
109 [1983] 2 All E.R 563 
110 Gallagher and Ziegler, Lifting The Corporate Veil (n 3) 
111 [1977] 137 CLR 567 
III Nakajima Chizu, 'Lifting the Veil' (1996) 17(6) Compo Law. 187 
113 [1996] 2 Al) E.R (Ch D) 
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closely integrated group of companies as a single economic unit on the basis mere(v of 
perceived injustice. particularly in cases where the separate legal existence of these 
companies assumed greater importance once they became insolvent". 
In the application of the single economic unit theory, parent and subsidiary were 
treated as a single economic unit when there was evidence indicating that the parent 
could make any arrangements which they pleased in regard to the management of the 
business of the subsidiary, or that every step taken by the subsidiary was determined by 
the policy of the parent, or that, the subsidiaries were bound hand and foot to the parent 
company and must do just what parent says or that the parent controlled the purse 
strings, on an item-by-item basis. 114 Similarly, courts in the United States and in the EU 
use some form of the economic unity theory to pierce the corporate veil. 115 As similar to 
English doctrine, under the theory, the main factor in piercing the corporate veil is the 
level of control by the parent over the subsidiary. 116 
In simple theory, the agency and the single economic unit approaches provide 
more reliable principles in establishing liability on parent corporations because two 
separate personalities are confirmed but the use of fraud principles tend to lead to the 
conclusion that there is only one person involved.117 That is why it is a fact that in some 
American cases fraud and agency principles have been brought together to govern the 
particular situation of abuse of control. 118 However, it may be concluded that there is no 
substantial difference between the English interpretation of the agency and the single 
economic unit and the fraud doctrine. In reality the agency principles applied in Smith 
may be used as a test for inferring that the subsidiary is the instrument of the parent. 
Both the English inferences and the American doctrine have the influence of treating 
parent and subsidiary companies otherwise than the independent legal entities and they 
deeply trust in facts which may differ from a case to case but they all resemble each 
114 Avgitidis, Group o/Companies. p. 182 (n 96) 
115 Bakst, Piercing the Corporate Veil, (n 53) 
116 Bakst, Piercing the Corporate Veil, (n 53) 
117 Dobson, Lifting the Veil, (0 54) 
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other in idea that a substantial degree of managerial control is exercised by the parent 
company. The only difference is that the American courts have imposed liability on the 
parent company on the ground of such control more often than the English courts have 
generally done. 119 
Consequently, the development of agency and single economic unit theories find 
its logic on excessive control of subsidiary and using the subsidiary as sham. Therefore. 
the applications of agency and single enterprise principles have easily been shielded by 
the Salomon principles. 12o Liability principles that rest on agency and single economic 
unit become no more than imprecise, symbolic variations of the plercmg the veil 
jurisprudence on the principle of fraud. 121 
Abandoning the Veil Piercing 
The first striking conclusion from the court-generated liability for group of companies is 
that generally the corporate veil will not be pierced unless the corporate shareholder 
dominates the corporate subsidiary and the corporate shareholder has engaged in a 
fraudulent or illegal conduct or other improper conduct, which has generated an 
injustice. Thus, the doctrine of lifting the veil plays a small role in liability discussions in 
English law. except for the area of particular contracts or statutes. Even where the cases 
for applying the doctrine may appear very logical, i.e. under-capitalised, one-person 
company. which might or might not be element of a corporate group, the courts are 
unlikely to pierce the corporate veil. 122 In their legitimacy effort, the courts always refer 
to lack of legislative effort on the issue claiming that even though the legislature has 
118 Dobson. Lifting the Veil. (n 54) 
119 Avgitidis. Group o.fCompanies, p. 189 (n 96) 
I~O Baughen. CorporaTe AccountabiliTY, (n 26) 
I~I Blumberg PI. The Multinational Challenge To Corporation La\\' (Oxford. 1993) p. J 43 
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intervened to deal with various issues relating to corporate groups, they have not acted 
on this particular matter. As a result English courts consider that their function in 
formulating any overreaching principle of enterprise liability is greatly circumscribed. 
The courts, even the House of Lords, are reluctant to intervene in a matter that requires 
strong legislative attention. 123 
Therefore, it is logical to claim that the devotion to limited liability in corporate 
groups is a common characteristic of modem laws as one American court decided, "The 
doctrine of limited liability is indented precisely to protect a parent corporation whose 
subsidiary goes broke. That is the whole purpose of the doctrine, and those who have the 
right to decide such questions, that is, legislatures, believe that the doctrine, on the 
whole, is socially reasonable and useful. We think that the doctrine would largely be 
destroyed if a parent corporation could be held liable simply on the basis of errors in 
business judgment." 124 
However, blaming only parliaments for the MNE liability problems is not very 
convincing since the same judicial system created the current inflexible regime of 
liability under the principles of limited liability and veil piercing. It also is interesting 
that there has been little criticism of the Salomon principles and little demand for its 
modification either judicially or legislatively. Thus, Professor Prentice went further to 
claim that, on current form, the Salomon principles may endure for another hundred 
years. 125 
Therefore, under these current rigid principles, the court created system of liability 
in common law' is very ill developed. There is no clear set of principles for any emerging 
doctrines for liability and it is difficult to predict when and under which conditions 
courts will disregard the separate entity principle. The need for English courts to resort 
In Davies, Gower and Davies, p. 189 (n 41) 
123 Prentice Dan D, 'Veil Piercing and Successor Liability in the United Kingdom' (1995-1996) 10 Fla.l. 
Int'l L. 469 
124 RDdaszewslci V. Telecom Corp. 1981 F.2d 305 
IlS Prentice, Veil Piercing and Successor, ( n 123) 
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to such symbolic tenns as mere fraud~ sham, dummy or alter ego in their judgments 
indicates their difficulties. In America as well, Blumberg noted that one of the most 
serious limitations of US law in dealing with group liability has been the arbitrary 
piercing the veil jurisprudence since the metaphoric use of piercing law has prevented 
US courts from developing a clear general concept of group responsibility.126 Piercing 
the veil for a parent corporation with a subsidiary facing tort claims is uncertain. which 
makes a settlement difficult and litigation costs high. 127 
In consideration of the piercing the veil theory from a broader perspective, such an 
inadequately developed and complex structure of case law, even incapable of creating 
solutions for private, one-man limited company, cannot be applied in modem times 
corporate groups, particularly to MNEs with complex horizontal structure. All the basics 
of the veil piercing doctrine have been built on excessive control by parent corporation 
over subsidiaries. However, under the modem complicated horizontally structured 
corporate groups, the control has been spread over subsidiaries, which appears in two 
ways: there is more self-dependent and self-operated subsidiaries and there is changing 
components control and influence over others operation in the groUp.128 Consequently. 
in this new and complicated structure, it is almost impossible to establish a simplified 
method of control under which excessive control of one entity over another is 
established. Thus, it is difficult to apply piercing the veil principles in subsidiaries' torts 
since there is no easy proof of control of one particular entity over another. 
One can claim the single economic unity principle was in a way a try to adopt the 
new structure to the case law. I would rather consider the single economic unit as a first 
reaction to the liability problems in corporate groups, particularly in vertically integrated 
groups. The problems of court created liability source from the fact that efforts to create 
liability theories were inefficient and apparently fruitless and at the time of the 
decisions, they were completely outdated because the complexity of MNE structure was 
I~t> Hofstetter Karl. 'Parent Responsibility for Subsidiary Corporations: Evaluating European Trends' (1990) 
39 ICLQ 576 
I~" Thompson. Piercing ... Empirical Study. (n 46) 
199 
already at the next level that the case law could not predict. 129 That is why the bigger 
and more complicated corporate groups get the less likely they are to be subjected to 
piercing to the veil principles. Referring back to examination of corporate structure and 
complicated ownership and managerial structure of the given examples in the second 
chapter of the thesis, there are multi-veil corporate groups. In those groups there are 
much more complex ownership structures than that the veil piercing theory suggests. 
Moreover, these complex ownership structures require much more complex horizontal 
managerial control and operation. 
In conclusion, the main problem of veil piercing theory is its dependency on the 
control theory which makes its application very weak and rare. In cases of horizontally 
structured MNEs group, the control theory is inapplicable. However, the piercing the 
corporate veil theory still depends on control theory under which excessive control of 
parent over its subsidiaries is a requirement. Thus, the control theory is much more 
suited to vertically organised corporate groups under which the divisions between 
subsidiaries and parent is more apparent and the parent exercise some certain level of 
control over its subsidiaries. Consequently, piercing the veil theory is now obsolete and 
must be abandoned in favour of liability theories, which are based on modem structures 
ofMNEs. 
Moreover, in the international area, in the great majority of cases, current 
international treaties hardly provide victims with any specific tools to pierce the veil. 
The existence of a customary international rule obliging a state to control and prevent 
the dangers resulting from the activities of their MNEs abroad is highly doubtful and not 
yet confinned by any international practice. l3O As a result, group liability might occur 
for subsidiary's torts in some jurisdictions, but be shielded from liability in others. These 
128 Detailed discussion is made at Chapter 2. 
12<1 Detailed discussion is made at Chapter 2. 
I ~(I Scovazzi, industrial Accidents. (n 36) 
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factors lead to the conclusion that victims, companies and other parties of the conflict 
might not be able to predict its exposure to liability within a jurisdiction.!3! 
Statutory Laws related to Liability for Group of Companies and M~Es 
There is an argument that lawmakers in the UK have no intention to change the 
principles of Salomon, because with the numerous passing of different Companies Acts 
there has been plenty of time for parliaments to produce such a change had it had a mind 
to do SO.132 Despite this apparent lack of interest in regulating MNEs liability, there are 
signs that at least some regulators are waking up to act and impose liability on MNEs 
thanks to strong public arguments. However, the regulations still mostly aim at issues 
where public pressure is irresistible or in very specific cases for specific problems. 
Therefore the statutory lifting of corporate veil is given very little attention in 
scholarly literature. Even though there are some regulations, which directly or indirectly 
require a lifting of the corporate veil, it is obvious that these regulations cannot create a 
situation under which corporate groups liability is achieved because the protection 
provided by such measures is invoked very rarely. For the purpose of this study, the 
importance of these regulations lies in the fact that. as the laws indicate, in case of need 
alternatives to the limited liability doctrine could be created. Moreover, examination of 
statutes and principles will provide an answer to the question of whether regulators have 
adapted to the modem characteristics of MNEs or the regulations are still based on the 
misconception of vertical structure because one of the reasons of failure of the statutory 
law is that they cannot fully embrace the current realities of groups of companies. 
111 C' 4"1) Fanner. Parent orporatlon. (n _ 
112 Bowmer. Company law. To Pierce. (n 37) 
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This thesis examines the current situation and discussions in the Cnited Kingdom 
.... 
and developments in European Union as central to the research. Moreover, there will be 
an examination of some interesting legislations from different jurisdictions. The German 
Stock Corporation Act has attracted lots of interest from scholars for being unique 
regulation of corporate groups. For this it deserves an examination. The American 
legislation of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) is very broadly discussed and indicated as an example of creating efficient 
liability in corporate groups. There will be examination of an interesting legislation from 
Turkey, under which the shareholders of private limited liability company is 
proportionally liable for the companies' debt owed to the state. Again there is an effort 
in Turkey to regulate corporate groups under the new draft commercial code. Moreover, 
as an alternative to case law, the approach of growing arbitration law to issue of 
corporate groups' liability under the lights of arbitral awards will be examined. The 
author does not claim this study covers all examples from every jurisdiction, nor claims 
all the examples from the primary jurisdiction are included in this study because such a 
comprehensive study is beyond the limit and purpose of this research. 
Developments Related to Corporate Groups" Liability in England 
In the UK, most regulations in relation to corporate groups have been introduced on an 
ad hoc basis in response to a specific problem or abuse, rather than in pursuit of any 
coherent legislative or regulatory strategy.133 In the UK Company Law, there are some 
provisions relating to the groups of companies but there is no section devoted to groups 
of companies, neither is there a particular group of companies' law. 
A number of Companies Act 1985 (CA) provisions require related corporations to 
be treated as if they are one with the parent company. Section 8( 1) of the C A requires 
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the courts to lift the veil to determine whether a company is a holding company for the 
purposes of the Act, and section 269(8) of the Companies Act and regulation 57(1) 
requires the presentation of group accounts as consolidated statements in order to 
provide a true and fair view of group activities. There are some more examples of group 
statutory regulations: CA 1985 s 227 provides that parent companies have a duty to 
produce group account, which requires a parent company to prepare group account on a 
consolidated basis. This requires treatment of all the enterprises within a group as 
though they were one. Moreover, (CA) s. 231 provides that a parent company has to 
disclose details of subsidiaries names, country of activity and the shares it holds in the 
subsidiary. Moreover, some tax and employment legislations also follow the approach of 
considering group of companies. For example the Employment Rights Act 1986 protects 
employees' statutory rights when transferred from one country to another within a 
group. 
Insolvency Act 1986 provisions make the most significant impact on corporate 
personality and limited liability. Where the business of the company has been carried out 
to defraud creditors, the courts, on a winding-up, are entitled to look behind the veil of 
incorporation to find parties that know about the carrying-on of the fraudulent behaviour 
and are personally liable for the debts of the company. There are two principal devices 
that could be used to impose such liability for fraudulent trading and liability for 
wrongful trading under the sections of 213 and 214 of Insolvency Act (IA) 1986.134 The 
applications of the provisions on fraudulent and wrongful trading in the context of the 
parent-subsidiary relationship relies upon evidence demonstrating that the parent 
company exercises some degree of managerial control over its subsidiary. The limited 
liability of the parent is lifted either where the parent was knowingly party to the 
carrying on of its subsidiary's business with intent to defraud creditors (IA s. 213 on 
fraudulent trading) or where the parent was the director or the shadow director of its 
m Hadden Tom, 'Regulating Corporate Groups: International Perspective' in McCahery J. Picciotto Sand 
Scott S (eds) Cmporate C01l1ro/ and Accountahili()' (OUP. Oxford 1993) 
1~4 Prentice DD, 'Group Indebtedness' in Wooldridge F and Schmitthoff CM. Groups of Companics 
(Sweet &. Maxwell, London 1991) p. 57 
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insolvent subsidiary (IA s. 214 on wrongful trading).135 Although the section 213 on 
fraudulent trading covers almost all the circumstances in which a parent is engaged in 
the management of its subsidiary, it is subject to the very strict requirement of 
establishing intent to defraud. On the other hand, although the section 214 on 
wrongful trading is free from the evidential difficulties of the s. 213 it applies only in 
circumstances where the parent company is found to be the shadow director136 of its 
subsidiary and its independency might be removed by the interior organisation of the 
group. 137 
The sections operate only when a company has gone to insolvent liquidation and 
declaration can be made only against a person who, at some time before the beginning of 
the winding up, was a director or shadow director of the company and knew, or should 
have decided, at that time, that there was no rational outlook that the company would 
keep from going into insolvent liquidation. 
Although the Insolvency Act provisions requires very strict conditions similar to 
those required for veil piercing, they still constitute, as Professor Davies states, probably 
the most extreme departure from the rule in Salomon's case yet achieved in the United 
Kingdom. 138 However, the requirements for a successful establishment of liability on 
parent corporations indicate that the IA can be considered just an enacted equivalent of 
the veil piercing principles in the case law. Therefore, it cannot be claimed as a 
successful piece of legislation to remove negative effects of limited liability principles in 
groups of companies' context. 139 Consequently, the criticism made for piercing the veil 
doctrine of being out of date and thus not practically functional can be repeated in 
evaluation of wrongful and fraudulent trading principles in the IA. The Act considers 
group of companies as simple vertical organizations as one entity applies control over 
135 Avgitidis, Group oj Companies. p. 224 (n 96) 
Db The term 'shadow director' is defined in section 741 (2) of CA as a person in accordance with whose 
directions or instructions the directors of a company are accustomed to act. 
P' Avgitidis, Group 0..( Companies. p. 225 (n 96) 
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another. Therefore, it has failed to bring any advanced liability regIme and it is 
impossible to bring one unless the statute adapts the modern structures and 
characteristics of group of companies. 
This lack of breakthrough in statutes for group of companies leads us to search for 
what the new Companies Act 2006 offers. The new Companies Act should be examined 
through its preparation process, which has three stages; the first is consultation report 
from the Company Law Steering Group in 2000, the second is Draft Company Law 
Reform Bill in 2005 and final stage is Companies Act 2006. 
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy140 
With a close look at the Steering Group's proposals one can observe that the Steering 
Group see no advantage in imposing a fundamental regime on groups of companies. 
They simply believe that, from their words, that "(having a groups of companies' law) 
would take away flexibility in the l1'ay business organise themselves and would strike at 
the limited liabilit} , basis for company law". 
As an alternative to a developed group of companies' law, the Steering Group 
offered a view on the question of group liability in tort and also considered the question 
of accountability, in particular by suggesting some new methods of group governance 
based on the concept of an 'elective regime' for groups. They believe that the most 
productive way for reform is to adopt an 'elective regime' under which, in exchange for 
a guarantee by the parent company of the liabilities of a subsidiary and satisfaction of 
certain publicity requirements, the subsidiary should be exempted from the requirements 
(under the Companies Act) relating to annual account and audit. An elective subsidiary 
I~I The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy Final 
Report (DTt London, 2001) 
"'0-
- ) 
must fall within the definition of a wholly owned subsidiary under Companies Act. The 
Steering Group see there little point in requiring all wholly owned subsidiaries to be 
included in this regime. Which gives corporate groups flexibility to join the elective 
regime or not. 
The Steering Group discussed the various options for the nature of the guarantee 
by the parent. But their initial view is that there should be no requirement for a 
reciprocal guarantee whereby the elective subsidiary would also guarantee the liabilities 
of the parent, nor for a cross guarantee from one elective subsidiary to another. Either of 
these would have the effect of a form of pooling of assets and liabilities across the 
elective group. This might create the most efficient regime of liability for the group. 
Thus, the Steering group rejected a pooling of liability across the group as a whole by 
supporting the system of simple bilateral guarantees. The reason was that the system of 
bilateral guarantees is likely to prove simpler in practice and would avoid the possibility 
that the creditors of an elective subsidiary could be at risk because of liabilities arising in 
a sister elective subsidiary. The approach of Steering Group apparently indicates that 
they consider groups of companies as vertical organisations. 
The proposed guarantee should work as a normal guarantee in that an unsatisfied 
creditor would take action against the elective subsidiary. joining the elective parent in 
the action. The Steering Group find joint and several liability of a parent inappropriate 
because of the fact that this would enable the creditor to sue the parent without suing the 
subsidiary. which is considered unacceptable. 
In short, the most important problem of group of companies has been left with no 
solution in the proposal. The most problematic circumstances in which they regard it as 
entirely proper for a holding company to separate an activity by using a subsidiary total 
the risk of liability. includes tort liability because the Group claims many torts are 
closely linked with contractual liabilities, for example liability for professional services 
and misrepresentation and product liability_ More interestingly. the Group founded the 
legitimacy of their findings on the fact that they are not aware of any jurisdiction 
providing for parent companies to be automatically liable for the torts or delicts of their 
subsidiaries. Thus. they claimed that defining the circumstances in which the use of 
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limited liability in this way is regarded as abusive would be difficult. Nor they are aware 
of cases where parent companies have engaged in such abuse. They find the easiest 
excuse and refer the problems to the insolvency law stating that the under-capitalisation 
of subsidiaries, and their operation in a way which creates undue risks of insolvency. are 
matters best dealt with by insolvency law. They concluded the proposal by saying that 
"We do not therefore propose an,V reform in this regard". 
In particular, the proposal did not offer any fundamental or innovative regime. It 
simply stated that there is no regime offering these kinds of regulation in the world. 
However, their elective regime even falls short of the types of regime established 40 
years ago by the German Stock Corporation Act of 1965. 141 The only significance of the 
Steering Group' s proposal is that, for the first time, reflection is being given to the 
question of whether English law should have a dedicated regime for groups of 
. 142 
compames. 
The regime Steering Group propose is just a reflection of pressure that current 
business apply on regulators and thus, contains many weak suggestions. 143 First, there is 
no obligation for the parent to make an election. Moreover. it is applicable for only 
wholly owned subsidiaries. Secondly. the proposal is silent on whether election could 
extend to any subsidiary. This is completely in contradiction to the modem 
characteristics of the MNEs. The horizontal structure indicates that the groups of 
companies might include many wholly owned subsidiaries together with many partly 
owned subsidiaries. Moreover, there is a complex cross-ownership in corporate groups, 
which might result many sub-corporate groups within in a group. Thus, it is 
unreasonable to expect success for the elective regimes that covers only wholly owned 
subsidiaries without requiring parent to extend the regime to other subsidiaries. 
Moreover, allowing parents to make the choice will result a situation that is similar to 
141 The Act is examined below. (p 228) 
I-e Muchlinski. Holding Multinationals, (n 25) 
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the current situation that the groups is not considered as single enterprise but it IS 
represented by many legal entities without necessarily creating any group liability. 
The jurisdictional problems have been left completely untouched. The electiye 
regime would apply only to EU based parent companies. but not to groups whose parent 
company is outside the EU. Failing to cover parents from outside the EU means failing 
to regulate MNEs originated in different jurisdictions. The parent might easily insulate 
itself by removing their assets to countries out of the EU. This is already common 
practice. For example in the Multinational Gas, the assets of the joint Yenture company 
in question were located in Liberia, while the main business operations were carried out 
in England through services-only companies. 
The rejection of a pooling approach to the definition of the limits of assets 
available to claimants ignores a basic problem in mass tort litigation, where the 
economic activity of the group as whole is involved in the hazardous processes that lead 
to the harm causing the claims. Actually, it is common in commercial practice to ask for 
reciprocal guarantees when dealing with groups of companies. Thus, sometimes 
contractors with the group ask for guarantees from different companies under the group 
to secure their credit. However, the proposals refuse to create a reciprocal guarantee 
between the parent and subsidiary. The reason for this depends again on 
misunderstanding of the structure of corporate groups in business practice. The one-way 
guarantee is typical of the vertical understanding that was used in past experiences in 
case and statutory law and failed to create a satisfactory liability regime. The horizontal 
structure suggests that not only there should be reciprocal guarantee but also there 
should be a group guarantee for creditors of any subsidiary because even in the selection 
of the elective regime there is no guarantee that the parent will be asset rich. Thus 
successful proposals in this sense should have included pooling of assets, at least for the 
claims made by involuntarily creditors. 
In conclusion, the proposal of an electi\'e regIme is frustrating for those who 
expeckd a regIme at least better than the German Stock Corporation Act. It is 
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disappointing because it would defmitely tempt manipulative corporate planning by 
groups of companies by leaving them to decide whether to elect or not. 144 Thus, the 
Steering Group's approach to corporate groups' liability may fairly be described as a 
major inadequate treatment of an issue of key importance in the reform of any system of 
company law since dismissing the problem of subsidiaries's laibilities by diverting it 
into the uncertain future of insolvency law reform is deeply unsatisfactory.145 But, it is 
logical to expect these kinds of regime because proposals are based on the lack of proper 
examination of corporate groups. 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Company Law Reform Bill, the "'bite 
Paper 2005146 and Companies Act 2006 
As the Steering Group unreservedly admits, its proposals are "not a radical recasting of 
company law", but it considers that these proposals are "a sensible reduction of burdens 
in groups without weakening their existing position". Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the proposal by the DTI mostly depends on the suggestions and reports of the Steering 
Group and has the preamble: 
"The DT! derives our working ambition of 'prosperityfor all' by working to create 
the best environment for business success in the UK. We help people and companies 
become more productive by promoting entelprise, innovation and creativity ... We 
champion UK business at home and abroad. We invest heaviZI' in world-class science 
and technology. TFe protect the rights of wor":ing people and consumers. And ),1'(' stand 
up/or/air and open markets in the UK, Europe and the world". 
1401 Boyle T, 'The Company Law. Review and Group Reform' (2002) 23 Company Lawyer 35 
14~ 
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With the proposal all positive expectations have vanished. even the little ones that 
the Steering Group' s handling of the group of companies as at least a matter of 
consideration seem to have fallen on deaf ears. The objective of the DTI proposal is to 
maintain the UK's position as one of the most attractive places in the world to set up and 
run a business. The draft Bill thus even does not mention the group liability problem so 
as not to scare the MNEs, which happily operate in the UK. 
Accordingly, there is a huge contradiction in both the Steering Group Report and 
the government's White Paper, by claiming they aim to create future company law for 
the country but they just ignore the phenomenon of MNEs that seems the most important 
feature of the current and future issues of company law. The DTI proudly announced 
that they are innovative but in terms of creating pioneering law they refer to the non-
existence of laws in other jurisdictions. Thus, it can easily be claimed that they are 
innovative in the fact that they can pretend there is no problem in a situation that the 
discussion of liability is intense and call for better regulation is more organised. As a 
result, the New Companies Act 2006 based on these principles does not offer any 
solution in this matter. 
The present idea of this thesis is not only to indicate the liability problems of 
groups of companies and particularly MNEs but also, assuming that the existence of the 
problems is not in dispute, the thesis aims to test the suitability of the current laws and 
proposals or discussions on the issues to new economic and organisational realities of 
the MNEs. Unfortunately, the New Companies Act offers no changes, thus, with huge 
disappointment I want to tum my attention to the developments in the EU regulations. 
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Developments in European Community Law 
European Company law recognises that a corporation is a separate legal entity and thus 
must have legal personality. This rule applies not only when the shareholders are natural 
persons, but also when the shareholders are corporations. 147 Accordingly, under the 
traditional European Company Law, a member company in a group cannot be required 
to satisfy the obligations of another member company in the groUp.148 Because of the 
settled rigid principles of limited liability in the member states and Union company law 
itself, the European Union has not achieved a comprehensive corporate group liability 
regime. 149 The efforts to produce fact specific groups of companies' directive have 
collapsed. Consequently, there is no basic principal for liability for corporate groups in 
the EU. The community rather defines and uses several notions of the group enterprise 
to be applied in various domains for different regulatory purposes. ISO Starting from the 
Seventh Company Law Directive and by various other legal provisions, such as banking, 
insurance and anti-trust law, groups of companies have attracted some sort of 
regulations. lSI 
The European Community has refrained from extensive uniform approaches to 
particularistic technical changes that can be integrated within the member states. IS2 
Thus, traditionally core areas of company law remain largely untouched by 
hannonisation. Particularly creditors' protection against corporate groups remains a 
147 Bakst, Piercing the Corporate Veil, (n 53) 
148 Bakst, Piercing the Corporate Veil, (n 53) 
149 Irujo, Trends and Realities, (n 7) 
ISO Adinolfi A, 'The Legal Notion Of The Group Enterprise: The EC Approach' in Sugarman D and 
Teubner G (eds) Regulating Corporate Groups in Europe (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1990) 
lSI For example, articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome refer to undertakings, which are accepted to be a 
much wider and looser concept than the English concept of separate individual corporate personality under 
Salomon. The provisions apply to parents and subsidiaries -even when not wholly owned. 
IS:! Sugarman D, 'Corporate Groups In Europe: Governance, Industrial Organisation, And Efficiency In A 
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matter of national law. Indeed, the EU intervention in some areas. instead of creating a 
common legal environment, has probably made the law more complicated. The changes 
that have taken place have often made it more difficult for a resident of a member state 
to know what the situation is with her own legislation while doing little to inform her 
about what the law is in other EU countries. I53 Thus. implementation of individual 
legislative and procedural laws on corporate groups is still inadequate in most European 
countries. 154 
However, the EU institutional law at least in theory is more advanced than the 
English approaches because it can be claimed that at the EU level, there is a wider 
acceptance of the problems created by the group of companies. Therefore. it is not 
surprising that there have been some ongoing efforts to create better regulations for the 
corporate groups. even though many of them had failed even before reaching at a 
proposal level. Moreover, it is a common practice in the EU to consider groups of 
companies in the processes of preparations of new legislations. For example. the Cross 
Border Merger Directive I55 would fill an important gap in company law and is the first 
measure to be presented under the Commission's Action Plan on company law and 
corporate governance in the European Union. In Article 14 of the Merger Directive, 
which has a title of 'consequences of the merger', it is regulated that the acqulnng 
company will be liable for acquired company" s obligations. 
The original proposal for a European Company Act (SE) contained provisions 
similar to those of the German Stock Corporation Act I56, which would permit the 
management of the group as a single economic unit. I57 It proposed (article 239.'1) that 
the controlling company of a concern shall be liable for the debts and liabilities of its 
153 Halbhuber H. 'National Doctrinal Structures and European Community Law' (2001) 38 C.M.L.Re\'. 
1385 
154 lrujo, Trends and Realities, (n 7) 
ISS Directive 2005 '56'EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-
border mergers of limited liability companies 
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dependent subsidiary compames. A parent company was presumed to control its 
subsidiary, and the subsidiary was presumed to be dependent on parent. The parent 
could invalidate this presumption if it established a proof that it restricted itself to a mere 
passive shareholder role. IS8 Additionally. the Ninth Company Law Directive on the 
Conduct of Groups Containing a Public Limited Company as a Subsidiary had 
provisions, as one of its proclaimed goals, to grant adequate protection to subsidiary 
creditors where their primary debtor is dependent on a parent company.159 Howe\'er, at 
present, neither proposal has been adopted. 
The failure of those attempts put new efforts in jeopardy for some time. Only in 
recent times and in connection with the Forum Europeaum has group regulation again 
caught the attention of the European Union. Following the Winter Report, the recent 
Company Law Action Plan makes special reference to the corporate group phenomenon. 
although from a less ambitious perspective than that of the Ninth Directive. 160 Thus. this 
thesis will discuss recent attempts rather than discussing of already failed attempts. 
Winter Report, High Level Group of Company Law Experts and Action Plan on 
"Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU,,161 
The Action Plan is the Commission's response to the fmal report, presented in 
November 2002, of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts chaired by Japp 
Winter. The Commission of the European Communities in its Communication and 
Action Plan set the principles that the plan for company regulation must be "jlexible in 
application. but firm in the principles". The main objectives of the Action Plan are: 1- to 
15~ Hofstetter. Parent Responsibility. (n 126) 
ISQ Bakst, Piercing the Corporate Veil. (n 53) 
160 lrujo. Trends and Realities. (n 7) 
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strengthen shareholders' rights and protection for employees, creditors and the other 
parties with which company deal, while adapting company law and corporate 
governance rules appropriately for different categories of company. 2- to foster the 
efficiency and competitiveness of business, with special attention to some cross-border 
Issues. 
In relation to corporate groups, the Winter Report states that the existence of risks 
in the groups of companies challenges neither the legitimacy of groups nor the limited 
liability principle. Thus, the Report supports the view that the enactment of an 
autonomous body of law, specially dealing with groups, is not recommended at EU 
level, but that particular problems should be addressed in three areas: transparency 
issues, consolidated approach to group policy and bankruptcies, and abusi\'e pyramids. 
As a result, the Winter Report states the need for legislative intervention on corporate 
groups through three basic issues: 1- the transparency of the group structure and its 
relations 2- the tension between the interest of the group and that of the group members 
and 3- the special problems of pyramid structures. 
Accordingly, the Report has made some general recommendations. First, they 
agree that there is no need to revitalise the dead Ninth Company Law Directive. Second, 
increased disclosure with regard to a group's structure and relations is needed, and the 
parent company of each group is to be made responsible for disclosing coherent and 
accurate information. These improvements can be managed by increasing disclosure 
requirements in the 7th Directive. Third; the commission should review the possibility of 
introducing in Member States rules on procedural and substantive consolidations of 
bankruptcies of group companies. Finally, the EU should require national authorities. 
responsible for the admission to trading on regulated markets, not to admit holding 
companies whose sole or main assets are their shareholding in another company. unless 
the economic value of such admission is clearly demonstrated. 
1111 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Modernizing 
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, 
COM/2003/0284 final 
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The commission published its Action Plan based on the evaluation of the Winter 
Report. Here, only issues relating to liability of groups of companies will be discussed. 
The commission has agreed with the Winter Report on the view that there is no need to 
revive the draft Ninth Directive on group relations. The commission did not want to be 
in deadlock again and thus created a plan, which is less comprehensive than the Ninth 
Directive. 
The Commission acknowledges the fact that groups of companies are a legitimate 
way of doing business, but they may present risks for shareholders and creditors. 
Although they apparently accepted the fact that creditors need protection, in terms of 
offering solutions they have failed to create fundamental principles. They recommended 
that more transparency could help minimise those risks. Initiatives aiming at improving 
the financial and non-financial information disclosed by groups are priorities for the 
short term. Such initiatives would aim to ensure better information on the group's 
structure and intra-group relations, as well as on the financial situation of the various 
parts of the group. Moreover, the action plans supports a framework rule to allow those 
managing a company belonging to a group to implement a coordinated group policy. 
Fortunately, it emphasises the need for action against abusive pyramids defined by the 
High Level Group as chains of holding companies whose sole or main assets are their 
shareholding in another listed company. Accordingly, the Commission has concluded its 
Action Plan for groups of companies dividing the actions in three phases, short term, 
medium term and long term. 
Firstly, in the short-term, the Commission intends to adopt legislative measures 
with the intention of improving the group disclosure of financial and non-financial 
information. Since transparency is felt as the most urgent problem in corporate groups 
context, whether they are listed or not, the commission regards these additional 
initiatives as priorities for the short term. 
Secondly, the Commission aims to come forward in the medium term for a 
proposal directive pro\'iding a framework rule for groups allowing adoption of a 
coordinated group policy. The Commission also points out that with coordinated group 
policy the interests of company's creditors are effectively protected. Commission does 
"')1-
- ,) 
not make any differentiation between voluntary and involuntary creditors under 
coordinated group policy. However. the Commission has not followed the 
recommendation of the Winter Report that the issue of introduction rules on procedural 
and substantive consolidations of bankruptcies of groups of companies in Member 
States. Thus, positive approaches taken by the Winter Report have been disregarded by 
the Commission. Examination of modem structural characteristics of MNEs indicates 
different realities since most groups already have improved organisational structure with 
different nature of control than the Commission suggest. Thus, expecting corporate 
groups to extend their control over their subsidiaries by adopting coordinated group 
policy, while managerial theory forces them to adopt an organisational structure which 
gives more independence to subsidiaries does not reflect the interdisciplinary 
characteristics of groups of companies. This situation is a result of Commission' s 
consideration of group of companies as simple vertical organisation. 
Thirdly, the commission intends in the medium term to give further consideration 
to the risk inherent in abusive pyramids and, if necessary, make a legislative proposal to 
prohibit them from stock exchange listing. 
As a result, the Winter Report and Commission Action Plan have failed to 
determine the important characteristics of groups of companies. The recommendations 
in the Action Plan are too shallow to create fundamental changes in the area of corporate 
groups' liability in Europe. It seems that in the short, medium and even long terms there 
is no intention to regulate the liability issues in the groups of companies. Under those 
conditions it is impossible to discuss EU law's approach to MNEs since the group of 
companies law in Europe does not offer anything fundamental. As a result, apart from 
the aforementioned formulation of basic principles (recognition of the group's interest 
and protection of external shareholders and creditors), the European Union has little 
room for progress on this subject. 
Thus, the positive approach taken by the EU by recognising problems created by 
groups of companies turned to be negative when it reached at Action Plan level. The 
Union has taken very practical approach to groups of companies' problems and tried to 
find solutions for practical operational problems of groups. Thus, they have ignored the 
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substantive problems of liability. The Action Plan does not touch any problems that 
might create a huge debate in member countries. As discussed earlier. the issues of 
MNEs liability have international characteristics and thus require more coordinated 
approaches by countries. The EU in this sense has many advantages in terms of creating 
a law. which can be applied in countries, in which together reside huge number of 
MNEs. 
The EU should therefore create another action plan in terms of corporate group 
liability covering MNEs as well. The new plan should consider the interdisciplinary 
realities of MNEs. Accordingly, the new plan should aim to recognise the fact that 
MNEs might create problems when operating in their modern structure. Therefore, the 
plan should disassociate itself from the mistakes made by previous regulations in 
member states. Rather than bringing different approaches in member states, the Union 
should go for innovative solutions and thus create a realistic corporate groups law that 
consider MNEs as horizontally structured organisation. 
16' Corporate Group Law of Europe, the Forum Europaeum -
The forum emphasises that corporate groups are a reality of life. Similar to the Action 
Plan, the Forum acknowledges the problems and seeks to clearly establish the legitimacy 
of the corporate group as a legal institution, as well as recognition of its interests and the 
exercise of management power by the entity controlling the group. The forum. like the 
Commission. recognises that the two most important objectives of corporate group law 
are the protection of creditors and minority shareholders of subsidiaries. As a way to 
1(,2 The Forum Europaeum Konzemrecht consists of a steering committee. Together with many other 
European academics. the committee conduct the project "Konzemrecht fur Europa" (Corporate Group 
Law for Europe). In this article The Forum Europaeum makes proposals to the European and national 
legislatures for addressing the common problem of corporate groups in Europe. Forum Europaeum 
Corporate Group Law. Corporate Group Law for Europe (2000) 1 EBOLR 165 
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achieve this, the forum has taken up the Rozenblum doctrine,163 which has been created 
by the French High Court. According to the doctrine, recognizing the interests of the 
group requires the practical confirmation of the existence of a solid entrepreneurial 
structure, a coherent group policy and internal balance between the burdens and 
advantages. 164 
The forum claims that there is already a kind of harmonisation of corporate groups 
in the Union under the rules of banking, insurance and the Seventh Directive on 
Consolidated Annual Accounts and many other individual laws which affect groups of 
companies. However, the forum aims to limit the proposal just for company law 
excluding other branches of the law (environmental, labour, insolvency, tax). This 
positive approach to the problem of corporate groups is very important. The forum 
understands the complexity of scattered regulations under different branches of the law. 
In other words, the forum suggests that if there is a well structured law that abolishes the 
limited liability principle and impose liability on every each member of the group, there 
will be no need for these complex regulations. 
Therefore, the most important characteristic of the Forum's proposals is that there 
.is an urgent need to regulate corporate groups at the Union level as well as reflecting 
these regulations in Member States. The forum indicates that harmonisation must cover 
core areas of corporate law in the Union. It must create basic principles of groups of 
companies' regulation so it must leave some empty space for member states. Aiming a 
regulation at the Union level is a very positive step. Thus, the forum at least in principle 
offers something braver than the Winter Report. 
163 Forum Europaeum, Corporate Group Law, (n 162). Accordingly, three conditions must be fulfilled in 
order that the interest of the subsidiary can be legitimately subordinated: firstly, the group structure must 
be firmly established; commercial activities of the companies in the group must be interrelated in such a 
way that they exercise negative as well as positive influence on each other. Secondly, a coherent policy for 
the entire group must be in place; the requirement of group policy presupposes the existence of one 
inclusive overall group policy for the group as a whole. Thirdly, the advantages and disadvantages for 
each company must be properly distributed within the group so that a balance is maintained. 
164 lrujo, Trends and Realities, (n 7) 
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On close examination of the Forum's proposal, the proposed rules by the Forum 
will be based on the concept of 'control' within the meaning of Article 1 (l) and article 
2 of the Seventh Directive. Under the articles, one company controls another company if 
it has a majority of voting rights, has the power to appoint or remove a majority of the 
members of the board of directors or the supervisory board, or has the right to exercise a 
dominant influence pursuant to a contract entered into with the controlled company or 
pursuant to a provision in the controlled company's constitution. 
The Forum Europeaum proposes that the EU should legitimize in all member 
states groups which are organised on an EU market-wide basis and thereby ensure that 
such groups as a whole and their subsidiaries operate on a solid legal basis. The forum 
consider the French 'Rozenblum' formula part of EU law must, in many respects, be 
merged with the law of each Member State, which must regulate the penalties to be 
imposed in case of non-compliance. 
In the issue of the legal recognition of group management, the French Rozenblum 
concept makes it possible for the management of subsidiary companies to subordinate 
the subsidiary to the interest of the group upon the fulfilment of certain conditions. 
Consequently, under this formula, as set out in the Draft Directive of the Forum 
Europeaum, directors of a group company can act in the interests of the overall corporate 
group, and subordinate or sacrifice the interest of their own company, if: 165 1-The 
corporate group has a balanced and fmnly established structure; 2-The company took 
part in a long-term and coherent group policy, and 3-The directors in good faith 
reasonably assumed that any detriment suffered by their company would in due course 
be made good by other advantages. 
In return for making use of this option of operating as a group, the company is not 
required to sacrifice the legal independence of its ,subsidiaries. Rather, the parent would 
be required to assume the liability for the commercial risks of subsidiary. 166 Approval by 
165 Kluver John, 'European And Australian Proposal For Corporate Group Law: A Comparative Analysis' 
(2000) E.B.O.L.R 287 
166 Forum Europacum, Corporate Group Law, (n 162) 
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the general meeting of the parent is a precondition for a legally effective group 
declaration. In addition to the entitlement of the parent to direct the management of the 
subsidiary. the legal consequences of the group declaration include the assumption by 
the parent of liability for losses incurred by the subsidiary in case of winding-up 
(creditor protection) and the obligation to compensate the minority shareholders in the 
subsidiary (minority shareholder protection). The special characteristic of the Ro=enblum 
concept is that it does not, compared to Gennan law. oblige the parent company to 
provide precise compensation for every disadvantage inflicted on an individual 
subsidiary.167 However, the obligation of the parent does not come into force at the end 
of the financial year, in opposition to the Gennan Stock Corporation Law, but only: I-
on the opening of insolvency proceedings against the subsidiary, or :!- the effective 
revocation by the parent of the group declaration. 168 Therefore, the liability is not a 
direct liability but a secondary liability because the parent liability occurs if only 
subsidiary gets bankrupt or the parent revokes the group declaration. 
The only direct liability of the parent company occurs in favour of the subsidiary's 
creditors only if the parent is considered as a shadow director. If the criteria for such 
requirement are not met, then the parent is not required to take any action to rescue the 
subsidiary, or to accept liability for its debts. In summary, whereas the parent may be 
motivated to rescue a subsidiary, it has no obligation to do so. This means that the 
Forum Europeaum proposes an obligation on a parent company either rescue or wind up 
a subsidiary company that has reached • crisis point', that is, where the subsidiary has 'no 
reasonable prospect' of avoiding insolvency through its own resources. A holding 
company, which fails to act in these circumstances, would be liable for any 
consequential losses of the subsidiary. An alternative proposal is to impose this liability 
only where a parent company has exercised actual control over the subsidiary.169 
1(,' Forum Europaeum, Corporate Group Law, (n 162) 
I(,~ Forum Europaeum, Corporate Group Law, (n 162) 
loQ Kluver. European And Australian Proposal, (n 165) 
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Here, one can compare the proposed wrongful trading rules to the general idea of 
the English . wrongful trading' rules, which regulates that if the directors ought to 
foresee that the company cannot continue to pay its debts, they must decide either to 
rescue the company or to put it into liquidation. Otherwise, the directors will be liable 
fully or in part to creditors for their unpaid clairns. 170 The concept of wrongful trading 
applies both to independent companies and to companies within the groups. The 
directors of a subsidiary company are subject to the rules, as well as the parent company 
and its directors if they operate as de facto or 'shadO\.v· directors of the subsidiary. 171 
An extensive study on corporate groups should come with more complicated and 
advanced group liability regime. However, interestingly, the forum fails to create a more 
advanced liability regime for corporate groups. Rather they copy the regimes already 
proven ineffective due to misunderstandings of the managerial structure of the groups. 
Even though, the Forum's proposal and the Rozenblum doctrine require group to have 
group structure and operate according to their group policy with balanced distribution of 
benefits and burdens amongst companies, the liability proposed is still parent companies 
liability. And it is not a direct liability of the parent but just is a secondary liability. Only 
direct liability is proposed in case of wrongful trading and is based on the excessive 
control of the parent over its subsidiaries. 
Accordingly, the Forum fails to absorb contemporary characteristics of MNEs into 
its proposals. The liability proposed is parent liability and the relationship between the 
subsidiary and the parent is considered as vertical rather than horizontal. Thus, the 
parent is primarily responsible for subsidiaries debts in certain condition of close 
control. In reality the structures of corporate groups are more complex and control 
applied by the parent over its subsidiaries is not that simple. There is a complex cultural 
control in corporate groups that requires more independence for subsidiaries from the 
parent but more integration as group by embracing other entities. Under these 
conditions. it is unrealistic to expect MNEs to undertake operational structure suggested 
I'll Final Report on the High Level of Group of Company Law Experts on a Modem Regulatory 
Framework of Company Law in Europe Brussels 4 November 2002. 
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by the Forum since is not suitable for the most efficient managerial structure. \10reo\,er. 
the liability based on wrongful trading depends on certain conditions that are very 
difficult to prove under the modem structure. 
As a general idea, the Forum's work is useful to emphasise the scale of corporate 
groups in the modern business world. It once again points out the differences from the 
legal model of the single and unattached company. However. the forum completely 
lacks innovatory proposals because all the typical missing points discussed earlier 
appear in the Forum's proposal as well; there are no special regulatory provisions for 
involuntarily creditors. Moreover, there is no attempt to create special regulation for 
MNEs. Under these conditions, the involuntarily creditors protection against MNEs is 
completely unfilled. Even though the Forum suggests a need of unified regulation in 
case of cross-border problems, they just ignore the problems by not considering 
problems MNEs create. In particular, it is not clear what happens if the law governing 
the subsidiary, the supposedly protected part, does not provide for the group declaration 
or states different rights and obligations compared to the parent's law. Similarly, the 
substantive law with the possible international private law questions are not discussed. ) 71 
The overall evaluation of Forum's proposals suggests the Forum fail to produce 
something new and evolutionary. The proposals are rather a mixture of legal principles 
developed in different jurisdictions in the EU to prevent abuses of groups of companies. 
Rozenblum from France. wrongful trading from England and qualified groups from 
Germany have been mixed. Thus, one can easily claim that, after the unsuccessful Ninth 
Directive, the participants thought it would be more likely to reach agreement if they can 
manage to bring together principles developed in basic jurisdictions in Europe. 
However, it should not be forgotten that the legal principles in one jurisdiction are 
always attractive to the professionals in other jurisdictions i.e. the French doctrine of 
171 Final Report On The High LeveL (n 170) 
1"2 Windbichler Christ me. 'Corporate Group Law For Europe' Comment On The Forum Europeaum's 
Principles Proposal For A European Corporate Group Law' (2000) 1 E.B.O.L.R 265 
Rozenblum and English doctrine wrongful trading have been criticised by many 
academics from these jurisdictions. 173 
Approaching the issues with a more general perspective reveals that the 
substantive liability proposal of the Forum should be read in the light of the concept of 
. control' . In the extensive examination of MNE structure it has been proven that the 
concept of control in corporate groups is different from the way it is perceived in legal 
studies. 174 The Forum is under the common misconception of corporate groups since 
they never mention horizontally structured enterprises. They are unaware of the modem 
conception of the corporate groups. Moreover, case law examination apparently pro\'es 
that founding liability on the basis of control is unsatisfactory. Thus, basing the new 
liability proposal on the control principles is a mistake and the life of the proposal will 
be short unless the forum considers the modem managerial structure of MNEs in 
creating corporate groups. 
European Competition Law litigation; Group as Single Economic Unit 
One should expect more fundamental and up-to-date development in competition law 
because of the multi-disciplinary characteristics of the anti-trust issues. Consequently. 
the emerging law of the European Community Competition Law represents one of the 
most recent attempts to legislate on groups of companies for anticompetitive behaviours. 
As a principle. where a subsidiary is wholly owned by its parent company and it is found 
as a matter of fact that the subsidiary is not able to engage in economic action that is 
autonomous of its parent company, then in spite of their separate legal identities. the two 
companies will be regarded as one for the purposes of EC competition law.175 
i'; Windbichler, Corporate Group Law, (n 172) 
174 Detailed discussion is made at chapter 2, 
I'~ Bakst. Piercing the Corporate Veil. (n 53) 
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In the cases of Centrafarm v Sterling 176 and TTiho Europe Brr v Commission oj 
European Communities 177 the European Court of Justice decided that where a company 
and its subsidiaries are fonned as a single economic unit, the subsidiaries cannot enjoy any 
real autonomy in determining their operations. Consequently, the most established basis 
in EC competition law for asserting jurisdiction over foreign companies is the doctrine 
of the group as a 'single economic unit'. This doctrine features the foreign parents' 
responsibility for the anti-competitive activities of a subsidiary that is present and active 
in Europe and over which they supposedly exert some control. Owing to the supposed 
control that the parent can exert and should have exerted over the subsidiary, the parent. 
and other relevant members of the group may be brought within the jurisdiction of 
European Law. 178 The court has emphasised the corporate structural relationship 
between the parent and the subsidiary and merely considered the parent's abilit), to 
control the latter, rather than whether that control was actually exercised. 179 
The court ruled that "the fact that a subsidiary has separate legal personality is 
not sufficient to exclude the possibility of imputing its conduct to the parent company,., 
in the circumstances, the formal separation between these companies, resulting from 
their separate legal personality, cannot outweigh the unity of their conduct on the 
market for the purposes of applying the rules on competition",180 Accordingly, the ECJ 
held that where a subsidiary does not enjoy real autonomy in determining its course of 
action in the market, the prohibitions set out in article 81 (1) of EU Treaty might be 
considered inapplicable in the relationship between it and the parent company with 
which it fonns one economic unit. 181 The application of single economic unit theory in 
EC competition judgement requires certain conditions. First of all, the parent and 
176 Centrafarm ,'Sterling 1974 ECR 1147 
177 J"i ho Europe B V,, Commission of European Communities (Case C-73/9 5P) 
p~ Case 48/69 ICI ", Commission [1972] ECR 619: CMLR 557, Viho Europe BV ", Commission [1996] 
ECR 1-5457, See Goyder DG, EC Competition Law (Oxford University Press. Oxford 2003) p, 499 
17Q Goyder. EC Competition La)!' p, 500 (n 178) 
180 Centrafarm B1",', Sterling Drug Inc, 
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subsidiaries should form an economic unit as explained in Viho '"an economic unit 'with 
in which the subsidiwy has no real freedom to determine its course of action in the 
market because the parent company permanently supervises the making of decisions by, 
and the administration of, its subsidiary. Secondly, the agreements must be soleh' 
intended to cany out internal allocation of tasks as between the undertakings". 182 
The examination of the principles indicates that, the requirements can only be met 
by the vertically organised corporate groups because clear control established by a 
parent over its subsidiaries is apparent only in such groups. The examination of the 
group subjected to the judgment in Viho case indicates that the Parker Pen ltd. controls 
and is involved in decision making in its subsidiaries in Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands, France and Spain. The parent controls its subsidiaries and key decisions are 
taken by the parent. For example the parent limits the subsidiaries' area of operations to 
their own jurisdiction. The examination of other cases indicate similar characteristics 
that corporate groups brought under the judgment of the ECl for constituting single 
economic unit have characteristics similar to vertically organised corporate groups. 
Accordingly, in the cases, there was a control or supposed control by parent over its 
subsidiaries and there was a one-way parent liability for this control. 
Thus, the analysis of competition case law demonstrates that the single economic 
entity theory applied in anti-trust cases by ECl has some similarities of veil piercing 
doctrine. 183 In the cases, the separate legal personality of the Community subsidiary is 
ignored in order to reach its corporate shareholders. However, the single economic unit 
argument in the EU competition law has more advanced features in comparison to the 
veil piercing theory in two aspects. First, the required nature of control in the group of 
companies is less strict than that required level in veil piercing cases because the Court 
looks for supposed control rather than actual control of the parent. This makes imposing 
I~I The group economic unit concept was confirmed in cases Centra/arm RIO \', Sterling Drug Inc. and 
Institlllo Chcmioterapico Italiano and commercial Solvent Corporations \', Commission cases 6--; 73 
[1974] ECR 2~3 
18~ l"h E Bl' 
'/ 0 IIropc 
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liability on the parent company eaSIer and more often. The second point is the 
applicability of the anti-trust ruling on foreign parent companies; the policy in the EU is 
to extent the applicability of competition rules to companies outside of the jurisdictional 
barriers of the EU. 
However, it seems that this relatively flexible approach is only considered in 
competition rulings and the single economic unit argument does not ignore the separate 
personality of the companies under the group. It rather establishes supposed liability on 
parent because of the difficulty of proving the independent economic decisions by the 
subsidiary in the common economic policy of the group. However, in the supposed 
control theory, it is always possible to escape liability by proving that there was not 
control over subsidiary by the parent. Accordingly, the liability regime that is designed 
according to a belief in a sharp and vertical control theory in corporate groups cannot be 
applied to compl~x structure of MNEs under which there is a horizontal organisational 
structure and cultural control. 
European Union: Adding More Complexity to the Problem 
Given the urgency of the liability problems in MNEs activities, the EU, in the interest of 
involuntarily creditors, should recognise corporate groups as a modem organisational 
form and take them out of the grey area of mere complexity. The regulation of groups of 
companies in certain areas of practice in order to solve very specific problems does not 
create a required level of tort liability in corporate groups. Moreover, not having 
inclusive recognition of the groups might cause regulatory competition amongst the 
member states. The mistake of the Union is that during the period of attempts to 
regulate, it seemed to prefer a corporate group law based on the formulation of major 
standards, leaving precise features relating to the formation and operation of corporate 
183 Schenck Daniel W. 'Jurisdiction over the Foreign Multinational in the EEC: Lifting the Veil on the 
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groups to the member states or, where applicable, to self-regulation. l84 Exposing the 
company to different legal requirements or differentiated extent of liability according to 
the laws of the individual member states only complicates and endangers the rights of all 
creditors at the European level.185 
Moreover, the contents of regulations in the Union are too shallow and exclude 
many basics. The discussions prove that from the beginning, including the Ninth 
Directive, attempts have failed to provide satisfactory solutions. The Commission's 
Action Plan and even specific study of the Forum Europeaum have failed to address the 
problem of MNEs liability even they have failed to articulate the problems. This failure 
to articulate problems has prevented interdisciplinary approaches to groups of 
comp~es' problems. Therefore, the discussions still concentrate on the control theory. 
The deadlock of the control theory, certain degree of control over the subsidiary 
.. imposed by the pat."ent, has· not been overcome· by any law or proposal at the European 
level. The Winter Report, the Action Plan and Forum Europeaum fail to spot that when a 
regulatory work is based on the idea of control, there is always possibility to avoid tort 
liability since the reality of corporate group structure is not exactly as simple as to be 
covered by the control theory.186 There will be huge obstacles to enforcing liability in 
horizontally organised groups and in case of MNEs it will be almost impossible to make 
them accountable for their torts. 
The misconception is still very common that groups of companies are vertically 
organised groups that the parent controls subsidiaries and they operate under the 
common policy of the parent. For this reason, in the short term, the possibility of 
development of group's notions at Community level appears to be linked to the adoption 
of measures of general application containing some specific provisions to be applied to 
Economic Entity Theory' (1989-1990) 11 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 495 
184 Irujo, Trends and Realities, (n 7) 
115 Lombardo Stefano, 'Conflict Of Law Rules In Company Law After Uberseering: An Economic And 
Comparative Analysis Of The Allocation Of Policy Competence In The European Union' (2003) 4 
E.B.O.L.R.301 
116 Detailed discussion is made at chapter 2. 
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vertically structured enterprises. 187 And none of these specific pro\"isions seem to be 
solving liability problems. As a result, because of this common belief of corporate 
groups as vertical, the legislators, courts and scholars cannot produce better proposals 
for establishing liability other than liability based on control theory. Howeyer. the 
reality is much more complex in a horizontal organisation; the control is completely 
spread over the subsidiaries and replaced by more common group policy and 
principles. 188 Companies operate according to policies of the group eyen in some 
occasions with no instruction from the centre. In case of a need for direction, the 
subsidiaries might refer to the parent or sub-parents or other specialised subsidiaries on 
particular policy creating such as, advertisement, infonnation technology, fmance, and 
. 189 
msurance. 
Therefore, it is obvious that being in a group means operating under a complex 
structure of cultural control and common group policies. Thus there is no particular need 
to develop a theory that requires many more non-provable conditions in order to make 
parent companies liable. The European legislator should restart the future efforts from 
this innovative approach and new proposals should cover national, union based and 
multinational enterprises since there is barely another field of law that is better suited for 
a common European development by jurisprudence than the law of groups of 
companies. Moreover. since groups of companies are operating to a great extent across 
the barriers of national borders, no national legislation has yet found a complete system 
but in all of them there seem great public demand for regulation, which can be trigger to 
develop a common group of companies' law of Europe. 190 The regulatory concept must 
cover protection measures against a misuse of subsidiaries established abroad. This issue 
of protection of people from hazard of rvlNEs under the basis principles of the European 
18' Adinolfi. The Legal Notion, (n 150) 
IR8 Detailed discussion is made at chapter 1. 
18Q Detailed discussion is made at chapter 2. 
IQO Lutter Marcus. 'The Law Of Groups Of Companies In Europe' (1983) 1 Forum Intemationale p. 1 
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rules must not be ignored. 191 Tort creditors could thus be identified as eligible for 
general interest status at the ElJ level from the public policy aspects and thus. a form of 
protection must be built to defend their interests. 192 
German Stock Corporations Act, 1965 
Unlike the most other systems, German law has a specific set of rules applicable to 
groups of companies. These rules are contained in the Stock Corporations Act of 1965. 
Articles 15-19 define different form of the enterprise connection and articles 291-337. 
contain the substantive provisions. The law on groups of companies deals with the 
balancing of interests in situations where one enterprise controls the business policies of 
one or more other enterprises, by directly or indirectly influencing the management of 
the controlled enterprises. 
A group is formed either when a controlling and one or more dependent 
enterprises are combined under a uniform management of the controlling enterprise 
or when enterprises which are legally and factually independent of each other come 
under uniform management. It is presumed that a dependent enterprise forms a group 
with the controlling enterprise. 193 The concept of controlling influence and uniform 
management are not defined in the statute. In general, it is considered that an enterprise 
is in a situation to exercise a controlling power if it has authority to make another 
enterprise comply with its wishes; methods used for this purpose are irrelevant. The 
controlling influence may be capable of being exercised either by means of major 
participation in the dependent enterprise or by means of a control contract or by means 
191 Haar Brigitte. -Piercing Veil And Shareholder's Product And Environmental Liability In American 
Law :\s Remedies For Capital Market Failures-New Developments And Implications For European And 
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of the power to control the composition of the management board of the dependent 
enterprise or by means of the fact that the boards of both enterprises are essentially 
composed of the same persons. 194 The law divides corporate groups into three classes: 
integration concerns, contract concerns and de facto concerns. 
Integration concerns: where a parent holds between 95 to 100 per cent of the 
stock of a subsidiary, the two companies can agree to integrate officially. The integrated 
group consists of a parent and wholly owned subsidiaries, which agree to subject 
themselves formally to the uniform management of the parent that, in exchange. 
becomes responsible for all their obligations. The chief company is liable to the creditors 
of the integrated company, jointly and severally, for all its debts and obligations arising 
before or after the combination. An agreement to the contrary has no effect against third 
parties. Even though the integration concern has no practical importance. its liability 
concept has been praised because of its crucial effect that removes the limited liability of 
the principal enterprise for the obligations of the integrated enterprises. Unlimited 
liability is the price that the parent has to pay for its unlimited power to direct the 
operations of the subsidiaries because the parent assumes this liability merely upon 
integration, without any further requirement. 195 
Contractual concerns: the expectation before enactment of the law was that 
corporate groups linked through control agreements would become the most popular 
fonn of corporate groups because control agreements are the only legal way for a parent 
to acquire broad managing power over its subsidiary corporations. 196 In practice though, 
control agreements have been rarely used. 197 
A control contract is usually concluded between a controlling enterprise and one or 
more enterprises, which are dependent on it. Contractual groups are combined on a basis 
IQ~ Avgitidis. Group o.fCompanics. p. 230 (n 96) 
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of a contract of domination whereby a fIrm subjects itself to management by another. 
The contract of domination thus changes the organisational structure of the now 
dependent frrm.198 This broad authority of the controlling enterprise in directing the 
controlled is balanced by the principal enterprise's obligation to compensate the 
dependent for every annual loss, which has occurred during the term of agreement. 
However, the nature of liability is not a direct liability so the creditors of the 
dependent enterprise have no right of action against the controlling enterprise but they 
can enforce the compensation claim against it in accordance with the powers given to 
them by the Civil Procedure RUles. 199 Because of this complex nature of the contractual 
- . 
concern, the contracts were very few as very well described by the great majority of the 
courts and commentators; parent corporations have "chosen relationship without 
marriage certificates". 200 
De facto concerns: as in general practice allover the world, most German parent 
and subsidiary companies are merely linked through stock ownership so majority stock 
ownership generates the presumption that subsidiaries are dependent on their parents. 
Thus, article 311 (1) provides that in the absence of an integration or a control contract, a 
controlling enterprise may not use its influence to cause a dependent corporation to enter 
into any transaction, to cause it to take or refrain from taking any measure that are 
damaging unless adequate compensation is made to the dependent corporation?Ol 
According to article 317, where the controlling enterprise fails to compensate the 
dependent for any imposed disadvantages by the end of the fiscal year, the controlling 
enterprise and the responsible legal representatives become jointly and severally liable to 
the dependent for any loss.2°2 However, art. 317(2) provide an exemption from liability; 
if it is established that an orderly and careful manager of an independent company would 
198 Assmann, Microcorporatist Structures, (n 197) 
199 Avgitidis, Group o/Companies. p. 234 (n 96) 
200 Avgitidis, Group o/Companies. p. 234 (n 96) 
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also have entered into a similar transaction or taken or omitted to take the same 
measure?03 Therefore, in order to establish liability under these provisions a plaintiff 
must prove not only that a controlling enterprise exercised a damaging influence over 
the management of the dependent corporation, but also the extent of any loss or injury 
incurred by the dependent corporation as a result of the detrimental influence and the 
absence of adequate compensation on the part of the controlling enterprise.204 
Consequently, as Hofstetter defmes, these provisions are a dead letter since successful 
actions for damages under them are apparently unknown?05 
Qualified de'facto group: Since the German Stock Corporations Act turned out to 
be ineffective in various 'aspects, most notably as regards the provisions for de Jacto 
concerns, in the area of parent liability, the German Federal Court has articulated special 
rules so-called 'qualified de Jacto concerns' which is a corporate group structure in 
which the parent, as a sole shareholder, applies a long-lasting and persistent control 
pattern over the relationships of its subsidiary. In a qualified de facto group, a private 
limited company is subject to continuous and comprehensive influence in management 
matters by the dominating enterprise which has an enduring disadvantageous influence 
on the dominated company's own interests. There has to be fact specific inquiry to prove 
controlling interest. 
Consequently, the qualified concern is a relatively efficient German corporate-
parent liability model because where the boundary between the parent and its subsidiary 
corporations becomes so intense as to make them inseparable to' outsiders, there is a 
fictional belief that subsidiary has no real mind to control itself. Thus, in case of damage 
to subsidiaries' creditors, the burden of proving that there is no damaging influence on 
the subsidiary by this dominant control shifts to the parent. 206 Thus, vicarious liability 
203 Assmann, Microcorporatist Structures, p. 348 (n 197) 
204 Assmann, Microcorporatist Structures, p. 349 (n 197) 
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applies where a hierarchical relationship has been established between the parent and the 
subsidiary. Consequently, this interpretation, in theory, suggests a sound belief of parent 
liability for the tort of the subsidiary.207 
In a specific case examination, in Autokran208, it was held that where a parent 
company was permanently and extensively involved in the management of a 
subsequently bankrupt subsidiary, in this situation a rebuttable presumption exists that 
. the parent did not show adequate consideration for the subsidiary. Hence, uruess the 
parent is able to defend itself successfully, it is directly liable to creditors for the 
subsidiary'S obligations.209 Similarly, in ITT- IO the German Federal Court decided that 
the parent corporation's control of a close corporation by its majority influence had a 
fiduciary duty to the close corporation.211 It is now generally thought that it follows from 
the relevant cases that such an undertaking holding shares in a dependent company has 
an enhanced duty of good faith in all its relationships with the company and its 
shareholders. The parent is forbidden from exercising any detrimental influence on that 
company, unless all its shareholders agree thereto.212 
The former decisions of the Supreme Court concerning such groups had placed 
emphasis on the controlling undertaking's lasting and comprehensive involvement in 
the management of the dependent company, and had made use of definite controversial 
presumptions in order to impose liability on the controlling company. However, the 
decision in Video213 caused a great deal of arguments in legal profession.214 In a series of 
207 Assmann, Microcorporatist Structures, (n 197) 
208 BGHZ 95, 330 
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cases leading to the Video case, which included Autokran, and Tiefbau215 the court 
detennined when the sole or majority shareholder of a private limited company was to 
be directly liable if the company failed to fulfil its own obligations and liabilities. 216 
In Video217 the Supreme Court held that a defendant who participated in a private 
limited company, which were video undertakings, and also carried on a business of his 
own, was to be regarded as an undertaking.218 The court went further than previous 
decisions holding an individual, even though not a corporate enterprise could be held 
personally liable for the losses of the subsidiary if he is both the sole managing director 
and majority shareholder of the subsidiary and he engages in business activities outside 
the subsidiary as sole owner.219 The court with this approach held that the controlling 
shareholder conducting his own business must be responsible for the losses of the 
controlled company if he could not otherwise prove that such losses had not arisen from 
actions he had taken for the benefit of his own business. The importance of the T'ideo 
cases lies under this; in making this judgment, the court had successfully transferred the 
traditional burden of proof away from the plaintiff to the defendant-controlling 
shareholder. 220 
In the TBB'22l decision, in 1993, the Supreme Court elucidating its earlier judgment 
held that the shareholder should not be liable simply because it could not invalidate the 
presumption of control, but rather the plaintiff creditor must establish justifications and 
prove that the shareholder's act had actually damaged the business of the dependent 
company. Where the plaintiff is not in a position to know certain matters, the 
shareholder must make the infonnation available, provided that he is in a position to 
know such information and the release of such information is reasonable. With this 
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decision, the Supreme Court in effect transferred the burden of proof back to the other 
side, so that the creditor must fIrst prove that the dependant company has suffered to its 
detriment rather than this being an automatic presumption, which must be rebutted by 
the shareholder.222 
As a result, whereas the previous decisions based the imposition of the liability on 
the controlling enterprise on the presumption of detriment to the dependent enterprise 
where there was comprehensive and lasting control over its affairs, the Supreme Court in 
TBB took a totally different view. The Supreme Court held that the basis of liability in 
the previous cases was not lasting and comprehensive control over the dependent 
company but a prejudice caused to its interests. Such prejudice could not, in the opinion 
of the court, be said to occur on a basis of presumption resulting from such a control. Its 
existence had to be based on additional factors?:!3 However because of the difficulties in 
articulating detrimental transactions and measures, the Supreme Court considered that a 
lesser burden of particularising and giving evidence of facts should be imposed on a 
creditor of a subsidiary who lacked insight into the affairs of the group. It was the 
defendant who according to the Court's opinion should bear the burden of giving fuller 
evidence for facts. 224 
In any event. the qualifIed de facto group concept constitutes, at least in theory, a 
signifIcant step towards a realistic approach to the issue of the imposition of liability on 
the controlling enterprise. In spite of the absence of integration and of control contract, 
liability may be imposed on a parent company merely upon evidence of a continuous 
and extensive interference with the subsidiary's management (according to the 
previous approach) or upon some evidence of prejudice of the subsidiary's interest 
(according to approach taken in TBB).225 However, changing the burden of proof in its 
latest decisions German Supreme Court (TBB case) made it very diffIcult to establish 
222 Marlow. Germany, (n 209) 
221 A\gitidis. Group o.(Companies. p. 244 (n 96) 
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liability over parent corporation for its excessive control on subsidiary company. In a 
highly complex and integrated modem corporate groups with horizontal structure it can 
become almost impossible for outsiders to trace and prove past violations of the 
subsidiary's interests by the parent, shifting the burden of proof to the parent company in 
a way similar to previous doctrine might, thus, be the only way to rebalance the 
situation?26 Therefore, the decision of TBB has had a negative effect on development 
process of the group liability in Germany. 
Although almost being 4 decades old, it is still claimed that German Law on 
corporate groups is the most advanced in the world and seen as an alternative to the 
traditional piercing the corporate veil law in the corporate group context.227 It has, more 
importantly, encouraged the evolution of an advanced German judge-made law outside 
the scope of the Stock Corporation Act.228 Thus, the qualified concern doctrine of the 
German Federal Court seems, at least in principle, well differentiated and promising.229 
However, it should not be misperceived that according to the German company 
law principles, public and private limited liability companies are independent legal 
entities. The shareholders (including company shareholders) have no personal liability 
for the commitments of the company. The shareholders of the company can be held 
personally liable if they have violated their fiduciary duties,23o because the original 
legislator of the Stock Corporations Act of 1965 did not want to implement a strict and 
direct liability of the parent company. This explains why instead of direct liability of the 
parent company in respect to the subsidiary's creditors, the legislator provided a flexible 
compensation obligation of the parent company in these particular cases. 
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As a result, the courts have until now only treated the problems of material under-
capitalisation in connection with the abuse of position. Therefore. it is neither required 
. by law nor necessary in itself to interpret the shareholders' liability against the will of 
the legislators.231 The legal consequences of the qualified factual group are supposed to 
be similar to the contractual group of companies: in this case the parent company is 
likewise obliged to cover the annual losses. Here, again, there is no direct liability of the 
parent company for the debts of its subsidiaries but an indirect liability for its losses.232 
Therefore, under German law, the liability of parent company for the debts of its 
subsidiaries clearly remains an exception. Even for wholly owned subsidiaries such a 
liability normally does not exist; instead indirect forms of protection of the interests of 
the subsidiary and its creditors have been introduced. 
There has also been a considerable amount of controversy about the exact nature 
of the liability in the qualified de facto group. Lutter argues that this is based upon 
conduct, namely the breach of the rules governing the proper management of a 
group.233 Hommelhoff234 challenges that it is based upon results, i.e. the use of 
management powers in the dependent company such that its interests are subordinated to 
those of the controlling undertaking. 235 It can be claimed in the comparative view that 
the German qualified de facto group liability is a German interpretation of veil piercing 
law since it finds the basics in existence of the close and extensive control exercised by 
the parent over its subsidiaries. Whenever liability is imposed on the parent, this is done 
mainly on the ground of the parent's managerial control over the subsidiary. Thus, the 
issue dealt with in German Stock Corporation Act is not the problem of liability but it is 
problem of compensation. 
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Therefore, notwithstanding the difference in approach, there are many similarities 
in language and result between the special German laws governing groups of companies 
and the rules for such groups under the piercing the corporate veil doctrine. 236 In the 
German law of company groups, the typical problems of unlimited liability are solved 
by 'piercing the corporate veil in an order~v manner'. 237 Granting creditors a guarantee 
as to the liability of the parent company for all liabilities incur before the termination of 
control or that of a profits transfer agreement.238 In de facto concerns or qualified de 
facto concerns and after the case of TBB, the corporate groups can always avoid liability 
by proving their control on the company was not reason for the loss or they have no 
control in first place. 
In case of MNEs, all the subsidiaries have independence and the ability to make 
important decisions under the common group policy, but Gennan groups of companies' 
law just depends on the dependence of the subsidiary to its parent which will be 
applicable to only small sized companies or better private limited companies rather than 
huge public limited companies. In a horizontally organised MNEs group, many legally 
independent companies come under networked management. The German Law does not 
contain any special provisions governing such groupS.239 In such groups there is no 
apparent control over any subsidiary but there is a common group policy, cultural 
control and extensive communication so their source of decision-making cannot be 
traced, which gives subsidiaries the tools to claim to be independent in many cases.240 
The qualified de facto concern is insufficient from this perspective because it considers 
only simplified vertically structured corporate groups. 
As in qualified de facto group the liability arises because of private limited 
company's activities. Moreover, pursuant to Gennan private international law, German 
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Stock Corporation Law is applicable if the controlled company is located in Germany, 
whether or not the controlling company is located abroad, but is not applicable if only 
the controlling but not the controlled company is located in Germany.241 
Groups of Companies in Arbitration 
In international arbitration cases, there is a question with which both arbitrators and the 
courts are frequently confronted as to whether an arbitration agreement signed by a 
member of a group of companies can be extended to include another company of the 
same group, which has not signed the agreement. 242 The question has been responded to 
in different ways; in most cases arbitrators applied the doctrine of separate legal 
personality and limited liability. In a situation where justice requires further liability, 
they have searched solutions on the basic principles of the existing law, which depends 
on the veil piercing doctrine, agency arguments or estoppels. 
In some cases the arbitration tribunals created a new doctrine called 'group of 
companies' doctrine. The group of companies' doctrine provides extending the 
jurisdictional scope of an arbitration clause to the non-signatory parent company or other 
companies in the groUp.243 Consequently, the doctrine can in some circumstances 
exposes one side that have a valid arbitration agreement with one member of a groups of 
companies to an award against them in favour of other companies in the same group. 244 
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The basics justifications for the 'groups of companies' theory are the single 
economic unit argument and the development process of the relationship between 
parties. First, under the doctrine, if a group of companies constitute the same economic 
reality, one company in the group can bind the other members to an agreement. Second, 
if the result confonned to the mutual intentions of all the parties and reflected the good 
usage of international commerc"e, extension of the award is justifiable on the basis of the 
parties' express or implied intention. The group of companies' doctrine provides that an 
arbitration agreement signed by one company in a group of companies entitles or 
obligates affiliated non-signatory companies; if the circumstances surrounding 
negotiation, execution and termination of the agreement show that the mutual intention 
of all the parties was to bind the non-signatories. 
Arbitrators acting under the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
demonstrate a strong tendency to recognise that an arbitration agreement signed by a 
company belonging to a group of companies obligates and entitles the other member 
companies of such group if that agreement fulfils certain minimum requirements.245 The 
tendency is strongest among the supporters of lex mercatoria. Following the Dow 
Chemical decision and ICC case numbers 2375246 and 5103247, the tribunal recognised 
that since group of companies constitute the same economic reality, one company in the 
group can bind the other members to an agreement if such a result confonns to the 
mutual intentions of all the parties and reflects the good usage of international 
commerce. 
These rulings of the ICC have found strong support from French jurisprudence so 
the group of companies' theory has had its consequences on the rulings of French courts, 
which seems persuaded to follow the new theory as evidenced by a judgement of the 
245 Sandrock Otto, 'Arbitration Agreements and Group of Companies' (1993) 27 International Lawyer 941 
246 ICC award 2375 1985 Rev. Arb. 583, 1976 Journal du Droit international 978. See Hanotiau B, 
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Dow Chemical v Isover Saint Gobain248 under which the group of companies' doctrine 
originated.249 Two Dow Chemical companies entered into contracts with the respondent, 
a French company, for the distribution of thermal isolation equipment. The agreements 
contained ICC arbitration clauses and provided that deliveries could be made to the 
distributor by any Dow company. Two other Dow Chemical companies afterwards faced 
litigation over one of the. products and sought to .pass their liability on to the distributor 
by way of ICC arbitration. The French distributor argued that the tribunal's jurisdiction 
only allowed it to deliver awards in favour of the two Dow Chemical companies with 
which it had a direct contract. The tribunal then held that the group of companies 
represented by Dow Chemicals constituted one and the same economic reality and 
assumed jurisdiction over the companies that had not been named as parties to the 
contract.2SO Therefore, the arbitrators held that the arbitration clause signed by two of the 
companies was also intended by the parties to be available to other companies in the 
group, commenting that: 2S1"Irrespective of the distinct juridical identity of each of its 
members, a group of companies constitutes one and the same economic reality of which 
the arbitral tribunal should take account when it rules on its own jurisdiction subject to 
Article 13 (1955 version) or Article 8 (1975 version) of the ICC Rules".2s2 
Since Dow Chemical, the group of companies' doctrine has been followed in a 
number of ICC Tribunal decisions, such as ICC Case No.51 03 and the KlS France SA v 
SA Societe Generale253 decision of French Appeal Court settled the application of the 
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theory in France and others followed the same route.254 The French courts have 
generally proved to be in favour of extending the arbitration clause to groups of 
companies where that extension is justifiable on the basis of the parties' express or 
implied intention.255 KIS France had entered into a basic agreement with Societe 
Generale for the sale of miniature photographic laboratories in certain countries. The 
basic agreement was signed by both parties on their own behalf and on behalf of their 
subsidiaries. Pursuant to that contract, the subsidiaries themselves dealt with the 
contractor and its subsidiaries in specific contracts referring to the framework contract. 
The basic agreement contained an ICC arbitration clause, which was referred in the 
contracts that subsidiaries signed. A dispute arose concerning unpaid lease fees, and 
Societe Generale and two of its subsidiaries commenced arbitral proceeding against two 
of the subsidiaries in the KIS group. The arbitrators made an interim award ruling that 
the claims against the KIS subsidiaries were admissible. The arbitral tribunal held that 
the co-contractors and their subsidiaries could commence arbitration proceedings based 
on the framework contract against both the parent company and its subsidiaries.256 On a 
challenge by KIS France, the Appeal Court held that 'the notion of group of companies' 
is recognised under French law and, therefore, the arbitrators did not violate the parties' 
choice of French law by taking it into account. 257 
A similar approach to KIS adopted by the tribunal subsequently rejected by the 
English courts in Caparo Group Ltd v Fagor An-astate Sociedad Cooperative,258 even 
though the principles of 'group of companies' doctrine were assured to be specific to the 
facts of that case. The Spanish company, Fagor and an Indian company known as CML 
had entered into a signed contract for the sale and purchase of printing presses. In a 
dispute over non-payment, Fagor sought to hold Caparo, which was a 60 per cent 
shareholder in CML, liable for the alleged default. Clarke J. held that: "Under English 
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law, I can see no basis upon which it could be held that the parties to either the contract 
or the arbitration agreement were other than F agor on the one hand and CHL on the 
other. In my judgment, there is no room for a conclusion that Caparo was a party to 
either the contract or the arbitration agreement. ,. 
The position was clarified when Langley J. in the Commercial Court in London, 
granted the application of Peterson Farms, Inc, an Arkansas company, to set aside parts 
of an award which had been issued to C&M Farming Limited, an Indian company, in 
reliance on the group of companies' doctrine. Langley J. held that these parts of the 
award were made without jurisdiction?59 Under a sales right agreement, Peterson had 
sold male "grandparent' chickens to C&M, which mated them to obtain parents, which 
could be sold on to third parties, including other entities in the same group as C &M. 
These third parties then mated the parent birds to produce chicks or hatching eggs to 
produce broilers for the consumer market. The birds supplied by Peterson were found to 
carry a virus, which reduced the birds' capacity to produce healthy chicks. 
The sales right agreement was subject to Arkansas law and contained a provision 
for disputes to be resolved by ICC arbitration in London. A dispute arose as to whether 
the ICC Tribunal had power to award damages in respect of losses suffered by other 
entities in the same group as well as by C&M. The tribunal held, based on the doctrine 
of separability of the arbitration agreement, that unlike the main body of the sales right 
agreement, the arbitration provision was not subject to Arkansas law. The tribunal held 
that the scope of the arbitration agreement is determined autonomously, in accordance 
with principles of international law and arbitral practice rather than application of 
national law. Thus, the tribunal took the view that this entitled it to apply the ICC 
precedent, including the group of companies' doctrine. 
Based on current correspondence, the tribunal in Peterson formed the view that 
Peterson had intended throughout to deal with the C&M group as a whole and had 
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contracted with one member of the group purely as a matter of convenience. the group 
not being a legal entity. Accordingly, C&M obtained an award of some USS6.7 million. 
of which some US$5.5 million related to losses suffered by other C&M group entities. 
which were not named as parties to the Sales Right Agreement. Moreover, some of 
them, at the time the sales right agreement was entered into, were partnerships rather 
than companies. 
Peterson brought a challenge in the Commercial Court in London under s.67 of the 
Arbitration Act 1996, arguing that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to award damages to 
entities which were not parties to the arbitration agreement. Langley J. found that the 
arbitration provision was subject to the same express choice of law clause as the rest of 
the sales right agreement. Therefore, the tribunal's decision was 'seriously flawed' and 
there was no basis for the tribunal to apply any law other than that chosen by the parties. 
i.e. Arkansas law. It was agreed between the parties for the purposes of the s.67 
challenge that Arkansas law was the same as English law in consideration of the 'group 
of companies' doctrine, and Langley J. ruled that "English law treats the issue as one 
subject to the chosen proper laytl of the Agreement and that excludes the doctrine which 
forms no part of English law". Accordingly, the view of the English court is that an ICC 
arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction to apply the 'group of companies' doctrine. 
However, the decision might have been different had Arkansas law recognised the group 
of companies doctrine.26o Under US law. the ultimate question of whether a party has 
agreed to arbitrate a dispute is to be decided by the federal courts, not by the arbitral 
tribunal. 261 Thus, the basis for binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements under a 
theory of implied consent derives from the US common law principles pertaining to 
related parties veil piercing, alter ago, agency. assumption and estoppels and related 
"'16"" 
agreements.- -
260 Wool house. Group Of Companies (n 250) 
261 Lamm and Aqua. Defining the Party. (n 243) 
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In consideration of the French Appeal Court's approach in the KIS case, it seems 
that Peterson might have been differently decided under French law. The KIS case 
differed from the Peterson case in that KIS was challenging an award against 
respondents who were not directly parties to the arbitration agreement, whereas Peterson 
was challenging an award in favour of claimants who were not parties. However. the 
judgment of the French Court is expressed in very general terms, and it appears to 
provide no immediately obvious reason why the French Court would not apply the 
'group of companies' doctrine in a case that was closer to the facts of the English 
decision. 
Commentators differ as to whether the' group of companies' doctrine in arbitration 
practice is distinct from the existing principles allowing the corporate veil to be pierced. 
Gaillard and Savage, for instance, consider both together, 263 whereas Born and Honatiau 
distinguish the group of companies' doctrine from alter ego claims in which a company 
or individual is deliberately contracting in such a way as to evade legitimate 
responsibilities.264 The alter ago doctrine characteristically requires an element of fraud 
to be established but the groups of companies' doctrine can be applied without fraud. 
It has been claimed that if a tribunal is justified in allowing entities that were not 
party to an arbitration agreement to become parties to the arbitration, there are 
alternative instruments that could be used. For instance, it may be possible to argue in 
appropriate cases that the respondent is estopped by its conduct from denying that the 
additional entities were parties to the arbitration agreement, or that there has been fraud, 
which justifies piercing the corporate veil. Consequently, a general' group of companies' 
doctrine is unnecessary.265 The rule created by lex mercatoria has little legal certainty 
and its definite forms are vague and open to discussion.266 Indeed, in the French case of 
~63 Gaillard and Savage J. Fouchard Gaillard Goldman. (n 242) 
~t>4 Born, Intcmational Commercial p. 653-700 (n 248) and Hanotiau. Problems Raised by Complex.. (n 
246) 
165 Leadley and Williams, Peterson Farms. (n 244) and. Sandrock. Arbitration Agreements. (n 245) 
161> Sandrock, Arbitration Agreements. (n 245) 
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Orri v Societe des Lubrifiants Elf Aquitaine 267 the Paris Appeal Court relied on both 
principles, although the Cour de Cassation subsequently upheld the decision based on 
the alter ego ground, while not considering the 'group of companies' argument on the 
facts. 
The examination of the cases indicates that the 'group of companies' doctrine 
originates from the similar principles that the veil piercing doctrine originated. The 
doctrine was created because justice required it. Thus. most of the commentators as well 
as English courts see the doctrine as unnecessary since there is already a valid doctrine 
that provides enough protection under the principles of alter ago or fraud or some 
principles of estoppels. Moreover, it is not so much the existence of a group that results 
in the various companies of the group being bound by the agreement signed by only one 
of them, but the true intention of the parties was considered important. Thus, the . group 
of companies' doctrine originated from the assumption that the involvement of other 
companies in the group in the negotiation or perfonnance of the contract implicitly 
proves their agreement to be bound by the clause.268 Thus, the theory has been shadowed 
most of the time by the phrase of 'intended by the parties'. Indeed, in the French cases 
the legitimacy for the application of the theory is established under the principles of 
justice. The tenn single economic unit was attached the extra requirements that the 
parties to behaviour must have supported the application of the theory. Thus, evidence of 
the managerial facts in each particular case is important. It makes the result of the cases 
unpredictable and more importantly successful awards will be only rare. 
The argument carried out in this thesis, is that the group of companies must be 
liable in a way that reflects their ownership and managerial structure in a modern 
organisational structure. The group of companies' doctrine in arbitration cases has 
indicated some important points with reference to the single economic enterprise theory. 
However, requiring extra facts for each case reduces its reliability. Moreover. under the 
horizontal structure of MNEs. the link between companies is not apparently seen in 
~67 (1992) Re\,. Arb. 90. 
~6~ Gaillard and Sa\'age J. Fouchard Gaillard Goldman. (n 242) 
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every particular case.269 Modem organisations have complex networked structures and it 
is almost impossible to trace every transaction or operation. Thus, if one searches for 
extra facts to prove real intention, he will fail to prove clear veil links between member 
companies under the group. Thus, the group liability introduced by arbitrators has some 
shortages to be considered as efficient models of imposing liability on corporate groups 
and it can be claimed that groups of companies doctrine in arbitration is just 
innovative just between the borders of limited liability. 
Moreover, the 'group of companies' doctrine can be applied just only 10 
commercial matters since arbitrational litigation needs the consent of the parties 10 
advance. But this new perspective is important for the thesis in theory since arbitration 
agreements require mutual agreements of both sides to solve the dispute in arbitration 
tribunals and can only be drafted in advance before the conflict. In terms of tort claims it 
seems very unlikely to take the conflicts to the arbitral hearing. 
Finally, although the case law of common law countries denies the 'group of 
companies' doctrine, the eagerness of arbitrators to create the 'group of companies' 
doctrine seem to be enduring. Legal consultants to MNEs will be forced next time to 
sign agreements that are binding all the companies under the group since the 
arbitrational organisations are more aware of the current economical and organisational 
structure of the MNEs. Therefore, the international law creating role of international 
arbitration organisations may bring to MNEs liability a new perspective. 
cc,q Detailed discussion is made at chapter 2. 
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The Comprehensive Environmental Responsibility and Compensation Act 
(CERCLA)270 
In 1980, the United States Congress enacted the CERCLA to ensure that every party that 
was potentially responsible for environmental torts would be held responsible for the 
resulting harm. There are four classes of potentially responsible parties for 
environmental torts under CERCLA section 107: 1- the current owners and operators of 
a facility; 2- persons who formerly owned or operated the facility at the time of disposal 
or treatment of hazardous substance; 3- persons who arranged for the disposal or 
treatment of hazardous substance; and 4- transporters of hazardous waste.271 
Accordingly, CERCLA liability may attach to a corporate owner in two ways: (i) direct 
liability under the operator language of CERCLA's section 107(a), and (ii) indirect 
liability as owner through common law veil piercing.272 
For the purpose of the study. the liability of owner or operator's liability is 
examined here. The owner or operator of a facility is defined as any person owning or 
operating such facility, excluding a person who, without participating in the 
management of a facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security 
interest in the facility. Thus, CERCLA failed to express any apparent intention to hold 
parent corporations or other shareholders individually liable for corporate activities 
because CERCLA' s definitions of person, owner or operators include corporations and 
other business entities as well as individuals, but no specific reference is made to parent 
corporations or shareholder liability. Hence, there is a dispute about whether owners or 
operators can be interpreted to include parent companies. 
CERCLA 's present definition of operator liability has left the courts with no 
inspiration. In their pursuit for balancing the contradictory liability principles, court 
~70 Another US statute, ATCA, is discussed in the chapter 3. 
~71 Bakst. Piercing the Corporate Veil. (n 53) 
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approached this issue by adopting one of three basic approaches; 1- the most extensive 
imposition of liability under the 'authority to control' or 'capacity to control' 
principles; 2- the 'actual control' test and 3- derivative-only liability, which declines 
. to hold parent corporations directly liable as operators under any conditions, other than 
when circumstances are adequate to pierce the corporate veil. 273 
First, in State of Idaho v. Bunker Hill C0274, a federal district court developed the 
capacity to control standard, the broadest reaching theory of parent corporation liability 
under CERCLA. In the case the court concluded that the parent and its subsidiary were 
'so intertwined' and that the parent 'so controlled the management and operations' of the 
subsidiary that the parent constituted an 'owner or operator' for purposes of CERCLA. 
Parent corporations are supposed to be liable because the CERCLA language points to 
them as owner and operator. The Bunker Hill court relied on United States v. 
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical CO?75 The court adopted the view that the 
remedial goal of CERCLA required a more expansive view of liability. Therefore, 
parents have the capacity, if not the totally reserved authority, to make decisions and 
implement actions and mechanisms to prevent the damage.276 However, despite the 
numerous federal district courts recognising the capacity to control test as the requisite 
level of involvement, no federal appellate court has recognised this test in the context of 
parent-subsidiary liability.277 They affirm their argument in the belief that this approach 
seemed to be fully in contradiction to the traditional common law concept of limited 
liability for owners of corporation, because parents could be liable for simply owning a 
272 Alexander DE and Sawez S, 'Toward a Uniform Parent Corporation Liability Standard under 
CERCLA' (1998-1999) 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1235 
273 Alexander and Sawez, Toward a Uniform, (n 272) and Hofstetter, The Ecological Liability, (n 77) and 
Stone, Parent Corporate Liability (n 206) and Silecchia Lucia Ann, 'Pinning the Blame & Piercing the 
Veil in the Mists of Metaphor: The Supreme Court's New Standards for the CERCLA Liability of Parent 
Companies and a Proposal for Legislative Reform' (1998-1999) 67 Fordham L. Rev. 115 
274 (D. Idaho 1987) 662 F. Supp. 725 other cases: Nurad, Inc v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co. 966 F2d 
837 (4th Cir. 1992) 
275 579 F. Supp. 823 
276 Hofstetter, The Ecological Liability, (n 77) and Farmer, Parent Corporatio~ (n 42) 
277 AJexander and Sawez, Toward a Uniform, (0 272) and Farmer, Parent Corporation, (n 42) 
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subsidiary, and not for any actions directly taken by the parent with regard to the 
contamination.278 
The second approach, actual control, was created by the District Court of Rhode 
Island in United States 1'. Kayser-Roth COrp.279 The court stated that a parent corporation 
cannot, as a rule, be believed to be an operator solely on the basis of its status as a 
shareholder?80 The court considered the appropriate standard to apply and determined 
that the Bunker Hill court's capacity to control test was too broad. Accordingly. the 
court's ruling was two-sided: it first relied on the basic principle that under federal law. 
a corporate entity may be disregarded in the interest of public convenience. fairness and 
equity. Secondly. direct liability holds the corporate parent liable if it acted as an 
operator of the site and the parent corporation must have had persistent control over the 
management of its subsidiary in order to incur direct liability. Kayser-Roth was found to 
merit such liability. Under the case, liability was not imposed on the parent corporation 
because of its capacity to control but the courts searched for persistent control over the 
b 'd' 281 su Sl 1ary. 
Thirdly, the Fifth Circuit adopted the traditional alter ago (veil piercing) liability 
principle for determining the liability of a parent corporation under CERCLA in Joslyn 
Manufacturing Co. 1'. T.L. James & Co. 282 The Fifth Circuit refused to apply the 
expansive reading to CERCLA's liability provisions. The CERCLA does not define 
'owners' or . operators , as including the parent company. The court found that the lack 
of explicit statutory language addressing the issue of parent corporate liability meant that 
federal courts lacked the authority to impose liability without piercing the corporate 
:1~ De Monte Jessica, 'Impact of United States v. Bestfoods on Parent Liability under CERCLA: When A 
Door Is Closed. Look for an Open Window' (2000) 61 Ohio St. L.1. 443 
:1Q 910 F. 2d. ~~ (1 st. Cir. 1990) other cases; Jacksonville Electric AuthoriTY \'. Bernuth Corp. 996 F.2d 
1107. Lansford-Coaldale Joint Jrater Authority \'. TonoW Corp. 996 F.2d. 1107 ( 11 th Cir. 1993) 
~80 Hofstetter. The Ecological Liability. (n 77) 
~81 Fanner. Parent Corporation. (n ~2) 
:8~ 893 F. 2d. 80 (5th cir. 90). Also see United States v. Cordova Chemical Co. 113 F.3d 57'1 (bth Cir. 1997) 
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vei1.283 Nor does the legislative history indicate that Congress intended to alter a basic 
principle of corporation law so significantly. The Joslyn court maintained that Congress 
is quite capable of creating statutes that hold shareholders or controlling entities liable 
for the acts of corporations?84 However, in Jos(vn the court was asked to rewrite the 
language of the Act significantly and hold parents directly liable for their subsidiaries' 
activities. To do so would dramatically modify traditional concepts of corporation law. 
The court then returned to the traditional, common law corporate veil piercing test. and 
agreed with the district court's [mdings that the parent's relationship with its subsidiary 
did not permit imposing liability on the parent. The subsidiary authentically adhered to 
basic corporate formalities by keeping its own books and records and holding frequent 
shareholder and directors meetings. The daily operations of the subsidiary and the parent 
were separate. The Supreme Court approved a review of Joslyn Manufacturing in United 
States v. Cordova Chemical Co285 that rejected all theories for parent corporation 
liability except for indirect owner liability under state veil piercing law. 
After these complicated court rulings there was a need for a definitive Supreme 
Court statement on parent corporation liability under CERCLA. United States 1'. 
Bestjooodi86 provided that statement.287 This decision reinterpreted the Circuits' stiff 
reading of parental liability and held that while a parent could still be liable under the 
restrictive veil piercing theory employed by the Sixth Circuit. a parent could now also be 
liable under a direct operator standard if it acted as the operator of a facility owned or 
operated by its subsidiary. This also diverged from lower court rulings that had 
previously considered direct liability by looking at the parent's legal relationship to the 
subsidiary rather than to the facility.288 
28~ Prebble Amanda L 'Corporate Law Confines to Parent Liability under CERCLA: United States \'. 
Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998)' (1998-1999) 67 U. Cin. L. Re\,. 1357 
284 Rolle Mary Elliott, 'United States Y. Bestfoods: Clarifying Parent Corporation Liability under 
CERCLA' (1999) 6 Wis. Envtl. L.J. 145 
185 Michigan, 113 F.3d 572,580 (CA6. 1997)). 
1St> 524 US 51 (1998) 
1K~ Rolle. United States Y. Bestfoods (n 284) 
1RR Silecchia, Pinning the Blame. (n 273) 
The key question in Best/ooods was whether a sole investor, a parent corporation 
that exercised control over a subsidiary. was safe from liability for damage invoh'ing the 
cleanup of industrial waste when the damage was done by its non-operational 
subsidiary.289 The specific issue before the Court was whether a parent corporation that 
actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of a subsidiary may. 
without more, be held liable as an operator of a polluting facility owned or operated by 
the subsidiary. The court said no; instead concluding that a corporate parent that actively 
participated in and exercised control over the operations of the facility itself may be held 
directly liable in its own right as an operator of the facility.290 The Supreme Court 
rejected the position that the parent is directly liable as an operator because it actively 
participated in and exerted significant control over the subsidiary's business and 
decision-making. The court said first that it is a general principle of corporate law deeply 
embedded in our economic and legal systems that a parent corporation is not liable for 
the acts of its subsidiary; second, that the corporate veil may be pierced and the 
shareholders held liable for the corporation's conduct when the corporate form would 
otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on 
the shareholder's behalf.291 The court's new. middle ground of liability required a parent 
corporation to actively participate in and exercise control over the subsidiary's business 
during a period of disposal of hazardous waste.292 Instead, according to the court, the 
question addressed by the district court should have been about the parent's interaction 
with the facility of the subsidiary. The question is not whether the parent operates the 
subsidiary, but rather whether it operates the facility, and that operation is evidenced by 
participation in the activities of the facility, not the subsidiary.293 As a result, the key to 
direct liability. according to the Court, is that the parent must exercise actual control 
~8Q Gelb Harvey, 'CERCLA versus Corporate Limited Liability' (1999-2000) 48 U. Kan. L. Rev. III 
290 Gelb, CERCLA. (n 289) 
2QJ Gelb, CERCLA. (n 289) 
~Q~ Sutphin Robert J Jr.. 'Environmental Law - Owners or Operators: Two Distinct Paths to Parent 
Corporation Liability under CERCLA - United States \. Bestfoods' (2000) 30 N.M. L. Re\,. 109 
~QJ Gelb, CERCLA. (n 289) 
over the facility (without regard for the parenfs control of subsidiary).294 If any such act 
of operating a corporate subsidiary's facility is done on behalf of a parent corporation. 
the existence of the parent-subsidiary relationship under the state corporate law is simply 
irrelevant to the issue of direct liability.295 Thus, parent corporations can avoid liabilitv 
by either not participating in the subsidiary's hazardous waste operations. or doing so 
with cautious oversight.296 If their interaction with their subsidiaries is not unusuaL there 
is no need to find them liable as owners.297 
The Bestfoods decision abolished the capacity to control test and narrowed the 
actual participation and control test. The decision also preserved indirect liability as a 
separate means of imposing liability. However, while Besffoods did establish that parent 
corporations could be held directly liable as operators under CERCLA. the 
determination of which factual scenarios will justify such liability appears to have been 
left for the lower courts to decide.298 
As these cases demonstrate, the liability of a parent corporation has stayed 
untouched despite the consequences of whether liability is based on traditional corporate 
law or direct statutory liability under the CERCLA. Liability does not occur merely by 
virtue of their ownership of stock, but rather by direct control over the subsidiary or the 
facility and for the wrongdoings.299 In cases in which parent corporations might be held 
liable under CERCLA, the parents must be in a situation of exercising control over the 
activities leading to the CERCLA violations. The courts simply hold parties liable that 
might be held liable under traditional corporate law doctrine.30o Analysis of the case law 
2Q4 De Monte. Impact of United States Y. Bestfoods. (n :!78) 
295 Rolle. United States v. Bestfoods (n :!84) 
296 Yeo Eric L. 'United States \" Bestfoods: Narrowing Parent Corporation Liability under CERCLA for 
the Twenty-First Century' (1999) 51 Admin. L. Re\', 1267 
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29Q Dent George W. 'Limited Liability In Environmental Law' (1991) 26 Wake Forest L. Re\,. 151 
300 Oswald L)l1da J and Schipani Cindy A. 'Cercla And The 'Erosion' Of Traditional Corporate Law 
Doctrine' (1992). 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 259 
simply does not support a conclusion that the courts are eroding traditional corporate 
liability rules regarding parent corporations in the CERCLA context. 
One of the important reason of failure of the CERCLA as an efficient example of 
corporate groups liability in tort is its misunderstanding of groups' structure hy 
considering them as simple vertically structured organizations rather than horizontally 
structured organisations. In the original text of the Act, there is no mention of parent 
liability but was owners and controllers' liability is the source of liability. Accordingly, 
the courts have to search for owner and controller in subsidiaries' environmental 
damage. This leads courts to look for a particular structure under which a parent applies 
excessive control over its subsidiaries, which is similar to vertical structure discussed 
earlier. Thus, a regulation just based on characteristics of vertical organizations fails to 
create an extensive liability regime and thus is inefficient. The same happened in 
CERCLA cases. Even though liability claims for corporate groups are brought under 
CERCLA's provisions, they have failed to offer any better solution than traditional veil 
piercing doctrine offer. 
In conclusion, CERCLA' s provisions are sophisticated, thus, they contain many 
drafting gaps, which might be claimed that the Congress intended the federal courts to 
fill through federal common law.301 The CERCLA may have developed better 
conditions for piercing the corporate veil since it particularly agrees the issue of 
operator's role on the subsidiary. However, it has failed to do so after the courts 
traditional interpretation of the rules and their failure to adopt modem interpretation of 
corporate groups' operational structure. 
)01 Farmer. Parent Corporation, (n 42) 
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Turkish Law 
According to the articles 50311 and 269 '2 of Turkish Commercial Code, shareholders of 
the private limited company and public limited company have limited liability. And 
article 53211 of Turkish Commercial Code defines the limit of the liability of the 
shareholders as the capital promised to be paid into the company. Shareholders can save 
themselves from further liability by paying this amount if the company's assets are not 
enough to cover all the debts. 
In Turkish law, there are two kinds of companies under which shareholders are 
unlimitedly liable. In Kollektif Company. every shareholder is unlimitedly liable 
disregarding the proportion of capital they promised to pay. In Komandit Company, 
there are two kinds of shareholders: one is unlimitedly liable similar to Kollektif 
company shareholders and the other is liable just for the capital he promised to pay. 
However. these two kinds of company structure have no importance in commercial 
practice. Turkish law has two most common company law forms: limited sirket (private 
limited company) and anonim sirket (public limited company). Both of them recognise 
companies as distinct legal personalities and grant limited liability to shareholders of 
companies. Accordingly, the problems that limited liability companies created have 
occurred under the Turkish system as well. 
When there is a claim for misuse of the company structure. there are not many 
options for the courts except for the general principles of Turkish Commercial and Civil 
Codes. In cases of breach of good faith rules, article 2( 1) of the Turkish Civil Code 
states that "ew'!)' person is bound to exercise his rights and fu~fil his obligations 
according to the principles of good faith". Accordingly. courts might remove the 
corporate veil and decide according to the facts of the particular case. In this case judges 
will look at on which conditions separate corporate personality and limited liability are 
used in breach of good faith. Article 2(2) of Civil Code states that "the law docs not 
sanClion the evident abuse of person's rights". This regulation might also be used by the 
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courts to Ignore the corporate veil ill cases where the corporate structure has been 
misused. 
Overall, these broad discretion rights have not been used in favour of deyeloping a 
doctrine similar to piercing the corporate veil. In cases, which are too disorganised to 
classify, the reasoning to remove the corporate veil was very similar to the common law 
doctrine of alter ago. In the case of corporate groups, a similar doctrine to the fraud 
principle has been developed by court to remove the corporate veil. In the cases that 
shareholders are liable there must be connection between the act of misuse and debts. 
The claimants have to prove that the debts occurred because of the misuse of corporate 
form. 
However, there is a recent law, The Law Regarding with the Procedure of 
Collection of the Money Owed to the State, (Amme Alacaklarinin Tahsili Usulu 
Hakkinda Kanun, AA TUHK) which introduces an exception to limited liability rule. 
The main exception to the limited liability of the shareholders is situated in article 35 
(introduced in 1998) of the Law with the phrase "the shareholders of private limited 
company are liable in accordance in proportion to their capital shares for the debt owed 
to the state". The objective of the law is to prevent misuse of company structures to 
avoid liabilities. 
There are two conditions for the debts: first, it must be owed to the state, or local 
authorities; and, it must have originated from the performance of public services. The 
most important sources of debts are taxes, duties, fines and other fees. The second 
condition is that collecting the money from the company must be impossible. Thus, the 
liability of shareholders is secondary because the shareholders are liable if the 
company's founds are not enough to pay the debts.302 Thus, the state will try every 
possible legal avenue to collect money from the company and if they cannot recover the 
debts they will go to shareholders in proportion to their shares in the company. 
~o~ Eyihilir Ihsan. 'Limited Sirket Ortaklarinin Sorumlulugu' (1995) 3:! Yak Der 93 
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According to the decisions of the Turkish Council of State, the last owner of the 
shares must pay the debts. The liability is founded on becoming shareholders of the 
company. Thus. taking legal action against the owner of shareholders at the time that the 
dept has occurred is wrong.303 The idea behind this is that if you transfer your shares. 
you transfer it with the rights and liabilities. 
The importance of the law comes from the fact that the law is a \'ery fundamental 
exception to the company law and limited liability principles. It removes liability 
barriers for all shareholders by not requiring any other conditions such as alter ago or 
misuse of corporate forms. Therefore, the application of the law has not brought much 
confusion in Turkey since it clearly indicated liability on shareholders and more 
importantly it neither reduced the number of private limited companies nor deterred 
people from establishing new companies. However, it only removes the corporate veil in 
private limited companies. Public limited companies still have their limited liability 
untouched. Consequently it cannot be claimed this law has changed liability structure of 
corporate groups in terms of Turkish Law. 
The most important characteristic of this law is that it has proved that limited 
liability rules could be abolished for some particular debts of the company. In normal 
conditions, in any ordinary company, money owed to the state is bigger than debts owed 
to the involuntarily creditors. And the liability to the state will occur for sure since 
companies have to pay taxes and other fees. If such an important and broad liability can 
be transferred to shareholders, liability for involuntarily creditors can defmitely be 
achievable. This law has also proved that more liability will not destroy the Turkish 
company structure or Turkish economy. The number of new companies established in 
Turkey increased fundamentally in recent years even though the application of this law 
has been settled. 304 
303 Turkish Council of State (Danistay) &. D. 2112, 1999E. 1997/847 K. 1999/ 4008 
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The latest attempt to regulate corporate groups has taken place in Turkey. Since 
2001. a commission which consists of scholars and practitioners had been preparing 
Draft Commercial Law Reform Bill, 2005305 . which includes company law 
regulations. The commission conducted very detailed comparative work for company 
law in order to achieve the aim of the new commercial code. which is to create the most 
up to date commercial code in Europe. In terms of company law provisions, they have 
been inspired by European, English, German, French and Swiss laws. Moreover. the 
Draft Bill has generated many unique proposals some of which are very innovatory in 
the world of commercial regulations. 
In tenus of corporate groups, the Draft Bill provides a section, which is not 
lengthy, consisting of 20 articles and it aims to create a very broad regulatory system for 
groups of companies. The Bill mentions the German Stock Corporation Act, 
developments in French Labour Law, Italian Bankruptcy Law, British Take-Over laws, 
and 7th and 9th EU Company Law Directives as examples of the developments in groups 
of companies laws in comparative perspective. In explaining the regulation. the Proposal 
analyses that groups of companies are in the centre of economic activities both at 
domestic and intemationallevel. Thus, the Draft Bill is aiming, by regulating groups of 
companies, to balance the realities of economic life and the rule of law. 
In order to create a new and modem group of companies' regime, the commission 
adopted some articles from the German Stock Corporation Act 17-21 related to groups 
of companies.306 Some proposed articles relating to subsidiary companies have been 
inspired from articles 291-337 of the German Stock Corporation Act. Moreover, the 
commission has taken into account the suggestions of Forum Europeaum in creating the 
organisation of the sections on groups of companies. However. the organisation of the 
Proposed Bill, especially those related to liability are unique to the Draft Bill. 
,(l~ Turkish Commercial Code Reform, and Draft Commercial Law Reform Bill. 2005 at 
http: \\'ww2.tbmm.gov.tr/d221111-1138.pdf 
306 The commission mentions that German Stock Corporation Law originally is based on concern. but it 
turned to be qualified de facto concern by the decisions of German Supreme Court. 
258 
The Draft Bill uses groups of companies as its main description. The Draft uses 
the term of control in its description of group of companies rather than domination or 
applied authority by one company over another. In control, there are certain criteria to 
determine whether it exists or does not exist, such as holding majority voting rights. In 
domination criteria, any kinds of established authority over another company will be 
considered as domination. Therefore, in many regulations, criteria for the existence of 
control are determined in advance and thus, there is no need to search for domination. 
For example according to 7th ED Company Law Directive a company cannot omit 
consolidated accounts by just proving there is no domination of parent. Accordingly. art 
195( 1) of the Draft consider the control system as its main system, additionally it 
recognises supposed control theory in article 195 (2). 
The Draft includes only limited liability companies. rather than including every 
enterprise, as does the German stock Corporation Act, which covers not only limited 
liability companies but also other enterprises recognised by the law. The Commission 
explains why it is just based on limited liability companies claiming that Turkey is for 
the first time regulating groups of companies and the Draft regulates it in just 20 articles 
as part of new commercial law. thus it is very difficult to cover such a comprehensive 
group system. Other types of enterprises, rather than limited liability companies, are not 
widely used in Turkish economic life. Moreover, according to draft article 195(6) on top 
of the group there might be a real person or an unlimited company or any other 
enterprise. 
In the determination of holding companies and their subsidiary companies, if there 
is a control exercised by one company over another, this section (corporate groups) 
will be applied to those companies and the controlling company is considered to be a 
holding company while the controlled company is considered to be a subsidiary. 
According to draft article 195( 1) there is a control if one company directly or indirectly 
has (A) 1- majority voting rights of another company 2- a right to appoint directors who 
has majority of votes in another company 3- a rights to use majority voting rights in 
another company. together with his votes, based on an agreement with other members. 
(B) If there is a control agreements between two companies. Moreover. in article 195(2). 
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there is a theoretical (supposed) control if one company holds majority of shares or 
shares that might have the effect of a majority over another company. The difference 
between 195(1) and 195 (2) is that in the fIrst paragraph the control is certain and parties 
cannot argue the opposite. However, under the second paragraph parties can always 
avoid being subjected to the groups of companies' regulations by proving there is no 
exercised control over the subsidiary by the holding company. Moreover, article 195(3) 
states that there is indirect control if one company controls another company through 
subsidiary companies or together with them. According to article 197, titled reciprocal 
ownership, if two companies own at least a quarter of the shares of each other. there is a 
mutual group. And if one establishes control over the other, the controlled one will be 
considered subsidiary company. If both control each other, both will be considered a 
subsidiary company. 
The Draft Bill imposes some duties on holding companies. For example, article 
198 requires a company to register and publicise when it directly or indirectly owns 10, 
20, 25, 33. 50, 67, 100 percent of the shares another company. If a company fails to 
perform registry and publicity requirements, the punishment will be withholding its 
voting rights. The Draft Bill (art. 199) also requires holding companies to prepare annual 
group reports. A holding company has to prepare the report within 3 months of 
acquisition of the subsidiary showing the scale of the relationship between holding 
company and subsidiary company. The report has to be well prepared and indicate all 
the facts. Moreover. the report has to show if there is a loss by the subsidiary company, 
which occurred as a result of a holding company's decision, also it has to show if the 
loss is paid back or planned to be paid back. 
From the point of the discussion in this thesis, the draft bill lmposes some 
liabilities for holding company if it performs its controls over the subsidiary 
unlawfull~'. The commission claims it is unique regulation since it covers every misuse 
of control without limiting it to certain types of transaction. The main liability clauses 
regulated in draft article 202; (a) "unless it is compensated in operating year or it is 
c1ear(l' stated how if will be compensated before the end of operating year, the holding 
company cannot use its control in a way to put the subsidiary company 111 a 
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disadvantageous situation (b) if the compensation is not peliormed, eve1}' shareholder 
can demand from the holding company and its directors who have voted in favour of the 
transaction, reimbursement to the subsidiary compan)1 of the amount it lost. (c) 
Creditors of the subsidiary compan.-v may as well demand reimbursement of the loss to 
the company". 307 Article 2002 paragraph (d) regulates a condition under which 
compensation cannot be claimed. Accordingly, if the decision that caused the 
disadvantage would have taken by the independent directors acting in good faith, there 
will be no compensation liability for holding company. 
In case of a fully owned subsidiary (art. 203) the directors of the subsidiary have to 
obey the order of the parent company, which is acting according to pre-determined 
group policy. This article was inspired from the Rozenblum decision of the French 
Supreme Court. 308 However, article 204 bans holding companies from giving orders that 
are exceeding the assets of the subsidiary or endangering its capability to make 
payments. Consequently, the directors of the subsidiary are not liable for the decision 
they have taken in line with articles 203 and 204. As a result, creditors of the subsidiary 
company can demand compensation from the holding company and from its directors if 
they have not performed their compensation duties for disadvantageous acts and it has 
caused damage to the creditors of the subsidiary (art. 206). 
If a holding company establishes a perception of group image that assures the 
public and consumers, there will be liability arising from group credibility (art. 209) for 
losses arising from usage of this image by a subsidiary. The proposal is the first attempt 
to regulate liability arising from the image of the group, which was firstly created in 
Switzerland by the Federal Court's decision of Wibru 1'Swissair. 309 
As result, the Draft Bill could be considered innovative from some perspectives. 
First of all it brings positive developments by producing a unified proposal including 
307 The author's translation 
30~ The doctrine is examined previously in this chapter. (p 117) See Tekil Muge, (in Turkish)'Rozenblum 
Karari ve Grup Cikari Karari' (1006) 10 HPD 213 
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almost every positive development in Europe. The Bill fmds its mam structure In 
defining group of companies in the German Stock Corporation Act and it creates its 
system inspired by the suggestions from Forum Europeaum. Moreover. it does not 
refrain from getting some ideas and rules from different jurisdictions such as French 
Rozenblum doctrine or Swiss Federal Courts decision in Wibru v SH'issair case. 
The liability clauses are much broader. First of all it creates a supposed control 
theory, which was referred to by the German Supreme Court's decisions as well as by 
CERCLA litigation in the USA and European Competition Law litigations. Moreover, 
the enforced liability upon holding companies for any unlawful control over subsidiary 
companies that cause disadvantageous economic situations is impressive. Especially, 
imposing liability on groups of companies for a misleading use of a group image is 
interesting and could create a model for future regulatory efforts for groups of 
companIes. 
However, there are many weakness of the Draft Bill in terms of creating better 
liability rules for groups of companies and thus for MNEs. First of all, neither the Draft 
Turkish Commercial Code nor sections related to groups of companies aim to abandon 
limited liability company principles in corporate groups. Accordingly, companies 
established under Turkish law have limited liability protection for their shareholders and 
there is no difference between individual shareholders and company shareholders. The 
liability clauses in the context of groups of companies in the Draft Bill require additional 
conditions for liability to be established. Thus, on those conditions, the draft regulations 
must be examined from two perspectives: whether they are successful in creditor 
protection and whether new understandings of group of companies mirror the modern 
conception of corporate groups and MNEs. 
The liability imposed on the holding company does not necessarily guarantee a 
payment to subsidiary's unfulfilled creditors. First of all, groups of companies exist only 
in certain conditions and the supposed control of the parent over a subsidiary is always 
.~oo Switzerland Federal Court (BGE 120 II 331) Akkanat Hand Aydincik S 'Grup Sirketleri Baglaminda 
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rebuttable. Although the parent owns the majority of shares it can escape from liability 
just proving it did not perform control over subsidiary. Moreover, there is no liability 
occumng if the holding companies' control over the subsidiary is not considered 
unlawful. In this case, on many occasions, especially those related to involuntarily 
creditors, even though a subsidiary committed a tort and it caused mass disruptions. 
holding company might escape liability just proving it did not perform unlawful control 
over subsidiary corporation. Thus, the new regulations will provide better protection for 
voluntarily creditors than it provides for involuntarily creditors. 
The second argument must be whether the Draft Bill has a perception of modem 
group of companies and MNEs or whether it falls into the same mistake that perceives 
group of companies as a vertical organisation under which divisions between the units of 
the group are easily distinguished. It can be claimed that the Draft Bill is based on the 
idea of vertical integrated groups of companies and comparatively smaller domestic 
enterprises. It aims to make parent companies liable for the debt of the groups thus there 
is a requirement of control of the parent over subsidiaries. The whole section of the 
regulation is dedicated to determine which company is a parent and which company is a 
subsidiary. The difference between parent and subsidiaries is determined according to 
control theory. Accordingly, liability is imposed if parent applies direct control over 
subsidiaries. Some provisions could be considered, from some aspects, closer to the 
modem structure of corporate groups, such as mutual ownership or indirect ownership 
but even these provisions might make its efficiency insignificant under the general 
liability system created according to the narrow perception of a simple vertical structure. 
Accordingly, the liability proposed in the Draft Bill is parent companies liability for its 
control over its subsidiaries. The difference from the earlier rules and principles 
discussed above is the comparative reduction of conditions for proving control over 
subsidiaries. Thus, the Draft Bill will not solve the liability problems since the 
horizontally organised groups can still avoid liability because of the difficulties of 
proving of unlawful control applied 0 subsidiaries. 
Culpa in Contrahendo Sorumlulugu' (2006) 10 HDP 219 
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Overall, the Draft Bill is a brave effort since it aims to create the most developed 
liability regime for group of companies but it cannot be considered innovative enough to 
solve the tort liability problems of MNEs. 
Evaluation of the Chapter 
This chapter aims to discuss the existing laws and regulations that impose some forms of 
liability for corporate groups from different jurisdictions. It has been discovered that 
there is no uniform comprehensive modern law or principles that can provide solutions 
to the liability problems of MNEs because the existent regulations have produced no real 
challenge to core areas of company law. 310 Indeed, even the most compact corporate 
group law, the German Stock Corporation Act, seeks to preserve the subsidiary as a 
separate entity in that the parent owes duties of compensation to the creditors of the 
subsidiary in return for the power of control. In that way German law remains 
grounded in the logic of the classical theory of corporations. The regulations are 
insufficient to offer a new, broad and internationally effective system by establishing 
new theories based on modern social, economic and managerial characteristics of 
corporate groups and MNEs. Instead some efforts have been made to find exceptional 
solution for the problems under different institutions of law. 
The English legislative efforts, in first instance. considered possible econOmIC 
effects of new regulations on capital markets. In the process towards producing a 
proposal for a new company law statute, issues related to creditor protection and 
corporate groups have been removed basically for economic reasons. The main 
regulatory efforts related to corporate groups, thus concentrated mostly on accountancy 
and tax issues. On the other hand, creditor protections have been the subject of 
regulation in Insolvency Law under fraudulent and wrongful trading principles. 
310 Prentice. Some Aspects of the Law. (n 22) 
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However, none of these has challenged the current situation in corporate group law. 
Neither does the Companies Act 2006 offer any solution: even worse it does not accept 
the existence of any problems regarding involuntarily creditors. 
The efforts that have been carried on at the EU level have as well been 
undennined by the fear of economic inefficiency. Moreover, different approaches to the 
problems in the member states weakened any chance of possible changes in the EU law. 
Thus neither of the European conceptions creates inclusive proposals that can be a 
solution to contemporary liability discussions. Instead they try to walk on a tightrope 
between the apparent benefits of limited liability and the evident necessity of putting 
groups of companies under modified liability designs for their tort actions. Some of the 
proposals (at least in theory) have created better hope and understandings in the area. 
However, they are still based on existing principles of liability by either requiring the 
proof of some violation of duties to the subsidiary or by giving the parent company a 
chance to avoid liability by proving non-existence of excessive control over 
subsidiaries. Even such influential approaches as the former articles of the draft 
European Company Statute would not deliver unconditional liability for the corporate 
shareholders in corporate groups. Thus, there is no group liability for subsidiaries' tort in 
. . 311 
any sItuatIOn. 
The comparative examination of the laws from different jurisdictions highlights 
many points of weakness in the area of corporate groups' law since each of these 
regulations aims to cure a very particular problem of limited liability for corporate 
groups. For example, CERCLA tries to establish broader liability for environmental 
hazards. Turkish AA TUHK aims to prevent misuse of private limited company forms 
for debts owed to the state. However, this plurality of the regulations creates diverse 
group concepts and various and even conflicting legal policy perceptions towards groups 
f . 312 o comparues . 
. 111 Hofstetter. Parent Responsibility, (n 126) 
31: lrujo, Trends and Realities. (n 7) 
265 
This lack of statutory intervention in the problem of groups of companies increases 
expectations from the courts to fill the gap but they are reluctant to admit the reality of 
interrelated companies in a complex structure acting as a number of companies affecting 
each other while at the same time holding each other's shares. This situation leads to the 
claim that even the statutory laws have offered more developed solutions.313 Thus, in 
case law. efforts to reach a sound level of liability have been wiped out by the 
inflexibility of judges by their rigid devotion to the restrictive characteristics of the 
doctrine of veil piercing. It can easily be stated that, in the field of general corporate law. 
the English and American courts are still attached to a traditional piercing the corporate 
veil doctrine, which requires a situation of parent company's control over the 
subsidiary together with some form of unlawful action. In some cases the requirements 
were relaxed by creating relatively better principles in terms of group liability in order to 
adjust parent liability concepts to more particular and flexible policies underlying tort 
and environmental law . However, on the whole. because of the persistent devotion to the 
limited liability principles of the Salomon doctrine, the common law attempts to control 
the exploitation of the limited liability form has proved unproductive.314 
The examination of comparative case law from different jurisdictions produces a 
result not much different to that of the English case law. The basic requirements of 
parent's control over subsidiary and intent to fraud have been interpreted in a similar 
manner. Accordingly, in order to establish liability on a group basis for certain 
behaviours, one needs to prove the existence of control of parent over the subsidiary and 
intent of misuse of the relationship between subsidiary and other companies in the 
group. Control has been considered, as a structural relation similar to property and it is 
distinguished from rule. 315 In practice, control is applied by powers of decision-making. 
Accordingly, there have been some efforts in case law in order to ease requirement of 
control theory for broader liability of the parent. For example the 'supposed control' 
m Dine. The Governal/ce. p. 44 (n 23) 
.,14 Griffin. Limited Liability. (n 6) 
115 Scott John. 'Corporate Groups and Network Structure' in McCahery J. Picciotto S and Scott S. (eds). 
Corporate Control and Accou1ltabili~l' (OUP, Oxford 1993) 
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theory in Ee competition law cases and . authority to control or supposed control in 
German qualified de facto group concern or 'capacity to control" in CERCLA transfer 
the burden of proof from plaintiffs to the parent. Moreover, a search for the true intent of 
the parties by applying group of companies' doctrine in international commercial 
arbitration cases provides some broad discussion in the area of liability of corporate 
groups. However, all these efforts have been undermined by the subsequent 
developments because there has always been a strong resistance to fundamental changes 
in principles of company law. 
The underlying reasons for failure can be found in the reality of misunderstanding 
of the structural characteristics of corporate groups and MNEs. The efforts to create 
group liability mostly aim to create kinds of compensation regimes for unsatisfied 
creditors of subsidiaries. Thus, many regulations fail to find a solution for subsidiaries' 
torts since the separate legal personality theory allows the parent to escape liability. 
Accordingly, the concentration for better liability regimes in MNEs context must be on 
bringing the separate legal personality theory of law together with the separate 
personality theory in economic and business studies. 
The lack of modern and comprehensive understandings of groups of companies, 
especially from the perspective of MNEs, prevents scholars, practitioners, courts as well 
as parliaments from developing satisfactory regulations. Even the latest attempts to 
regulate corporate groups such as Draft Commercial Law Bill in Turkey and new 
Companies Act of England as well as EU Action Plan fall into the same mistake, which 
is conceptualising corporate groups as vertical organisations. 
Thus, the main obstacle to reaching to broad liability rules is the same in both 
statutory and case law which is always complicated by a search for control over one 
company by the other in a group. This is a direct result of misconception of the 
functioning and structure of corporate groups. In the previous chapters, the extensive 
search to establish the modern structure has indicated different facts than those 
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conceived by the court or lawmakers.316 The control in a modern horizontal organisation 
is spread over subsidiaries. Each company under the group has broader independence 
and the control is exercised through group culture and principles rather than apparent 
involvement on daily decision taking. Therefore. management instructions might come 
not only from centre of the group but also from those who have \'arious specific duties to 
perform for the group. Consequently, the requirements of control that is imposed by the 
statutes and courts are mostly invisible from outside. Thus, all the regulatory efforts 
based on control theory are incompetent in practice. 
Another problem of existing regulation is the persistent ignorance of involuntarily 
creditors in MNEs torts. None of the statutory laws aim to solve the problems of tort 
liability. There is a complete negligence of the issues in contrast to huge public debate. 
Victims of MNEs torts are left with no solutions because there is no efficient mechanism 
to look for comprehensive liability on a group basis. 
In conclusion, this broad examination of existing regulations and principles in law 
can be concluded in a way that there have been many efforts to remove the unjust effects 
of limited liability for corporate groups but none of them has accomplished the long-
waited breakthrough revolution. In other words, none of the regulations or outcomes of 
case law created principles are able match the economic, managerial and social dynamic 
of groups of companies and MNEs. Thus, the reconsideration of principles of company 
law with the aim of creating better regime of corporate group liability must be 
conducted. For this purpose, broad examination of existing law must be used as 
illustrative models to indicate the failures in the area. The final striking outcome of this 
chapter is the indication of the need for better-structured proposals in the area to offer an 
adequate framework for assuring MNEs tort liability . 
. ' It> Detailed discussion is made at chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER V: FUTURE OF MNEs' TORT LIABILITY 
In the previous chapters, the thesis has indicated the problems of MNEs' tort 
liability. The torts committed by subsidiaries of MNEs are discussed and gaps in the 
legal systems are indicated by concluding that MNEs might avoid liability in tort and 
this problem is urgent and requires attention from academics, parliaments and judges. 
For this purpose, the thesis first indicates the distinguishing characteristics of MNEs 
from other institutions by examining developments in legal, social-economical and 
managerial-structural characteristics. Accordingly, the thesis claims that an MNE is a 
distinct institution, which is unique in its characteristics and thus different from other 
institutions recognised by laws and thus requires different regulatory principles and 
theories. Accordingly, chapters three and four are devoted to search for laws and 
regulations on MNEs liability issues. The thesis demonstrated that the laws and 
regulations are inefficient to solve the liability problems due to common 
misunderstandings of interdisciplinary characteristics of MNEs. As a result, even though 
the time has come to think about real, effective and internationally applicable solutions 
for the MNEs' liability problems, so far no concrete proposal exists for such a solution 
and governments seem unwilling to commit themselves truly to a legislative solution. l 
From an academic perspective, the solutions suggestions have always had weaknesses if 
they are not totally ineffectual. Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to propose the 
framework principles on which MNEs tort liability must be built. The principles will be 
based on a combination of social, economical and managerial characteristics of MNEs 
with the particular focus on the problems of MNEs tort liability. 
While doing that. the thesis focuses on the examination of liability in core areas of 
law. in other words. laws that are enforceable through states' court systems. Therefore. 
1 Gleichmann K. 'The Law Of Corporate Groups' In The European Community' in Sugarman. D. & 
Teubner. G. Ed. Regulating Corporate Groups in Europe (Nomos. Baden-Baden 1990) 
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the voluntarily approaches to corporate groups liability is excluded in this study. 
Moreover, the laws with public international law characteristics, e.g. criminal la\\'. have 
also been excluded. 
Excluding the examinations of public law and voluntary regulation options IS 
based on practical and academic reasons. The practical reason is that there is need for 
limitation of a subject in a research project, which is limited by time and space. 
Moreover there are many research projects devoted to voluntarily approach to corporate 
liability under the titles of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and codes of conduct. 
Similarly, forcing liability by using public law tools has completely different 
characteristics and studies on it as well are quite widely done in various institutions. The 
academic reasons for the exclusion of public law and voluntary regulatory approaches to 
MNEs tort liability is based on the fact that there are certain differences between the 
scope of this research and voluntary liability approaches. The voluntary approach tries to 
prevent corporate torts or any illegal and moral misbehaviour while the liability 
approach in this thesis aims to compensate or provide a justifiable liability for the torts 
committed by MNEs. In this case, principles and tools are fundamentally different; the 
voluntary approach requires a consideration of a number of policy and economic issues 
and soft law principles while the obligatory liability system requires mostly hard law and 
fundamental changes in statutes and case law. 
Moreover, even if MNEs behave in a very good manner or follow their CSR very 
closely, there is always the possibility for torts to happen. Nobody can guarantee that, 
even under very stringent regulations, MNEs behave in a good manner and there will not 
be another tragedy caused by torts committed by subsidiaries of MNEs. Thus, this thesis 
claims that the best way to achieve justice in MNEs tort cases is to balance profit-
maximisation theory with liability-expansion through creating efficient liability regimes 
and thus maximising the compensation paid for tort. In other words, a liability regime 
based on hard law is the most efficient ways to hold the balance between the economic 
theory of profit maximisation and requirements of justice in the law. I believe that CSR 
and other voluntary regulatory approaches might not create the expected level of a 
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justifiable regime to regulate MNEs, even though they would surely have some positi\'e 
effects. 
One of the aspects of liability issues relating to MNEs is whether liability should 
aim to protect people against MNEs tort or must it concentrate on compensating the 
victims for committed torts. In the first instance, the logical answer seems to be that the 
aim of any regulation must be preventing corporate torts before they happen but on 
careful examination it is not that easy. The protective measures already exist and there 
are many recent developments in environmental, labour or tort law that aim to prevent 
MNEs torts. However, these measures are two sided, in developed countries, 
preventative measures might work better than they work in less developed countries. 
And less developed countries are systematically prevented from taking more 
preventative measures since they are scared of loosing MNEs investments in their 
countries.2 On the other hand, even though there are very detailed rules to prevent 
MNEs' misbehaving, there is still very high likelihood of torts committed by MNEs. To 
be able minimise the effect of the MNEs torts, there is a need of system of liability 
aiming to compensate victims in a full and justifiable way. 
The effects of efficient liability systems will be two sided: first, it will create 
justifiable solutions for victims after torts have been committed which is the basic aim of 
every legal system. Secondly, compensation maximisation will have an important 
effect on preventing and deterring MNEs from misbehaving and committing torts. In 
other words, searching for compensation maximisation is not just searching for efficient 
ways to compensate after tort; it is, with the same importance, fmding effective ways of 
prevention of corporate groups torts by creating a solid liability regime. It is widely 
proven in many situations that an efficient liability regime prevents many torts by 
forcing companies to take necessary measures to avoid it. For example. liability imposed 
on companies for the use of asbestos has made them very careful in their mining 
operation: a newspaper report states: "there l-vas a good lesson learnt b.Y' companies since 
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more than 80 companies went bankrupt; the use of dead(v asbestos has nOll' completeZl' 
been abandoned in the USA and many more countries follow this practicc".3 It is very 
obvious that one of the reasons for this was high compensation awarded by the 
American courts. Moreover. in the case of purchasing insurance for the risk of 
companies operations, insurance companies will require high preventative measures or 
will sell the insurance at very high prices since the assessment of the risk will be made 
according to the new liability rules. Accordingly, the aim of liability regimes must be 
creating compensation maximisation, under which MNEs will be expected to pay high 
compensation to tort victims. 
With this aim, this chapter will be devoted to searching for better liability regimes 
for groups of companies and thus, for MNEs. However. there will not be completely 
clear-cut proposals in order to avoid a complex system of proposals that will have little 
chance of being considered by regulators. Rather. the aim will be determination of 
principles and theories on which MNEs liability regulations must be built so that the 
regulatory discussions will be comprehensive enough to solve current and future 
problems. Principle creating in the first instance will increase the chances of reaching a 
more global and widespread regime of liability. 
Accordingly, in this chapter firstly. there is indication of the basic difficulties, 
which explain why the expected level of protection could not be achieved for MNEs tort 
victims. A number of obstacles will be discussed to clear the way for understanding of 
future developments. Acknowledging the difficulties will be very helpful in creating 
better proposals and helps us avoiding mistakes made in the past. Secondly. the solution 
suggested outside corporate laws will be discussed briefly in order to test their 
efficiency. Finally. there will be a search for a number of options by comparing existing 
laws and principles and solutions offered on the principles discussed in this thesis: the 
:; See Dine Janet. Companies. International Trade and Human Rights (Cambridge Uni\ersity Press. 
Cambridge 2005) and Dine J. 'Using Companies to Oppress the Poor' in Dine 1. Fagan A (eds.) Human 
Rights alld Capitalism (Edward Elgar. Cheltenham, 2006) 
~ Hall Ben and Peel Michael, 'Law Change to Speed up Asbestos Cases' Financial Times (London June 
21 2006). According to Financial Times. asbestos claims cost more than $70 billion and bankrupted nearly 
80 companies. Financial Times (London. 15 February 2006) 
suggestions will be built on the facts discussed in the second chapter of the thesis and 
will be associated with the fIndings in third and fourth chapter. Howe\'er. there will be 
no attempt to create precise codes in order not to fall in contradictions of our claims that 
MNEs are dynamic institutions and must be regulated according to their contemporary 
realities. Taking this approach will make the life of the suggestions longer and will give 
this study a broader characteristic and, more importantly. a guiding mission. 
Difficulties and Obstacles to Imposing MNEs' Tort Liability 
At this stage, it is vital to provide a basic explanation why the apparent injustice in 
current legal order could not been overcome for such a long time. In other words, one 
should search for what the difficulties are behind this rigid situation since case and 
statutory laws do not offer any solutions to :MNEs' torts. 
The first difficulty on the way to achieve comprehensive MNEs liability is the lack 
of empirical research to assess what would happen if there were no limited liability since 
on this stage all forecasts of the economic system of companies without limited liability 
are subjective and depend on non-empirical prediction. Therefore, in the absence of 
influential experimental research any conclusion has to remain spontaneous and 
unverified.4 It is suggested that, from an economic points of view, the abolition of 
limited liability for corporate groups' torts would result in a level of damage to the 
financing of business enterprise, which would sooner or later be seen, to be 
unacceptable. Accordingly, liability rules dependant on this non-empirical prediction 
have been inefficient since they either offer some changes under current regime of 
liabilities or search for alternative options outside the range of company law principles. 
Thus, there has always been a search for solutions that do not touch the core principles 
,; Pettet B, 'Limited Liability - A Principle for the 21 51 Century' (1995) CLP 124 
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of limited liability.s However. not having empirical data must not be an excuse since the 
legal system should begin to collect empirical data by starting a gradual elimination of 
limited liability. It must start with the most urgent and justified case: abandoning limited 
liability for the benefit of tort victims in the context of corporate shareholders since there 
are number of indications mentioned in second chapter that prove that abandoning 
limited liability for corporate shareholders might not fundamentally disturb capital 
market economies. Moreover, some case and statutory law examples from comparative 
jurisdictions have created empirical data. Thus, it can be claimed that, non-a\'ailabilit:y of 
empirical data cannot be an excuse for not solving liability problems in corporate 
groups' context. 
One of the basic reasons for failure is that limited liability company is considered 
as one of the driving forces of modern capital economies putting it at the centre of 
market-economy regulations. This requires that, in order to solve the problems, the 
theories in legal and economic studies must be dealt with together by bringing social 
justice theory into this frame. Thus, there is a requirement to create a better background 
theory and justification not only in legal but also in economic and political and social 
aspects of limited liability. With this aim, this study indicates that limited liability in the 
corporate groups and MNEs context play little role in investment decisions and the 
functioning of market economies. As a result, economic, social and political theories of 
MNEs have been built to consider options for liability regimes in MNEs context. 
The effect of limited liability differs according to types of shareholders: individual 
shareholders need the protection of limited liability more than company shareholders. 
This brings us the discussion to the conception of shareholders. In academia and in 
case law, shareholders are considered as innocent participants in the modem capital 
economies. In need of protection, shareholders are considered almost on the same le\'el 
as creditors creating a situation that in a sense no solution can be perfect because group 
responsibility laws will often compensate one group of innocent parties (that is the 
shareholders and/or creditors of the compensated group member) at the expense of 
5 Pettet. Limited Liability. (n 4) 
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another group of innocent parties (that is the shareholders and/or creditors of the liable 
group members).6 In order to avoid this protectionism of shareholders, the conception of 
corporate shareholders must be differentiated from individual shareholders. 
Accordingly, in this thesis, there has been a mission to differentiate between corporate 
shareholders and individual shareholders in corporate groups' concept by claiming that 
the law should take a different approach towards individual shareholders and company 
shareholders in terms of application of limited liability since different treatment and 
structure of corporate shareholders and individual shareholders is already a common 
practice in the market economies. 
The deadlock created by strict devotion to limited liability in the corporate concept 
switched some attention to corporate directors. Diverting our attention to the directors 
will be eradicated by the principles of limited liability since making them liable outside 
of their personal misconduct seems unfair while real owners of the companies can avoid 
liability. Thus, from a legal and economic point of view, making directors liable for torts 
committed in the course of management of the company is inefficient because 
development of liability of directors for tort is peculiar to the idea of efficient balancing 
of risk that the doctrine of limited resource aims to achieve.? Moreover, although 
director's liability provisions have been widely adopted, and more generously proposed 
neither legislators nor courts have managed any clear articulation of the basis on which 
they may be explained. There is a contrast in the law: if there is liability imposed on 
managers of the companies who are working for the benefits of shareholders, there must 
be liability for shareholders as well. 8 Therefore, it can be claimed that liability imposed 
on directors differs in principle from the liability imposed on corporate groups or 
shareholders, either company shareholders or individual shareholders since directors are 
employed by shareholders to operate companies' daily business and thus, they must be 
considered employees of the shareholders; for this reasons, making the employees liable 
6 Nolan A. 'The Position Of Unsecured Creditors Of Corporate Groups: Towards A Group Responsibility 
Solution Which Gives Fairness And Equity A Role' (1993) CSLJ 461 
- Grantham Ross and Rickett Charlie, 'the Bootmaker's Legacy To Company Law Doctrine' in Grantham 
Ross and Rickett Charlie (eds.), Corporate perSOnali(l' in the 20th century (Hart. Oxford 1998) 
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rather than employers seem unfair. Moreover, it is apparent that, even in case of full 
personal liability of directors, the expected level of protection will not be achieved 
because of the limited funds of directors and easy avoidance of liability by indication 
that the directors perfonned their basic legal duties, which is maximising the profit of 
the company. 
Another difficulty which explains failure to create a functioning corporate group 
liability for tort was that under the complex structure of corporate groups, the unclear 
nature of laws applied to groups have caused the confusion to which legal body in the 
group victims should address their claims. This creates a difficulty for regulators finding 
a legal person to impose liability on.9 As a result, liability models have always 
concentrated on making parent companies liable under different systems and principles. 
These models to reach parent as only logical legal personality to have liability in the 
group have been at the centre of proposals. The reason for this is that when liability 
issues for MNEs and group of companies started to be considered in academia, in 
practice and by lawmakers, almost all the proposals, either successful or not, have been 
depended on this simple approach to MNEs structure, under which it is assumed that 
parent applies direct control over its subsidiaries. 
Accordingly. the extent to which liability of the parent reqUIres specific 
regulations and the conditions of such a specific group liability are very controversial 
indeed. There have been three different kinds of liability tried to be imposed on the 
parent. IO In a simple approach to groups of companies there is a tendency to hold the 
parent liable for damages inflicted on the subsidiary provided that there was fault, such 
as in the piercing the veil principles. A second pattern of liability is the assumption of 
the subsidiary's losses by the parent at the end of the year (approaches taken by German, 
French and European regulators). Alternatively the law may attach a direct liability on 
8 Grantham and Rickett, the Bootmaker's Legacy. (n 7) 
Q Prentice Dan, 'Corporate Personality, Limited Liability and the Protection of Creditors' in Grantham 
Ross and Rickett Charlie (eds) Corporate personality in the 20th century (Hart. Oxford 1998) 
10 Hopt Klaus 1. 'Legal Elements and Policy Decisions in Regulating Group of Companies' in Wooldridge 
F and SchmitthotT CM (eds.), Groups of companies (Sweet & Maxwell. London 1991) p.103 
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the parent corporation by reason of its failure to exerCIse proper control over its 
subsidiary (vicarious liability). 
Legal complication in regulation of corporate groups and difficulty of finding legal 
persons on whom to impose liability has resulted in many variations in legal and 
academic principles suggested to solve the liability problems. In all those approaches. 
the basic justification was control of the parent over subsidiaries: that control gives 
rise to the legal obligation of the parent to the plaintiff. II Since there are no critical 
approaches to group of companies' structure and organisations those principles have 
fallen into the same models of laws that have already proven inefficient. Interestingly, 
once alternatives have proved inefficient. the searches have intensified and created more 
detailed proposals on the same economic and structural symbolization of corporate 
groups. We have already seen many examples in case and statutory laws but some 
examples of variations in proposals made by academics considered alternatives to 
statutory and case-law-created veil piercing doctrine are worth mentioning. 
The first alternative proposal would be to impose liability on parent corporations 
where their subsidiaries have exposed others to knowable risks and are now unable to 
cover their liabilities for damages caused by these knowable risks. Professor Schwartz' 
proposed rule would impose unlimited liability for corporate torts only in the context of 
knowable, but not remote, riskS. I2 The proposal would draw a distinction between the 
different types of risk, and impose parent corporation liability only for knowable risks. 
This approach claims to have comparative fairness and efficiency in application, because 
it encourages the discovery of risks and punishes the parent corporation only when it 
II Nygh Peter, 'The Liability Of Multi-National Corporations For Their Subsidiaries' (2002) EBOLR '27 
I: Schwartz Alan. 'Products Liability. Corporate Structure. And Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances And The 
Remote Risk Relationship' (1985) 14 Journal of Legal Studies 689 defines a knowable risk as "a risk that 
a product is as dangerous as a firm would predict on the basis of doing the cost-effective amount of 
research. or less dangerous. Conversely. a remote risk is a risk that a product is more dangerous than a 
firm would predict if it had done the cost-effective amount of research into safety". 
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places a knowable risky activity in a subsidiary corporation without placing sufficient 
assets into the subsidiary.13 
However, in practice, the liability of the parent only for knowable risk cannot 
actually create a better solution than veil piercing doctrine. Under complex horizontal 
structures of MNEs, it is unclear and almost impossible to prove to what extent the 
parent was aware of the activities of subsidiaries. Moreover. the evaluation of risk hy the 
parent and by the subsidiary could be completely different since subsidiaries are more 
independent and self-operated. Under those conditions, to be able to apply liability for 
knowable risk, the courts have to engage in very fact-specific inquiries of the situation 
between the parent and the subsidiary similar to one in veil piercing doctrine. 
Alternatively, Professor Dent proposes that liability should be imposed on 
negligent controlling persons, but not on cautious ones. 14 Dent suggests an alternative to 
current parent corporation liability standards that would encourage, rather than 
discourage, active involvement of the parent corporation in the operations of the 
subsidiary. The firm members can avoid personal liability by showing that the firm 
implemented reasonable measures and procedures to control the conduct that caused the 
loss. Therefore, firm members can escape personal liability if they can affirmatively 
show that they acted reasonably in managing risk. IS Dent explains that the standard of 
the cautious parent corporation should not require the monitoring of day-to-day activities 
of the firm but will require that parent corporations make sure that the subsidiary retains 
capable officers who install a reasonable program to prevent subsidiaries' fraud. This 
prudence standard or approach would further require that the parent corporation assure 
financial soundness the determination of which would be left to the courts where several 
factors should be relevant. 16 Dent tries to change the traditional parent-subsidiary 
13 Farmer Richard S, 'Parent Corporation Responsibility For The Environmental Liabilities Of The 
Subsidiary: A Search For The Appropriate Standard' (1994) 19 1. Corp. L. 769 
I~ Dent George W. 'Limited Liability In Em'ironmental Law' (1991) Wake Forest Law Review 151 
15 Fortnev Susan Saab, 'Seeking Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended Consequences -The Trap~ of 
Limited Liability Law Firms' (1007) 54 Wa"h. & Lee L. Rev. 717 
I~ Fortney, Seeking Shelter, (n 15) 
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liability concept by encouraging parental control, not discouraging it. Therefore. this 
new approach to parent corporation liability seems more in tune with the objecti\'es of 
CERCLA and existing tort law. which were criticised earlier in the thesis for causing 
more complexity. Moreover. as already tested by many failed statutes and proposals. the 
encouragement of control has been far from creating solutions and completely in 
contradiction to the direction of contemporary changes in groups structures under which 
the control is decentralised. 
An alternative solution suggested is parent corporation liability for equipping the 
subsidiary with insufficient assets. Gelb proposes that in cases where creditors are 
unable to protect themselves, such as tort creditors, the adequacy of the corporation's 
assets should be the relevant inquiry.17 The court's focus should be on the adequacy of 
assets, and the term under-capitalization should be abandoned in favour of this new 
description because capitalisation may overly focus a court's attention on assets provided 
to a corporation as capital at. the time of its organisation. Consequently. there must be a 
continuing requirement for the maintenance of an adequate level of assets and not one 
based solely on the assets situation at the commencement of the business. Gelb 
concludes his proposal by defending the adequacy of assets approach, stating that 
consideration of other traditional factors is unnecessary, irrelevant and may lead to 
error. 18 
Courts and commentators often cite inadequate capitalisation as an important 
factor in the corporate veil piercing analysis. However, empirical analysis of the case 
law suggests that inadequate capitalisation in practice is not as persistent an issue as the 
commentators would suggest. 19 Thus, minimum capital requirements arguments also 
seem not very convincing. since it could be claimed that it has more importance in 
small-scale private limited companies rather than huge networked MNEs, Moreover. 
1- Gelb Harvey. 'Piercing The Corporate Veil--The Undercapitalization Factor' 1982 Chicago-Kent Law 
R ('vi ell' 1 
I~ Gelb. Piercing The Corporate Veil. (n 17) 
IQ Thompson Robert B. 'Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study' (1990-1991) 76 Cornell L. Rev, 
1036 
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mInImUm capital has already existed in many jurisdictions but it has not created a 
solution to the corporate groups' liability. Moreover. e\'aluating the adequacy of asset 
requires complicated and demanding work before the corporate veil can be disregarded. 
In this respect, Gelb's proposed standard presents a less dramatic shift from current \'eil 
piercing doctrine, narrowing the range of factors necessary to pierce the corporate \"eil. 
but still requiring a fact-specific, sui generis inquiry in each individual case.~o 
As a result, the examples of proposals on the concept of parent-subsidiary 
relationship for the basis of liability cannot provide adequate solutions to the problems 
because they ignore the economic and managerial realities of modem corporate groups. 
The above mentioned and similar proposals somehow have been tested in different 
jurisdictions but mostly failed to create dramatic improvements in the MNEs tort 
liability situation. The scholars have failed to grasp the common interdisciplinary 
characteristics of corporate groups and MNEs so the overall outcome of their proposals 
produced very complex structure of liability, which requires a number of conditions and 
are simply very easy to evade by MNEs. This created a circle in which already tested 
liability proposals have been reintroduced with different names but the same principles 
with different shapes. Therefore, in order to be progressive, the lawmakers, courts and 
scholars should search for liability options by considering interdisciplinary 
characteristics of MNEs. 
Moreover, liability options offered by scholars are usually compensatory liability 
by parent company rather than direct liability of the parent or group. Thus, liability 
directed to the parent is not efficient in MNEs context. The jurisdictional differences 
between countries and different approaches to liability in a subsidiaries' jurisdiction 
make it very difficult to create a group based liability if a parent's liability is considered 
as compensatory rather than direct liability. 
10 Farmer. Parent Corporation. (n 13) 
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Liability Options outside Corporate La,,' 
The strict principles of company law have caused problems in the MNEs tort liability 
context. Therefore, scholars and regulators are searching for relief of the MNEs tort 
problems outside the company law sphere as alternatives to deadlock in company law 
principles.21 Here, I just want to discuss some examples of alternative solutions 
suggested to the MNEs tort problems: mandatory insurance. parent guarantee for 
subsidiaries debt, and changes in insolvency laws. 
The preference in favour of involuntarily creditors in insolvency can be considered 
as a solution to tort liability problems for group of companies. Leebron and Thompson 
have argued that financial creditors should be deferred to tort claimants in a liquidation 
procedure.22 Professor Davies as well suggested that in some jurisdictions. part of a 
solution to the group problem is to be found in insolvency law. where the court may be 
given discretion in certain circumstances to bring a solvent company in the group into 
the insolvency of another company in that groUp.23 However. this option is very shallow 
since changes in insolvency law will not fundamentally affect the liability issues 
discussed in the thesis; deferring involuntarily creditors to voluntarily creditors would 
just improve the conditions of involuntarily creditors rather than solving any problems. 
Moreover, this option might work only in small-scale domestic operating corporate 
groups since the application of insolvency would be much more problematic in big 
corporate groups and MNEs. Thus, deferring involuntarily creditors in insolvency will 
have a very little influence on the current situation. However. the differentiation of 
creditors should be made when discussing MNEs liability: involuntarily creditors should 
:!I Easterbrook Frank H and Fischel Daniel R. the Economic Structllre of Corporate Law (Harvard 
Uni\'ersity Press. London 1991) p, 60, 
22 Leebron Da\id \\', 'Limited Liability, Tort Victims. and Creditors' (1991) 91 Colum L Rev 1565 and 
Thompson. Piercing the Corporate Veil. (n 19) 
:!3 Davit:s Paul L Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell. 2003 
London) p,205 
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be treated differently in application of liability rather than waiting until the insolvency 
procedure. 
Alternatively. the theory of business might suggest that the key to all liability 
problems in MNEs activities does lie with insurance. Accordingly, laws requiring 
MNEs to purchase liability insurance against tort claims to the extent that the claims 
overvalue their assets is suggested. How it should be done could only be determined 
after extensive consultation with the insurance industry, carried out by relevant 
regulatory bodies. On a basic level, small companies can be liable up to a set amount 
covered by insurance while big companies. which deal with hazardous activities. will 
make a detailed assessment of the risk.24 
Accordingly, to some extent, insurance can create solutions to compensation 
problems in MNEs tort. However, insuring corporate groups who are engaged with 
extremely hazardous business would be very expensive. Therefore, a big majority of the 
companies will refuse to do business in the areas considered dangerous, which might 
create a monopoly in the hazardous business area. Monopoly in international business 
and investment would make the current situation worse. Moreover, there is another 
problem that insured companies might conduct their business very carelessly, since the 
insurance is already very costly, the companies will not be willing to spend more money 
for safety measures. Possible devastating effect on insurance companies should not be 
ignored. For example, in an incident like one in Bhopal any insurance company could 
hardly pay the huge economic damage. 
Insurance options must be questioned from the perspective of liability. Even if 
there were sufficient insurance it will just cover the compensation determined by the 
courts or agreed by the parties, rather than creating a liability regime for an entire 
networked corporate group. However, in this thesis, the aim is to create a liability regime 
on a group basis not just a find a way to finance the compensation. Looking back to 
some tort examples, it can be seen that compensation had already been paid in such 
~4 Pettet. Limited Liability, (n 4) 
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cases as in the Bhopal tragedy where the company paid the agreed amount. Howe\'er. 
the problems are still not solved in a fair way, thus, there is a need for more fundamental 
changes in corporate law systems of liability. 
Another problem with insurance option would be the question of who will arrange 
insurance, the subsidiary or parent. If a parent corporation has to insure subsidiaries. the 
problem of insurable interest would arise. Moreover, insurance is a business preference 
for companies and each individual entity should insure their own activities and there is 
no mechanism to guarantee this worldwide. There are two different persons so the parent 
company cannot have an insurable interest in the subsidiary according to the principles 
established under the case Macaura. 25 As a result, for a successful insurance protection 
of corporate victims the system must force insurance of corporate groups as whole. 
However, enforcing insurance on corporate groups as whole will require the same laws 
and regulations as imposing liability on them: which must be built ignoring the corporate 
veil and treating corporate groups as single personality. Moreover, the existence of 
limited liability in the corporate group concept and case like Adams l' Cape industries 
support the idea that corporations are free to split up their enterprises into smaller 
entities to avoid liability. Under those conditions, groups' purchase of insurance seems 
inconsistent with general principles since shareholders are already protected from 
liability claims. Thus investors should not be willing to pay insurers to reduce risk as it 
can be clearly stated "why hl~I' something you already have for free".26 
Above-mentioned suggestions are just the chief examples; there are number of 
different suggestions. For example, those dealing with an undercapitalised company in a 
group of companies may obtain a guarantee from the parent compan~'. Or. less 
securely, the parent company may issue a letter of comfort to the subsidiary's accounts 
on a going concern basis, or to a third party contemplating contracting with the 
~~ MacQlIra \. N0/1hem Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619 
~t> Easterbrook and Fischel. the Economic Stmcture. p. 54 (n 21) 
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company.27 These options do not create liability either; they just create better protection 
mostly for voluntarily creditors. 
Because of the apparent difficulty of creating laws in the area of MNEs' liability 
voluntary regulations can be seen as alternative. The claim is that market and business 
should be free to consider self-regulation which is much-discussed topic especially in 
recent years while attracting very controversial reactions?8 Therefore, it is a fact that 
there is huge public, media and NGOs attention together with business enthusiasm on 
the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) while the topic is also attracting many 
academic studies. It has also been very broadly advertised by the industry and MNEs as 
alternatives to the statutory regulations. Not only business is supporting voluntarily 
regulations but also some governments29 and international organisations are in favour of 
the voluntarily regulationS. 30 
Even though the topic of voluntarily regulations is very popular, the nature of 
voluntarily regulations is not very clear because there is no single guide to CSRS.31 
Therefore, the reactions to the issues are very diverse; one argument is that it is just a 
public relations issue for huge MNEs; companies use CSRs as an advertisement tools to 
increase their profits. On the other side of the arguments, CSR is considered as a result 
of public pressure that in some cases voluntary codes force MNEs to behave in a lawful 
27 Davies, Gower and Davies' Principles p.185 (n 23) 
28 Dine, Companies, chapter 5 (n 2) 
29 DFID and Corporate Social Responsibility, the Government's Role: Legislation and Voluntary 
Initiatives, (DFID), (September 2003) p. 9 UK's department for International Development (DFID) says: 
"internationally legally binding frameworks for multinational enterprises may divert attention and energy 
from encouraging corporate social responsibility and towards legal process." Business groups and 
international institutions such as OECD also support self-regulation. Despite the UK's position that 
company behaviour is best deal with through voluntary approaches, past experience shown that it is not 
enough. 
30 For example, the British government is still a vocal supporter of voluntarism. The voluntary approach is 
widely endorsed by European governments as well. The UK government has appointed Stephen Timms 
(MP) as the minister for corporate social responsibility within the Department of Trade and Industry (OTI) 
his view is that the role of governments is to "work with the corporate sector to facilitate this type of 
involvement, rather than looking to regulatory measures or new law. His speech can be found at 
http://www.dti.gov.uklministerslarchived/Iimms131202.btml#related 
31 See Zerk JA, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2006) 
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manner and thus prevent much misbehaviour of MNEs in host countries. Although being 
highly promoted, it is a fact that the CSR has not been put to a real test yet.32 Since there 
are no binding or powerfully accepted uniform codes for the business. every M:\E 
claims their own codes and of course they report complete compliance with fantastic 
achievements. 
In the voluntary approach, companies are concerned with their own reputations. 
with the potential damage of public campaigns directed against them, and 
overwhelmingly, with the desire to secure ever-greater profits. None of this necessarily 
means that companies do not act responsibly. But it does mean that their attempts to do 
so likely to be partial, short term and inconsistent leaving vulnerable poor communities 
at risk. 33 For many companies, corporate social responsibility has become at best an 
advertisement exercise and at worst a tool for opposing regulation. But both also 
demonstrate the continued determination of the voluntary sector to make it work 
properly and their commitment to exposing its misuse.34 Simply, many companies have 
found that CSR has often had a positive impact on corporate profits. Of all the topics 
related to CSRs, so far, the greatest amount of experimental data links practical 
companies with positive financial results.35 
Accordingly, self-regulation fails to prevent continued abuses of corporate power. 
and thus corporate torts, for a number of reasons: 1- they do not provide strong 
incentives for compliance to balance the financial incentives for non-compliance-
because sanctions are missing or weak. 2- they rely on the appearance of compliance 
through self-regulation, without even independent confmnation or enforcement. 3- they 
fail to authorise citizens and stakeholders in the matter; instead, even where a 
3~ Mazurkiewicz P, 'Corporate Environmental Responsibility; Is a Common CSR Framework Possible:' 
http://www . worl dbank.org/developmentcomm unicationslPublications l csrframework.pdf, accessed 13 
January 2006 
J~ Christian Aid, Behind The Mask The Real Face Of Corporate Social Responsibility (Christian Aid, 
January 2004) http:,"\\'ww.christianaid.org.uklindepth i 0401 csr'csr behindthema<;k.pdf accessed 24 June 
2006 
~.j The Times (London 02 February 2004) 
.5 Mazurkiewicz. Corporate Environmental Responsibility, (n 32) 
"8-
- .) 
stakeholder discussion approaches is used, they present the Issue of corporate 
responsibility as top-down- as defined by the company.36 
From the perspective of this study, it can be claimed that arguments of \'oluntary 
regulations should not challenge or affect outcome of the present study. Actually. 
voluntary regulations and statutory regulations must co-exist. Successful voluntary 
regulations have the characteristic of preventing mass-misbehaviours by corporations 
because they establish standards for the industry, workers, and directors and so on. 
Consequently, CSRs or codes of conduct might reduce tortious action and tort claims 
against MNEs, which will make liability regulations much more applicable since the 
number of claims will be reduced and there will always be possibility to compare well-
behaving MNEs and tort committing MNEs. However. it should not be forgotten that the 
existence of CSRs will not eliminate tort since tort is a reality of life and in some cases it 
might happen in situations beyond the control of company or directors. Therefore. 
voluntary regulation and statutory regulations should not be considered as substitutes to 
each other; rather they should be evaluated as supporters of each other's applicability 
and efficiency. Therefore, the legal systems should still develop affective obligatory 
statutes and laws to create core principles and regulations for MNEs liability issues. 
Efforts ?f international organisations have also attracted many reactions either 
positive or negative. The OECD has published the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprise37 and OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004.38 The International 
Labour Organisation (lLO) adopted the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.39 Recently the UN has different working 
36 Towards Binding Corporate Accountability (FoEl pOSItIOn paper for the WSSD January 2002) 
http:h\'ww. foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/corporate accountability.pdf accessed 27 June 2006 
37 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise (2000) available at 
http:/.www.oecd.org/document•29/0.2340.en_2649_34889_2439005_1_1_1_1.00.html 
38 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) available at 
http:iwww.oecd.org/dataoecd'32/18 J 15 57724.pdf 
.~Q Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (ILO. 
N(l\(~mbl'r. 1977, revised November 2000) 
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groups and projects in the area of MNEs40 and the LJ1\ has produced ~onns on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human RightS.41 The aim of these attempts is to bring some harmonisations 
and clear general principles to MNEs activities. These attempts seem to promise creating 
awareness in the public to force companies to have more responsibility as a group. 
However, the outcomes of these regulations seem to be insufficient to abolish torts 
committed by MNEs. In order to stop the committing of further torts by MNEs. there 
should be efficient legal regulations that create full legal liability in a deterrent way.42 
In conclusion, the idea of codes of conduct and self-regulation for companies has 
no legal basis. It leaves everything to the wish of companies since it does not abandon 
using company law principles to avoid liability. That is one of the reasons MNEs 
support corporate CSRs as alternative to liability rules. However. the level of protection 
for tort victims cannot be provided by CSRs or codes of conduct. Thus, states should not 
risk the safety of their people by supporting MNEs' policies. 
As seen many of the alternative suggestions for liability offer solutions that are 
outside of the sphere of company law. These options mostly have limited applicability or 
are mostly applicable for voluntarily creditors since it requires assessments of conditions 
in advance. Thus, it can be stated that those alternative options are useful in practice for 
conducting business transactions between companies and creditors but they lack 
comprehensive principles to solve the problem of tort liability. Moreover, even the 
alternatives outside sphere of company law have problems with assessing the nature of 
corporate groups and MNEs as is apparent in the insurance or parent guarantee 
proposals. All are based on the corporate groups have been perceived as vertical 
organisations. 
40 Detailed data are available at http://www.un.orgipartners/businesslindex.asp accessed 23 August 2006 
~I UN. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Sub-Comm'n on Promotion & Prot. Of Human Rights. SomIs 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights. U.N. Doc E/CNASub.2.'2003/12IRev.2 (Aug.26. 2003) 
~~ Schutter 00, 'the Challenge of Imposing Human Rights Norms on Corporate Actors' in Schutter 00 
(ed.) Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Hart Publishing. Oxford 2006) 
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Future of MNE's Tort Liability 
In the previous chapters, the background knowledge and discussions have been built to 
be able to facilitate emergence of principles for the most efficient liability reaime for 
_ 0 
MNEs' torts. The previous discussion suggests the law is inadequate to solve the 
problems that corporate groups and MNEs create. Thus, current legal systems should 
take action to regulate tort liability of corporate groups and MNEs by elucidating the 
basic principles for liability regimes for corporate groups. As a result, the thesis next 
searches for answers to the question of which types of regulations are best suited to 
corporate groups and MNEs' liability problems. These discussions are made from 
different perspectives. 
The first principles to discuss must be the ground for liability (jurisdictional 
concerns). The jurisdiction for an effective liability regime (global, international, 
regional or national level) is important since globalisation of international economic 
activities has created new challenges for lawmakers. Domestic civil laws have failed to 
solve the problems or rather have become obstacles to solving some civil liability 
problems created by the activities of globalised civil actors. Therefore, in order to create 
efficient civil liability regimes, there must be a search for regulations valid at global 
level. However, this seems very difficult at the moment because of the economic 
differences and development inequalities amongst countries as well as differentiated 
roles of MNEs by creating huge disputes among countries according to their interests. 
This heterogenic structure of countries is an obstacle to reaching a global regime of civil 
liability, which proposes that consideration of regional or domestic regimes with more 
global effect will be more realistic. 
In regional concerns, the EU might offer some provincial regulatory schemes that 
guarantee civil liabilities of any parties who are exposed to a tort by a member of a 
group of companies. Efficient regimes in the EU might have external effect hy imposing 
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liability on EU based MNEs for their tort outside the ED. Moreover. if an EC member 
state were to introduce group liability for tort, the ECl's rulings in Daizv Mair: 
C 44 Ub" . 45 d 1 . A 46 47 ld h' . entros, erseerzng. an nspzre rt cases wou guarantee t at ClfcumventlOn 
of this regime by setting up a company in another member state might not be considered 
an abuse of the freedom of establishment regulated in the ED Treaty. 48 Thus. any 
possible introduction of liability at the EU level will prevent avoidance of the reoulator\' e _ 
competition amongst members to attract more companies to establish in their jurisdiction 
since regulatory competition is one of the biggest obstacles to introducing an accepted 
level of liability regimes in any particular country. Thus. the ideal regulation must be 
able to reduce the possible regulatory competition by designing regulations that are 
widely accepted. 
Moreover, the complexity of the area of MNEs liability also favour regulation 
based on standards to create better applicability. In this the EU can provide the most 
efficient regulation for corporate groups, since it focuses on creating standards-based 
law and leaving the role of improvements to member states. Accordingly. the EU must 
start a broader initiative than its current Action Plan on Modernising Company Law to 
reduce the severe affect of MNEs torts. Actually. the ED should start a new project on 
this matter either as part of the Action Plan or completely independent from it. 
It is useful at this level to mention the discussion of the nature of possible EU 
action; at the EU level there is a discussion in the case of unitary regulation as whether it 
must be obligatory for every state or states to be given a right to opt out from this 
regulation or some part of the regulation. The self-determination even by states is always 
supported by business organisations, which might create possible corporate heavens 
4 .. ECl Ca'\e 81187 of27 September 1988. ECR 1988.5483 
44 ECJ Case C-212/97 of9 March 1999. ECR 1999. 1-1459 
45 ECJ Case C-208/00 of 5 November 2002. ECR 2000, 1-9919 
oil' ECJ Case C-167/01 of30 September 2003. in: DB 2003. 2219 
4- See Andenas Mads. 'Free Movement of Companies' (2003) L.Q.R. 221 
4~ Berkamp Land Pak Wan-Q. 'Piercing the Corporate Veil: Shareholder Liability for Corporate Tons' 
(2001) 8 Maastricht J. Of European And Comparati\'e Law 167 
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similar to Delaware in the US. However. allowing this to happen would result in the 
emergence of regulatory competition, which any regulation should aim to avoid in the 
first place. Thus, the implementation of possible EU based laws should be compulsory 
for member states, at least so far as the basic principles are concerned. 
In the absence and failure of the global and regional regulatory efforts. national 
corporate laws as well might create the same effects especially in those countries in 
which MNEs are originated. The law of a certain nation state might grant jurisdiction 
rights for victims and might create a regime under which victims pursue their civil 
liability claims in equal ways to citizens of this particular country. Such law will be at 
domestic level but the influence will be at a global level since it will have the effect that 
civil liabilities against MNEs might be pursued in domestic courts as well as 
implementing liability clauses for other member corporations in the group. 
In pursuing the aim of creating the widest possible liability regime either at 
national or regional level, the basic principles of A TCA can be improved to make it an 
effective regime of tort liability. The basic nature of ATCA, which is creating civil 
liability for torts committed by the removal of jurisdiction barriers, must be kept but all 
the obstacles that restrict application of liability must be removed. First of all, the notion 
of civil liability must be not just sourced from international law but it must cover any 
tort liability raised against MNEs. The most dramatic aspects of A TCA, which is 
bringing the case even if the company has only a connection to the state, must be kept so 
victims can start their liability actions in any jurisdiction where a subsidiary of a group is 
based. Moreover, application ofJorum non conveniens must be abandoned as well as the 
application of veil piercing doctrine in corporate groups must be abandoned to make the 
rules more efficient. 
Accordingly, on the lack of global and regional liability regimes for MNEs. the 
minimum contact to jurisdiction principle introduced in ATCA litigations can be 
considered sufficient to eliminate the jurisdictional barriers to yictims 0 f MNEs tort. 
Under this principle. existences of subsidiaries provides a minimum contact in the forum 
and therefore create a jurisdiction over parent companies. or other companies in the 
group or on complete group. Thus. the system of minimum contact would work better if 
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it can be combined with widely accepted group liability. Accordingly, the system of 
creating jurisdiction based on minimum contacts is better suited to horizontal structures 
as well. On the lack of clear hierarchy in corporate groups, it is better to try to apply 
liability not only through parent companies but also through other entities in the group. 
After determining the jurisdiction to address the problems it is necessary to argue 
whether there should be protecting regulation for creditors or regulations should aim 
to facilitate operations of MNEs (Economic Concern vs. Justice). It is a fact that the 
efforts to create better liability regime for group of companies and MNEs have always 
been blocked by the consideration of economic wellbeing of society. There is a common 
belief in international economic studies that MNE operations in home or host countries 
are necessary for the economic benefit of people at any level of the society. Thus, the 
regulations of MNEs activities have mainly concentrated on facilitating their operations 
or opening up borders to these huge economic powers. Consequently, regulating efforts 
or tightening liability issues is kept at a minimum level. Accordingly, under the belief 
and policies shaped by modem capital economic theories, the protective regulations for 
corporate creditors against MNEs activities are constantly ignored by lawmakers in 
order not to deter MNEs investing in their territory. 
The difficulties appear in the understandings and characteristics of these regulatory 
approaches: the protective regulatory perspective and the organisational approach 
demonstrate specific features and are based on different standards. While the former is 
based on a view of the group as a hazardous institution, the latter regards corporate 
groups as an entrepreneurial reality, trying to provide them with safe guidelines for their 
operation and for the ongoing relations between the member entities and amongst their 
organs. Accordingly, together with the complex economic and managerial feature of the 
MNEs activities and lack of studies to combine these theories with risky feature of 
MNEs have caused the current deadlock in MNEs regulation. 
The law should come to more comprehensive proposals In order to balance 
economic need and the need for justice according to social economic analysis built into 
the preyious chapters. Both sides of the regulatory arguments have important concerns 
thus the legal system should not restrain economic or justice concern for the benefit of 
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the other. Some situations might require weighing in on the side of re!lUlation of grOUPS o ~ 
to facilitate their economic activities, while some situations require laws that are 
protecting creditors and victims. For the better and more contemporary regulation of 
corporate groups, modern law systems should take both approaches in equal measure 
and try to integrate them into the modern regulatory regime. 
Accordingly, the regulatory approach should consider this imbalanced situation 
while introducing new laws by imposing liability on MNEs. Moreover. the present study 
has indicated that imposing liability for subsidiaries' torts on MNEs would not result in 
the collapse of company groups or collapse of any national economy. In the area of 
MNEs liability, it has already been indicated that the prospective liability imposed on 
MNEs for their tort in home or host countries is not really unbalancing the economic 
developments of any nation because of the requirements of justice. In other words, being 
liable for their subsidiaries' tort will not substantially affect the economic existence of 
MNEs. 
This brings us to the discussion of differentiation amongst shareholders. In a 
situation that every solution suggestion to MNEs' tort liability problems has been 
somehow blocked by the limited liability principles, one should think that limited 
liability should be abandoned completely. Accordingly, the most extreme departure from 
current legal systems towards liability would be abandoning limited liability and 
introducing pro-rata shareholders liability for corporate torts or even creating a most 
dramatic departure by creating unlimited shareholders liability. It is claimed that, a rule 
of unlimited pro rata liability would protect the marketability of corporate shares without 
permitting shareholders to externalise the cost of corporate tortS.49 This proposal is 
aiming to abolish limited liability not only for in corporate shareholders but also for 
individual shareholders, thus it could not attract many supporters. 50 
4Q Hansman Hand Kraakman R. 'the Essential Role of Organisational Law' (2000) Yale LJ 387 
so Hansmann Henry and Kraakman Reiner. 'Do the Capital Markets Compel Limited Liability: A 
Response to Professor Grundfest' (1992-1993) 102 Yale L.J. 427. Hansmann Henry and Kraakrnan Reiner 
'Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts' (1990-1991) 100 Yale L.J. 1870. 
Hansmann Henry and Kraakman Reiner 'Procedural Focus on Unlimited Shareholder Liability' (1992-
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However, abandoning limited liability completely might have very diYerse effects 
on capital market economies. Even though. there is no empirical data to evaluate 
capital market economies without limited liability, it is obvious that drastically changing 
a core of the company laws might destroy the structures of modem enterprises. Thus. I 
believe that the time has not come for discussing complete abolition of limited liability. 
Even abolishing limited liability for tort victims would have many procedural and 
practical problems and seems very unlikely to be possible in the near future because it 
requires much more preparation and empirical testing. Moreover, for the title and 
purpose of this study it is not necessary to discuss this option very deeply at this stage 
since the aim pursued in this project is to establish liability for corporate groups' torts. 
Thus, I believe the concentration must be on eliminating liability problems in corporate 
groups, which could provide more empirical data to discuss further elimination of 
limited liability. 
In the process of liability discussions, given basic principles of common law, the 
discussion of the role of the courts in any regulatory approach will be unavoidable. 
Thus, there should be question whether the regulation should be statutory or case Law. 
Professor Lowry claims that any shortcomings in limited liability problems can be 
addressed by the courts being prepared to adopt a bolder and more principled approach 
to the issue of piercing the corporate veil, which would at least provide a necessary 
counter-balance against the abuse, which it is claimed Salomon has given rise to. 51 Thus, 
if the universal availability of limited liability does produce abuse, the appropriate 
solution may well lie with the courts rather than the creation of a new principles of 
liability. The principle that should guide the courts in determining whether or not to 
pierce the corporate veil should be firmly based upon notions of justice or more general 
1993) 106 HaT\,. L. Rev. 446, Grundfest Joseph A: 'limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital 
Markets Perspective' (1991-1993) 101 Yale LJ. 387 
51 Lowry John. 'In Defence of Salomon: Promoting The Corporate Veil' in Barry AK.. Rider and Mad.., 
Andenas (cds) Del'elopments in European Company Law. 1'012/1997: The Quest/or an Ideal Legal FornI 
(or Small Businesses (Kluwer Law International, London 1999) 
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equitable considerations. Only thus will the judges be able to strike the best possible 
balance between devotion to Salomon and the doctrine of limited liability. 52 
However, previous examination of the case law in England and comparati\'e 
examination in US case law prove that leaving liability problems to the courts will not 
create better results than veil piercing principles. This fact has already been stated in 
many incidents by courts by addressing the parliaments for fundamental changes. The 
problem in the case law is the lack of principles and a difficulty in changing their stand 
on limited liability and Salomon principles. In these conditions, it is difficult for courts 
to develop 'a very fundamental departure from old and settled practice without 
revolutionary interference from parliaments. The parliamentary effort would create basic 
of regulations to make MNEs liable since it is relatively easier to change the current 
situation by a statute than changing it by case law. However, the requirement of 
statutory interference does not mean courts would be inactive in creating and developing 
liability regimes for MNEs. The creative role of the courts is required at every stage of 
the practice and for further application of the rules to new and changing situations in the 
practical world. Therefore, any forthcoming reconsideration of a liability regime should 
consider both statutes and case law together. 
Deciding requirements of statutory intervention triggers another question as to 
whether there should be single or plural regulation. In strict terms, whether to have a 
single exclusive regulation or different ways of legally ordering corporate groups within 
the same legal system is indeed a question that needs to be addressed before the features 
of group regulation are dealt with. 53 The discussion conducted earlier in this thesis that 
the regulation of corporate groups has been made under different branches of law and 
this creates some problems for those who expect some kind of harmony and 
predictability in law of a particular matter. On the other hand, there is a discussion that 
corporate groups are of interest not only to company law but a very broad range of laws 
spread through other branches of law such as competition, tort, labour or insolvency. 
5:! Lowry. In Defence of Salomon. (n 51) 
" Irujo Jose Miguel Embid. 'Trends and Realities in the Law of Corporate Groups' (2005) 6 EBOLR 65 
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Therefore it is claimed that it will be necessary for other branches of law to have 
provisions and principles related to corporate groups from their own perspective. 
For the purpose and the aim of this thesis, giving some credit to opposite ideas, 
groups of companies must be regulated under a single law, but it should consider the 
dynamics of the other branches of law. There is a need for a group of companies' 
regulation covering MNEs but this law should not be initiated just from the basics of 
company law: rather it should possibly consider and take into account experience and 
principles that have been created under other branches of laws examined in the previous 
chapters. Corporate groups' law must be comprehensive enough not to require other 
branches of laws to search for further liability clauses. For example. it must cover and 
thus offer solutions to the problems of jurisdiction so that there will not be a time-
consuming battle to establish jurisdiction on MNEs. The lawmakers should examine 
how different characteristics of tort, labour, and competition, environments, and human 
rights laws might give impact in MNEs and group of companies and company laws. 
Doing so will enrich the basics of MNEs liability laws so that the law will be long-
lasting and well equipped in creating more justifiable solutions. 
In order to achieve this aim, we should look for an answer to question of whether 
there should be company law or corporate groups' law or MNEs law. For practical 
purposes or more importantly for the life of durable regulations of MNEs, the legal 
regimes should decide whether there should be a new corporate groups law covering 
MNEs or the law-makers should still regulate group of companies' law under company 
law. One side of the argument is that there is no need to regulate corporate groups under 
different principles since they consist of independent companies operating together, but 
on the other hand, the examination of groups of companies and MNEs as social and 
economic institution in this thesis indicates some different institutional characteristics 
for MNEs. Under those conditions, the law should create its own applicable principles to 
MNEs because the basic principles of company law have failed to regulate MNEs and 
thus failed to prevent the unjustifiable situation in tort claims. Accordingly, the best wa) 
to regulate corporate groups must be generating regulation that determines the basic 
requirements and principles of corporate groups as new institutions. This law must 
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create basic principles of corporate groups including liability issues. Moreo\-er. this new 
regulation must be innovative relying on its own theories rather than borrowing theories 
from company law. 
After determination of the requirement for a single regulation, there should be a 
discussion whether the law should be standards-based or detailed regulation. The 
issue simply is whether regulation must be expressed through a number of general 
standards or a detailed set of legal rules. From the viewpoint of common law systems, 
the options are either standards-based regulations or detailed regulation. 54 Actually. case 
law based characteristics of the common law support regulation on principles. In other 
words, if there is a necessity for regulation it will support standard based regulation 
rather than rule based regulation. However, from the perspective of the discussion in the 
previous chapters, the standard based regulation seems more logical and efficient. Thus. 
it would not be advisable to undertake a detailed regulation aimed at forecasting 
problems caused by diverse corporate entities in a group. 55 Thus, the need to encompass 
all general situations requires supporting standard based regulatory approaches. 
The principal discussion carried out in this thesis related to managerial structure of 
companies and also points out more general and standard based regulations. 
Accordingly, the dynamic characteristics of modern enterprises with a complex 
horizontal structure might make detailed regulations inefficient. The laws that have very 
rigid detailed regulations and principles might create unexpected results such as 
Salomon ruling did in corporate groups' context. Thus, rather than trying to regulate any 
details based on one single understandings of a corporate groups, the focus should be on 
creating a regime that is suited to the complexity of groups and thus, flexible in 
application. 
It can be claimed that the Forum Europaeum proposal and the recent EU Action 
Plan are in favour of standards-based regulation. According to the general policy of the 
:\-llrujo, Trends and Realities. (n 53) 
55 Irujo. Trends and Realities. (n 53) 
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Union, during the period of attempts of regulations, the European Union seemed to 
prefer a corporate group law based on the formulation of major standards. leaying 
specific aspects relating to the formation and operation of corporate groups to the 
member states or, where applicable, to self-regulation.56 However. the other side of the 
argument claims that exposing groups of companies to different legal requirements or a 
differentiated extent of liability according to the laws of the individual member states 
only complicates and endangers the rights of all creditors at the European level. The fear 
always exists that regulation based on just standards for corporate groups might put 
regulations in jeopardy and there would be complex and differentiated regulatory 
systems in every member states for MNEs. 
However, at a regional level, the lack of international aspects in company law: 
sovereign and local characteristics of the law support standard based regulations while 
leaving the details of rules to national states. On the other hand, one can claim that since 
MNEs and institutions have very similar characteristics and structures. the regulations 
should support detailed liability rules being applicable in all jurisdictions. In conclusion, 
the issue must be considered in accordance with the level of the regulation; there must 
be standard based regulations if regulations are at regional or international level. 
However. there must be more detailed regulations if regulatory effort is at national level. 
In other words, standard and rule based regulations might exist jointly: the efforts to 
regulate corporate groups must be built considering the different characteristics of legal 
systems. Therefore. there must be principle-creating regulations at global level: standard 
based regulation at regional level and rule based regulation at national level so that the 
conflict of principles of liability will be avoided. 
The discussion of standard or rule based regulation reflects another challenge 
whether establishing regulation as situation or process (static or dynamic 
regulation). The discussion carried out on this thesis is that the corporate groups are 
changing and thus they must be regulated with specific concern to this reality. 
Accordingly. MNEs are under a changing process resulting from basic structural 
5~ lrujo. Trends and Realities. (n 53) 
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principles of capitalist economies and pressure of maximising profits. Thus. regulatory 
efforts should consider those processes and it should have impact on the future of 
corporate group law. If lawmakers regulate MNEs as static institutions, the new law 
regime would be struggling to solve problems the next generation of MNEs will create. 
The law systems have already made a mistake by considering companies as 
standstill institutions and kept the same structure and principles of company law for 
decades. The laws and principles have been established considering corporate groups as 
simple structured institution with quite clear separation between parent and subsidiaries 
and amongst subsidiaries. This mistake of considering corporate groups as simple 
organisations has resulted in very complex and inefficient legal regime of liability for 
group of companies. Moreover, considering groups as static institutions is one of the 
reasons that prevent possible developments since it is very difficult to change legal rules 
once the rules have been settled. For example, the mistake made while applying limited 
liability to corporate groups prevents changes of limited liability rules in modern 
company laws; even in very specific circumstances it requires very detailed discussions 
and burdensome efforts. Moreover, concentrating on a static situation in law making 
demolishes the possibility to produce empirical data for alternative regulations. 
Regulations of corporate groups should thus not focus completely on the principles 
considering the group as a mere static situation since formation of corporate groups 
require that all references to different approaches must not be ruled out. Therefore, 
understanding groups as a process allows us to have necessary flexibility. The difference 
with the static standards is therefore that the economic and legal processes that lead to 
such a situation are also included in regulation thus giving it better chance of adoption in 
economic and legal life. 57 Therefore, the regulatory efforts should focus on the basics of 
MNEs characteristics and should try to cover many situations including the current 
structure of the MNEs. It also should consider future developments by aiming to have 
influence in shaping the future of the MNEs structure. 
5' lrujo, Trends and Realities. (n 53) 
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The next step in discussions of the future of MNEs tort liability must be search for 
answer to how MNEs should be personalised in law. First, there should be discussion 
of regulations from the perspective of whether regulations should be based on the 
concept of groups of companies or a concept of MNE. One of the interesting aspects of 
the recent attempts in regulatory efforts of corporate groups' liability is concentration on 
the concept of corporate groups. This situation creates the problem of separation 
between a group of companies and MNEs. Right from its most basic principles, 
corporate group law certainly reveals an institutional concern despite the group' s lack of 
a corporate personality. 58 Accordingly, groups of companies have attracted some 
regulatory efforts in national jurisdiction but when attempts are made to extend these 
regulatory efforts to MNEs, more problems arise because of the jurisdictional limits of 
the regulations or reluctance of lawmakers to apply the same laws to groups of 
companies outside of national borders. Moreover. there are number of characteristics 
and institutional differences between group of companies and MNEs. As a result these 
differences between groups of companies and MNEs might affect the outcomes of any 
legal regulation aiming to create justifiable liability for MNEs since any effort has to 
consider special characteristic differences of MNEs. 
For these reasons, the problem of MNEs' personality must be clarified. 
Accordingly, one of the most important arguments in this area is whether MNEs are 
recognised as international legal personalities or they are still considered a group of 
independent companies operating together under common management. To be able to 
discuss the possibility of attributing legal personality to MNEs. one should begin with 
clarifying the legal situation of groups of companies. No legal system grants legal 
personality to groups of companies, rather the national laws impose some liabilities and 
responsibilities on parent companies while maintaining the separate legal personality of 
member companies. In an application of the situation of a group of companies' law to 
MN Es, it is undisputable that MNEs are not recognised as international legal 
personalities: international law does not grant them a privileged international legal 
58 lrujo. Trends and Realities. (n 53) 
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personality status. Public international law is only implemented in their regard through 
state action. so that they continue to be subject only to domestic law of states. 
In this discussion, logically, it is not appropriate to change the situation of ~'Es 
personality by attributing an international legal personality status to l\~Es. because 
their direct participation in the process of creating legal norms applicable to them and 
their access to mechanism for the application of international law could be at the 
expense of certain values and essential principles of international law, in yiew of their 
discretional function in the economic sphere. 59 In other words, the legal world has to 
consider their huge economic and political influence on the governance of national states 
and the world economy since granting MNEs with legal personality is like equipping 
them with most powerful weapons in a war. 
Accordingly, under no situation should international law be applied when 
contracting with MNEs and it is unacceptable that a contract should provide for the 
application of such law, because it would mean that national law is being disregarded 
and it accepts the ambition of MNEs to evade state control. In order for MNEs to be held 
accountable for their actions, it is not necessary to give them an international legal 
status, because national legislation might contain provisions, which are applicable to all 
companies under the group, and there are treaties between states to deal with conflicts of 
laws and enforcement issues. Any means of liability can be imposed on MNEs without 
considering them as legal persons in international law. In conclusion, either regional 
law, such as EU law, or domestic laws are capable of imposing liability without further 
recognition of groups of companies and MNEs as legal persons. The enforcement of 
laws on groups has already been common practice for tax and group accounting 
purposes. Therefore, it is very possible to manage similar enforcement in terms of tort 
liability. 
Clarifying legal personality, the next stage of discussion must be models of 
liability imposed on different personalities (group liability, parent liability, and 
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subsidiary liability, (Entity v. Enterprises). There have always been some discussions 
about models of liability on corporate groups. Models for regulations have varied: some 
pointed to parent companies to be held liable for subsidiary's tort, and some support the 
subsidiary liability together with some obligations on the parent. The broadest one was 
an attempt to create an enterprise theory under which all the assets of the group are 
combined. The recent attempts usually concentrate on aggregation of assets in corporate 
groups since the corporations' law already requires this to be done for accounting 
purposes. This would seem to provide creditors and other interested parties with 
information that would allow such persons to make an informed assessment of the 
creditworthiness of a related group of companies. 60 
Liability for parent companies, fmding its justification for allowing creditors to 
reach the assets of parent corporations, does not create unlimited liability for any MNE. 
Thus the benefits of diversification, liquidity, and monitoring by the capital market are 
unaffected. Moreover, the moral-hazard problem is probably greater in parent-subsidiary 
situations because subsidiaries have less incentive to insure creditor protection,61 
However, liability aiming at parent companies have many weak points since they can 
escape liability by proving their non-involvement in control of the subsidiary since the 
liability attributed for their control over subsidiaries. Thus, the concentration on parent 
company for liability does not create solutions under the current organisational 
structure, which is always more complicated than the one described or presumed by the 
court or lawmakers. 
In case of the group liability concept, this perception is not very different from 
parent corporation liability since in cases or statutes the liability is mostly directed to the 
parent and parent mostly has mere duties imposed on the limit of separation between 
subsidiary and the parent. Therefore. interestingly, any term of group liability used in 
5Q The Acti\'ities Of Transnational Corporations: The Need For A Legal Framework (Geneva, July 2001) 
http://attac ,arg. u k. attacidocumentltransnational s- legal-framework.pdt:docu mentID=41 
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Ltd. \' Schroders Australia Ltd.' (1991) 19 ABLR 211 
61 Easterbrook and Fischel, the Economic Struclllre p, 57 (n 21) 
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statutes or case law or even by scholars do not exactly mean group liability but rather 
they refer to parent liability. 
This lack of group liability concept or failure to distinguish differences between 
parent liability and group liability has affected the emergence of the concept of 
enterprise entity doctrine. The doctrine differs from existing concepts of group 
liability in that it replaces an approach based on exceptions to the otherwise unbreakable 
corporate separation between the parent and subsidiary (whether through the lifting of 
the corporate veil or through specialized group liability laws) with one that presumes 
parent company liability from the fact of economic integration between itself and the 
subsidiary.62 This recognises the corporate group as a distinct form of business 
association, thereby opening the way for the evaluation of a specialized legal regime 
going beyond the model of the single unit limited liability joint stock company. Thus, 
the concepts of enterprise liability may offer a solution, especially in the case of mass 
torts, but its extent and limitations remain to be explored.63 The closest example to 
enterprise theory can be found in the Amoco Cadiz case but as already mentioned at case 
was exceptional and never created a better doctrine in the common law case law. 
Therefore, a broader conception of groups as an enterprise has not prevented criticism of 
the enterprise theory. For example, an enterprise entity approach has been criticised for 
being too hierarchical since it aims again basically at parents for imposing liability 
ignoring the current developments in corporate group structure. 64 In this sense the 
enterprise theory does not offer a practical radical solution to corporate group liability 
but it offers a better ground for veil lifting. The examination of enterprise theory proves 
as well that corporate groups have been considered vertical organisations and thus the 
corporate veil is always considered as clearly existing and thus should be lifted since 
separation amongst the entities is still the basic of the theory. Accordingly. liability 
could be avoided by proving there is no jeopardizing corporate veil between entities. 
6~ Muchlinski P. Multinational Enterprises and the Law (BlackwelL Oxford 1999) p. 3:28 
63 Nygh. The Liability. (n 11) 
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Thus, enterprise liability on those conditions tum to be veil-piercing law in corporate 
groups with a more appealing name. 
The major problem underlying the evaluation of an enterprise entity approach to 
group liability rests in identifying the existence of such a business association. This 
requires the use of economic theories of corporate integration so as to develop a clearer 
concept of the group under which the parent can be said to control its subsidiaries for the 
purpose of liability. Thus, the outcome of any claim based on the enterprise theory 
depends on an interpretation of evidence that reveals a more complex structure than the 
theory suggests. Therefore, the enterprise theory has not developed in connection with 
reality but developed on the same belief of the parent and subsidiary divisions and belief 
of the parent's control over subsidiaries. It still contains many obstacles since it requires 
examination of structure of the enterprise to prove that the enterprise is operating in 
. d 65 mtegrate ways. 
Accordingly, on the issue of comparison of entity and enterprise theories in group 
liability concept, one will see that the developments of enterprise approach or parent 
liability approach through veil-piercing judgment is not really a huge departure from 
Salomon's entity law principles. The separation between entities and the liability is 
based not on ownership or not derived from the economic realities but it is developed 
from tort law under which control and involvement of the parent is searched for to 
impose liability for their acts. 
In order to solve the deadlock created by these theories, the discussion must 
concentrate on why corporate groups must be liable (liabili~' based on ownership and 
business organisation or control: demise of control theory). It is inevitable that in any 
case of liability regime there must be a basic justification~ in order to create the theory 
for the future of liability issues relating to MNEs, the legal systems should base their 
justification on certain theories. Thus principles for liability are very important question 
to consider on the aim to achieve justifiable regulation for MNEs torts. On the earlier 
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and existing regulations and application of liability in corporate groups, the emphasis 
has been on the control theory, under which there is a search for excessive control of 
one entity over another in order to impose liability to controller. On the absence of this 
excessive control, the controller entity might escape liability even though it owns all the 
shares in the controlled entity. In these circumstances, there is an unfair situation that the 
owner of the shares might escape liability even though they collect all the benefits of 
subsidiary's success. 
The level of required control or practical approaches to prove the control has been 
varied in the past in regulation and case law. In the first introduction of control theory. 
there was liability only in clear fraudulent use of control over a subsidiary. When this 
was not enough, the required level of control was reduced or burden of proof was shifted 
from claimants to the company itself (supposed control) but there has been no shift from 
the requirements of control in corporate groups to make one entity liable for others acts. 
However as it was already mentioned in qualified de-facto groups in German law or 
assumed control in EU competition cases, even the presumption of control is always 
rebuttable. Moreover, under the complex horizontal structure of MNEs, it is not difficult 
for a parent company to submit conclusive evidence of proof that the subsidiary was 
independent and was making its own decision since the modem structure of MNEs 
suggests that subsidiaries are not only becoming more independent in their own 
decision-making but also becoming more dependant on principles of decision making. 
Accordingly, there is a situation under which a day-to-day involvement in subsidiaries 
decision-making is not common practice but there is a consistent application of cultural 
control in MNEs. Therefore, establishing liability on the basis of control is very difficult 
and more likely to be effective in single member companies and small-scale domestic 
corporate groups. 
These changing characteristics of decision-making and control with horizontal 
structure should force lawmakers to think of better functioning theories for liability in 
6S Teubner G. 'Unitas Multiplex: Corporate Governance In Group Enterprises' in Sugannan D and 
Teubner G (eds.) Regulating Corporate Groups in Europe (Nomos. Baden-Baden 1990) 
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MNEs' tort. In the failure of excessive control theory. we should divert our attention to 
liability based on principles of ownership and business organisation. These principles 
should be considered together with social, economic and managerial structure of the 
MNEs. 
Of course broad examination of ownership theory might lead us to a complete 
removal of limited liability. However, bringing these theories with the justification 
theories for existence of limited liability and differentiation between individual 
shareholders and company shareholders, removal of limited liability for corporate 
shareholders might be justified. As a result, it will be more efficient to create liability on 
corporate groups not by their control over their subsidiaries but common ownership of 
the enterprise as a group through separate legal entities. By doing this, the burden of 
proof in control theory will be removed so that strict requirements of factual 
examination of the relationship between the parent and the subsidiary will be eliminated. 
Together with this positive development, the law should consider every company under 
the group as part of business organisation and thus liable for any tort other entities of the 
business organisation has committed. The system of liability based on ownership and 
business organisation will be based on removal of limited liability for purpose of 
creating effective liability for tort victims similar to allowing corporate groups to apply 
group relief for the losses made by subsidiaries: the Ee] allowed Marks & Spencer Pic 
as parent company to reduce the loss made by its European subsidiaries from its 
profits.66 Applying the same logic to tort creditors, parent companies or other subsidiary 
companies under a group should be held liable for the tort actions of any subsidiary. 
Accordingly, any country that a subsidiary of MNEs is established in will have 
jurisdiction over all components of MNEs through the subsidiary established in that 
country. This can in a sense create a subsidiary-to-subsidiary liability. which means 
liability for a subsidiaries tort not only on parent but also on other subsidiaries in a 
group. Basically, there will be group liability for the torts committed by subsidiaries but 
M ECJ Grand Chamber: Marks & Spencer pic v David HalsC)' (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes). (C-
446/03) 
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since the group has no legal personality, this liability is imposed on legal personalities in 
the groups. Accordingly, the liability can be imposed on parent or other subsidiaries. 
As a result, efforts must concentrate on a comprehensive liability regime that is 
built by taking into consideration the problems in historical deyelopments in the area and 
taking modem interdisciplinary realities of MNEs into account. Therefore, in principle, 
imposing liability on business organisation principles together with ownership theory 
while considering managerial structure of the modem enterprise (liability on entities 
without necessarily involving the parent) is attractive. 67 
The new liability regimes must be based on creative theories that are wide enough 
to solve current and future problems. Therefore, considering MNEs as non-veil 
enterprises in tort liability is very appealing. For the better and most efficient liability 
regimes, the corporate groups should be considered as an enterprise with no veil 
amongst entities: for the issues relating to liability and the corporate veil must be kept in 
the extent of necessity for practical economical functions. In this way there will be a 
balance between economic requirements of modem global capitalism and requirements 
of justice. The victims of MNEs torts must be able choose the entity against which they 
want to bring their cases. The judgment of the tort must be made on behalf of the 
business organisation so the organisation must be held liable through the personality of 
the entity that the case has been brought against. In this system, the liability of parent or 
other entities will not just cover compensation but there will be direct enterprise liability 
for the tort action. Attributing direct liability to enterprise itself by making entities under 
an enterprise to face civil liability action will also remove jurisdictional barriers. The 
proposed liability regime is indicated by the figure below. 
/l~ Muchlinski Peter, Mliltinational Enterprises and the Law ( OUP. Oxford, 2007) p. ~24 
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Figure 9: Liability Based On Organisational Structure 
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLVSIO~ 
Finding solutions to MNEs tort liability problems will start by questioning social-
economic roles of MNEs in modem capital industries and will lead to the question how 
ready modem law regimes are to change some basics of modem capital economic 
principles. In other words, the fundamental issue in the regulation of corporate groups 
and MNEs is to which level market economies are willing and able to move beyond the 
traditional models of the company to one contemporary justified model of MNEs. Thus. 
implementation of broader liability is as well a problem of political choice as legal 
problem. 
Consequently political obstacles must be overcome by creating alternative 
movements to current standings. The current' thesis deals with political issues by 
illustrating the injustice created by the current system of liability even though none of 
them yet have been able to create a notable influence on a political stance on liability 
issues. The author believes that the issues will come to the political agenda eventually. It 
is predicted that public pressure on politicians will reach to a level to force them to 
introduce fair liability regime for MNEs. Accordingly, the proposed solutions to 
problem of MNEs tort liability should be comprehensive enough to overcome not only 
today's practical challenges but also create a future for the MNEs liability regulation. 
The present thesis indicates that the problems are not impossible to solve and alternative 
regimes are readily available with some compromise. The current groups of companies' 
regimes ignore most important characteristics of MNEs. for this reason they mostly fail 
to satisfy requirements of justice in social justice theory. However, there is no such a 
thing as creating a new legal system from nothing. Thus, the new legal structure must be 
created by examining past efforts, either successful or unsuccessful, with the aim of 
improving the ideas or developing better principles. This thesis, in this sense. has 
indicated suggestions for alternative solutions. 
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